rough the tedious procaffidavit of William (). il units in Memphis on police and he is now

n April 3, 1968, he was t unit in the vicinity of that a member of Dr. units be removed from That is, if they were otel area, that they not

pparently, according to · site was causing some

in turn communicated Crumby states in his ief of police and you, of the street commander arrived at that led to vicinity of five to six

the communication of decision was made the x blocks. Do you recall

o ask you to read from e notification-who he he decision as to what med.

nat you refer to. ragraph.

l'act units, each consisting of ing the five to six-block area 1 3, 1968. All of these units i, to remain in the general as order was promulgated by a unidentified member of Dr. treet commander of the tact

If and in turn by me to Chief Frank Holloman. As a result, c on the morning of April 4,

· pertinent part that I A decision was made. He said a decision was in whatsoever of what ted that he would have would have reported to onald told me about it that is something that I ction of the tact units

that the mere presence ct in the potential for violence that might erupt around the Lorraine Motel because of Dr. King's presence, you don't think that that was a decision—the decision to remove them would have been brought to your attention? That that was within the-

Mr. HOLLOMAN. Well, they were not removed. They were only removed from the immediate-from what you have said, from the immediate vicinity. As a matter of fact, when the shot was fired, an entire tact unit was in the fire station, so it was as close as you could get to the Lorraine Motel almost.

Mr. Spriser. But they were not on the street, as I understand it?

Mr. Holloman. Right.

Mr. Speiser. It was between the fire station and the Lorraine Motel?

Mr. HOLLOMAN. They had parked their cars between the fire station and the boardinghouse where Mr. Ray was.

Mr. Spriser. My last area of questioning, Mr. Holloman, concerns the post-assassination effort or lack thereof on the part of the Memphis Police Department to apprehend the assassin.

What, if anything, did you personally do when you were advised of the fact that Dr. King had been killed? What was your immediate reaction?

Mr. Holloman. I was not on the scene; I was not in communication with the men on the street. I was listening to a radio which was in my office. There were people on the scene. I was listening to the dispatches that were being given by our dispatcher on the

I did not-I will back up a moment there. I would say that within 30 minutes of the assassination, I was talking to the Governor of the State of Tennessee asking for the Guard to be sent back into Memphis. But as far as I was personally, I knew that there were commanding officers on the scene. I knew that Chief MacDonald was on the way to the scene. I did not go to the scene and I did not issue any orders myself at that time.

Mr. Speiser. Would you say that your attention was more directed toward curbing any demonstrations and rioting within the city of Memphis than apprehending the assassin?

Mr. HOLLOMAN. No, sir; I would not say that

Mr. Speiser. Would you say your attention was split equally between those two concerns?

Mr. HOLLOMAN. Yes. I think that is a fair statement because I had the responsibility of some 600,000 people in Memphis and I was concerned, of course, with all of those individuals if a riot should occur again, which it did, and which I-the first thing I knew or thought after the assassination was that, "Here we are We have got another riot.

Mr. Speiser. But you were equally concerned in apprehending the assassin, Mr. Holloman. Why did you not specifically instruct that an all-points bulletin be sent out and that roadblocks be set

Now, for the edification of those people who are unfamiliar, an all-points bulletin alerts the neighboring jurisdictions of the fact that there might be a fugitive entering their jurisdiction and that they should be aware of his presence and they are alerted to this