

thing we might consider. Bremer wanted to kill so as to become famous. This is also what motivated Herostratus to burn down the Temple of Artemis of Ephesus, one of the Seven Wonders of the World. The Greeks promptly denied him his prize by prohibiting forever any mention of his name. (They did not succeed.)

Herostratic motivations have become quite prominent as the oppressiveness of anonymity has grown. We might give some thought to ways of reducing the celebrity gained by those who murder (or try to) for fame. Total isolation from all publicity may become part of the punishment, including perhaps material isolation. Certainly no biographies or autobiographies should be published for, say, ten years after the crime. If publicity is what they are willing to pay for with their own life or with imprisonment, publicity is what must be denied if we are to discourage Herostratic crimes. These crimes will increase otherwise.

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The central problem facing America today is the need for a clear, broad-based perception of reality. The press is more interested in what is believable than in what is true—and so we continue to be surrounded by a believable mythology. The people are more interested in comfort than in awareness—and so our mythology gives them comfort.

The major part of the new American mythology holds that the country is so populated by lonely, disoriented men that all assassinations can be credited to them. The counterpart of the same piece of mythology is that the American war machine, which has killed hundreds and hundreds of Asians, primarily in order to maintain its power, would balk at killing within the continental limits of the country. The effect of the mythology, long since adopted as official government doctrine, is to cause each assassination to appear to be of no significance—in spite of the fact that a substantial gain by elements of our national government is perceivable in each assassination.

When the question of "who gained?" is applied to the Wallace shooting, against the context of the then current election campaign, the shooting—in terms of probability—becomes less mysterious and more meaningful. In the same way, the application of the question "who gained?" to the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Robert Kennedy causes those murders—in terms of probability—to become less mysterious and more meaningful.

The attempted assassination of Governor George Wallace produced readily discernible gains for the warfare apparatus of the government. The warfare apparatus may be defined as that bureaucratic complex consisting of the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as those departments and agencies that serve them. Civilian control of this well-entrenched operation is considerably more apparent than real—and this is due in no small

measure to the highly refined assassination capability of the warfare complex.

The first gain accomplished by the disability of Governor Wallace was to assure that President Nixon would acquire the great majority of Wallace's Southern vote, thereby substantially increasing his potential vote percentage over that of Senator McGovern—the candidate who was committed to a substantial reduction in the power of the warfare apparatus. This does not necessarily mean that President Nixon in any way was aware that an operation was in effect to assure—indeed, to guarantee—his victory. It does mean that, far and away, he was the most desirable chief executive from the point of view of the bureaucratic complex.

The second major gain accomplished by the devastating crippling of Governor Wallace was that it virtually assured that the only Democrat with a viable chance of defeating the President—namely, Sen. Edward Kennedy—would not be drafted at the Democratic Convention. It was predictable that with assassination "by lonely deranged men" still in the air, the counsel of Senator Kennedy's friends and family would be for him to refuse any draft and bide his time. The other two Kennedys had been eliminated but Sen. Edward Kennedy remained as another potentially formidable *bête noire* for the American War Machine.

It is my considered judgment that the diary left by Arthur Bremer, while undoubtedly written by his hand, is an example of the deception customarily used by intelligence agencies. It serves as an arrow pointing in the wrong direction. It serves to help make a highly meaningful act appear meaningless—just as did so much of the "evidence" gratuitously left behind after the assassinations of John Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and Robert Kennedy.

More specifically, in my judgment the Bremer diary gives great emphasis to his initial "pursuit" of President Nixon in order to make the ultimate and intended shooting of Wallace appear to be irrelevant and capricious.

Again and again, through the diary, the predicate is laid so that all can see how *violence-oriented* Bremer was ("I could of had enough guns in my baggage . . . to start a revolution in Canada), how *mentally ill* he was ("danger gave me an erection" . . . "I'm as important as the start of World War II . . ."), and, above all, how *lonely* and *frustrated* he was ("If I attempted to say half of what was done to me, I wouldn't do the emotion of despair justice").

It is really too much. American domestic intelligence has a heavy hand. Sooner or later, even the most credulous audience must tire of the cloying deceptions our intelligence leaves behind as souvenirs of its operations. When the warfare apparatus determines to eliminate or cripple an individual, why cannot it just shoot and have done with it? It need not fear that there will be any departure of the great mythology in which the American press and the American people live.

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