

CIA Analysts Continue Drumbeat of Criticism

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Sen. David L. Boren (D-Okla.), chairman of the intelligence committee holding confirmation hearings on Robert M. Gates to be the new CIA chief, observed yesterday that the American public finally is getting its first glimpse at how the intelligence community works and is finding that in many ways "the CIA is not one agency but two."

He was referring to the focus this week not on the CIA's covert operations branch which has been the source of scandal in the past, but on the agency's intelligence directorate from which Gates comes and which generates for policymakers normally secret analysis of world events.

This community of analysts has labored in relative obscurity, sifting through reams of classified documents and computerized data and trying to make sense of it all. In riveting testimony yesterday that echoed earlier accounts by two other former analysts, Jennifer Gaudemans condemned Gates for politicizing that process, for intimidating those who disagreed with him and for creating a "culture of fear and cynicism among front-line analysts."

"Many analysts out at Langley [CIA headquarters] are pleading, and pleading largely to you, to set a higher standard of excellence and integrity," Gaudemans told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The criticism from the analysts comes after the panel has concentrated its efforts on examining Gates's relations with the operations side of the agency, some of whose members have been implicated in the coverup of the Iran-contra affair. Now, the committee appears to be trying to determine how widespread the problem is in the analytical side, and how much can be blamed on Gates.

Gaudemans and the two other witnesses who have testified against Gates say his actions "poisoned the atmosphere principally in the division responsible for Soviet analysis, which includes some 300 or so analysts of 2,000 to 3,000 at the agency."

The intelligence committee has interviewed about two dozen other analysts, collecting statements and documents that are said to corroborate reports of serious morale problems under Gates, who headed the intelligence directorate from 1982 to 1986 and served as the CIA's second-in-command from 1986 to 1989.

There have been several references in public testimony about unreleased CIA inspector general reports on the issue, and each of the witnesses this week told of receiving calls from other analysts who praised them for going public and agreed with their criticisms, but felt they could not come forward.

The three analysts who have come forward span three generations at the agency but agree on what their mission was: to call

things as they saw them for policymakers and "not to please them or cater to their preconceptions," as veteran intelligence analyst Harold P. Ford put it.

Ford, 70, joined the CIA virtually at the agency's inception. Melvin A. Goodman, 53, went to work there in the 1960s, about the same time as Gates, and their families were once close. Gaudemans, 32, with two young children, was like many analysts recruited out of graduate school—she got her masters in 1983 from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School.

Gaudemans, who worked in the office of Soviet analysis in the mid-1980s, described the pride she once held in her analytical efforts. "I've had no less fun flying my computer terminal in search of an understanding of Soviet foreign policy than an F-18 pilot has flying his aircraft," she said. "And I got no less thrill out of finding the right word that would put me on the cutting edge of analysis than a test pilot had pushing the envelope."

She said she had been loyal, honoring commitments to protect sources and methods. "But I also believe the CIA had an obligation to me," she said. "They were obligated to uphold and protect my mission as an analyst, who was responsible for providing independent analysis. I waited for 3½ years for somebody in a position of authority to do just that."

By 1989, she testified, she was fed up with the problems in the So-

viet division and "walked away from this mess." Politicization is not easily documented, she acknowledged. It "quickly becomes one person's word against another," she told the senators. "But let me suggest to you that politicization is like fog—that you cannot hold it in your hand, or nail it to the wall. It is real. It does exist, and it does affect people's behavior."

She recalled for the Senate panel a response two weeks ago by Gates who, when asked about the politicization complaints, suggested they grew out of frustrations analysts felt with his demands for greater rigor in their work. He, too, had perceived politicization as a junior analyst, he said, when his views had not been accepted.

Gaudemans took sharp exception to that, charging Gates had missed the point. "Senators, I think that answer is the most smug, condescending and callous answer to such a sensitive question I could possibly imagine," she said. "And I believe it offers an insight into Mr. Gates's managerial style: I shudder to think what he might do if he is confronted."

She asked the intelligence committee to send a "clear, loud, and strong signal" to the CIA "as to what the analyst's mission really is. I believe those people deserve a better answer than the one they have been given by Mr. Gates thus far."