THE COLD WAR isn’t over for Anatoly Golitsyn. Since last summer’s failed coup in Moscow, he has been churning out memos for the CIA, warning them of what he regards as the true import of the tumultuous events taking place in the former Soviet Union. It is all “pretense,” he says—an elaborate exercise in strategic deception, designed to gull the West into embracing what is still an evil empire, still run behind the scenes by communist ideologues. Mikhail Gorbachev is in on the scheme. And so, too, says Golitsyn, is Boris Yeltsin. “At the end, when they win,” Golitsyn declares, “they [will] get rid of capitalists forever.”

Golitsyn, you may remember, is the KGB defector whose assertions about Soviet moles at Langley once threw the CIA into a turmoil. The great mole hunt, actively pursued by the late CIA counterintelligence chief James J. Angleton, Golitsyn’s indefatigable sponsor, lasted more than a decade, but never unearthed a single mole at the agency. According to the recently published “Cold Warrior” by Toni Mangold, a detailed study of Angleton’s work, Golitsyn was actually a “minor and undistinguished KGB officer” whose paranoid finger-pointing ruined the careers of many of the CIA’s finest officers and blackened the credentials of genuine Soviet defectors who threatened his standing.

Since he was not quoted in the book, I asked to see him to get his side of the story. For only the second time since his defection almost 30 years ago, (he sat down with New York Times columnist William Safire recently) he consented to an interview—but only to discuss...

See GOLITSYN, C4, Col. 1

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The Ultimate Red Plot

By GOLITSYN, From CL

the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. He wants to save his side of the
counterintelligence wars until later, perhaps for his memoirs.

A man who has long portrayed the

West as putty in Moscow's hands, today Golitsyn, you might think, would be
blushing shamefacedly in light of the failed
August coup in Moscow and the quickening
dissolution of the Soviet empire.

Not so. There wasn't a trace of embar-

rassment on his ruddy face. A chat with

Anatoly Golitsyn is like a plunge into another
dimension where everything is turned
upside down or inside out, a universe where
all sorts of strange things can happen. If
anything seems real in this odd place, Golit-
syn will assure you, that is not because he is
fantasizing but because the West is so blind.

"Soviet-style democracy is cuckoo-clock
democracy," he said. "The present Soviet-
Western cooperation is only temporary.

They will successfully rebuild. Then they
will turn on the hated capitalists and a new
holocaust will result, based on class, not
race. The principal victim will be the West-
ern political, military, religious and manag-
erial elite.

Even more startling is Golitsyn's claim
that the seeming chaos in the Soviet Union
is the result of a KGB plot cooked up back
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, just be-
fore Golitsyn detected. Then-KGB Chair-
man Alexander Shelepin, Golitsyn says, laid
down the plan—a long-range, systematic
program of "strategic disinformation"—at a
May 1959 Moscow conference attended by
some 2,000 KGB officers.

From that, all sorts of deceptions flowed.
One, says Golitsyn, was the split between
the Soviets and China, which he contends
was faked to trick the West into thinking the
monolithic communist world had been
shattered. Another, he claims, was creation
of a fake dissident movement in the Soviet
Union, led by Andrei Sakharov, who, until
his death in 1989, Golitsyn maintains, was
"a major KGB agent of influence . . . a
knowing agent."

Sakharov? The Soviet Union's most per-
sistent campaigner for human rights? The
political outcast hounded by the state for his
liberal views and sent into internal exile?
The Nobel laureate who called more than
20 years ago for peaceful cooperation with
the West and the internal transformation of
the Soviet Union into a democracy?

Yes, Sakharov, Golitsyn said firmly. "It is
inconceivable," Golitsyn wrote in a 1984
book called "New Lies for Old," that "if [Sa-
karov] were seriously at odds with the re-
gime and therefore a security risk, he would
have been given the opportunities he has
had to maintain contact with Western friends and colleagues." Sakharov's "so-
called exile," Golitsyn claims now, was sim-
ply a KGB device to build up his credibility
and increase his influence with the West.

If that sounds plausible, it should be easy
to see, Golitsyn suggests, that the demo-
cratic trends in the Soviet empire are the
KGB's idea, not Sakharov's. Perestroika is
simply a plot, cooked up decades ago to
overcome the West by pretending to be-
come more like it.

Fortunately for capitalism, Golitsyn was
present at the creation of this intricate
scheme, back in 1959-60 when no one in
Western intelligence was looking and when,
by Golitsyn's account, all was set in bedrock
for the rest of the century. He faults West-
ern intelligence agencies for not knowing of
all this until he arrived to enlighten them.

Golitsyn added ominously that any KGB
defector or source who described the 1959
KGB conference and Shelepin's report as
"routine" should be viewed with "serious
doubt." Anyone who disagreed with him, in
short, should be suspected as a fake himself.

There is little in Golitsyn's past that
signals such omniscience. He was born in a
small Ukrainian village near
Poltava on Aug. 25, 1926. He does not like
to be called a Ukrainian. He stresses that
his parents brought him to Moscow when
he was seven. "I am Russian by culture and
education," he said.

In Moscow, Golitsyn joined the Commu-
nist youth movement (Komsomol) at age
15, while a cadet in military school, and won
a medal digging anti-tank ditches to help de-
defend the city against the Nazis. In 1945, he
entered military counterintelligence school
and shortly after graduation the next year,
joined the Soviet intelligence service. He
did an undercover stint in Vienna in 1953-
54, but many of his years at the KGB were
spent as a student, in High Intelligence
School, in High Diplomatic School and at
the KGB Institute where he spent four
years (1955-59) earning a law degree.

After his defection, he told CIA officials
that disillusionment began to set in when the
Soviets invaded Hungary in 1956 and
that once he decided to defect, he began to
collect and memorize what he thought
might be useful to the West, including the
purported text of Shelepin's remarks. He
claims in his 1984 book it was Shelepin's re-
port, signifying the adoption of a "new, ag-
gerassive long-range communist policy" that
precipitated Golitsyn's decision to break
with the regime.

Sent to Finland as vice consul for the So-
viet embassy there, KGB Maj. Golitsyn
turned up with his wife and daughter on the
doorstep of the U. S. ambassador, Frank
Friberg, on Dec. 15, 1961. Heartily sup-
ported by Angleton, Golitsyn brought havoc
to the CIA, and the British and French in-
telligence services, for more than a decade.

Mangold reported that Golitsyn was giv-
en unprecedented access to secret files,
which Golitsyn used to charge, on the film-
siest of indicators, that numerous intelli-
gencc officials, Soviet defectors and West-
ern politicians were tools of the KGB. Ac-
cording to Mangold, it made no difference
that shortly after the defection, the chief
psychologist of the CIA's clandestine ser-
vice found that Golitsyn was suffering from
a form of paranoia and had a tendency to ex-
aggerate. Mangold writes that Angleton
told a secret congressional hearing in 1978
that the psychologist's assertions were the
product of "imprecision and unprofession-
alisn."

The reign of terror lasted more than a
decade, until Angleton was finally fired by
then-CIA director William Colby in 1974.

"It really wasn't Anatoly's fault," one CIA
Golitsyn, an affable, burly man with thick eyebrows and a pepper-and-salt beard, kept slugging. And on paper, some of his predictions seem remarkable.

For example, in a memo to the director of Central Intelligence, dated Jan. 15, 1978, titled "The Long-Range Political Objectives and Intentions of the Soviet Leaders," Golitsyn asserted that among the goals "Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the 'dissident movement'" were:

"The introduction of economic reforms . . . an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party . . . an increased role for the Soviet parliament, reform of the KGB and amnesty for 'dissidents,' greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel . . . the emergence of a younger party leader to initiate the reforms . . . similar reforms in Eastern Europe including . . . perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall."

So far, not bad. But then Golitsyn added:

"The liberalization, however, will be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO, dismantling the 'U.S. military-industrial complex' . . . [It] will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown out of all proportion by the media . . . It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies."

Sniffed one former senior CIA official:

"When the Berlin Wall went down, he claimed he was the only one who predicted it. That's nonsense. And it went down for reasons totally different from what he had in mind."

People like [Alexander] Yakovlev [a top political adviser to Gorbachev] and [Georgi] Arbatov [director of the USA-Canada Institute]."

By this standard, of course, the failed coup was a fake coup, staged to make it seem that the good guys won and to get the West to open its pockets. Even the siege of the Russian parliament building and the defiant holdout of Russian President Boris Yeltsin were parts of the show.

"The word goes out," Golitsyn said with a shrug. "Yeltsin will do this. Crowds will do that. The KGB will do this and that."

As evidence that the CIA still thinks highly of his work, Golitsyn displayed a photograph of the medal the agency awarded him a few years ago, on then-CIA director William H. Webster's watch. It is the Distinguished Intelligence Medal, the highest honor the CIA can bestow for outstanding service. Then-CIA counterintelligence chief Gardner Hathaway awarded it to Golitsyn in 1987, four months after Angleton's death.

CIA spokesman Peter Earnest said: "On Sept. 21, 1987, the agency awarded Mr. Golitsyn a medal for his many years of diligent service. Although we cannot disclose its title . . . the award was considered appropriate recognition by those assessing Mr. Golitsyn's contribution at the time."

One CIA insider predicted sharp criticism within the agency at the disclosure of Golitsyn's award in light of the ruined careers he left in his wake. Several sources described it as a consolation prize. One said Angleton years ago promised Golitsyn "national recognition" if they ever found the mole they were looking for. Other sources said Golitsyn felt he deserved a Medal of Freedom from President Reagan and that Hathaway gave him the CIA honor "to get him off our back."

Still drawing what he describes as sort of a "pension" from the agency, Golitsyn is starting to draw rapt attention from far right circles. But his outlines of the Soviet end-game remain a bit puzzling. The aim, he said, is "convergence" with the West in a world government. There, Golitsyn said, "the communists will be advantaged because they are more skillful politically."

Their goal, he warned, will be nothing less than "a classless society," achieved by parliamentary means.

At the same time, he kept predicting "a bloodbath" for recalcitrant capitalists. But he never explained why the communists would resort to bloodshed when they will be winning all the votes. Come the revolution, it may all become clear.