

Gates's Intelligence Management at the

By Charles R. Babcock
and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

As Robert M. Gates's confirmation hearings to be CIA director head into a third week, members of the Senate intelligence committee are being forced to judge the credibility of reports that Gates's management of the agency's analysis branch during the 1980s spawned internal turmoil and bitterness.

Three former CIA analysts told the committee Wednesday in secret, and are expected to repeat publicly Tuesday, that there were morale problems and considerable personnel turnover because of a perception that a reorganization of the intelligence directorate by Gates was used by him and then CIA Director William J. Casey to institutionalize the slanting of intelligence on key issues of interest to the Reagan administration.

One of the witnesses, Melvin A. Goodman, a former senior Soviet analyst who left the agency after 25 years following disagreements with Gates, alleged that Casey and Gates systematically politicized intelligence reports about the Soviet Union, Iran, Nicaragua and other subjects by inserting their own political judgments and closing traditional avenues for expressions of dissent, according to sources familiar with Goodman's testimony. One result, Goodman concluded, was that CIA reports repeatedly emphasized the Soviet threat and deemphasized the Kremlin's problems and declining international position.

Jennifer L. Glaudemans, a more junior analyst who quit after six years, described instances at the CIA where analysts were fired or moved by Gates because their analyses did not match Casey's policy agenda, sources said. Hal Ford, another witness, said he did not have firsthand knowledge of intelligence being slanted under Gates, but had heard such stories from people he respected, sources reported. Gates took over as head of the intelligence directorate in 1982 and became deputy CIA director in 1986; he moved to the White House in 1989 to be deputy national security adviser to President Bush.

The committee also heard favor-

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able testimony Wednesday about Gates's tenure from two other CIA officers. But the seriousness of the charges, especially Goodman's, clearly focused the attention of the committee, several senators said in interviews yesterday.

"All the members sat up and took notice. . . . If what he [Goodman] charges is accurate, it could jeopardize the nomination," said Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), who has been leaning toward voting for Gates. The committee did not have time to question any of the witnesses, so Goodman's testimony went unchallenged, Cranston said, adding, "He made some factual statements that need to be proven or disproven."

Sen. Warren B. Rudman (R-N.H.), a Gates supporter, said some of the testimony, "if true, would be troubling."

The intelligence panel, which had hoped to conclude hearings this week, now has scheduled a public session next week to air the allegations heard in closed session Wednesday, "and it could go on because more people are coming forward," one Senate aide involved in the process said yesterday.

"A number of people who worked under Gates have been keeping book on him for years," a former CIA analyst said, "and they are now coming together."

In his presentation, sources said, Goodman charged that:

- Gates put into agency publications without supporting evidence that the Soviets were using lethal chemicals in Afghanistan; that there were economic ties between drug dealers and international terrorists; and that the Soviets were coordinating state-sponsored terrorism by Syria, Libya and Iran.

- Gates rejected evidence from

analysts of Soviet problems in Iran and was personally responsible for a 1985 special intelligence estimate on Iran that exaggerated the prospects of Soviet influence there. The estimate was later used by some administration officials to try to justify secret arms sales to Iran.

- Gates also allowed a CIA operations officer, who was working on the arms sales, to file reports on the political situation in Iran. The officer represented some of his own comments in the reports as coming from an Iranian moderate with access to the Khomeini government. In addition, the officer was permitted to analyze his own reports for inclusion in the daily briefing paper sent to President Reagan.

- Gates manipulated intelligence reports on the Soviet Union so that they overemphasized the Soviet threat and ignored Moscow's weaknesses, including the development of pluralism under Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. As a result, Goodman concluded, the Casey-Gates approach led to the CIA's failure to predict the collapse of communism in the the Soviet Union.

Goodman and Gates have been battling for 20 years since they served together in the CIA's office of current intelligence in the 1970s. They regularly disagreed on ana-

lyses, according to a colleague from those days. Goodman was moved from Soviet affairs and took an assignment in the late 1980s teaching at the National War College. In 1989 he turned down a CIA assignment as chief of East European affairs and resigned to continue teaching.

Glaudemans told members, sources said, that she heard that during the mid-1980s three division chiefs—including Goodman—were removed at Gates's request for not supporting his tough anti-Soviet views.

Both Goodman and Glaudemans spoke of Casey and Gates putting pressure on agency analysts in 1982 to show that the Soviets were

supporting European terrorist groups in line with information carried in a book by author Claire Sterling. At one point, Gates altered the key judgments of a report to suggest there was more Soviet involvement than the analysts had been able to prove.

The operations directorate protested this inclusion, saying its own reports had been misused.

In his remarks yesterday, Rudman declined to talk about specifics of Wednesday's testimony, but said "a lot of it was personal opinion, a lot of it was not firsthand knowledge."

"The fundamental question that has to be asked is was he [Gates] exercising management responsi-

bility or was he trying to please someone," Rudman added. "It's a very difficult subject to deal with. I've spoken to a number of people who are comfortable that Gates didn't try to impose his views."

Rudman said the entire committee, not just the Democratic members, agreed the issue was important enough to take the time to get Wednesday's material declassified so the issues could be aired in public next week.

The antagonism toward Gates among agency personnel is "partly from jealousy," said one former colleague. Gates, who turned 48 on Wednesday, rose from being an analyst to the head of the intelligence directorate without serving longer

than a few months as a mid- or upper-level manager in the directorate. One key to his meteoric rise was the time he spent as a White House aide in the Ford and Carter administrations, sources said.

In taking over in 1982 as deputy director for intelligence—the No. 4 job at the agency—Gates implemented a reorganization of the directorate that he had helped formulate. The staff of the directorate grew by almost 30 percent from 1982 to 1989, but Gates's tenure was also marked by enormous turnover, including resignations and firings, according to intelligence sources.

"It was an unhealthy situation," according to one former CIA vet-

eran analyst who said he left after 20 years because of Gates. "He destroyed the old DI [directorate of intelligence] and the integrity of analysis," he said.

In testimony last week, retired Adm. Bobby R. Inman, a former deputy CIA director who supervised Gates in the early 1980s, described Gates in those days as "an extraordinarily hard taskmaster" who "broke some china." Nonetheless, Inman strongly endorsed Gates's nomination, saying Gates is "older" and "maturity has been added."

One thing Gates did was to increase sharply the number of analysts. As a result, the number of

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intelligence assessments on various subjects written by CIA analysts exploded to a point where it was "a feckless exercise," one retired analyst said.

At the same time, the personnel turnover was such that 20 percent of the analysts had less than five years' experience with the subjects they were responsible for covering.

"On select accounts [the CIA term for areas of concern] where policy was sensitive to the Reagan White House," one source said, Gates and the people he put in senior positions took special interest.

Gates said he wanted analysts "to be aggressive, lean forward, be predictive," one former analyst recalled. But he set up a review process that created four and five layers of management that delayed the publishing of materials and provided opportunities to reshape conclusions, this source said.

At the end of the process, every paper had to go through Gates's office to be reviewed by him or one of his assistants, sources said.

Staff writers Benjamin Weiser and George Lardner Jr. contributed to this report.