

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARK A. ALLEN,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	Civil Action No. 81-2543
)	
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, et al.,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

DECLARATION OF LOUIS J. DUBE

LOUIS J. DUBE hereby declares and says:

1. I am the Information Review Officer (IRO) for the Directorate of Operations (DO) of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). I was appointed to this position in March 1981, and have held operational and executive positions in the DO since 1952. As Information Review Officer, I am responsible for the review of documents containing information originated by the DO, or otherwise implicating DO interests, which may be responsive to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and/or Privacy Act (PA) requests and ensuing litigation. As part of such review, I am responsible for ensuring that determinations as to release or withholding of such information and concerning the disposition of such documents are proper. The statements made herein are based upon my personal knowledge, upon information made available to me

in my official capacity, upon advice and counsel of the CIA Office of General Counsel, and upon conclusions and determinations reached and made in accordance therewith.

2. Through the exercise of my official duties, I have become generally familiar with plaintiff's FOIA request and with the course of this litigation. In that connection, I previously submitted a Declaration dated 11 October 1984 which sets forth some of the difficulties faced by the CIA in processing Mr. Allen's FOIA request. I am specifically aware of this Court's Order dated 14 January 1986 requiring the CIA to create a Vaughn index for 350 documents to be selected by the plaintiff. I am also aware of this Court's Order of 2 April 1986 establishing times for submission of this index and for filing of appropriate motions. These 350 documents would be selected from installments of documents processed thus far by the CIA.

3. Pursuant to this Court's Order, plaintiff's counsel, by letter dated 22 January 1986, designated 150 documents to be addressed by the CIA's Vaughn index. By letters dated 20 March 1986 and 16 May 1986, plaintiff's counsel designated the remaining 200 documents for inclusion in this index. These 350 documents were selected from the seven installments of documents processed and released to the plaintiff thus far. Copies of the documents released in part are attached hereto as Exhibit A. Copies of the seven indices attached to these installments are enclosed herewith as Exhibit B.

4. The purpose of this Declaration is to explain why certain information in the documents at issue, and withheld from the plaintiff, is exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. Furthermore, I will explain why the claimed FOIA exemptions apply to the information withheld from the plaintiff. For the Court's and plaintiff's ease of reference, this Declaration will be divided into two sections. In the first section, I will discuss the general types of information contained within these documents and withheld from plaintiff, and the application of the appropriate FOIA exemptions to such information. In the second section of this Declaration--the Document Disposition Index--I will discuss the individual documents selected by plaintiff, cross-referencing the justifications to the appropriate explanatory paragraphs in the first section.

5. Initially, I should note that many of the documents designated by plaintiff fall into specific defined categories. For example, approximately 60 of the documents selected concern one human intelligence source of the CIA. This group of documents makes up one Category. This "grouping" of documents is not surprising since the House Select Committee on Assassination (HSCA), during its massive investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy, requested the CIA to locate documents relating to a multitude of precise subjects. CIA documents relating to these subjects ultimately became part of the HSCA segregated collection which is the subject of this lawsuit. To avoid undue repetition when describing the documents in the second section of

the Declaration, I will use categories and groupings wherever possible. Specifically, I will identify a category of information and the number of documents selected by plaintiff that fall within that category. I will then provide a short narrative explaining the subject of that category and discussing why the information within that category is exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. I will then list the individual documents in that category specifying: (a) type of document, (b) number of pages, (c) date, (d) CIA number, (e) plaintiff's selection number, and (f) FOIA exemptions claimed to justify withholding. Hopefully, this procedural format will obviate the need to repeat a series of virtually identical document descriptions.

6. As DO/IRO, I am responsible for the determinations set forth in this Declaration. After carefully reviewing the documents selected by the plaintiff and addressed herein, I have personally determined and affirm that the CIA information withheld from plaintiff may not be released because:

(a) Much of the information withheld is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356 as information requiring continued protection against unauthorized disclosure. Thus, such information is exempt from release pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1); and/or

(b) Much of the information withheld, if released, could reasonably be expected to lead to the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods which the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting against unauthorized disclosure as set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3). Thus, such information is coextensively exempt from release pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3); and/or

(c) Certain of the withheld information reveals facts about the organization, filing systems, functions, names, official titles, or numbers of personnel employed by CIA, all of which categories of information are encompassed within 50 U.S.C. § 403g. Thus, such types of information are exempt from release pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3); and/or

(d) Disclosure of certain of the withheld information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of identified individuals' personal privacy. Thus, such information is exempt from release pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(6).

7. I would emphasize that the FOIA exemptions listed above apply to the documents thus far selected by plaintiff for inclusion in a Vaughn index. I specifically reserve the Agency's right to assert additional exemptions should the occasion arise.

Classification--FOIA Exemption (b)(1)

8. Exemption (b)(1) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), provides that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are:

(A) Specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy; and (B) are, in fact, properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.

As will be discussed below, the CIA has invoked FOIA exemption (b)(1) to justify withholding of classified information in many of the documents addressed by this Declaration. The final review of the CIA documents withheld on the basis of classification was conducted pursuant to the criteria established in Executive Order 12356. Thus, the standards of that Executive Order apply in evaluating the Agency's claim of exemption under FOIA exemption (b)(1).

9. As a senior CIA official and pursuant to a written delegation of authority from the Director of Central Intelligence, I hold original classification authority at the TOP SECRET level. I, therefore, am authorized to conduct classification reviews and to make original classification decisions. With respect to the information for which exemption (b)(1) is asserted in this case, I have personally reviewed the determinations under the standards of Executive Order 12356 and have determined that such information is currently and properly classified. I have also determined that the CIA-originated documents were classified properly under predecessor classification Executive Orders and retain their classified status at the SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL levels pursuant to Executive Order 12356. In certain instances, documents containing classified information were not previously marked as classified. However, in my capacity as an original classification authority, I have determined that such documents should, in fact, be classified.

10. Initially, I have determined that the kinds of information contained in the documents at issue concern one or more of the following general categories of classifiable information set forth in Executive Order 12356:

- (a) Information concerning intelligence sources or intelligence methods (§ 1.3(a)(4)); and/or
- (b) Information concerning intelligence activities of the United States, (§ 1.3(a)(4)); and/or
- (c) Foreign government information (§ 1.3(a)(3)).

I have further determined that unauthorized disclosure of this information, either by itself or in the context of other

information, reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Executive Order 12356, § 1.3(b); 1.1(a)(2) and (3). Accordingly, I have determined that the great majority of the information withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(1) is properly classified at the SECRET level. Because the information concerns classifiable categories of information, and because unauthorized disclosure of this information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, such information satisfies the substantive classification requirements of Executive Order 12356 and, thus, properly maintains its classified status.

11. In this regard, it is significant to note that the unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information or of intelligence sources or methods is presumed to cause damage to the national security. Executive Order 12356, § 1.3(c).

12. All of the documents for which exemption (b)(1) is claimed were originally classified or authored prior to the effective date of Executive Order 12356. As stated previously, the Agency's final review was conducted under Executive Order 12356. Accordingly, I have determined that the official full-text copies of the CIA-originated documents withheld on the basis of exemption (b)(1) are now in conformity with the requisite procedural requirements of Executive Order 12356. The documents now bear on their faces a number identifying the classifying officer, the date of classification review, the date or event for the next scheduled

classification review, or the notation OADR (Originating Agency's Determination Required), information indicating the agency or office of origin, and the level of classification. Accordingly, such information satisfies the procedural classification requirements of § 1.5 of Executive Order 12356. Since the information satisfies the substantive and procedural classification requirements of Executive Order 12356, such information is exempt from disclosure under exemption (b)(1) of the FOIA. In addition, and as I will discuss later, most of the information concerns intelligence sources and/or methods. Therefore, such information is exempt coextensively from disclosure pursuant to exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA.

Intelligence Sources or Methods--
FOIA Exemption (b)(3)

13. Exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA states that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are:

Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than §552b of this title), provided that such statute (a) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (b) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.

The CIA contends that two exemption (b)(3) statutes operate to exempt certain of the information contained in the documents at issue. Initially, 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3) requires the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The provisions of this section are implemented further by virtue of 50 U.S.C. §403g, which provides

that the CIA shall be exempt from the provision of any other law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the CIA. Thus, information falling within the ambit of either of these two statutes is exempt from disclosure pursuant to exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA.

Intelligence Sources--FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)

14. Certain of the information in the documents at issue has been withheld because its disclosure reasonably could be expected to lead to the identification of various intelligence sources utilized by the CIA. As may be obvious, the CIA depends upon a plethora of intelligence sources, human, technical and otherwise, to collect information pertaining to or affecting the national security of the United States. Human intelligence sources can be expected to furnish information to the CIA only when confident that they are protected from retribution or embarrassment by the absolute secrecy surrounding the source-CIA relationship. In other words, intelligence sources must be positive that the CIA can and will do everything in its power to prevent the public disclosure of their cooperation and that their cooperation will forever remain secret.^{1/} For example, if an American businessman is willing to

^{1/}Of course, certain types of intelligence sources, known as "unwitting sources," never know that they are, in fact, providing information to the CIA. Nevertheless, such individuals provide crucial information and, thus, are intelligence sources in every sense of the term.

share information with the CIA, which information is collected by the businessman in the course of his everyday business, such an individual would suffer serious embarrassment and loss of business domestically or in foreign countries should the fact of his collaboration with the CIA be publicized. In the case of a foreign national abroad who has been cooperating with the CIA, usually without the knowledge of his government, the consequences of public identification as a CIA "agent" are often swift and sure--ranging from economic reprisals to possible harassment, imprisonment, or even death. In light of the probable consequences of disclosure, individuals understandably are reluctant to cooperate with the CIA or with American intelligence unless they can be absolutely certain that the fact of their cooperation will forever remain secret. Moreover, intelligence sources who remain within their society are at all times subject to retribution if and when they are identified or, indeed, even suspected of being CIA collaborators. This also is true of intelligence sources who no longer may cooperate actively with the CIA. In many cases, the very nature of the information passed necessarily tends to reveal the source because of the limited number of individuals having access to the information. If such information is publicly disclosed by FOIA release or otherwise, the source may be perpetually vulnerable to discovery, and retribution may be a real threat for him and his family for many years.

15. Moreover, the release of information which would or could identify an intelligence source most likely would have a serious

effect upon this Agency's ability to recruit other potential sources in the future. As stated previously, most individuals are reluctant to cooperate with the CIA unless they can be positive that their identities will be kept forever secret. If a potential source has any doubts about the ability of the CIA to preserve secrecy, i.e., if he learns that the identity of another source was publicly disclosed by the Agency, his desire to cooperate with the CIA naturally would be quite small. In other words, individual sources, be they present or future, simply will not work for the CIA if they are convinced or believe that the CIA cannot protect their identities. The loss of such intelligence sources, and the accompanying loss in critical intelligence which they provide, would have serious effects upon the national security of this country.

16. The CIA has another strong interest in keeping secret the identities of its sources, human, technical or otherwise, namely, to prevent disclosure to our adversaries of what areas the CIA is interested in and upon which it is focusing its resources. For example, if the information at issue indicates that the intelligence source is a little-known specialist in a particular area, it does not take sophisticated analysis to conclude that the CIA is interested in that specialized area. Therefore, an adversary might focus its resources to prevent CIA utilization of that source. Likewise, if an adversary were to learn that the CIA collects intelligence from a particular nonhuman source, i.e., a

specialized technical publication, it could well take efforts to negate the Agency's ability to exploit that source.

17. I believe it is important to realize that many of the sources identified in the documents at issue provided information which was highly relevant at that time to the intelligence needs of the CIA and, thus, to the national security of this country. In fact, much of the source information consists of reporting on Cuban activities and plans, and on the activities of anti-Castro organizations. During the time that many of these documents were originated, the United States was intensely interested in Cuban activities, both internally and vis-a-vis other countries. Many of the documents withheld consist of information from various sources on Cuban activities, intentions and positions, which information was critical for informed decisionmaking by U.S. leaders. Clearly, the foreign intelligence provided by these sources was highly relevant and necessary to the Agency's mission and to the interests of the United States. Public disclosure of these sources now would constitute a betrayal of their expectations that their information would be furnished in absolute secrecy.

18. For the foregoing reasons, I have determined that the unauthorized disclosure of information which reasonably would or could be expected to lead to the identification of an intelligence source would cause damage to the national security. Thus, such information is currently and properly classified and, therefore, exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1).

Coextensively, information which could lead to the revelation of the identity of an intelligence source precisely falls within the ambit of 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3) and thus is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3).

19. I also should note that §1.3(c) of Executive Order 12356 specifically provides that the unauthorized disclosure of information concerning an intelligence source is presumed to cause damage to the national security.

Intelligence Methods--FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)

20. Certain of the information in the documents selected by plaintiff has been withheld because its disclosure reasonably could be expected to lead to the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence methods. In particular, some of the information withheld in the designated documents would identify the use of particular intelligence methods, technical and nontechnical, at specific times. Such information thus is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3).

21. Intelligence methods are the means by which, and the manner in which, an intelligence agency accomplishes its business. Most organized professions or businesses employ methods which are common to and, in some cases, unique to that business or profession, to accomplish their goals and objectives. A bank, for example, uses accounting and financial recordkeeping methods, some of which are unique while others are common to all banks and possibly even to other businesses which keep financial records.

In this matter?
A. Alvarez?
These documents?

The same general characterizations may be applied to an intelligence agency such as the CIA and the intelligence methods it uses. Many of the methods CIA uses are unique to CIA among all of the intelligence agencies. Many of the methods are common to all intelligence agencies, and some methods CIA uses are common to activities other than intelligence. The basic element in all of these variants is that they are methods used by the CIA in its conduct of intelligence activities. The use of such methods in that capacity provides them with a special character in CIA records which necessitates protecting the fact of their use, as well as the details of their use, from unauthorized disclosure.

In this matter?
A. Alvarez?
These documents?

Electronic know-
-method efficiency

22. Intelligence methods must be protected in situations where a certain capability or a certain technique or the application thereof is unknown to those individuals or entities, such as a hostile intelligence service, who would take countermeasures. Secret information collection techniques or technological devices are valuable from an intelligence-gathering perspective only so long as they remain unknown and unsuspected. Once the nature of an intelligence method or the fact of its use in a certain situation is discovered, its continued successful use is in serious jeopardy. In fact, once an intelligence method or its use is discovered, the method may be neutralized by hostile intelligence services and eventually even turned against the CIA itself. A hypothetical situation best illustrates the potential dangers of disclosure. For example, suppose that the CIA had a wiretap on the

CIA approved
disclosure by
Hunt & Phillips
of exactly this

They all assume
this exists

telephone line of a hostile power. So long as the use of that wiretap in that particular situation remained secret, the intelligence derived from the use of that method would be authentic and valuable. If the fact of the use of the wiretap were to be discovered, it is obvious that the target country would take immediate action to negate the method itself. Such retaliatory action could consist of destroying the wiretap or rendering it useless through technical countermeasures. On the other hand, the hostile power could allow the wiretap to continue but deliberately feed it false information, thereby deceiving the CIA as to the authenticity and value of the information derived from the wiretap.

23. Detailed knowledge of the methods and practices of an intelligence agency must be protected from disclosure because such knowledge would be of material assistance to those who would seek to penetrate, detect, prevent, or damage the intelligence operations of the CIA. As can be seen, the result of disclosure of a particular method is the inevitable neutralization of that method. This result is true whether the intelligence methods are those used for the collection of intelligence information, the conduct of clandestine activities, the performance of counterintelligence targeting and analysis, or those techniques utilized in the analysis and evaluation of intelligence information.

24. It is significant to note that the term "intelligence methods" is not limited to sophisticated techniques and electronic devices. Rather, "intelligence methods" also includes the standard

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relevance in this
case? or otherwise

practices and procedures of an intelligence agency. These standard practices may encompass a multitude of techniques, ranging from the methods employed to evaluate a source to measures taken to disguise Agency personnel abroad or, a method may involve the targeting of a particular individual who is hostile to the United States. Such targeting frequently provides the Agency with valuable counterintelligence information concerning the practices and personnel of our adversaries, enabling us to thwart those activities. Knowledge of or insights into such practices would be of invaluable assistance to those who wish to detect, penetrate, counter, or evaluate the activities of the CIA. In summary, it is the fact of the use of a particular intelligence method in a specific context that is the information that must be protected. As will be discussed with regard to the individual documents, part of the information withheld relates to or identifies particular intelligence methods used at specific time periods. Disclosure of this information would allow plaintiff, and presumably anyone in the public, to immediately pinpoint the intelligence methods at issue, thereby compromising the past and future value of these particular methods. For these reasons, unauthorized disclosure of details pertaining to the intelligence methods in question reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, through compromise of the method in question and a concomitant loss of intelligence produced by that method. Thus, such information currently and properly is classified and is exempt

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from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1). Coextensively, since release of this information could lead to the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence methods, such information falls within the ambit of 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3) and thus is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3). As a final matter in this regard, I reemphasize that §1.3(c) of Executive Order 12356 establishes a presumption that the unauthorized disclosure of information concerning intelligence methods will cause damage to the national security.

Intelligence Sources and Methods --
The Passage of Time

25. In arriving at my decision to withhold information relating to intelligence sources and methods, I expressly considered the passage of time since many of these documents were created. In other words, I considered whether the passage of a substantial period of time should affect my decision to continue protection of the intelligence sources and methods withheld from the documents at issue. After careful deliberation, it is my judgment that the passage of time should not, indeed cannot, vitiate the protections which the CIA must afford to the sources and methods contained in these documents.

26. At the outset, I readily acknowledge that some of the intelligence sources reflected by the documents may have provided relatively insignificant information when evaluated by today's standards. However, at the time these documents were created,

any not clearly
disclosed?

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to Cuba information
& not to this much
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these sources' reporting was considered to be of real value to the United States. As I mentioned earlier, many of the sources reported on Cuban plans and activities--topics which were of intense interest to this country in the late 1950's and 1960's. Certain of the sources identified in these documents are dead or otherwise safe from reprisals. Still others may not care whether their relationships with CIA are revealed. Others may not even realize that they, in fact, provided information to the CIA. All of these assumptions, I believe, are utterly irrelevant to the issue of whether the CIA may and should continue to protect their identities under the relevant statutes. A principal rationale for the passage of 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3) was Congressional recognition that protection of sources and methods is a vital, inextricable element of the CIA's mission of collecting foreign intelligence. This mission, in turn, is linked to the national security of this country. By passage of these statutes, Congress recognized the simple fact that disclosure of sources and methods is equated with their loss. Thus, Congress accorded such information absolute protection from required disclosure.

27. I would like to explain my decision in this regard by using an analogy with which the Court is familiar. Consider the case of a law firm which has sensitive attorney-client information which it wishes and needs to protect. Such a firm cannot pick and choose which of its clients' confidences it will keep and which it will disclose. Indeed, if such a firm began to disclose information

not comparable
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authorizations to
this case which no
law firm has.
The privilege is the
clients, not the
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not a private law
firm.

that its clients had given in confidence (even "old" information), word would spread and the firm's business would certainly decline. It would be difficult for the firm to prove, by empirical evidence, the specific harm which would flow from each individual disclosure of confidential client information. This would be especially true if a confidence had been imparted to the firm long ago, and the firm no longer had detailed files on the client. Nevertheless, the principle that the firm's business would inexorably decline in direct proportion to its disclosure of clients' secrets cannot be doubted. In summary, the attorney-client privilege does not and should not expire after an arbitrary period of time. To assume that the passage of years dilutes the protection to be afforded invites the risk of damage to the firm's reputation as a reliable keeper of its clients' confidences.

28. This problem is far more serious in the intelligence arena, and particularly with regard to the CIA. Not only is the reputation of the CIA at stake, but, in addition, the lives of its agents and sources are in continuous jeopardy. The CIA operates throughout the world in direct competition with other very powerful and clever intelligence services. We still gather much of our information through human contact, but this contact is of a unique variety. In the usual case when we form a relationship with a person overseas, sooner or later that person becomes involved in espionage. This is true irrespective of the value of the information he provides, and regardless of whether it occurs in a

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friendly or hostile country. This activity abroad is not in violation of U.S. laws and is a legitimate function of the Executive. However, it is almost always an exceedingly serious violation of the criminal laws in the host country. In simple language, the source knows that, if he is caught, his punishment will be swift and sure. For this reason, every source, actual and potential, must know unequivocally that his identity will be forever safe with CIA. If the source has any doubts about the ability of the CIA to protect his identity, he would be a fool to render his services to this country.

29. Some people may believe that the revelation of the identities of a few old sources in FOIA cases could never reach the ears of potential sources around the world. Our adversaries would lose no time in using their vast propaganda apparatus to disseminate the news that the CIA has betrayed its former agents through intentional public disclosures. Potential CIA sources would not be comforted by fine distinctions or by CIA protestations that it could protect their identities. Rather, such sources will see only one important fact--that the CIA has betrayed its sources simply because of the passage of time. These sources will quite naturally assume that, thirty years from now, their identities will be fair game for disclosure in response to an FOIA request or litigation.

30. Since its inception in 1947, CIA has been remarkably successful in protecting the identities of its sources. Indeed,

See last note above -
Simply not true
re Alvin Karpis

He has upped the ante
has won the war
when he says all
sources are safe - etc

the United States Supreme Court recently recognized the absolute importance of this protection. Today, when we approach a potential source in a distant country, governed perhaps by a hostile government with little particular concern for human rights and the rule of law, that source believes that his identity will be forever protected by the CIA. It is upon this simple principle that our business is grounded. If we unilaterally violate that principle, we will simply and without exaggeration be unable to function.

31. It is my firm belief, based on many years as an intelligence officer, that if CIA voluntarily or otherwise reveals the identities of intelligence sources in this case, the principle of source protection, which has been maintained by this Agency since its inception and which has been for all times an iron-clad rule of all intelligence services, will be seriously compromised. It is of absolutely no consequence that a particular source is dead, relatively insignificant or that his relationship with CIA has been dormant for thirty years or never reached fruition. Next week, we may attempt to recruit a foreigner who we hope may be an important official thirty years from now. If he has reason to think that the CIA will not protect his identity at that time (if only because we have lost track of him and cannot prove to a court that he will be harmed by the revelation) he definitely will not help us. No rational individual would ever consider cooperating with American intelligence if he perceived that there was any possibility of a public disclosure by the United States.

based on the most
deliberate generalities
only he now states
that in this case
there would be "revelation"
of intelligence sources
I doubt that this
is or can be true or
that he made any
effort to learn

there again he is
talking only of
spies, not political
"sources"

This goes further
& presumes what is
not true. That "way"
one is "secret."

even after official
disclosure, as with
abuse?

32. In summary, an intelligence service, like a law firm or a doctor or priest, simply cannot function unless it can maintain the absolute secrecy of every source relationship. Absent this ability, people will simply not cooperate with the United States to the serious detriment of our national interests as a country. For all these reasons, I have determined that source-identifying information in the documents at issue cannot be released, despite the passage of time.

Foreign Government Information--FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)

33. Certain of the information withheld from the plaintiff herein is information provided to the CIA by the intelligence or security services of foreign governments. I should note at the outset that § 1.3(c) of Executive Order 12356 provides that the unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information is presumed to cause damage to the national security. It is important to note that this provision explicitly recognizes the simple fact that foreign governments will not cooperate with and provide information to the United States unless mutual understandings of confidentiality are clearly established, strictly adhered to, and recognized by law.

34. Cooperative relationships between the CIA and intelligence and security services of foreign countries, which are termed "liaison relationships," are initiated and continued only on the basis of a mutual understanding that the existence and details of such liaison arrangements will be kept in the utmost secrecy. If

the CIA released documents or information provided by foreign intelligence services, no matter the age of the information, thereby unilaterally breaching the mutual understanding of confidentiality, it reasonably can be expected that all such relationships or understandings with foreign intelligence or security services would be jeopardized and that serious damage to the national security would result. If our government appears unable to control access to information provided to it by foreign governments in secret, those governments which have provided or currently do provide such assistance will undoubtedly decline to cooperate with the United States in the future. The corresponding adverse effect on the availability of critical intelligence information for this Agency and, in turn, for United States decisionmakers is obvious. Additionally, it is important to consider a related aspect of our relations with foreign intelligence or security services. It is public knowledge that most governments do not officially acknowledge the existence of their intelligence and security services. Those countries, such as the United States, which do reveal such information, to my knowledge do not ever disclose the full scope of such services, the extent of their liaison with other nations, or the types of information derived therefrom. The rationale for this policy is simple yet fundamental. To disclose such details, even if the existence of an intelligence service is acknowledged, would result in serious political ramifications, including at a minimum: (1)

serious strain or disruption in the relations between the United States and other countries; and (2) sharp curtailment or total elimination of cooperation between the CIA and other intelligence services.

35. As stated previously, certain of the information in the designated documents and withheld from the plaintiff was provided to the CIA by cooperating foreign intelligence or security services. Most of these services still cooperate with the CIA under the understanding that such cooperation will be kept absolutely secret, both as to its existence and as to the information provided. If the information provided were to be publicly disclosed, such service and its parent government could suffer public embarrassment within their own country and the international community. Additionally, the services would be forced to take retaliatory action against the perceived offender--the CIA--likely resulting in a decrease of any future cooperation. For all these reasons, information received from foreign liaison relationships clearly satisfies the substantive requirements for classification under Executive Order 12356 and, indeed, is presumed to be classified. Therefore, such information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1).

36. It must also be remembered that foreign liaison services provide the CIA, and thus the United States, with intelligence information critical to informed decisionmaking -- information which the CIA might be unable to obtain through its own resources.

In this sense, foreign liaison relationships clearly constitute valuable sources of intelligence information. Accordingly, information derived from such an intelligence source is coextensively exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3).

Information Which Would Reveal Covert CIA Field
Installations and/or Foreign CIA Activities
FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)

37. Many of the documents at issue herein contain information, the disclosure of which would reveal either specific foreign locations in which the CIA conducts covert intelligence activities, the location of unacknowledged CIA field installations in foreign countries or the details of CIA activities in foreign countries. The Directorate of Operations has a number of unacknowledged field installations which facilitate the foreign intelligence activities of the CIA. In this sense, these installations are CIA installations on foreign soil designed to act as methods for the collections of intelligence. Public disclosure of the existence and locations of these covert installations could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security of the United States for a variety of reasons. First, a foreign government, even a friendly government, confronted with an official disclosure that a CIA installation existed and operated on its soil, could bow to public opinion and order all CIA personnel out of the country. Obviously, such a reaction would impair the national security of this country in that this Agency would have its intelligence

collection capability in such a country reduced drastically. Second, public disclosure of covert CIA activities on its soil could seriously embarrass the government of the country involved, thereby creating diplomatic tensions between that country and the United States. Many nations are willing to tolerate the presence of CIA installations on their soil and the fact of CIA activity within their borders only so long as the fact of that acceptance remains totally secret. Official confirmation of such an arrangement would not only cause the foreign government involved acute public embarrassment but would also pressure that government into terminating or severely limiting its relationship with this Agency. No foreign government can stand mute in the face of public acknowledgment that another country is conducting espionage activities on its soil. The resulting damage to the foreign intelligence activity of this country would be severe. Third, public disclosure of such covert CIA activity and installations on foreign soil would be of value to a hostile intelligence service. Such a service could use this information for propaganda purposes to embarrass the Government of the United States or to pressure the foreign government involved into retaliating against the CIA. Finally, personnel identified as working for such a covert installation, and thus for the CIA, could be subjected to threats, reprisals, and physical injuries from terrorist groups, or from other persons hostile to this Agency.

38. In summary, official acknowledgment that the CIA maintains a particular installation or is conducting clandestine intelligence

activities in a particular foreign country will compel the government involved to take measures, either on its own initiative or in response to public pressure, to eliminate the CIA presence within its borders or to retaliate otherwise against the U.S. Government. The detrimental effects upon the foreign relations of the United States and upon the foreign intelligence activities of the CIA are manifest. Furthermore, official acknowledgement of such an installation would subject the personnel working therein to possible reprisals from individual groups or retaliation from the foreign nation itself. For all these reasons, information which reveals a CIA presence or activity in a foreign country is classified pursuant to the criteria of Executive Order 12356 and is thus exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1). Moreover, inasmuch as information concerning CIA covert activities abroad or the location of covert foreign CIA installations would reveal a specific methodology utilized by the CIA to collect foreign intelligence, such information is also within the purview of 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) and, accordingly, is coextensively exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3).

CIA Employee Names, Employee Identifiers, Official
Titles, Filing Instructions, and Organizational Data --
FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and/or (b)(3)

39. Another statutory measure taken to protect intelligence sources and methods (Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. §403g) provides that the CIA is exempt from the provisions of any other law requiring the disclosure of

information regarding the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. On the basis of this statute, certain CIA employees' names and other personal identifiers of individuals or information related to specific individuals (employee numbers, etc.) have been deleted from the documents at issue. Additionally, the titles or other organizational identifiers of a number of CIA internal organizational components have also been deleted. Finally, internal filing instructions, file indicators and control markings have been deleted from certain of the documents. Such data has been deleted to prevent detailed knowledge of CIA personnel, structure, organization, and procedures from becoming publicly available and possibly being used as a tool for hostile penetration or manipulation. Filing instructions and file indicators may disclose areas of geographic, functional, or operational interest. This information is withheld to prevent the possible penetration of the security of CIA filing systems and the accompanying disclosure of substantive areas of CIA interests. The names of CIA employees have been deleted because the Agency does not disclose the identity and affiliation of those employees who do not come into public view during the course of their duties. Such employees may have in the past served under cover or in sensitive positions or operations, may be doing so now, or may do so in the future. The public revelation of their affiliation with the CIA could well be used to compromise past, present, or future intelligence operations or

activities; to impair the usefulness of such individuals to the Agency; and/or to place their lives, the lives of members of their families, and the lives of intelligence sources they have worked with in jeopardy. Since such information fits within 50 U.S.C. §403g, deletions from portions of the attached documents have been made pursuant to exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA. In particular instances where such information concerning CIA personnel and/or CIA organizational functions (1) relates to sensitive intelligence operations or activities or (2) would prejudice the prospects of ongoing or contemplated intelligence activities that might be undertaken in the future, such information is also currently and properly classified according to the criteria set forth in Executive Order 12356 and, thus, is coextensively withholdable under the authority of exemption (b)(1) of the FOIA.

Intelligence Methods: Cryptonyms and Pseudonyms--
FOIA Exemptions (b)(3) and/or (b)(1)

40. Certain of the documents contain cryptonyms and pseudonyms which have been withheld from the plaintiff. Cryptonyms and pseudonyms are intelligence methods used to provide an added measure of security to minimize the adverse effects which would flow from the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information. A cryptonym is an artificial word used as a substitute for the actual name or identity of a person or project. When obtained and matched with other information, a cryptonym possesses a great deal of meaning for those who are able to fit it into the proper

cognitive framework. For example, the reader of a message is better able to assess the value of the information contained therein if the reader knows the identity of the particular individual or project represented by the cryptonym. Similarly, the reader of a message could also take action to neutralize the intelligence value of a particular source if the reader knows the identity of the particular source represented by the cryptonym.

41. The mere use of a cryptonym instead of plain text to describe a project is an important piece of information to those who do not know the scope or nature of a particular project because the use of a cryptonym signals to the reader the importance of the project for which the cryptonym stands. The use of cryptonyms reduces the seriousness of the breach of security if a document is lost or stolen. However, while release or disclosure of isolated cryptonyms would not necessarily create a serious likelihood of damage to the national security, the disclosure of cryptonyms in the aggregate or in a particular context would make it possible to fit disparate pieces of information together and discern or deduce the identity or nature of the person or project for which the cryptonym stands. Furthermore, the factual setting within which cryptonyms appear is occasionally of such a descriptive nature that disclosure of the document often reveals, to a knowledgeable reader, the true identities of persons or activities intended to be protected by the cryptonyms. Simply stated, cryptonyms are intelligence methods used to conceal intelligence sources and

methods currently requiring protection. Accordingly, such cryptonyms are clearly intelligence methods within the meaning of Executive Order 12356, §1.3(a)(4) and are, thus, exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3).

42. Pseudonyms are fictitious names used in place of the actual names of individuals to ensure their safety. Pseudonyms are used in communications and other records of intelligence operations where the security of the project and the personnel involved is of the highest priority. The use of pseudonyms restricts the knowledge of the identity of intelligence operation participants to only those individuals who possess knowledge of the pseudonym and the true name for which it stands. As do cryptonyms, pseudonyms reduce the seriousness of the breach of security if a document is lost or stolen. The CIA does not release or disclose pseudonyms because the factual context of the document in which the pseudonym appears may reveal to the knowledgeable reader the actual identity of the person being protected by the pseudonym. As with cryptonyms, release of pseudonyms in the aggregate would make it possible to fit disparate pieces of information together and discern or deduce the true identity of the person for which the pseudonym stands.

43. Cryptonyms and pseudonyms are both intelligence methods used to provide a degree of protection for other intelligence sources and methods. Accordingly, information which would disclose pseudonyms and cryptonyms is withheld under the authority of exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA, as specifically exempted from

disclosure by the statutory provision that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods (50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3)). Because the disclosure of cryptonyms and pseudonyms could jeopardize the individuals or projects to which they relate, disclosure of cryptonyms or pseudonyms could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. Thus, such information is currently and properly classified pursuant to the criteria of Executive Order 12356. Accordingly, such information is coextensively exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemption (b)(1).

Information the Disclosure of Which Would Constitute
a Clearly Unwarranted Invasion of an Individual's
Privacy--FOIA Exemption (b)(6)

44. Certain entire documents, and portions of other documents designated by plaintiff, have been withheld pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(6). In my considered judgment, disclosure of these documents or portions of information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of specified individuals. The bases for my determinations are set forth below.

45. Twelve of the documents selected by plaintiff are letters to and from a specific individual, which letters were intercepted by the CIA during its HTLINGUAL program.^{2/} These letters were

2/ The genesis and details of this program are discussed at length in the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, June 1975 at pages 101-115. See also Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).

retrieved by the CIA in response to an HSCA request for all documents relating to the individual who was the author/addressee of the letters. Thus, these letters became part of the segregated collection at issue in this litigation. Because these letters relate to specific individuals and since they are contained in a particular file, I believe that these letters clearly constitute "similar files" as that term is used in the language of exemption (b)(6).

46. After determining that these letters were in "similar files," I sought to ascertain if there were any substantial privacy interests evidenced by the letters. If so, I would balance those interests against the factors favoring disclosure. In evaluating whether to withhold or release these letters, I considered several factors. First, I recognized that the individual who was the primary subject of these letters was publicly identified by the HSCA during its investigation into the Kennedy assassination. Therefore, under the reasoning of this Court's Order of 24 August 1984, public association of this particular individual with the HSCA investigation, i.e., by releasing her name, would not per se infringe upon any substantial privacy interests. However, the letters to and from this individual in no way relate to the HSCA investigation or to the Kennedy assassination. Therefore, I concluded that this individual (and the other individuals discussed in these letters) continued to possess substantial privacy interests in (a) not being publicly associated with the HTLINGUAL

program, and (b) the contents of the letters themselves. In my opinion, letters to and from an individual evidence the highest form of privacy interest and should not be publicly disclosed absent a compelling reason. In this connection, I would note that this individual previously filed a Privacy Act request and received copies of these letters pursuant to that request.

47. Considering whether to withhold the names of these individuals and the contents of these letters, I balanced the existence and degree of the likely intrusion into the individuals' privacy against the policies favoring disclosure. Specifically, I believe that any public interest in, or benefit from, disclosure of these letters would be extremely slight, even in connection with such an infamous event as the Kennedy assassination. The HSCA issued comprehensive reports which spelled out the details of its investigation and those individuals possibly connected with the assassination. Clearly, the public's interest in going beyond those reports to discover unrelated letters to and from one of the listed individuals would be slight. In this connection, I would note that these letters do not shed any light on the investigation. I also considered that the requester has not indicated any substantial public interest so as to warrant disclosure of these letters. I find that, in the circumstances mentioned above, individuals' personal privacy interests outweigh any public interest in disclosure.

48. Finally, I considered the fact that the individuals in question are generally private individuals rather than "public figures." They have not voluntarily thrust themselves into the limelight surrounding the Kennedy assassination. This factor also tilts the balance in favor of nondisclosure.

49. In summary, I have balanced all the factors and have determined that the balance tilts in favor of nondisclosure. Since the information requested consists of personal letters, no further segregation out of identifying details can be accomplished. Accordingly, these letters are exempt from disclosure pursuant to exemption (b)(6).

Information Withheld at the Request of
Other Government Agencies
FOIA Exemptions (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(D)

50. Three of the documents described in Category 15 of the Document Disposition Index contain information originated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and/or the United States Customs Service which is being withheld, at the request of those agencies, pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(D). For the convenience of the Court and plaintiff, I will include a short narrative explaining the justification for those exemptions. However, if more detailed information is required, the CIA will ask those agencies to submit separate affidavits.

51. Exemption 7 provides that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are:

Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would...(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation,...confidential information furnished only by the confidential source....

Records of FBI and Customs Service criminal investigations clearly satisfy the threshold requirements of Exemption 7 as investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes.

52. Exemption (b)(7)(C) has been applied for the excision of certain names and other identifying information which, if disclosed, would reveal the identities of and/or personal details concerning individuals who were of investigatory interest to those agencies or who were mentioned in connection with such investigations. To release this information would reveal to the public at large that these persons were in some way connected with a law enforcement investigation, thereby causing public exposure and potential embarrassment to these persons. Many people assume that, just because the FBI or the Customs Service has a name contained in its investigatory files, the person named is guilty of some criminal or security violation. In this regard, it should be noted that Court decisions interpreting Exemption (b)(7)(C) have recognized that the mere mention of an individual in a law enforcement file carries a stigmatizing connotation. Therefore, the release of the limited information which has been withheld from the documents at issue would, in and of itself, constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and, thus, is exempt from disclosure pursuant to exemption (b)(7)(C).

53. Exemption (b)(7)(D) has been applied to justify the withholding of confidential information furnished by confidential sources and compiled by the FBI and the Customs Service during the course of law enforcement investigations. Exemption (b)(7)(D) provides protection for both confidential sources in all law enforcement investigations and the information provided by the confidential source. The availability of the exemption depends not upon the factual contents of the documents but upon whether the source was confidential. The informants' identities are protected whether they have provided information under an express promise of confidentiality or under circumstances from which such an assurance could reasonably be inferred. As will be discussed, information in two of the documents was provided by confidential informants of the FBI and the Customs Service under circumstances from which a promise of confidentiality could be inferred. Release of this type of information would jeopardize the free flow of information which is necessary to the functioning of a law enforcement agency such as the FBI and the Customs Service. Therefore, such information is withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(7)(D). It should be noted that both the FBI and the Customs Service have cited exemption (b)(7)(C) in conjunction with exemption (b)(7)(D) to withhold the identities of certain individuals whom these agencies had interviewed and who had provided information to the FBI and the Customs Service.

Segregability

54. After carefully reviewing the documents at issue, I have determined that there are no further meaningful segregable

segments of information which can be released to plaintiff. The CIA has made an extremely conscientious effort to release all information it can to the plaintiff. Deletions have been made only to protect intelligence sources, intelligence methods, or otherwise properly exemptable information. A release of any further information would risk compromise of the intelligence sources, intelligence activities, methods, and other information sought to be protected. Any bits of nonexempt information would, in my judgment, be meaningless without details of the context in which they appear. Once exempt information is deleted, any nonexempt bits of information are meaningless.

55. We have employed the letter codes listed below to identify the category of information contained within each deletion. Each letter code will state the type of information covered and the FOIA exemptions justifying withholding of that information. Each letter code will refer back to the appropriate explanatory paragraphs of this Declaration which detail the rationale for withholding the particular information at issue. I should note that some of the letter codes listed will not be used for any of the documents covered by this Vaughn index. However, they may very well be used in the future; thus, for the sake of completeness, I have included them in this list. I should also note that the Agency will frequently use the term "classification markings." This simply means that a document is marked CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET. No exemptions apply to classification markings.

56. Letter-coded copies of those documents previously released to the Plaintiff in sanitized form, as well as copies of those documents previously released in full text, are attached hereto for the Court's information (Exhibit A).

DELETION LETTER CODE LIST

- A. Name or other identifier of an intelligence source
EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) & (b)(3). See paragraphs 13-19, 25-32.
- B. Circumstantial information which, in combination with other information, could lead to the identification of an intelligence source
EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) & (b)(3). See paragraphs 13-19, 25-32.
- C. Information confirming the existence of or describing a liaison relationship with a foreign intelligence or security service
EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) & (b)(3). See paragraphs 33-36.
- D. Foreign government information
EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) & (b)(3). See paragraphs 33-36.
- E. Information disclosing an intelligence method used in intelligence analytical activities
EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) & (b)(3)
- F. Information disclosing an intelligence method used in intelligence collection
EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) & (b)(3). See paragraphs 13, 20-32.
- G. Location of a CIA field installation or circumstantial information which would reveal the location of a CIA field installation
EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) & (b)(3). See paragraphs 37-38.
- H. A pseudonym or a cryptonym
EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) & (b)(3). See paragraphs 40-43.
- I. Information identifying a CIA staff employee
EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) and/or (b)(3). See paragraph 39.
- J. Information identifying a CIA organizational component
EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) and/or (b)(3). See paragraph 39.
- K. Filing instructions and information processing, storage, and retrieval markings
EXEMPTION (b)(3). See paragraph 39.
- L. Information which, if publicly disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
EXEMPTION (b)(6). See paragraphs 44-49.
- M. Information originated with and withheld at the request of another federal agency
EXEMPTIONS (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(D). See paragraphs 50-53.
- N. Classification and related information control markings. Deleted solely for the purpose of providing a redacted copy for release.
No exemptions.

CATEGORY 1

There are four documents in this category: two separate intelligence reports and two duplicates of those reports. These reports consist of detailed information which came from the same foreign intelligence source, an individual with contacts inside his government. The documents, information reports transmitted from the capital of the source's country to CIA Headquarters, are denied to protect the identity of the source providing the information. Further descriptions of these documents follow.

<u>Doc.No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
653, 655 (Duplicates) Field Information Report 11 Dec 59	85 87	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)

The first page of this document is a cover sheet with no substantive information on it. However, this sheet gives the subject of the attached intelligence report, the distribution; the location from which the information was received, and the individual names to which the report should be indexed. It also contains the cryptonym assigned to the source of the report and the names of CIA employees approving and preparing the report. The second page, which is the actual intelligence report, contains information about the travel of a named foreign official to another foreign country and identifies the official's former occupations. That named official also reported to our source concerning the position of a fellow countryman in a foreign country and on the political goals of his own government. Release of any of this information could reveal the identity of the intelligence source, the official talking to our source, and the subjects of that conversation which comprise the report (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

In addition, the document contains a field comment on some of the source's information; the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38); two pseudonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); and filing information and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). This document remains classified at the SECRET level.

654, 656 (duplicates see below), Field Information Report 11 Dec 59	86 88	3 5	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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These documents are virtual duplicates. The first page of both documents is a routing sheet containing no substantive information. However, the routing sheet does contain CIA employee initials, CIA

organizational data and CIA filing information (see paragraph 39). The second page of Document No. 656 is a duplicate of the routing sheet, except that it does not contain two file numbers nor the date and title of the attached document. These pages are withheld because they are nonrecord documents. Additionally, even if records, they contain the initials of CIA employees, CIA file numbers and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

The next page of these documents is a cover sheet for the attached intelligence report. This cover sheet details the distribution for the report, the location from which the information was obtained, the cryptonym for the source, the names of the CIA employees preparing and approving the report, etc. The following page, which is the actual intelligence information report, consists of two paragraphs which total five lines. This document reports on some of the monetary arrangements concerning trade between two foreign countries, one of which was the home country of the intelligence source providing the information. Document No. 656 has an additional duplicate last page, the only difference being the addition of a blank distribution block at the bottom of the page.

As the information contained in the document was provided by an official in the foreign government identified to our source, it must be withheld to protect the identities of the two sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

Information withheld in this document also includes two pseudonyms and a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). This document remains classified at the SECRET level.

CATEGORY 2

The seven documents in this category are all reproductions of index cards. Document Nos. 31, 41, and 59 (Plaintiff's Request Nos. 2, 8, and 10) are duplicates, undated, and consist of three index cards on one page. They have been released in part to the plaintiff. The only deletions are CIA file numbers (letter code K; see paragraph 39) and classification markings (letter code N). Exemption (b)(3) is claimed for these deletions.

Document No. 40 (Plaintiff's Request No. 7), undated, consists of three pages. The first page is a retyped copy of the three index cards described above in Document Nos. 31, 41, and 59 and is released in part. The deletions and justification are the same, i.e., CIA file numbers (letter code K). The second and third pages of this document consist of hand-written notes. The second page is released in part. The deleted material consists of information obtained through a specific technical intelligence method (letter code F; see paragraphs 13 and 20-32). Information in the second paragraph of the third page is also withheld to protect the same intelligence method, and, indeed, identifies the method. This information is withheld pursuant to exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). The information at the top of the third page is withheld because it relates to a CIA employee and information processing markings (letter codes I, K; see paragraph 39). This document remains classified at the SECRET level.

The remaining documents, Nos. 616, 619 and 620 (Plaintiff's Request Nos. 169, 66, and 67), are duplicates and are dated 9 Nov. 1959. They consist of reproductions (on two pages) of four index cards and are released in part. The only withheld portions concern the name of a CIA employee, filing information, and internal organizational data (letter codes I, K; see paragraph 39).

CATEGORY 3

These eleven documents in this category are letters to and from named individuals. They are denied in their entirety under FOIA exemption (b)(6) to protect the privacy interests of these identified individuals. These letters were obtained through the CIA's HTLINGUAL project (see paragraph 44-49) and consist of letters to, from and about an American student/writer who was living in Moscow during the period 1958-1960. The correspondence was between this individual and various family, friends and business associates. These letters, which have been released previously to the American involved, are included in the HSCA collection because this individual interviewed Lee Harvey Oswald in Moscow. None of these letters mention Lee Harvey Oswald. Disclosure of these letters would constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the privacy interests of this specific individual, as well as of that individual's correspondents. Most of these letters contain detailed accounts of the author's views, family life, travel plans, etc. These letters could not be sanitized without risking disclosure of the individuals writing or receiving the letters.

<u>Doc.No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
450 Two letters & envelope, 26 Sep 58	48	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(6)
451 Letter & envelope, 30 Sep 58	49	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(6)
463 Letter & envelope, 31 Oct 58	50	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(6)
483 Letter & envelope, 8 Feb 59	51	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(6)
488 Letter & envelope, 13 apr 59	52	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(6)
505 Letter & envelope, 19 Jun 59	54	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(6)
633 Letter, en- velope & enclo- sure, 16 Nov 59	72	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(6)

684	Letter & envelope, 13 Jul 60	113	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(6)
732	Letter & envelope, 22 Feb. 60	170	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(6)
748	Two letters, 22 Mar 60 & 13 Jun 60 with envelope & enclosure	126	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(6)

NOTE: An inquiry of Plaintiff's attorney confirmed that this document was also No. 125 on Plaintiff's list inasmuch as CIA No. 743 did not fit the description of the document. Also, please note the fact that there are two letters included with this document.

792	Letter & envelope, 9 Jul 60	133	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(6)
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CATEGORY 4

The four documents in this category are all denied in their entirety in order to protect the identity of an individual who was of counterintelligence interest to the CIA. (See paragraphs 13, 20-32.) The individual subject of these documents was an American citizen living abroad who defected to a hostile foreign country. Further descriptions of these documents follow:

<u>Doc.No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
210 Index Card & Notes, 11 Jul 52	31	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)

This index card contains the name and occupation of the individual, his location abroad and the CIA file number assigned to him as a counterintelligence subject. The two pages of notes contain the numbers and/or dates of six documents which refer to this individual. This information is denied to protect CIA interest in the Subject (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) and the file markings (see paragraph 39). The document remains classified at the CONFIDENTIAL level.

607 Dispatch, 13 Nov 59 (Please note corrected date)	59	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document, a one-page dispatch from a covert CIA overseas station, forwards to CIA Headquarters information on personalities mentioned in the notebooks of the individual discussed above. The referenced information is not attached. However, the notebooks were given to CIA by a foreign liaison service. Release of this covering document would reveal the identity of that service as well as the individual owner of the notebooks. This information is denied because it would reveal a counterintelligence target and the foreign liaison service at issue (see paragraphs 13, 20-36.) The location of a CIA overseas installation, a pseudonym, a cryptonym and internal organizational data also appear in this document (see paragraphs 37-43). This document remains classified at the SECRET level.

628, Dispatch, 629 13 Nov 59, with attachment (Duplicates)	69, 70	7	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This dispatch is identical to Document No. 607 and is denied for the same reasons. However, the attachments referred to in the dispatch are included. They consist of a foreign liaison service's traces on 46

individuals. Therefore, this information is foreign government information. Release of the information would disclose the identity of that foreign liaison service, as well as the specific information it provided (see paragraphs 33-36). The attachments, like the dispatch itself, are also classified at the SECRET level.

CATEGORY 5

The 81 documents in this category all identify, contain information reported by or otherwise relate to, one individual intelligence source of the CIA. All of these documents come from the official CIA file of this intelligence source. As is evidenced by the documents, this individual provided a wealth of important information to the Agency, primarily on the subject of Cuban anti-Castro organizations and their activities. This individual also provided the Agency with intelligence concerning activities of the Cuban regime and of various Latin American revolutionary groups. During the timeframe of these documents, the information reported by this source was of immense importance to the Agency and to American decisionmakers who were trying to formulate American policy towards Cuba and the anti-Castro groups.

The intelligence source reflected in these documents ultimately became of interest to the HSCA, presumably because of his familiarity with the activities of the anti-Castro organizations. Because of the HSCA's interest, this source's CIA file was retrieved and became a part of the segregated collection. A number of the documents selected by plaintiff come from this source's file.

To the best of our knowledge, this intelligence source is now dead. However, as discussed previously, the Agency submits that a source's death in no way affects the need or ability of the Agency to protect his identity from public disclosure. This individual may very well still have living relatives who could be retaliated against as a result of his public identification as a CIA source. Additionally, and as noted at length previously, public disclosure of any intelligence source, even one who is dead, could deter potential sources from choosing to work for American intelligence. I should also note that, even though some of the information in these documents may appear superficially innocuous, or even facially unrelated to the source, disclosure of such information could pose a danger. Presumably, the particular documents at issue were placed in the source's file for good reasons, reasons which may not now be readily apparent. However, disclosure could provide our adversaries with the final bit of information they need to complete identification of this source. For all these reasons, and for the reasons set forth previously, information relating to this intelligence source is exempt from disclosure pursuant to (b)(1) and (b)(3).

Specific descriptions of the documents relating to this source follow.

<u>Doc.No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
46 Cable, undated	164	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document contains a page 3 and a page 2, apparently from other cables. The two pages are not, themselves, part of one cable. They are

classified SECRET. The third page is a nonrecord transmittal form.

The substantive two pages concern, in part, the relative merits of a group's involvement in a clandestine operation in which the Subject source participated. The pages also contain a partial evaluation of the operation itself in terms of future operations. The results of two name traces on two individuals are also provided.

This document is withheld to protect the identity of the Subject source, as well as details pertaining to an actual CIA intelligence operation (see paragraphs 13-32).

58	Name Trace	9	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	Rpt., Undated			entirety	

This document consists of a negative name trace result on one individual (with several possible spellings of his/her name) which appeared in the file of the source described above. Although the connection to our source is not clear, this individual may well have been associated with our source. Since this document appeared in our source's file, the document is denied to protect the identity of our source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document is classified SECRET.

61	Index Cards,	11	23	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	undated			entirety	

This document reproduces 97 index cards containing information concerning a large number of individuals who were of interest to the Agency. The connection of these individuals with the intelligence source described above is not clear, but these documents were found in his file. It could well be that these individuals were known to our source and that he reported information concerning them to the Agency. If this is the case, disclosure of these individuals' identities could reveal CIA targets or allow an adversary to track back to our source. Moreover, the information contained in certain of the cards indicates that some of these individuals were independently CIA sources. Although many of the cards are not dated, others include a date of 1962. These cards provide, in most cases, brief biographical and activity information concerning the individuals. They are withheld to protect the identities of those who acted as sources, to prevent the disclosure of CIA targets, and to prevent disclosure of the source in whose file they were located (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). This document is classified SECRET.

65	Paper,	12	2	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	undated			entirety	

This document contains specific questions to be asked of a group of individuals should the Subject source be tasked to interview them. These

questions are specific and relate to the activities of a named foreign country. It is denied to protect the identity of our intelligence source and is classified SECRET (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

75	Article, 18 Sep 45	14	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(3)
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This newspaper article, published in a foreign country, appears in our source's file for a reason that is no longer apparent. The article may well have been provided by the source himself. Release could provide a clue to the identity of our source. It is denied to protect the identity of the CIA source to whom the file relates (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

127	Memorandum, undated	17	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This memorandum lists four specific additional FBI reports concerning the source to which this category applies. This list was compiled for use in locating documents pertaining to this individual. Disclosure of this list could allow a knowledgeable person to ultimately identify the source described therein. Since this individual was an asset of the CIA, the document must be withheld to protect his identity (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). It is classified at the CONFIDENTIAL level.

161	Report, 6 May 1950	21	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(3)
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This foreign-language report was most likely provided to the CIA by the subject source of this category inasmuch as it appeared in his file. The report cannot be released without risking revealing the identity of that source, particularly when the report is considered in context with the other documents in this category (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

190	Memorandum, 24 Jan 52	27	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document, classified at the CONFIDENTIAL level, contains the partial results of a security check on the Subject source of this category. The security check was conducted to evaluate this individual's use as a potential source of foreign intelligence information. The document is eight lines long and is withheld to protect the source's identity (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The names and initials of CIA employees and a file number also appear and are withheld (see paragraph 39).

196, 197 Report, 18 Feb 52 (Duplicates)	28,29	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(3)
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This document consists of typewritten excerpts from several letters between two individuals over a four-year period. They were in all likelihood provided by the source. These excerpts must be withheld to protect the identity of the CIA source who is the subject of this category (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

216, 217, 218 Memorandum, 8 Oct 52, (Duplicates)	32, 33, 34	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This memorandum summarizes the results of a previous file check on the intelligence source of this category. It provides his address and states that he had been the subject of a previous request for a security clearance. An earlier document cited in this memorandum named the source's then-current occupation and location. The document is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is withheld to protect the source's identity. The document also contains a file number, the name of a CIA employee, and CIA organizational data, all of which are withheld (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32, and 39).

219 Memorandum, 30 Oct 52	35	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document contains a request that another CIA office inquire of another government agency as to what pertinent biographic data it might have on the Subject source. It is classified SECRET and is withheld to protect our source's identity. A file number, the name and initials of CIA employees, and internal organizational data also appear (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32 and 39).

234 Memorandum 30 Dec 52	36	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document, which is classified SECRET, consists of three lines and advises that the earlier security clearance request concerning the source be cancelled. It is withheld to protect the identity of the source, who was the subject of the original clearance request. A CIA file number also appears (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32, and 39).

247 Memorandum, 17 Feb 53	38	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This memorandum, which is classified CONFIDENTIAL, contains a request from Headquarters to a field station to locate the pertinent details of a

file which contained the results of an earlier investigation concerning a business investment in which the Subject source may have been involved. It is withheld to protect the identity of the intelligence source who is the subject of this file (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document also contains the names and initials of CIA employees, CIA internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

277	Form, 17 Mar 54	42	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is classified CONFIDENTIAL. Disclosure would identify the intelligence source as well as the organizations which the Agency would check in its evaluation of him (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). Employee initials and file numbers also appear (see paragraph 39).

289	Form, 21 Jul 54	44	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document contains the results of inquiries of other federal agencies in connection with processing a security clearance for the Subject source. It is withheld to protect the identity of that source and is classified CONFIDENTIAL (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The name of a CIA employee and a file number also appear (see paragraph 39).

303	Memorandum, 17 Aug 54	46	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document, classified CONFIDENTIAL, contains information pertaining to the plans of a group of six individuals who were going to visit and study the operations of one CIA component. One of the specific individuals listed was the Subject source of this category. The memorandum is addressed to the chiefs of two divisions and enunciates the security considerations for this visit. It also asks for concurrence for the visit and confirmation that necessary security standards are met for this visit. CIA organizational data, employee names and initials, and filing information also appear (see paragraph 39).

306	Memorandum 17 Aug 60	47	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This two-paragraph internal memorandum from the Acting Director of Security provides the response to the request contained in Document No. 303. This memorandum states that the six individuals meet the standards for a particular security clearance. One of the individuals, who was a member of the identified group in question, was the Subject source of this Category. The document is denied, therefore, to protect his identity (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document, properly classified CONFIDENTIAL,

also contains the name of a CIA employee, filing information, and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

571	Memorandum,	56	2	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	20 Oct 59			entirety	

The four paragraphs of this document record a detailed conversation held between the Subject source of this category and a Cuban exile. This individual asked for help from the CIA source, who, in turn, made no commitments, citing his reasons. The Cuban exile is not identified but his identity would be obvious from the context. The document is denied to protect the identity of our intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and specific intelligence methods used to collect the information (see paragraphs, 13, 30-32). The document is classified SECRET.

608	Dispatch,	168	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	6 Nov 59			entirety	

This document from a field installation to CIA headquarters contains three paragraphs and is classified SECRET. It forwards the results of two conversations which the Subject source had with one individual in the first case, and two individuals in the second case. The attachments reflecting the details of these conversations are not included with the dispatch. However, this document contains a summary of various apprehensions Subject source had with respect to the attachments and a request as to the final disposition of the attachments. In a handwritten note at the bottom of the document, it is noted that the source's request was denied.

The document is withheld in its entirety because its release would identify Subject source as well as the three sources who provided information to him during the conversations (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); an intelligence method involved in obtaining the attachments (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); one pseudonym and one cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43); the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38); and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

609, 611, 613	60, 62, 64	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3),
(Duplicates),			entirety	
Memorandum, 9 Nov 59				

This document, classified SECRET, consists of a brief opening and a brief closing paragraph. The substance of the memorandum is contained in the second paragraph which details a particular method which the Subject source was going to use to gather intelligence information. Specific details are provided concerning this method, including the fact that a potential problem with its use appeared to be minimal. The intelligence source of this category and the actual intelligence method utilized would

be readily identified should any portion of this document be released (see paragraphs 13-32). In addition, the name of a CIA employee and filing information appear in the memorandum (see paragraph 39).

610, 612, 614 (Duplicates) Memorandum, 9 Nov 59	61, 63, 65 1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This brief five-line memorandum, classified CONFIDENTIAL, refers to an earlier final report and identifies an informant in that report. This document, as well as the earlier one, identifies Subject source by name (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). In addition, there is an identification, albeit indirect, of the same intelligence method discussed in document numbers 609, 611, and 613 above (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). CIA internal organizational data and the name of a CIA employee are also withheld (see paragraph 39).

627, 634, 635, 636, (Duplicates) Memorandum, 17 Nov 59	68, 73, 74, 75 1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is classified SECRET and consists of three paragraphs totalling seven lines. It is an internal memorandum stating that the request of one office to the originator of this document had been completed. That request concerned the implementation of an intelligence method in conjunction with the use of Subject source for intelligence gathering purposes. This technical intelligence method is the same one discussed in the two previous documents (see paragraphs 13-32). The name of a CIA employee, internal organizational data, and filing information are also contained in this document and are withheld (see paragraph 39).

638, 639, 640 Memorandum for the, Record, 25 Nov 59 (Duplicates)	77, 78, 79 3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document, classified SECRET, records in detail a conversation between the Subject source of this category and a former Cuban government leader (subsource) who headed an anti-Castro group in the United States. The subsource reported on current conditions in Cuba and on possible plans for changing the situation in Cuba. He also commented on the names of persons the Subject source had suggested might be of some help to him and on the difficulties of effecting any changes. This extremely detailed document is withheld to protect the identities of the Subject source, the subsource (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), the name of a CIA employee and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document also

relates to the intelligence method by which this information was obtained, which is the same method discussed in the previous three documents. This document remains classified at the SECRET level (see paragraphs 13, 20-32).

645, 646, Memorandum, 27 Nov 59 (Duplicates)	80, 81	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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The information in this document was obtained through a specific technical intelligence method (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). This document records information provided to Subject source by two Cuban individuals (subsources) as well as advice given by the Subject source. The memorandum is classified SECRET. The document details six points for agreement and four principal lines of possible action with respect to anti-Castro action. The document is withheld to protect the Subject source, the two subsources mentioned, the technical method of obtaining the information (see paragraphs 13-32), the name of a CIA employee and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

648, 668 Memorandum, 9 Dec 59 (Duplicates)	82, 99	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This memorandum is a summary of a meeting the Subject source held with several individuals who represented different groups of organized opposition to the Cuban regime. The second document is a reduced-size duplicate of the first.

The meeting consisted of a review of the travel the group had done and detailed operational plans for the future, with which everyone was in accord. The very specific nature of the memorandum precludes its being released, even in segregated form. Any form of release would reveal the identity of the Subject source, as well as the participants in the meeting who acted as subsources and co-planners of the Agency's source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). This document also relates to intelligence methods and contains the name of a CIA employee and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). It remains classified at the SECRET level.

650, 651 Memorandum, w/atts 10 Dec 59 (Duplicates)	83, 84	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This memorandum, which is classified SECRET, includes two attachments which are lists of names which were of interest to the Subject source. Assessments of these individuals are included regarding their

compatibility with respect to a proposed intelligence operation. Release of any portion of this document would reveal the identities of the Subject source, his subsources, the details of the intelligence operation mentioned, the name of a CIA employee and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraphs 13-37, and 39).

658, 660, 665,	89, 91, 96,	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
678, 679, Memor-	107, 108		entirety	
andum, 16 Dec 59				
(Duplicates)				

The substance of these five documents is identical. The small manner in which they differ will be detailed below. The basic document is a memorandum from the Director of Security to the Director of Central Intelligence, for his information. It is classified SECRET. This memorandum discusses the assignments which will be given to the Subject source inasmuch as he has recently received his security clearance. It also provides some recent biographic information about this source, including past assignments. The document is withheld to protect the source's identity (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), his assignments (operational methods, see paragraphs 13, 20-32), the name of a CIA employee, filing information and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

Document Nos. 658, 660, and 665 are identical except that No. 660 has, as an attachment, an other-agency name check report concerning Subject source. Document Nos. 678 and 679 are identical to each other but carry different marginal notations, employee initials, and the name of the person who signed for the Director of Security. There is also a notation that the memorandum had been returned from the DCI's office. In addition, a date has been stamped in the upper right-hand corner.

659, 661, 664	90, 92, 95	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
Memorandum,			entirety	
16 Dec 59				
(Duplicates)				

These documents are "crossed-out versions" of the document described directly above. In addition they carry a "Retyped" notation. They are denied for the same reasons as specified for the documents described above.

662, 667	93, 98	3	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
Memorandum of			entirety	
Conversation,				
16 Dec 59				
(Near duplicates)				

This document is a memorandum of conversation between two CIA employees. It details the extensive activities of several named

individuals who were involved with the anti-Castro movement, along with their assessment of the Subject source of this Category. The document, which discusses some operational plans with which the Subject source was involved, is withheld to prevent the identification of those plans (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), as well as the Subject source and other individual sources mentioned in the memorandum (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document, which is classified SECRET, also contains the names of CIA employees (see paragraph 39).

The second of these two documents is a reduced-size duplicate of the first except that it has been partially sanitized (presumably for review by HSCA) to remove the names of two CIA employees and that of an FBI agent. To the best of my knowledge, this sanitized version was never publicly disclosed. Indeed, the sanitized version bears SECRET classification markings, reinforcing my belief that sanitization was solely for the HSCA.

663, 666	94, 97	2	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
Memorandum,			entirety	
16 Dec 59				
(Duplicates)				

This is a detailed account of a meeting between a named CIA employee (see paragraph 39) and a foreign individual intelligence source concerning that source's activities and plans with respect to Cuba. The potential problems for a proposed intelligence operation and the wide variety of plans which were in motion are discussed. These operational plans were of great interest to the Subject source who also participated in a portion of the meeting. The document is withheld in its entirety to protect his identity, the intelligence operations being discussed, as well as that of the source and other participants in the various plans (see paragraphs 13-32). The document is classified SECRET.

670, 671, 673	100, 101, 103	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
Memorandum,			entirety	
22 Dec 59				
(Duplicates)				

This document, classified SECRET, contains the brief results of a restricted security check that was done concerning the Subject source. It is withheld to protect his identity (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), as well as information pertaining to intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The names and initials of CIA employees, internal organizational data, and filing information also appear (see paragraph 39).

672, 674	102, 104	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
Letter, 22 Dec 59 (Duplicates)				

This letter was written by the Subject source of this category to a CIA employee. The source forwards some information relating to the intelligence operation in which both he and the CIA employee were engaged. The document is classified SECRET and is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the Subject source, the specific intelligence project (see paragraphs 13-32), and the name of the CIA employee (see paragraph 39).

680, 681	109, 110	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
Memorandum, 31 Dec 59 (Duplicates)				

This Memorandum for the Record is classified SECRET. It contains the substance of a telephone conversation between the Subject source and a named deputy division chief of the CIA. Subject source requested that certain information concerning an identified subsource of his be passed to the appropriate CIA officer. Our source hoped that a quiet talk between the two could serve to calm the excited accusations which the subsource had been making. The document is withheld to protect the identity of the source, the subsource (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), the identity of two CIA employees, and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

706	Letter, Feb 60	118	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(3)
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This letter is in a foreign language and is addressed to some of the writer's fellow countrymen. The letter was presumably provided to the Subject source either by the writer himself or by one of the group to whom it was addressed. Once again, this document was located in the Source's official file. It is impossible to determine the actual distribution of the letter. Thus, disclosure could lead ultimately to our source. Thus, it is withheld to protect the identity of that source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

726	Memorandum, 18 Feb 60	121	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This Memorandum for the Record, classified SECRET, records the contents of a telephone conversation between a CIA employee (the Deputy Chief of an operational division) and the Subject source. The source reports on a conversation that he had with one of his contacts concerning the plans of an anti-Castro group in exile and another individual who was purportedly involved with these plans. The Agency employee then requested

of the Subject source that more information be obtained with respect to that individual, as well as the proposed operational plans. The document is withheld to protect the identity of the Subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), the CIA employee and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). This document was listed as No. 721 on Plaintiff's list. A check with his attorney confirmed that No. 726 was the one which he wanted described.

734	Cable,	122	2	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	26 Feb 60			entirety	

This cable from a covert CIA installation to CIA Headquarters reports on a meeting between a source of the field station and two other individuals who were interested in the overthrow of the Castro regime in Cuba. One individual offered the assistance of his group to the other, and some background information regarding one of the individuals and his group is provided. This document is classified SECRET and has been the subject of some sanitization (almost assuredly for HSCA review). Once again, to the best of my knowledge, this document has not been publicly released. The specific content of the cable, if disclosed, could identify any one of the three sources mentioned (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), CIA employee initials, internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). This document was located in Subject source's CIA file and could be his own report.

741	Letter,	123	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	4 Mar 60			entirety	

This letter, classified SECRET, was written by the Subject source of this category to a CIA employee. In it the Subject source described the five enclosures (which are not included) which he was forwarding with the letter. These enclosures related to contacts with two individuals who were engaged in an intelligence operation. The author also requested that certain actions be done by the CIA employee. The document is withheld to protect the Subject source, two other sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); information relating to intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); and the name of a CIA employee (see paragraph 39).

762	Report,	171	4	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	6 May 60			entirety	

This document contains a translation of a paper which was provided to the Subject source by one of his contacts. It consists of a lengthy treatise on the kind of government which he believed must be formed after the desired downfall of the Fidel Castro regime. This source provided specifics about a wide variety of elements necessary to be considered to prevent anarchy in such a situation and outlined some of the required elements of participation by the United States.

The document is withheld in its entirety to protect the identity of the Subject source, the subsource who authored this paper, and information relating to intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13-32). It is classified SECRET. An official file number also appears in the document (see paragraph 39).

763	Report, 6 May 60	172	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is the original foreign-language paper, the translation of which constitutes and is discussed above under Document No. 762. This document is withheld for the same reasons specified for Document No. 762.

767, 768	Statement, circa 11 May 60 (Duplicates)	128, 129	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document does not identify the Subject source by name but was, in fact, located in his official file. It is classified CONFIDENTIAL. Although the reason for its retention in the file is not clear at this moment, disclosure could provide the final clue towards identifying the Source at issue in this file. Accordingly, it is denied in order to protect the identity of the human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

785	Cable, 7 Jun 60	131	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This SECRET cable from a CIA installation to CIA Headquarters discusses at length some of the problems and discussion among members and potential members of an anti-Cuban revolutionary group located in a foreign country. This information, which seems to have been obtained from the Subject source, also includes information about various CIA assets in the target country as well. It appears that there were originally more than two pages to this document, but the remainder are not included in this collection. The document has been partially sanitized (once again, presumably for the HSCA) so that the location from which it originated is not printed. However, the nature of the information would reveal that location should this document be released (see paragraphs 37-38). This document is withheld to protect the identity of the Subject source, and the identities of the other individuals reporting to our source (see paragraphs 13-32).

787	Cable, 2 Jul 60	132	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This brief four-line SECRET cable forwards information provided by an intelligence source of a CIA installation, specifically, that Subject source may be the object of a local investigation. The document's release

would reveal the identity of Subject source and that of the CIA source providing the information (see paragraphs 13-19, 30-32).

796	Letter,	134	2	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	20 Jul 60			entirety	

This document, like document #767, does not identify the Subject source by name. However, it was presumably placed in the Subject source's file for a good reason. It is classified CONFIDENTIAL. Disclosure could provide our adversaries with the last clue needed to identify the source. Accordingly, it is denied in order to protect the identity of the human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

805	Memorandum,	135	2	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	3 Aug 60			entirety	

This Memorandum for the Record, classified SECRET, summarizes a conversation between the Subject source, and a CIA employee regarding the current status of an intelligence operation against the Castro regime, the individuals involved, with some mention made of the financial considerations of the operation. The detailed nature of this document precludes release of any portion of it. Disclosure would reveal the identities of the Subject source, and of other CIA sources (see paragraphs 13, 20-32).

858	Memorandum,	175	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	27 Oct 60			entirety	

This Memorandum for the Record is denied in its entirety and is classified SECRET. This document lists 10 items which were left at Headquarters by the Subject source prior to his return to the field. The document also provides the disposition of those items.

Release of this memorandum would unquestionably reveal the identity of the Subject source as well as some of his named sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), and information pertaining to intelligence methods as they relate to these individuals (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document also contains a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43), the name of a CIA employee, and an official file number (see paragraph 39).

863	Dispatch,	179	4	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	2 Nov 60			entirety	
	w/attachment				

This document forwards to a CIA field installation a letter which was received by Subject source from one of his subsources. The accompanying dispatch asks for some information relative to the people and organizations mentioned in the letter.

The three-page attachment, dated 18 Oct 1960 and written to Subject source, discusses the plans and capabilities of an anti-Castro individual in the United States. This letter provides an evaluation of this individual and recommendations for Subject source's action.

This document is withheld in its entirety and is classified SECRET. Its release would identify the Subject source, as well as several of his subsources, by name (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). Information relating to the methods by which CIA conducts its intelligence mission is also contained in the document (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). In addition, CIA organizational data appears (see paragraph 39).

867	Memorandum,	180	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	7 Nov 60			entirety	

The seven lines in this memorandum report on the publication of a newspaper and the fact that several revolutionary groups have united. Although the identification of the Subject source by name has been deleted in this document, a knowledgeable individual could deduce the source's identity by analyzing his connections in the anti-Castro movement. For these reasons, the document is withheld in its entirety to protect those individuals (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document also contains information relating to intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), and is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

870	Memorandum,	139	3	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	9 Nov 60			entirety	

This document is a foreign-language memorandum concerning the plans of an anti-Castro group, including their proposed reforms if they were to gain power. There is a note, in English, in the margin recommending careful consideration of the document and the reasons why. The document was found in the Subject source's file, was presumably provided to the Agency by him, and is withheld to protect his identity inasmuch as he was in contact with various anti-Castro and revolutionary groups (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document is classified SECRET.

928	Note,	143	1	Denied in	(b)(3); (b)(1)
	19 Jan 61			entirety	

This document, like 767 and 768, does not name the Subject source of this category. However, since it was located in his file, disclosure could ultimately provide knowledgeable adversaries with clues leading to his identification (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The substance of the note is a list of items provided to a foreign official for his use. The document is classified SECRET.

984	Cable,	146	2	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	14 Mar 61			entirety	

This document is properly classified at the SECRET level. It reports on the comments of a high foreign official of a foreign country regarding

various Cuban matters. It also forwards the suggestion to another US Government agency that the foreign official be kept more currently informed on some of these activities. Although the location of a CIA installation has been removed from the cable, the name of the official remains and would reveal that location (see paragraphs 37-38). This document is denied to protect this source. In addition, the document is withheld to protect the identity of the Subject source, who had briefed the official somewhat earlier, and to protect information relating to intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13-32.)

1000 Letter,	147	6	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
20 Mar 61			entirety	

This document is a translation of a letter written by a prominent individual in a foreign country to the Subject source. They had been friends and associated in earlier years. In the letter the writer reminisces about those earlier times and also offers the outline of an article he proposes to publish regarding various anti-Castro matters. Release of this document would identify the recipient of the letter (Subject source) (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document is properly classified CONFIDENTIAL.

1038 Letter,	184	3	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
13 May 61			entirety	

This document is addressed to Subject source and is handwritten in a foreign language. It supplies the answers to several questions the Subject source had posed to the writer about his various travels and contacts. It is withheld to protect the identity of the Subject source of this category (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

1051 Memorandum,	186	5	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
24 May 1961			entirety	

This document is a lengthy exposition of the events concerning the negotiations for a release of prisoners between various groups.

This document appears in this category because the Subject source was also a participant in these events and was instrumental in making many of the necessary arrangements for the negotiations. The document is withheld in its entirety because its release would identify that individual (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). Information also appears in this document which relates to intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) with respect to the fact of Subject source's relationship with his various subsources. In addition, the document contains the names and initials of CIA employees and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). It is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

CATEGORY 6

The 48 documents in this category consist of the contents of the official file which CIA maintained on Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. As the reader can ascertain from the six documents which are released in part, Alvarado volunteered information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald. The documents reflect the interest of CIA and the United States government in determining the veracity of Mr. Alvarado's statements as well as the ways in which to accomplish that objective. These efforts resulted in the final conclusion that Mr. Alvarado had fabricated the story of his observations concerning Oswald. Further descriptions of the documents follow. All of the documents are currently and properly classified SECRET and contain those markings.

1220	Memorandum,	156	17	Release in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	1 Jun 64			part	
	with attachments				

The deletions in this memorandum contain only information identifying Agency staff employees (letter code I, see paragraph 39), CIA organizational data (letter code J, paragraph 39) and classification markings (letter code N). Unfortunately, full text copies of some of the attachments are missing so that it is difficult to determine what the deletions are. However, it appears that the information deleted identifies a foreign security service and a CIA overseas installation as well as information concerning a specific foreign intelligence collection method (see paragraphs 13, 20-32 and 37-38).

1225	Letter,	157	2	Release in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	21 Apr 64			part	

The portions deleted from this document contain the name of a CIA employee (letter code I, see paragraph 39) and a specific intelligence collection method (letter code E, see paragraphs 13, 20-32). In addition, internal filing information (letter code K, paragraph 39) and organizational data (letter code J, paragraph 39), have been deleted.

1226	Memorandum,	158	5	Release in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	12 Dec 63,			part	
	with attachment				

The deleted paragraph 2 in the memorandum contains information relating to CIA staff employees and the manner in which they conduct some of their business (letter codes F and I, paragraphs 13, 20-32 and 39). In addition, the document contains the name of a CIA employee (letter code I), internal organizational data (letter code J, paragraph 39), filing information (letter code K, paragraph 39), and classification information (letter code N).

The material deleted in the attachment relates to Alvarado's intelligence activities with respect to his anti-Cuban interests. It is withheld to protect the details of those activities and the identities of the persons with whom he was in contact (letter code A; see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). In addition, material relating to CIA staff employees has been deleted (letter code I, paragraph 39).

1227	Dispatch, 12 Dec 63	201	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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There are four paragraphs in this document totalling nine lines. The dispatch from the field to Headquarters forwarded documents (which are not attached) which were background to the interrogation of Alvarado in connection with his allegedly having seen Lee Harvey Oswald at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The attachments provide evidence of a sensitive operational method used in connection with this particular interrogation (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document also contains operational cryptonyms and the pseudonyms of two Agency staff employees (see paragraphs 40-43), the identity of a specific Agency station abroad (see paragraphs 37-38), as well as Agency internal filing instructions and organizational data (see paragraph 39).

1228	Memorandum, 12 Dec 63, with attachment	202	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This three-line document forwards to a senior CIA official the report of the interrogation of Alvarado as discussed in the description for Document No. 1227. Once again, this three-page attachment provides detailed evidence of a sensitive operational method used in connection with this particular interrogation (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document also contains the name of a CIA employee and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1229	Cable, 10 Dec 63	203	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This five-line cable reports that the documents discussed in Document No. 1227 above would be forwarded on 12 December 1963 and that duplicates would also very likely be forwarded to another government agency. Release of the document would reveal the sensitive operational method used in connection with Alvarado's interrogation (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document also identifies several Agency components, and includes the pseudonym of an Agency staff employee, Agency internal filing instructions and operational cryptonyms (see paragraphs 39-43).

1232 Cable, 205 1 Release in (b)(1); (b)(3)
7 Dec 63 part

The deletions in the substance of this document contain information concerning an intelligence method as it pertains to the interrogation of Alvarado (letter code E, paragraphs 13, 20-32). Other deletions in the document identify an Agency station in a specific city abroad (letter code G, see paragraphs 37-38) and include information identifying Agency staff employees, Agency components and Agency internal filing information. (Letter codes I, J and K, see paragraph 39.) Cryptonyms were also deleted (letter code H, see paragraphs 40-43).

1234 Cable, 206 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
7 Dec 63 entirety

This document from the field to Headquarters contains the conclusions about the veracity of Alvarado's statements and the manner (method) through which these conclusions were reached. The document must be withheld because its release would reveal this operational method (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document also reports on the travel plans of a CIA employee who is identified by a pseudonym (see paragraphs 40-43) as well as those of Alvarado. In addition, CIA internal organizational data, filing information (see paragraph 39) and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43) appear in the cable. Release of any portion of this document would compromise the above material.

1236 Dispatch, 207 12 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
5 Dec 63, entirety
with attachment

This dispatch forwards an attachment which was supplied to CIA by a sensitive foreign source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). Release of any portion of the document would identify that source. The brief dispatch also provides a partial evaluation of the attachment.

This document also identifies two Agency stations abroad, the pseudonym of an Agency staff employee, as well as internal filing instructions and CIA organizational data (see paragraphs 37-43). Cryptonyms also appear in the dispatch (see paragraphs 40-43).

1237 Cable, 208 2 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
5 Dec 63 entirety

This document contains the notification of the arrival of a CIA employee in a foreign country and the fairly detailed operational plans for his use there. Release of any portion of the document would reveal those plans and their implementation (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). Protection of the name and pseudonym of a CIA employee, CIA organizational

data and filing information also necessitates the withholding of this cable (see paragraph 39). In addition, the document confirms the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38), and contains cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), and information identifying a foreign intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

1238	Cable,	209	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	4 Dec 63			entirety	

This cable is concerned solely with a discussion of practices of a foreign security service and, as such, identifies the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38). The document also contains cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), a number of Agency components, names of Agency employees, and internal filing instructions (see paragraph 39).

1239	Cable,	210	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	4 Dec 63			entirety	

This document contains the travel and arrival plans of a CIA employee in a foreign country and, as such, its release would identify that named employee as well as the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-39). It also outlines the operational arrangements to be made upon this employee's arrival (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) and a number of Agency components and other staff employees. Internal filing information also appears in the document (see paragraph 39) as do cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

1240	Cable,	211	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	4 Dec 63			entirety	

This cable is a five-line continuation of the discussion of operational arrangements discussed in Document No. 1241 (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document identifies two CIA overseas installations (see paragraphs 37-38) and contains cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), CIA internal organizational data and internal filing information (see paragraph 39).

1241	Cable,	212	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	4 Dec 63			entirety	

This document from the field to Headquarters is concerned with Alvarado's travel and is denied to protect the methods by which the travel was arranged (see paragraphs 13, 20-32.) The cable is withheld, in addition, to protect the location of two overseas stations (see paragraphs 37-38), a number of Agency components and filing information (see paragraph 39). Several cryptonyms also appear in the document (see paragraphs 40-43).

1242 Cable, 213 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
3 Dec 63 entirety

This four-line cable from the field to Headquarters concerns the joint interest of CIA and another Government agency in the interrogation of Alvarado and a suggestion of how it might be accomplished. Information concerning that intelligence method precludes release of the document (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). In addition, the document contains cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), the identity of two Agency stations abroad (see paragraphs 37-38), Agency components, the identity of a staff employee, and internal filing information (see paragraph 39).

1243 Cable, 214 2 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
3 Dec 63 entirety

This document, sent from the field to Headquarters, concerns primarily the operational problems and plans relating to the interrogation of Alvarado. Its release would reveal an Agency operational technique as well as CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). Further, the cable identifies two CIA stations abroad, several CIA components and employees, and contains internal filing information (see paragraphs 37-39). In addition, several cryptonyms appear in the document (see paragraphs 40-43).

1244 Cable, 215 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
3 Dec 63 entirety

The four lines of this cable from the field to Headquarters further consider the interrogations of Alvarado with respect to his alleged sighting of Lee Oswald and, as such, relate to intelligence methods as well as sources (see paragraphs 13-32). The document also identifies Agency installations abroad, an Agency staff employee, internal organizational data, filing instructions and contains several cryptonyms (see paragraphs 37-43).

1245 Cable, 216 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
3 Dec 63 entirety

This document from Headquarters to the field reports the approval of Headquarters of the plans the field has made regarding the interrogation of Alvarado. In the case of one aspect for which alternatives had been offered, Headquarters determined which one should be used and the reasons for the decision. The cable also reports on the travel plans of one CIA employee.

The document is withheld to protect the specific intelligence methods by which Alvarado was to be debriefed (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), the name of a CIA employee, internal organizational data, filing information (see paragraph 39) and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

1246 Cable, 217 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
3 Dec 63 entirety

This cable from Headquarters to the field further discusses the interrogation of Alvarado and some of the specifics with regard to plans after the arrival of a named CIA employee (see paragraph 39). The document also reports that Headquarters believes that Alvarado is a fabricator.

As the document discusses intelligence methods, it must be withheld from release (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). In addition, the document contains filing information and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

1247 Cable, 218 2 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
3 Dec 63 entirety

This document reviews to date the developments in the field, and those projected for the future, regarding the interrogation of Alvarado. As such, it relates directly to sensitive CIA intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). Its release would also identify the location of the two CIA overseas installations, two staff employees and Agency internal filing instructions (see paragraphs 37-39). Cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43) and internal organizational data also appear in the document (see paragraph 39).

1249 Cable, 219 2 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
30 Nov 63 entirety

This document was sent to Headquarters from the field and reported on some preliminary interrogations of Alvarado and the interrogator's impression of the man. It also reported on the arrival of another individual who was to be important in later interrogations of Alvarado. The document, therefore, is denied to protect various CIA intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) and contacts. Cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), the location of CIA overseas installations (see paragraphs 37-38), the identity of a CIA employee and organizational data (see paragraph 39) also appear in the document.

1250 Cable, 220 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
30 Nov 63 entirety

This cable from Headquarters to two field installations concerns the retraction of Alvarado's story about Oswald and requests the particulars about that retraction. Further instructions concerning Alvarado are also forwarded in the cable. Release of any portion of the document would reveal operational methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) as well as the location of two CIA overseas installations (see paragraphs 37-38). In

addition, the document contains CIA organizational data, filing instructions, the names of CIA employees (see paragraph 39) and several cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

1253	Cable,	221	2	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	29 Nov 63			entirety	

This document from the field repeats Alvarado's story concerning Oswald and relates some of the difficulties encountered in verifying the story. Some of Alvarado's previous alleged activities are also reported. The document is withheld to protect the methods used to resolve the discrepancies in Alvarado's story (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document also contains CIA organizational data, filing information, the identity of a CIA employee (see paragraph 39), the locations of two CIA stations abroad (see paragraphs 37-38), and several cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

1254	Cable,	222	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	29 Nov 63			entirety	

This cable from the field is concerned solely with the various arrangements being made regarding the interrogation of Alvarado. It details the several people and organizations involved in that interrogation. As such, it relates directly to CIA intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document also contains CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39), as well as the pseudonyms of CIA employees and several cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

1255	Cable,	223	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	29 Nov 63			entirety	

The first two paragraphs of this cable from the field to Headquarters concern the developments regarding another individual who was thought to be related in some way to the Kennedy assassination and plans for future scrutiny with respect to this person. As such, the document is concerned with operational intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) and cannot be released. The one-line third (and last) paragraph is simply a statement about the interrogation of Alvarado. Additionally, the document contains CIA internal organizational data, filing information (see paragraph 39) and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

1256	Cable,	224	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	29 Nov 63			entirety	

This document, addressed to the White House, FBI and the Department of State, reports on the first sketchy results of the interrogation of Alvarado. There is some discussion about the veracity of Alvarado's story due to unresolved discrepancies in his information. As the substance of the document relates directly to CIA intelligence methods (see paragraphs

13, 20-32), it cannot be released in any form. Further, the document contains CIA internal organizational data, the names of CIA employees and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1257	Cable, 29 Nov 63	225	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document from Headquarters to the field contains "housekeeping" instructions with respect to the handling of information being received concerning Alvarado and another foreign source. Release of the document would reveal the identity of the second source as well as information relating to intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13-32). In addition, the cable contains CIA organizational data, filing instructions, and CIA employee names (see paragraph 39) as well as operational cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

1258	Cable, 29 Nov 63	226	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a message to the field requesting that Headquarters be frequently and quickly informed about all aspects of the Alvarado matter. A few suggestions are offered as to the manner in which this could be accomplished.

The document is denied to protect CIA's relationship with a source who would be asked to help (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43), the names of CIA employees and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

1259	Cable, 28 Nov 63	227	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This brief cable to the field suggests that another source be utilized, at least as a consultant, in helping with ascertaining the truth of Alvarado's statements. The cable is withheld because its release could identify that source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document also contains cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), the locations of two CIA stations abroad (see paragraphs 37-38), the names of CIA employees, filing information and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

1260	Cable, 28 Nov 63	228	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document, a message from Headquarters to the field, further instructs those in the field regarding some specifics to be considered with regard to the interrogation of Alvarado. As those specifics relate directly to a CIA intelligence method, the document must be withheld (see paragraphs 13, 20-32).

In addition, the document contains cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), the names of CIA employees, filing information and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

1262	Cable, 28 Nov 63	229	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This message to the field from Headquarters issues specific instructions with respect to the handling of Alvarado, as requested by the FBI.

The document is withheld to protect CIA's relationship with a source concerned with Alvarado's interrogation (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), several cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), the locations of two CIA stations abroad (see paragraphs 37-38), the names of CIA employees, internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1264	Cable, 28 Nov 63	230	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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Although this document carries the same date as the one described above, it exactly contradicts that message. This document is also a message from Headquarters to the field. It appears from the time-stamp on the document that Document No. 1262 supersedes Document No. 1264.

This document also discusses the advisability of the travel of a CIA source from a third country to help in the Alvarado matter.

The document is withheld to protect CIA's relationship with two sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), several cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), the names of CIA employees, internal organizational data, and filing information (see paragraph 39), and the location of two CIA stations abroad (see paragraphs 37-38).

1265	Cable, 28 Nov 63	231	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a three-line request from an overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38) regarding the travel of a foreign source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). It is withheld to protect that location and that source. In addition, the document contains cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), filing information and CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39).

1266	Cable, 28 Nov 63	232	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This cable from the field to Headquarters concerns CIA's relationship with a source regarding the handling of Alvarado after he initially revealed his alleged sighting of Oswald. The document also

concerns the interrogation of another individual who was thought to have had information concerning Oswald.

The document is withheld to protect CIA's relationship with a named source who provided the above information (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), several cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1267	Cable,	233	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	28 Nov 63			entirety	

This document from a CIA overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38) concerns the travel of a foreign source to provide information concerning Alvarado and to help in his interrogation and handling. Specifics are provided regarding how messages are to be sent between the interested parties and, therefore, the document relates to intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32).

The document also includes several cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39), and the location of two CIA stations abroad (see paragraphs 37-38).

1268	Cable,	234	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	28 Nov 63			entirety	

This three-line cable from the field to Headquarters advises about one specific aspect concerned with the interrogation of Alvarado and asks that arrangements be made immediately to meet this request. The document is withheld to protect the specific method to be used in this interrogation (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) as well as cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1269	Cable,	235	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	28 Nov 63			entirety	

This cable from the field to Headquarters provides the identity and brief biographical data and physical descriptions of the individual discussed in Document No. 1267 above.

The document is withheld to protect the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38), information relating to a CIA source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1270 Cable, 236 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
28 Nov 63 entirety

This document from the field to Headquarters reports that a foreign source will be made available to help with the interrogation of Alvarado and to assist in the evaluation of his recent activities. The field believes that this individual will be helpful regardless of how the handling of Alvarado progresses.

The document is withheld because its release would compromise the CIA source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), reveal the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38), as well as cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), the name of a CIA employee, filing information and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

1272 Cable, 237 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
28 Nov 63 entirety

This cable from the field to Headquarters requests an authorization with respect to the disposition of Alvarado and provides reasons why the field's suggestion is a good and valid one in view of Alvarado's past history, some of which is reported. The document is being denied to protect CIA's relationship with a source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), information pertaining to intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), the name of a CIA employee, internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1273 Cable, 238 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
28 Nov 63 entirety

This document provides the arrangements that should be made regarding the arrival of a foreign individual who was slated to help with the interrogation of Alvarado. As such, the document identifies a CIA source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), reveals the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38), and identifies the name of a CIA employee, internal organizational data, filing information (see paragraph 39) and a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43).

1277 Cable, 239 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
27 Nov 63 entirety

This cable concerns recent developments regarding several individuals who were thought to have possible connections to the Kennedy assassination. One of those individuals was Alvarado. The message also offers some alternatives and suggestions regarding the handling of these individuals, asks that this information be shared with another US Government official, and requests immediate instructions for further action.

The document is withheld because much of the information relates to CIA activities and relationships with sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). In addition, the document contains cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), the names of two CIA employees, internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1280	Cable,	159	2	Release in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	27 Nov 63			part	

The deleted portions of the first, third and fifth paragraphs of this document contain information relating to an arrangement with a foreign source (letter code B, see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and, as such, must be withheld. The deleted portions of paragraph 4 contain instructions regarding the methods by which Alvarado's story can be verified and, therefore, discuss the exploitation of this source. (Letter code F, paragraphs 13, 20-32.) The document also contains the names of CIA employees, internal organizational data, filing information (letter code I, J and K, see paragraph 39) and cryptonyms (letter code H, see paragraphs 40-43).

1281	Cable,	240	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	27 Nov 63			entirety	

The text of this document is identical to Document No. 1277 above. Only the distribution and the format differ. It is, therefore, withheld for the same reasons.

1284	Cable,	241	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	25 Nov 63			entirety	

This document is a cable from CIA to the FBI, the White House and the Department of State and provides biographical information concerning Alvarado as well as a small bit of evaluation regarding his activities. Because release of this information would reveal the identity of a sensitive foreign intelligence source, the cable must be withheld (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). In addition, the document contains the names of two CIA employees, internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1286	Cable,	242	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	27 Nov 63			entirety	

This two-line cable from Headquarters informs the field that another foreign source will assist in the interrogation of Alvarado. It is withheld to protect CIA's relationship with that source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), the names of two CIA employees, internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1287	Cable,	243	3	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	26 Nov 63			entirety	

This document is from Headquarters to the FBI, the White House and the Department of State and transmits an earlier message from the Ambassador to Mexico to the Secretary of State which was apparently also transmitted through CIA channels. As in the case of Document No. 1277, the cable concerns recent developments regarding several individuals who were thought to have possible connections to the Kennedy assassination. One of those individuals was Alvarado. Similarly, it offers some suggestions for the handling of these individuals and requests addressee response to these suggestions.

The document is withheld because much of the information relates to CIA methods and relationships with sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). In addition, the document contains the names of two CIA employees, internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1289	Cable,	160	1	Release in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	26 Nov 63			part	

The deletions in the substance of this cable from Headquarters to the field contain a cryptonym (letter code H, paragraphs 40-43) and information regarding CIA's relationship with a sensitive CIA source (letter code B, paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The remaining deletions in the document contain internal filing instructions (letter code K, paragraph 39), internal organizational data (letter code J, paragraph 39), the names of CIA employees (letter code I, paragraph 39), and the location of two CIA overseas installations (letter code J, paragraphs 37-38).

1291	Cable,	161	2	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	26 Nov 63			entirety	

This cable from the field to Headquarters contains only information which was obtained from a foreign intelligence source (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The information relates in part to an operation involving that source. The explicit nature of the information precludes release of the document in any part. In addition, the document contains the location of two CIA overseas installations (see paragraphs 37-38), the identity of CIA employees, CIA organizational data, filing information (see paragraph 39), and operational cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

CATEGORY 7

The 15 documents in this category all identify, or otherwise relate to, one individual who was, and in all probability still remains, an intelligence agent for a foreign power. During the period 1968-69 while this individual was serving abroad under journalistic cover, he became the target for an operation conducted by the CIA and was the subject of periodic surveillance.

Disclosure of the information in these documents would reveal not only the operational methodology utilized by the CIA in tracking the activities of hostile intelligence agents but also those particular personality traits and family or background details which might lead the Agency to evaluate a particular individual as a promising operational target. Such information, if publicly revealed, could enable our adversaries to devise methods to counter such operations or, conceivably, to mount a "provocation operation" by dangling a "suitable" target before our eyes.

For all of these reasons and for the reasons set forth previously, information relating to the intelligence methods revealed in these documents is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). More specific descriptions of these documents follow.

<u>Doc. No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
1077 Report, 16 Apr. 1969	151	8	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
<p>This document contains the translation of lengthy discussions between three individuals who are identified by name on the second page of the report. Two of these individuals were the Subject target and his wife. The discussions took place in a foreign country the identity of which, if released, would reveal the location of a CIA station abroad (see paragraphs 37-38). Disclosure of the document would also identify the operational target and CIA operational methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) as well as CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.</p>				
1086 Dispatch, 27 Mar. 1969	152	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document is a cable from a CIA overseas installation to headquarters containing an evaluation of information regarding the Subject target. The cable references documents which are not attached. Release of this communication would compromise the intelligence operation which provided this information on the target agent and would identify the method by which this information was collected (see paragraphs 13,

20-32). Additionally, the document is being denied to protect cryptonyms and pseudonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA employee names, filing data, and other organizational data (see paragraph 39); and the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37-38). This document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

1128 Cable, 23 Nov 1963	188	6	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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The four-line covering document, which appears to be a draft cable from CIA Headquarters to an overseas station, identifies Subject target, reports on his travel, and requests the addressee to report further on Subject target's activities, as well as the activities of another named individual. The attachments to the document list conversations between Subject target and other identified individuals which were obtained through sensitive intelligence methods. Release of this information would reveal CIA operational interest in Subject target, as well as the intelligence methods utilized to obtain the information contained in the attachments (see paragraphs 13,20-32). In addition, the document contains the name of a CIA employee, CIA internal organizational data, and filing information (see paragraph 39). Cryptonyms have also been withheld (see paragraphs 40-43). The document is classified SECRET.

1129 Note, 7 Oct. 1963	189	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document appears to be an entry in an index listing of documents. This document identifies another Government agency report concerning Subject target. Release of any part of this document would identify the foreign individual who was the target of the CIA and the subject of this file (see paragraphs 13,20-32). This document is classified SECRET.

1135 Memorandum, 19 Jun. 1962	190	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This memorandum, with a covering routing sheet, forwards to another Government agency the results of a name check on the Subject target. The memorandum indicates that information on Subject target from a usually reliable source identifies Subject target as working for a foreign intelligence service while posing as a reporter. The source also reported that, while on a visit to a named foreign country, Subject target was in contact with local Communist leaders and Cuban diplomats. This information must be withheld in order to protect the source of this report (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), as well as intelligence methods and CIA operational interest in Subject target (see paragraphs 13-19,25-32). There is a file number and internal organizational data which must be withheld (see paragraph 39). This document is classified SECRET.

The covering routing sheet is a non-record document and merely indicates the internal routing of the attached memorandum. It contains the names and initials of CIA staff employees, identifiers of CIA components, and an official file number, for all of which information exemption (b)(3) is claimed (see paragraph 39).

1136 Information Request, 24 May 1962	191	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a request from another Government agency for information on Subject target's spouse. It is not a CIA document, but was included in this collection because it is part of Subject target's official file. The document is withheld to protect CIA intelligence interest in this individual as noted in the introductory paragraph for this category of documents (see also paragraphs 13, 20-32). There is a handwritten reply referring to Document 1135 at the bottom of this document with CIA employee initials which must be withheld, as well as internal organizational data and an official file number (see paragraph 39). The document also reveals the location of a CIA field installation overseas (see paragraphs 37-38). This document is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

1137 Information Request, 24 May 1962	192	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a request from another Government agency for information on Subject target. It is not a CIA document. The document was included in Subject target's official file because of HSCA interest in Subject target's travel to a specific foreign location. Document No. 1135 is the reply to this request. This document is withheld to protect CIA intelligence interest in this individual as noted in the introductory paragraph for this category of documents (see also paragraphs 13, 20-32). There are internal markings, a file number, and a CIA employee name which must also be withheld (see paragraph 39). The document is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

1138 Memorandum, 5 June 1962	193	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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The information contained in this memorandum concerns the travel plans of Subject target and his family. Disclosure of this document would reveal an intelligence source and vital CIA operational methodology which must be protected (see paragraphs 13-32). The document also contains the name of a CIA staff employee, file markings, and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

1141 Cable, 3 May 1962	194	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a cable from CIA headquarters to two covert CIA field installations. The dispatch transmits information regarding the activities and affiliations of the Subject target of this category. Release of this document would reveal the Subject target and CIA methodology inherent in his development (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). This information also discloses a sensitive liaison relationship existing between the United States and a foreign government which must be protected (see paragraphs 33-36). In addition, there are cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43) and CIA employee names and other organizational data (see paragraph 39) in the document which must be protected from disclosure. This document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

1160 Telepouch, 24 Feb. 1968	153,195	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This telepouch, from CIA Headquarters to a field installation overseas, indicates that certain information from referenced documents concerning Subject target and two other individuals may be passed to Liaison. As stated previously, confirmation of a liaison relationship with a foreign government could seriously jeopardize the US Government's relationships abroad, and this information must therefore be denied (see paragraphs 33-36). This information also relates directly to intelligence methods, inasmuch as it reveals CIA operational interest in the three named individuals (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). Operational cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), as well as file numbers and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39) are also withheld. This document is classified SECRET. Note there are two plaintiff numbers listed for this document because of Plaintiff's error in requesting this same document twice.

1161 Telepouch, 10 Feb. 1978	154,196	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a cable from a covert CIA overseas field installation to CIA Headquarters requesting instructions regarding the Subject target. Release of the cable would reveal operational methodology concerning the target (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); our liaison relationship with a foreign government (see paragraphs 33-36); a cryptonym mentioned in the document (see paragraphs 40-43); and a file number, and other organizational data (see paragraph 39). It is currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL. Note there are two Plaintiff numbers listed for this document because of Plaintiff's error in requesting the same document twice.

1163 Cable, 30 Mar. 1976	197	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a cable from CIA headquarters to a field installation. It transmits a summary of the Subject target's biographical information central to the operational use of this target. Release of the document would reveal intelligence methodology involved in the development and use of a target (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The cable is currently and properly classified SECRET. Additionally, disclosure of the document would reveal the location of a CIA installation (see paragraphs 37-38), cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), and file numbers and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

1168 Cable, 23 May 1975	198, 155	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This cable is a duplicate of Document No. 1163 and must be withheld for the identical reasons. The only differences between the two cables are the dates that the cables were sent and the addressees. In addition, this version (Document No. 1168) has a one-line cable attached which cites the cryptonym assigned to the Subject target. This attachment is withheld to protect the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38), the name of a CIA employee and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39); and three cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43). It is classified SECRET. Please note that two Plaintiff request numbers are listed for this document, as Plaintiff in his request listed CIA list number 1168 twice.

1203 Cable, 3 Oct 1969	199	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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Information contained in this cable concerns the travel plans of the Subject target. Release of the information would disclose the methodology employed in the operational use of the target (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38); organizational data and a file number (see paragraph 39); and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43). This document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

1217 Review, 1968	200	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This form is a non-record document which was used for material that was reviewed at CIA Headquarters by staff members of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The document contains the name and signature of the staff member and is being denied in entirety in order to protect the identity of the Subject target (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). In addition, a headquarters file number is withheld (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL.

CATEGORY 8

The five documents in this category all identify or otherwise relate to one intelligence source of the CIA. All of the documents come from the official CIA official file of the source. As is evidenced by the documents, this individual provided important information to this Agency on Cuban government officials. Disclosure of the information contained in these documents would identify the source and thus possibly subject the source to retaliation. Additionally, and as noted at length previously, public disclosure of any source could deter potential sources from choosing to work for American intelligence. For all these reasons and for the reasons set forth previously, information relating to this intelligence source is exempt from disclosure pursuant to (b)(1) and (b)(3).

More specific document descriptions follow.

<u>Doc. No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
3802 Memorandum, 16 May 1963	293	12	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)

This 12-page document outlines the information received from the Subject source of this category in the course of several interviews with an officer of this Agency. The source supplied information of varying degrees of specificity on numerous Cuban government officials who might be of operational interest to us. The document is denied to protect the identity of the source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) as two lengthy paragraphs of this document contain operational proposals based on information received from this source. The document is properly classified SECRET, and also contains the name of a CIA employee, filing information, internal organizational data (see paragraph 39) and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

3814 Dispatch, 27 Aug 63 with routing sheet, 3 Sep 63	294	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a dispatch which contains a report on conversations held by source with an individual of interest to this Agency. It also contains a report of the personal observations of the source on activities of the individual of interest at his workplace and of his co-workers. This document is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document is properly classified SECRET and also contains the initials of CIA

employees, filing information, internal organizational data (see paragraph 39) as well as cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

3828 Memorandum	295	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
6 Nov 1963			entirety	

This document contains one page of a longer memorandum. It records information given by the Subject source of this category on a number of individuals, at least one of which was of operational interest to this Agency. This information concerns travel and work plans as well as comments on the political beliefs of some of the individuals. This document is denied to protect the identity of this valuable source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and to protect intelligence methods which are still in current use today (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document is properly classified SECRET and also contains cryptonyms and a pseudonym (see paragraphs 40-43).

3829 Cable,	296	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
21 Nov 1963			entirety	

This one-page document is a cable giving information received from a foreign government source on the travel plans of certain specified individuals, some of whom were of operational interest to this Agency. This document is included in this category because it discusses an individual named in one of the previous documents in this category. Release of this document could help to identify the valuable source who has reported on some of the individuals named. This document is denied also in order to protect intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 30-32), the site of an overseas CIA installation (see paragraphs 37-38), the foreign government liaison activity (see paragraphs 33-36), cryptonyms and pseudonyms (see paragraphs 44-49) as well as filing and organizational data (see paragraph 39). This document is properly classified SECRET.

3855 Form 3567	297	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
15 Sep 1978			entirety	

This document is a one-page form detailing the passage of information contained in the official file of the Subject source to another agency of the United States Government. This document is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is denied in full in order to protect intelligence methods. Release of this document could lead to the identification of an individual who was of operational interest to this Agency (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). This document also contains filing and organizational data (see paragraph 39).

CATEGORY 9

The five documents in this category are from the official CIA file on an individual of interest to the United States Government. As evidenced by these documents, this individual probably had connections with anti-Castro organizations and, thus, was considered to be of possible operational interest to this Agency. In other words, this individual was a potential intelligence target for the Agency.

The individual discussed in these documents ultimately became of interest to the HSCA, presumably because of his familiarity with the activities of the anti-Castro organizations. Because of the HSCA's interest, his CIA file was retrieved and became a part of the segregated collection. Certain of the documents selected by plaintiff come from this file. More specific document descriptions follow.

<u>Doc. No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
4393 Memorandum, 30 Nov 59	309	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)

This one-page document is a memorandum from the CIA Deputy Director for Plans to the Director, FBI. It indicates, in reply to a request from the Bureau, that all information concerning the Subject of this official file has been previously disseminated to the Bureau. Release of this document would identify an individual who was of operational interest to this Agency and would compromise intelligence methods still in use at the present time (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). This document, which is properly classified SECRET, also contains the name of a CIA employee and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

4394 Form, 30 Dec 1959	310	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This one-page form contains a hand-written memo to be inserted into the official file of the Subject of this category. It details several aliases used by the Subject and contains information considered very important to the welfare of individuals dealing with this Subject. This document is denied in order to protect against disclosure of the identity of this target and intelligence methods still in use at the present time (see paragraphs 13, 30-32). This document, which is properly classified SECRET, also contains the name of a CIA employee and internal organization data (see paragraph 39).

4397 Document Ref. 311 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
20 Jan 1960 entirety

This one-page form, apparently an index entry, details an FBI document that pertains to the Subject of this official file. To release this document would publicly identify the Subject who was of operational interest to this Agency. (See paragraphs 13, 20-32). It is properly classified CONFIDENTIAL.

4425 Document Ref. 312 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
7 Nov 1961 entirety

This one-page form, once again apparently an index entry, details an FBI document that pertains to the Subject of this official file. It is similar to document 4397 above. To release this document would publicly name the Subject who was of operational interest to this Agency. (See paragraphs 13, 20-32). It is properly classified CONFIDENTIAL. The CIA List No. was incorrectly numbered 4424 on Plaintiff's list

4431 Document Ref. 313 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
12 Jul 1963 entirety

This one-page form, apparently an index entry, details an FBI document that pertains to the Subject of this official file. To release this document would publicly name the Subject who was of operational interest to this Agency as well as the anti-Castro group to which he had connections. (See paragraphs 13, 20-32). It is properly classified CONFIDENTIAL.

CATEGORY 10

The four documents in this category are all concerned with individuals whose activities were inimical to the United States. Accordingly, these individuals became of counterintelligence interest to the CIA. From these few documents it is not readily apparent why they were included in the segregated HSCA collection. The information contained in the documents in the CIA official file on these individuals came to the United States Government from liaison with several foreign governments. Release of this information could result in identification of the foreign governments involved causing the possible repercussions discussed in detail previously. Additionally, disclosure could result in a refusal by those intelligence services to supply this country with any further intelligence information. For this and other reasons, these documents are exempt from disclosure pursuant to (b)(1) and (b)(3) in order to protect intelligence sources and methods. (See paragraphs 13-36.)

<u>Doc. No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
4554 Memorandum, 25 May 1949	327	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document is a one-page memorandum from the CIA to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This document transmits information, received by a foreign government and provided to the Agency, detailing the movements, possible end destination, and descriptions of several identified individuals. This document is denied to protect the intelligence methods involved (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) and the foreign information contained therein (see paragraphs 33-36). It must also be remembered that this government constitutes an intelligence source. The document is properly classified SECRET, and also contains the name of a CIA employee and filing data (see paragraph 39).

4564 Memorandum, with routing sheet, 13 Feb 1959	328	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a memorandum from the CIA Deputy Director for Plans to the FBI, transmitting information on the individual Subjects of this particular official file. The information contained in this memorandum was received from a foreign government intelligence service. It details the individuals' current travel plans, Subjects' stated reasons for that travel, possessions carried by Subjects, and reasons for criminal violations of United States Government travel regulations. This document

is denied to protect intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), and foreign government information (see paragraphs 33-36). This document, which is properly classified SECRET, also contains the name of a CIA employee and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

4578 Dispatch with report and routing sheets 29 Apr 1964	329	7	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This seven-page document, which consists of a transmittal dispatch, a report, and two routing sheets details a long conversation which an intelligence source had with the Subjects of this official file in a foreign location. The source at issue was the source of a foreign intelligence service which then provided that report to the Agency. This report, which is foreign government information, provided extensive information received by the source from the individual. This information was obtained from liaison with a foreign government. The document is denied to protect the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), the foreign government information (see paragraphs 33-36), intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), and a CIA oversees installation (see paragraphs 37-38). This document, which is properly classified SECRET, also contains filing information, internal organizational data (see paragraph 39), and a pseudonym and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

4579 Summary, 1945-1964	330	5	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document summarizes the information known about the Subjects of the CIA official file. Much of the information detailed was obtained from liaison with foreign governments or from other identified sources. Disclosure of any part of this document would identify the counterintelligence targets at issue, who became the subject of this file. The document is denied to protect the foreign government information (see paragraphs 33-36) and intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 30-32). It is properly classified SECRET, and also contains a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43) and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

CATEGORY 11

The 49 documents in this category all relate to the activities of one particular CIA human intelligence source, who is identified variously by true name, cryptonym, and other aliases used by this source. The documents came from the official CIA file which was maintained on the source. This individual was connected with an exile anti-Castro organization and also had access to certain Central American leaders and anti-Communist revolutionary groups. As a result, this source was able to provide the Agency with a wealth of information which was of immense importance to the Agency and to American foreign policy makers who, during the timeframe of these documents, were formulating American policy towards the anti-Castro groups and Central America. Eventually, the source's formal association with, and financial assistance from, the Agency was terminated, but the source continued to maintain a loose contact with the Agency for a while, passing along to his Agency case officer items of interest to the Agency.

Disclosure of the information contained in these documents would identify the source and subject the source to possible retaliation. Additionally, and as noted at length previously, public disclosure of any source could deter potential sources from choosing to work for American intelligence. For all these reasons and for the reasons set forth previously, information relating to this intelligence source is exempt from disclosure pursuant to exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3).

More specific document descriptions follow.

<u>Doc. No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
3333 Memorandum, 12 Jul 65	244	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
<p>This memorandum for the record details the gist of several telephone conversations between the subject source and his CIA case officer, during which the source outlined both his recent activities in support of the Cuban anti-Castro movement and his plans for the future. The document is denied to protect the identity of the source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), specific intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 30-32), the source's cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43); information which identifies a CIA staff employee; CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.</p>				
3335 Study, 13 Jul 65	245	58	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document is a study received from the subject source regarding a proposed development project in a named foreign country. This project was

of potential interest to this Agency in connection with certain programs and activities being managed by the source in that location. The source's activities in the area in question were well-known, and his identity could therefore be deduced from the subject matter and the location of the proposed project. The document, which is currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL, is therefore denied in order to protect the source's identity (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

3342 Cable, 22 Jul 65	246	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a two-page Intelligence Information Cable and a one-page transmittal sheet. The transmittal sheet, which contains no substantive information, is withheld in order to protect the names and initials of CIA staff employees, the CIA organizational components to which the report was disseminated, the report number, and a cryptonym. The cable itself reports on information received from a human intelligence source, who had contacts among the anti-Castro groups, concerning planned activities of the subject of this category of documents. The document is denied in order to protect the identity of the source of this information, as well as the identity of the subject of this category of documents, who is identified in true name (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43); the identities of CIA staff employees, and internal CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

3343 Memorandum, 23 Jul 65	247	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This memorandum for the record details a meeting held between a named CIA staff employee and a certain American individual who provided information to the Agency concerning the activities and contacts of the subject source in a named foreign country. The document, which is currently and properly classified SECRET, is denied in order to protect the identities of both the source of this information and the subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); names of CIA staff employees and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3347 Memorandum, 6 Aug 65	248	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This internal CIA memorandum concerns the mechanism by which the CIA provided operational support for subject source's activities. It is denied in order to protect the identity of the source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); specific intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 30-32); the cryptonym assigned to subject source, as well as the cryptonym assigned to the support mechanism (see paragraphs 40-43); the name of the CIA staff employee who prepared the memorandum and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

3349 Dispatch,
9 Aug 65

249

2

Denied in
entirety

(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document is a dispatch from a CIA field installation to Headquarters. It details information furnished to the Agency by an intelligence source concerning a contemplated arms deal between subject source and certain other Cuban anti-Castro individuals. The CIA staff officer preparing the report comments that this information correlates with other reporting the Agency has received from various sources concerning the activities of the individuals concerned. The document, which is currently and properly classified SECRET, is denied in order to protect the identities of sensitive human intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); Agency cryptonyms and a pseudonym (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA internal organizational data and file numbers (see paragraph 39).

3351 Dispatch,
13 Aug 65

250

3

Denied in
entirety

(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document consists of a two-page dispatch from CIA Headquarters to a covert field installation and a one-page official routing slip. This dispatch concerns a meeting held between CIA and representatives of another US Government agency to discuss that agency's operational interest in a named foreign individual. The second agency was informed that CIA was not in favor of coordinating any operational use of this individual due to CIA's poor opinion of him and his dubious activities, together with the fact that any covert relationship between the subject individual and the US Government could, if discovered, have an adverse effect on the political situation in a named Latin American country. In the final paragraph of the dispatch, Headquarters indicates that it has no objection to the Station passing to Liaison certain information concerning the subject of this dispatch. The attached routing slip contains comments made by CIA staff members concerning possible use which the Agency could make of subject source's contacts with the subject of the dispatch. The document, which is currently and properly classified SECRET, is denied in order to protect the identity of a potential source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); the fact of CIA liaison with a foreign intelligence service (see paragraphs 33-36); operational methodology (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); the cryptonym assigned to subject source (see paragraphs 40-43); locations of CIA covert field installations (see paragraphs 37-38); names of CIA staff employees and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3356 Memorandum,
26 Aug 65

251

6

Denied in
entirety

(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document consists of a four-page memorandum for the record with a two-page attachment. The memorandum details the substance of several conversations between subject source and several named Central American government officials. The substance of these conversations involved the

current political situation in the country at issue. A two-page attachment to this document contains the agenda of points raised by the subject source in interviews conducted with two of the Central American officials with whom he had meetings. The document, which is currently and properly classified SECRET, is denied in order to protect the identity of the subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); the name of a CIA staff employee and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3365 Letter, 4 Sep 65	252	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a letter from the subject source, on the official stationery of the anti-Castro group with which he was associated and signed with the alias he had used in the Cuban anti-Castro underground movement, to his CIA case officer. The letter presents the source's accounting for operational expenditures during the three preceding months. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is withheld in order to protect the identity of subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); intelligence methods and the address to which the letter was mailed (see paragraphs 13, 30-32); and the alias of the source's CIA case officer (see paragraphs 40-43).

3366 Form, 4 Sep 65	253	5	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a three-page English-language translation of the preceding document (CIA list number 3365, Plaintiff's request number 252), which is attached to a two-page internal CIA accounting form. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is denied in order to protect the identity of the subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); specific intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 30-32); an operational cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43); the name of a CIA staff employee and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3373 Memorandum, 8 Sep 65	254	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document, an internal CIA memorandum from a CIA case officer to his superior officer, is a status report on various activities being undertaken by the CIA, including those involving subject source, who is identified by true name. As such, it reveals detailed information concerning CIA operational methodology and the activities of subject source. The document, which is currently and properly classified SECRET, is withheld in order to protect the identities of sensitive human intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); specific intelligence

methods utilized by the CIA (see paragraphs 13, 30-32); operational cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); names of CIA staff employees and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraphs 39).

3378 Dispatch, 23 Sep 65	255	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This dispatch, from a CIA field installation to Headquarters, concerns the financial circumstances and possible future activities and business plans of subject source. This information was given to the CIA by another human intelligence source who obtained it from a third source, also a CIA asset. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is denied in order to protect the identities of sensitive human intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); operational pseudonym and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA file numbers and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3380 Dispatch, 29 Sep 65	256	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a one-page dispatch from a CIA field installation to Headquarters. It details information received from another intelligence source concerning subject source's financial circumstances and planned future activities. The two one-page attachments contain the identities, and in some cases CIA file numbers, of individuals mentioned in the dispatch. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is denied in order to protect the identities of sensitive intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); operational cryptonyms and pseudonym (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA file numbers and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3391 Cable, 20 Nov 65	257	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a one-page internal transmittal form and a three-page Intelligence Information Cable, prepared for both internal and external dissemination. The transmittal form contains the names of CIA staff employees, identifiers of internal CIA organizational components, the identifying numbers of the documents upon which the report was based, a comment by a CIA staff employee concerning the substance of the report and operational cryptonyms. The information in the cable itself was obtained from two different human intelligence sources whose identities could possibly be deduced from the descriptive paragraphs on each and from the specific nature of the information supplied. This information in each instance concerns Central American politics and the activities of certain named Central American personalities. The document is included in subject source's official file since it mentions a meeting between subject source, identified by true name, and two of the individuals whose activities are discussed in this report. The document is currently and properly

classified SECRET and is denied in order to protect the identities of sensitive human intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); names of CIA staff employees, and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39). Cryptonyms also appear (see paragraphs 40-43).

3397 Cable, 2 Nov 65	258	5	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a cable from a covert CIA overseas field installation to Headquarters. The cable summarizes information received from various sources concerning the activities and political orientation of a certain Latin American individual whose political plottings were of interest to this Agency. This individual was a contact of subject source, and the field installation authorizes passage to subject source of certain information contained in the cable. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is denied in order to protect the identities of sensitive human intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); the location of a covert CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38); operational cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA file numbers and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3400 Letter, 30 Nov 65	259	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document, written in a foreign language, is an operational report from subject source to a CIA case officer; the letter is written on the letterhead stationary of the anti-Castro organization with which subject source was affiliated and is signed with the source's underground alias. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is denied in order to protect the identity of this sensitive intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); and the operational alias of the CIA case officer (see paragraphs 40-43).

3414 Dispatch, 22 Dec 65	260	5	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a two-page dispatch from the chief of a CIA field installation to the chief of an operational division at Headquarters and to another covert field installation located overseas, together with a three-page letter from subject source to a CIA case officer. The dispatch concerns reporting received from subject source concerning an alleged conspiracy developing in a named Latin American country to overthrow that country's regime. The dispatch summarizes information received from various sources (overt and covert) concerning the individuals reported to be involved in the alleged conspiracy. The attached letter from subject source is the source's report on this conspiracy and the conspirators involved. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is denied in order to protect the identities of sensitive intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); the location of a covert CIA

overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38); an operational pseudonym and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA file numbers and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3416 Bio Reports, 14 Jan 66	261	7	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a two-page copy of an official internal routing slip transmitting biographic summaries (five pages) of five Cubans recommended by subject source for inclusion in a certain training program in Latin America. The names of these individuals were given by subject source to another individual, also involved in this training program, who in turn transmitted them to this Agency. The officer transmitting the bio summaries expressed his doubts as to the qualifications of some of these individuals and his concern as to how their acceptance into the program might tarnish the overall image of the program in liberal Latin American circles. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is denied in order to protect the identity of subject source as well as the identity of the individual who provided these names to the Agency (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); specific intelligence methods utilized by the CIA (see paragraphs 13, 30-32); names of CIA staff employees and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3421 Cable, 27 Jan 66	262	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a two-paragraph cable from a covert CIA field installation overseas to Headquarters. The cable reports on subject source's arrival in a foreign country and the travel of another individual, identified by cryptonym, from the same foreign country to the U.S. The cable also indicates that the station has no information concerning a certain activity of subject source. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is withheld in order to protect the identities of sensitive intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); operational and source cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); the location of covert CIA field installations overseas (see paragraphs 37-38); internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3428 Cable, 21 Mar 66	263	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a cable from a covert overseas CIA field installation to Headquarters. Subject source is identified by true name in this cable. The first paragraph reports on information the station had received concerning the possibility of Cuba lodging a protest with the host country with respect to subject source's anti-Castro plotting in the country at issue. This information was received from a sensitive

intelligence source whose identity could easily be deduced from the source description and from the specificity of the information which he provided to the Agency. The second paragraph contains information received via liaison from the host country security service concerning actions it had taken in anticipation of such a Cuban protest being lodged. The document, which is currently and properly classified SECRET, is being withheld to protect the identity of sensitive intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); the fact of the CIA's liaison arrangement with a foreign government (see paragraphs 33-36); the location of covert CIA field installations overseas (see paragraphs 37-38); operational cryptonyms, including the cryptonym assigned to subject source (see paragraphs 40-43); and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3429 Letter, 31 Mar 66	264	5	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of two letters from the subject source, on the official stationery of the anti-Castro group with which he was associated and signed by nickname, to his CIA case officer. The first letter presents the source's accounting for operational expenditures during the three preceding months. In the second letter, the subject source reports on the activities and contacts made by a certain named individual who had recently travelled to Europe. In a hand-written note at the end of this second letter, the case officer notes that subject source was subsequently advised that the Agency had no interest in further trips or contacts in Europe. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is withheld in order to protect the identity of subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); and intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 30-32).

3430 Dispatch, 18 Apr 66	265	6	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of an internal CIA routing and record sheet which is attached to a dispatch from a CIA field installation to Headquarters. The routing sheet reflects the various offices in the responsible operational division to which this dispatch was routed and includes various officers' comments on the substance of the dispatch and suggestions for further dissemination of the information it contains. The dispatch forwards for Headquarters information a copy of a letter addressed to subject source which the station had obtained by means of a specific intelligence method. The letter was written to subject source by a contact in a Latin American country and reports on the political situation and various Communist and pro-Castro activities in Latin America. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is withheld in order to protect the identity of the subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); specific intelligence methods utilized by the CIA (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); operational pseudonyms and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); names of CIA employees, CIA file numbers, and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3435 Dispatch,
27 Apr 66

266

10

Denied in
entirety

(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document consists of a one-page internal routing and record sheet, a one-page dispatch from a CIA field installation, and two attachments totalling eight pages. The routing and record sheet contains no substantive information; however, it lists the various branches within a CIA operations division to which the attached dispatch was routed and the initials and/or names of CIA staff employees who reviewed the dispatch. The dispatch itself forwards to Headquarters a report which summarizes information received from a sensitive intelligence source concerning various public statements made by the subject source of this category. Release of this information would reveal not only the true identity of subject source, but could also enable a knowledgeable observer to discern the identity of the source of the report itself. The second attachment is a copy of an article reporting a public appearance made by the subject source of this category. The dispatch and attached source report are currently and properly classified SECRET; although the second attachment is unclassified, its release would reveal the identity of subject source. The entire document is, therefore, denied in order to protect the identity of sensitive intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); intelligence methods utilized by the CIA to obtain this information (see paragraphs 13, 30-32); operational cryptonyms and pseudonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); names of CIA staff employees, file numbers, and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3440 Memorandum,
10 May 66

267

24

Denied in
entirety

(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document consists of a one-page memorandum for the record together with a 23-page attachment. The memorandum, which is currently and properly classified SECRET, indicates that the attached material was furnished by subject source during the course of a meeting with his CIA case officer. As the case officer notes in the memorandum, subject source was told that the attached reports had no significance to this Agency inasmuch as subject source was unable to provide details as to date and place the information was acquired and the end sources of the material. The attached reports, which appear to be unclassified, were xeroxed from very poor copies, and it is difficult to ascertain their import. However, a knowledgeable observer might be able to pick up enough information to enable him to identify the subject source. Accordingly, the entire document is withheld in order to protect the identity of subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); the cryptonym assigned to subject source (see paragraphs 40-43); and the identity of the CIA case officer (see paragraph 39).

3443, 3512 Form, 7 Aug 78 (Duplicates)	268, 281	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This non-record document is an internal CIA form which indicates that subject source's official CIA file was reviewed at CIA Headquarters on 7 August 1978 by an official of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Subject source's true name and file number are listed, together with the printed name and signature of the HSCA staff member who reviewed the file. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and must be denied in order to protect the identity of subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), as well as his official file number (see paragraph 39).

3457 Memorandum, 15 Jun 66	269	9	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a one-page memorandum from the Deputy Director for Plans to the Director of the FBI, a seven-page attachment, and an internal CIA routing and record sheet. The routing and record sheet is considered to be a non-record document; it contains no substantive information and merely lists the operational components within the CIA to which this memorandum was routed and the initials of CIA staff employees. The memorandum itself consists of two paragraphs, transmitting to the FBI a letter addressed to subject source from an individual in Central America, together with an English language translation of the letter. The FBI is also apprised of the results of Agency traces on the writer of the letter. The memorandum and its attachments are currently and properly classified SECRET and must be withheld in order to protect the identity of subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The memorandum also contains the name of the CIA staff employee who prepared the memorandum, a file number, and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3462 Memorandum, 28 Jun 66	270	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This two-page memorandum for the record details the gist of several meetings held between subject source and his CIA case officer, during the course of which various operational matters relating to source's anti-Castro activities were discussed. It is currently and properly classified SECRET and is denied to protect the identity of subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); CIA operational methodology (see paragraphs 13, 30-32); the cryptonym assigned to subject source (see paragraphs 40-43); and the name of a CIA staff employee (see paragraph 39).

3467 Pamphlet,
Jul 66

271

7

Denied in
entirety

(b)(3)

This unclassified document is a pamphlet produced by a professional organization in a foreign country. There is no apparent connection with source; however, presumably, this particular document was placed in subject's file for reasons which are not now readily apparent. It may have been provided by subject source himself. Its disclosure could provide a knowledgeable observer with the final bit of information needed to complete identification of this source. The document must, therefore, be denied in order to protect the identity of subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

3475 Dispatch,
22 Jul 66

272

5

Denied in
entirety

(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document consists of a one-page dispatch from a covert CIA field installation located overseas to Headquarters, a three-page attachment, and an internal CIA routing and record sheet. The routing and record sheet contains no substantive information but merely lists the organizational components and initials of CIA staff employees to whom the dispatch was routed. The dispatch forwards, for Headquarters information and/or action, information received from subject source concerning certain actions taken by the Cuban government with respect to foreign airlines. Subject source received this information from a Latin American contact who thought the information significant and requested subject source's assistance in getting the information into the right hands. The dispatch and the attached information received from the source are currently and properly classified SECRET and are denied in order to protect the identity of subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); the location of a covert CIA field installation overseas (see paragraphs 37-38); operational pseudonyms and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA file number, names of CIA employees, and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3476 Letter,
23 Jul 66

273

6

Denied in
entirety

(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document consists of an English-language translation of a letter from subject source to his CIA case officer. In this letter, source reports on various operational matters of interest to the Agency, including, inter alia, information he had obtained concerning Communist activities in Central America and information concerning various individuals of interest within Cuba. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is withheld in order to protect the identity of subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), and an operational pseudonym (see paragraphs 40-43).

3489 Form,
19 Sep 66

274

13

Denied in
entirety

(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document is an internal CIA biographical data form, completed and signed by subject source. As such, its release would not only reveal subject source's true identity, but would also reveal methods utilized by this Agency to evaluate individuals for employment by the Agency. It is currently and properly classified SECRET and must be withheld in order to protect the identity of this sensitive intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); and viable intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 30-32).

3490 Dispatch,
5 Oct 66

275

6

Denied in
entirety

(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document consists of a one-sentence dispatch from a covert CIA field installation overseas to Headquarters and to another covert CIA field installation; it transmits a five-page report submitted by a CIA case officer detailing the substance of an operational meeting between the case officer, subject source, and an associate of the source. During the course of this meeting, subject source's associate reported on contacts he had had with an individual whom he suspected of being a member of the Cuban Intelligence Service and who was attempting to recruit him to provide information to that Service concerning anti-Castro groups and activities. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is denied in order to protect the identities of both subject source and his associate (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); operational cryptonyms and pseudonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); the location of covert overseas CIA field installations (see paragraphs 37-38); and a CIA file number and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3491 Cable,
5 Oct 66

276

2

Denied in
entirety

(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document is a cable from a CIA covert field installation located overseas to Headquarters and to another covert overseas field installation. It presents a brief summary of the information which was reported at greater length in the operational report attached to the preceding dispatch (CIA list number 3490, Plaintiff's request number 275). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is denied in order to protect the identities of both subject source and his associate (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); operational cryptonyms and a pseudonym (see paragraphs 40-43); the location of covert overseas CIA field installations (see paragraphs 37-38); and a CIA file number and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

NOTE: With respect to Document Nos. 3489, 3490 and 3491 above, please note the following:

- A. Plaintiff listed Document No. 3489 twice in his list.
- B. There is no "Internal CIA Bio Data, 05 Oct 66," in CIA's Transmittal No. 6
- C. It is assumed that CIA No. 3498 (Plaintiff's No. 275) is the document for which Plaintiff wishes to have a description. (Dispatch, 5 Oct 66)
- D. Document No. 3491 is a Cable, 5 Oct 66, rather than a Dispatch

3502 Memorandum, 26 Oct 66	277	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a one-page internal routing and record sheet attached to a three-page internal memorandum from the chief of an operational branch to his division chief. The memorandum concerns termination of CIA support to subject source--it outlines the financial support given to source, both in the past and at the present time, and presents the reasons why the author of the memorandum feels this support should now be terminated. As evidenced by his signature on the last page of the report, the division chief approved the recommended termination. The attached routing and record sheet shows the routing of the memorandum and includes a recommendation from the branch chief to his deputy re advising certain U.S. Government officials of this action. The document is currently and properly classified SECRET and is withheld in order to protect the identity of subject source, who is identified by true name (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); information concerning intelligence methods utilized by the CIA (see paragraphs 13, 30-32); the names of CIA staff employees and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3503 Cable, 26 Oct 66	278	7	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a cable from a covert CIA field installation overseas to Headquarters. It reports on information elicited by a CIA case officer, operating in alias, during the course of two meetings with a certain individual who was of interest to this Agency because of his contacts with, and attempted recruitment by, the Cuban intelligence service. (See CIA list numbers 3490 & 3491, Plaintiff's request numbers 275 & 276, described above. As is noted in the description for document 3490, this individual was introduced to the Agency by the subject source of this category of documents.) During the course of these meetings, the individual concerned reported on his contacts with various Cubans and the various types of information which the Cubans hoped to receive from him. The cable concludes with the case officer's analysis of this individual's clandestine capabilities and requests that Headquarters provide the station with background information on the individual and the assignment

of a cryptonym. The document, which is currently and properly classified SECRET, is denied in order to protect the identity of this individual (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); intelligence methods utilized by the CIA in operations targetted against hostile intelligence services (see paragraphs 13, 30-32); the location of covert CIA field installations overseas (see paragraphs 37-38); operational cryptonyms and pseudonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA file numbers and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3506 Letter, 2 Dec 66	279	15	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a six-page letter from subject source to his CIA case officer, a seven-page English-language translation of the letter, an internal CIA routing and record sheet, and an internal official routing slip. The routing sheet is a non-record document and merely indicates to which country desks copies of the attached source report had been sent and in which numbered file it was to be kept. The official routing slip forwards the source report to certain individuals with the notation that these individuals might be interested in some of the information reported on by source concerning a specific Central American country. The letter itself, which is currently and properly classified SECRET, is subject source's report on a recent trip he had taken and includes details on contacts he made and information he gathered concerning Latin American politics and the activities of anti-Castro Cuban exiles. The document is withheld in order to protect the identity of this sensitive intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); the cryptonym assigned to the source (see paragraphs 40-43); names of CIA employees, a file number, and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3508 Letter, 18 Dec 66	280	12	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a five-page letter containing seven paragraphs from the intelligence source addressed to the CIA case officer. A seven-page English language translation of this letter is attached. The intelligence source reports on specific details concerning the activities of certain communist party leaders from Central America as well as the activities of anti-Castro revolutionary groups. It appears that the source was able to acquire this information as a result of anti-communist groups who were able to penetrate the specific communist party organizations. This information, if disclosed, would identify the intelligence source. As previously indicated, such disclosure of source's identity would subject source to possible retaliation. The document is classified SECRET and is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). An operational alias used by the CIA case officer as well as the alias used by the intelligence source and a cryptonym are also withheld (see paragraphs 40-43).

3517 Memorandum undated	282	7	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This memorandum is an emergency communications plan pertaining to the intelligence source. The memorandum is classified SECRET and is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

3524 Memorandum, 17 Jan 67	283	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a memorandum for the record written by the Headquarters case officer. The memorandum describes in detail the termination of the intelligence source and outlines a communication plan in the event that the source desired to contact the case officer. The document is classified SECRET and is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The operational methodology involved in terminating the source as well as a discussion of an operational activity performed by source on behalf of the CIA and the arrangement whereby source could re-contact the CIA has been withheld (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The name of a CIA employee, internal CIA filing instructions and organizational data have been withheld (see paragraph 39). In addition, the operational alias of the CIA case officer and a cryptonym have been withheld (see paragraphs 40-43).

3527 Letter, 3 Mar 67	284	6	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a two-page letter from the intelligence source addressed to the CIA case officer, with a two-page English language translation of the letter, and a photocopy of the envelope consisting of two pages. The letter details the operational activities of the source and describes the role of various individuals that will be involved in this operational activity which the source has set up in connection with an anti-communist revolutionary operation concerning Central America. The document is classified SECRET and is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). An operational alias used by the CIA case officer as well as the alias used by the intelligence source are also withheld (see paragraphs 40-43).

3545 Letter, 3 Apr 67	285	8	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a five-page letter containing seven paragraphs from the intelligence source addressed to the CIA case officer. A three-page English language translation of the letter is attached. The intelligence source reports on a number of subjects. In particular, source details an operational plan involving a political leader from Central America.

Included in the letter is source's opinion concerning events which took place regarding the Cuban political situation. The document is classified SECRET and is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). An operational alias used by the CIA case officer as well as the alias used by the intelligence source are also withheld (see paragraphs 40-43).

3549 Letter,	286	6	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
24 Apr 67			entirety	

This document is a three-page letter containing 14 paragraphs from the intelligence source addressed to the CIA case officer. A three-page English language translation of this letter is attached. The intelligence source reports on a variety of subjects including the political climate of a particular country in Central America. The source discusses the activities of certain individuals, involved in political activities in this country. The document is classified SECRET and is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). An operational alias used by the CIA case officer as well as the alias used by the intelligence source are also withheld (see paragraphs 40-43).

3597 Memorandum,	287	6	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
29 Apr 69			entirety	

The document is a Memorandum for the Record which consists of 14 paragraphs. The memorandum was written by a CIA officer who met with the intelligence source in a foreign country. The source outlined the various business dealings that source's company conducts in a particular country in Central America. Source also detailed the activities of certain individuals concerned with the Cuban political situation. The document is classified SECRET and is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the intelligence source who is clearly identified in this memorandum (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The location of a covert CIA field installation is withheld (see paragraphs 37-38) as well as internal filing instructions and organizational data (see paragraph 39).

3617 Cable,	288	3	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
14 Oct 69			entirety	

This document is a four-paragraph cable from a covert CIA field installation to CIA Headquarters and several covert CIA field installations. The cable is a report of a meeting between the source and a CIA officer in a foreign country. Source provided information regarding arms shipment to a Central American country by certain individuals. The cable is classified SECRET and is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). Other

information which is withheld from the cable is the location of several CIA field installations (see paragraphs 37-38), filing instructions and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39), and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

3627 Dispatch, 20 Jan 71	289	5	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a two-page dispatch from a covert CIA field installation to CIA Headquarters with a one-page routing sheet and a two-page duplicate of the dispatch. The five-paragraph dispatch concerns an operational meeting between a CIA officer and a business associate of the intelligence source. The business associate provided information on certain individuals involved in political activities regarding Cuba. There was also a discussion of the fact that the intelligence source had wanted to re-contact the CIA. The document is classified SECRET and is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). Information withheld from the dispatch includes the location of a covert CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38), the name of a CIA employee and filing instructions (see paragraph 39), a cryptonym and a pseudonym (see paragraphs 40-43). Information withheld from the routing sheet includes the names of CIA employees and organizational data (see paragraph 39) and a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43).

3650 Cable, 12 Mar 74	290	5	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a six-paragraph cable from a CIA field installation to CIA Headquarters. It concerns a meeting between two CIA assets during which a variety of topics were discussed including the business activities of the intelligence source and activities of individuals associated with anti-Castro groups. In addition, operational requirements were levied on one of the assets to develop information concerning Cuban exiles. The document is classified SECRET and denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and operational methods by which the CIA obtained certain information of operational interest (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). Other information withheld from the cable includes CIA field installations (see paragraphs 37 and 38), filing instructions and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39) and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

3651 Cable, 31 May 74	291	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a five-paragraph cable from a covert CIA field installation to CIA Headquarters and a covert CIA field installation. Most of the cable deals with the activities of a CIA asset who was a friend and collaborator of the intelligence source. The CIA asset needed

the assistance of the intelligence source in obtaining certain documentation. The document is classified SECRET and is denied in order to protect the identity of the intelligence source as well as the CIA asset (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). Other information withheld from the document is the location of covert CIA field installations (see paragraphs 37-38), filing instructions, name of a CIA employee, and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39) and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43).

3753 Memorandum, 25 Sep 75	292	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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The document is an internal CIA memorandum from a Division Chief to the Special Assistant to the DDO. The memorandum contains a list of CIA files located in the particular Division. The Senate Select Committee had requested to review these particular files. The file of the intelligence source identified in true name is among these files. The document is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is being denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). Release of this list of files would indicate the method by which the particular CIA Division maintains its filing system and is withheld (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). Other information withheld from the document include the name and initials of CIA employees, filing instructions, and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39).

CATEGORY 12

The 12 documents in this category comprise the official file of one individual intelligence source. This individual supplied the Agency with invaluable reports concerning the plans and activities of the anti-Castro organization of which he was a leader. As such, he furnished American decision makers with crucial insights into the workings of the political opposition within Cuba. After fleeing Cuba, the intelligence source named in these documents became head of an anti-Castro exile group based in Miami. Presumably because of his familiarity with the activities of a wide variety of anti-Castro organizations, the source named herein became of interest to the HSCA.

Although some of the information in these documents may appear superficially innocuous or unrelated to the source, disclosure could provide our adversaries with the final bit of information they need to complete identification of this individual. Additionally, and as noted at length previously, public disclosure of any source could deter potential sources from choosing to work for American intelligence. For this reason and the reasons set forth previously, information relating to this intelligence source is exempt from disclosure pursuant to (b)(1) and (b)(3).

More specific document descriptions follow.

<u>Doc. No, Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determinations</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
4445 Cable, 3 Dec 59	314	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document is a five line cable from a CIA field installation to Headquarters transmitting the essential data available to the station concerning the Subject source of this category. The document is denied, therefore, to protect the identity of this source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document, which is currently and properly classified SECRET, also contains the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38); information which identifies a CIA staff employee; CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4446 Cable, 4 Dec 59	315	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a three paragraph cable from a field installation to CIA headquarters. This message references the previously described cable, further identifies the source, and requests headquarter's authorization to

utilize a viable intelligence method. This document is classified SECRET and is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the source and the intelligence method involved which would both be readily identifiable should any portion of this document be released (see paragraphs 13-32). This document also contains the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38); cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); information which identifies a CIA staff employee; CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4447 Report, 9 Dec 59	316	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a CIA Information Report derived from an account provided by the Subject source of this category to another source, a prominent European. The document concerns the plans and observations of the Cuban-based democratic opposition to the Castro government. The report which is classified SECRET encompasses the opposition party's future plans, together with evaluations of the Cuban leadership and communist influence in the Castro government. The document is denied to protect the identity of the sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38).

4461 Cable, 5 Apr 60	317	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document which is currently classified SECRET is a two-page cable from a field installation to CIA headquarters reporting on a conversation the Subject source had with his CIA case officer. The message concerns the source's future travel plans and his opinions regarding the activities of particular anti-Castro leaders. The document is denied to protect the identity of the source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). This document also contains the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38); a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43); information which identifies a CIA staff employee; CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4475 Cable, 29 Mar 62	318	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a brief five-line cable from a field installation to CIA headquarters concerning the travel plans of the Subject source as reported to the field office by a CIA asset. The cable is classified SECRET and is denied in full in order to protect the name of the Subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); and CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4481 Memorandum, 13 June 62	319	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a one-page transmittal sheet and a two-page memorandum. It is presently classified SECRET. The transmittal sheet

which contains no substantive information is being denied in order to protect information which identifies a CIA staff employee; CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). The memorandum encapsulates the biographical and operational data available to the US Government concerning the Subject source of this category. The memorandum is being denied to protect the identity of the Subject source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

4492 Report, 27 Apr 63	320	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document contains pages 1 and 2 of a lengthier CIA Information Report transmitted in the form of an electronic message. The two pages are presently classified CONFIDENTIAL. The message reports a conversation between a source and his CIA case officer concerning the activities of an anti-Castro group. The Subject source of this category is mentioned in the message in conjunction with the operational planning of the group. Therefore, the document is being denied in order to protect the identity of the sources (see paragraphs 13-19; 25-32). The report also contains the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38); CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4502 Form, 24 Sept 63	321	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a form used by the Agency to transfer information to an official file. The completed form reports on an activity of the Subject source of this category. It is classified SECRET and is being denied in order to protect the source (see paragraphs 13-19; 25-32). This document also contains CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4513 Memorandum, 5 May 64	322	5	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is comprised of two routing sheets and a three-page memorandum. One routing sheet, which is classified SECRET, contains no substantive information. It is being denied in full in order to protect CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). The second routing sheet, which is also classified SECRET, is being denied to protect the identity of the Subject source (see paragraphs 13-19; 25-32), information which identifies a CIA staff employee, and CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

The three-page memorandum from a CIA field installation to headquarters is presently classified CONFIDENTIAL. It is a thirteen-paragraph report by the Subject source of this category

concerning a specific activity in which the source was involved. The concluding two paragraphs consist of the comments of the CIA staffer who received the report. The memorandum is being denied to protect the identity of the Subject source (see paragraphs 13-19; 25-32). This document also contains information which identifies a CIA staff employee; CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4517 Form, 6 Aug 64	323	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(3)
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This document is a routine form request from another Federal agency asking for information regarding the Subject source. The document is presently unclassified and is being denied in its entirety because release of this document in the context of this litigation would readily identify the Subject source of this category (see paragraphs 13-19; 25-32). This document also contains CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4528 Cable, 19 Sept 73	324	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a cable from one CIA field installation to another CIA field installation transmitting a compilation of all the information in the Subject source's 201 file. It is presently classified SECRET and is being denied in full to protect the identity of the Subject source (see paragraphs 13-19; 25-32). This document also contains the locations of two CIA field installations (see paragraphs 37-38); cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4539 Record, 4 Jan 60	325	12	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document, classified SECRET, consists of a routing sheet, a cover memorandum, and a two-part personal report. The routing sheet and the cover memorandum, which contain no substantive information, are being denied in full in order to protect a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43); the names of CIA staff employees; and CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

The two-part personal report is an internal Agency form especially designed to record data pertinent to operational use of a source. Part I of the report consists entirely of the source's biographical data. Part II details plans for the operational use of the source. Both parts of the report are withheld in their entirety because their release would identify the Subject source and the intelligence methods used in conjunction with the development of the Subject source of this category (see paragraphs

13-32). The report also contains cryptonyms and pseudonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). Please note that Defendant's Listing No. 4529 was not an "Internal CIA Memorandum, 4 Jan 60." It is presumed that Document No. 4539 was the one for which Plaintiff wanted a Vaughn description.

CATEGORY 13

The contents of this Category concern an active Cuban exile in whom CIA had an operational interest due to his extensive activities in the field of anti-Castro matters. He travelled widely, was in contact with several CIA sources and also, occasionally, with CIA staff personnel. The documents include a wide variety of reporting on this individual over a long period of time. It is not known whether the person is alive or dead, but the documents are properly withheld to protect him, CIA's operational interest in him, and the inferences and allusions to matters regarding intelligence gathering activities.

Further descriptions of these documents follow.

<u>Doc. No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
4614 Cable, 12 Aug 65	331	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)

This one-page cable forwards a two-page Intelligence Information Cable. The first page contains a description and an evaluation of the source who provided the information contained in the attachment to the CIA. That two-page attachment reports on the imminent operation in which a group of Cuban refugees, which included the Subject of this Category, was about to participate in connection with their anti-Castro activities. The second page of the attachment provides another, and unrelated, piece of intelligence concerning another group and another individual. However, the source for both parts of this report was the same.

This document is withheld to protect the identity of this source, who is described by his employment (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) as well as the identity of the Subject of this Category who was of operational interest to the CIA. Further, the document contains the name of a CIA employee, internal organizational data, filing information (see paragraph 39) and a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43). The document is classified SECRET.

4628 Memorandum, 4 Nov 63	332	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document contains a report of two meetings held in a city in this country between a CIA employee, the Subject of this Category, and, in one of the meetings, a CIA source or asset. The subject of the meetings was the potential funding of various activities in which the Subject of the Category wished to engage and for which he needed money. Various alternatives were suggested to arrive at a mutually acceptable arrangement, but the funding did not come to fruition.

The document is withheld because it relates directly to intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). Further, the document contains the name and alias of a CIA employee (see paragraphs 40-43), a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43), internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). The memorandum is properly classified SECRET.

4637 Dispatch, 27 Sep 62	333	14	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This dispatch, consisting of two pages, forwards a document from a field installation to the chief of an operational component. In the dispatch, the writer outlines in some detail the biographic and current activity background of the Subject of this Category. This information had been provided by three different sources which precludes release of the document, even in sanitized form. (See paragraphs 13-19, 25-32.)

The attachment is a copy of a recent pamphlet written and published by the Subject, in which he denounces many things about the United States and its government. This, also, cannot be released without revealing the source who provided a copy of it to the CIA.

The document also contains the initials of the pseudonym of a CIA employee and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). It is currently and properly classified SECRET.

4648 Form, Feb 1962	334	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This one-page form from one CIA component to another requests an operational approval for the use of the Subject in a named operation. The attachment provided basic biographic information on the Subject for the use of the component which will issue the approval.

Release of this document would identify the Subject, who was to become a source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and also the method by which CIA evaluates potential sources (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). In addition, the document contains two cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), the names of CIA employees, internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). The document is classified SECRET.

4658 Dispatch, 13 Apr 61	335	13	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a two-page dispatch, sent from a CIA field installation to the chief of an operational component, enclosing a copy of another of Subject's publications. In the first paragraph, the writer describes where, how, and through whom the publication was obtained, thus identifying the source (see paragraphs 13-19, 20-25). In the second

paragraph, the writer quotes extensively from the publication, and in the third paragraph he notes that the article attacks certain individuals and institutions while praising others.

The remainder of the pages contain the foreign-language publication discussed above. The document also contains a pseudonym and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), and filing information (see paragraph 39). It is classified at the SECRET level.

4663 Report, 25 Nov 49	336	5	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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The first page of this CONFIDENTIAL report from the field to Headquarters summarizes some of the information in the following four pages and outlines the reasons why the report was sent. The report itself details in depth the events and the personalities involved in a political student upheaval in a university located in a foreign country. The information contained in the document was supplied by a CIA source who is identified by a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43), and information from publications which were obtained locally. The students had divided into three groups, one of which was led by the Subject of this Category.

The report is very detailed in that it names personalities and happenings during a specific time period. Release of any portion of the document, therefore, could compromise the identity of the source who provided this information to the CIA abroad (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38). The pseudonym of the writer (see paragraphs 40-43) is also exempt from release. In addition, the document contains filing information (see paragraph 39).

4679 Cable, 1 May 67	337	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This cable provides the results of traces from the field on seven individuals, as requested by Headquarters. One of those individuals was the Subject of this Category. The document lists the document numbers which Headquarters would already have and also forwards other information concerning some of those individuals which was not available except in the field. These individuals were of interest to Headquarters because of a pending trial. This document is withheld because the information contained in it was provided by several CIA sources and there was some concern about their being compromised because of the trial. (See paragraphs 13-19, 25-32.)

In addition, the document contains cryptonyms for CIA sources and locations (see paragraphs 40-43), internal organizational data and a great

deal of filing information (see paragraph 39). The document is classified SECRET.

4686 Cable, 7 Oct 66	338	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This SECRET cable from the field concerns the results of a criminal trial and its potential ramifications to CIA interests. The Subject of this Category had some pithy comments about his activities vis-a-vis CIA's activities, which are elucidated in some detail. These comments were provided to CIA by two of its sources and cannot, therefore, be released. (See paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The cable also provides an evaluation of these happenings as they impact, or might impact, on field activities, location, and cover. (See paragraphs 37-38.)

In addition, the document contains cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); the name of a CIA employee, internal organizational data, and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4697 Form, 17 Nov 65	339	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This form refers to another document and summarizes its contents which concerned the travel of Subject to a foreign country. The document is denied to protect CIA's interest in this individual, who is identified by name and by file number. (See paragraphs 13, 20-32.) In addition, the document contains internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). It is properly classified SECRET.

4706 Cable, 15 Nov 74	340	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a SECRET message from the field to Headquarters and concerns the present documentation and appearance of the Subject of this Category. This information was reported to CIA by a source who is identified by a cryptonym (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32, 40-43). The Subject also reported to the source about some recent revolutionary activities. The remainder of the document contains administrative details about passing this information to the FBI.

The document also contains internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39), and reveals the locations of covert CIA overseas installations (see paragraphs 37-38).

4725 Document, 18 Feb 71	341	10	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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These ten pages contain a photocopy of an official document forwarded from the field which was issued to the Subject of this Category in alias.

A knowledgeable person could deduce his true identity were the document released. The document is withheld to protect identification of this individual, a man of interest to the CIA and is related to intelligence methods. (See paragraphs 13, 20-32.) The document also contains a CIA document number (see paragraph 39). The document is classified SECRET.

4736 Document Reference, 16 Jul 76	342	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This file card identifies an FBI document the subject of which was an organization with which the Subject of this Category was apparently associated. It is withheld to protect his identity and CIA intelligence interest (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document is classified SECRET.

4744 Extract, 29 Oct 77	343	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document contains an extract of another document which was to be found in another CIA file. It summarizes the subject of the second document, lists Subject's name and cautions CIA employees that the second document contains further information about the Subject. It is withheld to protect Subject's identity. (See paragraphs 13, 20-32.) The document also contains CIA file numbers (see paragraph 39) and numbers which identify CIA employees (see paragraph 39). The document is classified SECRET.

4755 Excerpt for File, 7 Jul 76	344	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(3)
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This document contains the contents of a news conference that was held by an official of a foreign country. The Subject of this Category was mentioned during the news conference, and the official offers some evaluation of him and his supporters.

The document must be withheld to prevent the disclosure of this Subject's identity, an individual of operational interest to the CIA. (See paragraphs 13, 20-32.) The document is UNCLASSIFIED.

4765 Cable, 15 Jun 76	345	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document concerns a possible coup in a Latin American country. However, the Subject of this Category is not mentioned in any fashion in the cable. The document was apparently placed in this individual's file because of his later alleged association with this coup.

The document relates in detail the alleged plans for the coup, which was to be orchestrated from another country and executed through a third. The ramifications of such a coup, plus a possible "back-handed" reason for it, are discussed in detail. All of this information came from a field source as reported to an overseas installation and passed to Headquarters in this cable. Its specificity precludes release of this document in order to protect the source who had close personal and ideological connections with the plotters. (See paragraphs 13-19, 25-32.) The document also requests Headquarters approval of certain actions on the part of the field.

In addition to the above, the document contains cryptonyms (see paragraphs 43-43), and locations of covert CIA field installations (see paragraphs 37-38), internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). It is properly classified SECRET.

4776 Excerpt, 22 Apr 76	346	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(3)
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This document contains a report of a press conference held in a foreign country. The document is in this Subject's file because he is mentioned on the final page. The document is withheld to protect his identity (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) for the reasons cited earlier. The document is UNCLASSIFIED.

4844 Extract, 5 Sep 75	347	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This one-page document reproduces three file cards which reference FBI documents concerning five individuals. Although it is not clear why these appear in this Subject's file, it may be that these persons were associates of the Subject. It is withheld to protect his identity, an individual of operational interest to the CIA (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

4855 Cable, 27 Oct 76	348	7	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This cable reports to Headquarters the full details of a specific incident that occurred in a foreign country regarding the Subject of this Category. The information was provided by a knowledgeable source who was an employee of a third country. It concerned his identity documents, among other things.

The detailed nature of this report could, if released, reveal not only the identity of this Subject but also that of the individual who provided this information to the CIA. (See paragraphs 13-32).

The document identifies the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38), cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). It is properly classified SECRET.

4864 Cable, 29 Oct 76	349	6	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is addressed to other interested U.S. government agencies from Headquarters and is classified SECRET. It reports the same information as was received from the cable described in Document No. 4855 and is withheld for the same reasons. In addition, the names of CIA employees appear in the document (see paragraph 39).

4876 Cable, 19 Oct 76	350	7	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is an Intelligence Information Cable from the field and is classified SECRET. Some of the information in it was provided to CIA by an official of the host country and other parts were provided by an individual with close ties to government officials. The information concerns the investigation by that country of an incident involving apparent sabotage. The reporters also alleged that the investigation might be maneuvered to accomplish a certain goal. Subject's association with some of the individuals in the target of the investigative maneuvering explains why this document appears in his file.

Protection of the sources of this detailed information and the identity of this Subject preclude release of this document. (See paragraphs 13-32.) In addition, the document contains cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), and the locations of covert CIA overseas installations (see paragraphs 37-38), internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

CATEGORY 14

The ten documents in this category concern an individual who had a relationship with this Agency for approximately six years. His citizenship was in question during most of that time because of his participation in an official capacity in an arm of a foreign government.

During the period of his association with CIA, he travelled often to the United States and was able to provide information to the Agency concerning internal matters of his home country. He also was in touch with many other individuals of his own nationality within the United States and was, therefore, able to report on their activities.

The documents in this Category all came from his official file and are withheld to protect his identity. All of the documents are classified SECRET except for the last document, which is classified CONFIDENTIAL. Further descriptions follow.

<u>Doc. No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
3891 Memorandum, 2 Apr 59	298	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)

This document is a form memorandum from one CIA division to another. It forwards a Provisional Operational Approval for the use of the Subject of this Category as a CIA source and states that an Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed. It also requests that certain necessary forms be supplied the investigating unit. The document is being withheld because it would reveal the identity of this individual, a CIA source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and because it contains information on certain methods which are used to ascertain the suitability of a source for employment with the Agency (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), the names of CIA employees, internal organizational data, and filing information (see paragraph 39).

3943 Cable, 3 May 60	299	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This cable from the field to Headquarters reflects conversations concerning an operational method discussed among several CIA sources, one of whom was the Subject of this Category. These sources are identified by cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43). It is denied to protect a method as well as the identity of those individuals (see paragraphs 13-32).

The document also contains the name of a CIA employee, internal organizational data, and filing information (see paragraph 39), as well as the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraphs 37-38).

3965 Cable, 300 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
25 May 60 entirety

This document forwards to a CIA overseas installation (paragraphs 37-38) a message from another field installation that was routed through Headquarters. That message was from one CIA source to another. The document is withheld to protect the identity of those two sources, who are identified by cryptonym and by the substance of their message (see paragraphs 40-43).

The cable also contains the name of a CIA employee, internal organizational data, and filing information (see paragraph 39).

3972 Memorandum 301 9 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
undated entirety

This document is a memorandum for the record which summarizes the conversations held between three individuals in an operational meeting. One of those individuals was the Subject of this Category. In general, the conversation was a "gripe" session on the part of one source regarding his handling and his relationships within the small source group to which he had been assigned. The Subject source of this Category was also a member of that group.

The document is withheld because its release would identify these sources and, almost more importantly, the manner in which this CIA operation was handled (see paragraphs 13-32.) The document contains the names of the two sources, as well as an internal file number and the name of a CIA employee (see paragraph 39) and a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43).

4027 Memorandum, 302 4 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
17 Jul 61 entirety

The first page of this document is a non-record Routing and Record Sheet containing a cryptonym, the name of a CIA employee, internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraphs 39-43). The three pages of the memorandum, the named subject of which is the Subject of this Category, concern the status of his citizenship as discussed by a named CIA employee in a meeting with him. During that meeting, the Source provided detailed information about his background, employment and activities. As a result of the meeting, the writer of the memorandum recommended to the Chief of a CIA division that two specific steps be taken to help in the resolution of this citizenship problem.

The detailed biographic information concerning this Source as contained in this document precludes release of either the document or Routing Sheet (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

4062 Cable, 303 4 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
3 Apr 63 entirety

The cable, from a field installation to Headquarters, is an Information Report. The first page contains background data on acquisition and source information. The material in the report concerned an operation which was allegedly going to take place and which was to be accomplished by individuals who were not in the employ of the U.S. government. However, the information came from a sub-source through the Subject of this Category and its release could identify both of those individuals (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32).

The document also contains a field comment about the possible reasons for the sub-source to have reported this information.

Further, the cable contains the cryptonym of the Source (see paragraphs 40-43), the name of a CIA employee, internal organizational data, and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4076 Memorandum, 304 5 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
21 Aug 63 entirety

This two-page memorandum concerns financial accounting and payment matters pertaining to this Source's CIA case officer. As such, it relates to an intelligence operation with which the Source was affiliated and which is identified by a cryptonym (see paragraphs 13, 20-32, 40-43). The memorandum has two photocopied attachments which are back-up for the financial request elucidated in the document.

The first page is a Routing and Record Sheet, addressed to a CIA component from the case officer, on which an officer of that component offers some suggestions concerning the claim being made and poses some questions. It contains the names of CIA employees, organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). The document is withheld to protect the above CIA equities.

4112 Dispatch, 305 7 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
24 Jul 64 entirety

This document contains a lengthy exposition of this Source's citizenship trials and tribulations, elaborating at length on his efforts to have his U.S. citizenship reinstated. Much of it is in the first person. In addition, the document, sent from the field to Headquarters, requests an investigation of the matter followed by appropriate remedial steps.

The third page (and first attachment) of the dispatch lists the identities of individuals mentioned in the Source's first person account.

The fourth page is a cover sheet to the second attachment which contains, on the fifth page, photocopies of the Source's personal identity cards. The sixth page contains an application for a U.S. visa, and the seventh page contains a stamp of arrival in the United States.

This document must be withheld because its specific nature clearly identifies the Source of this Category (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). The document also includes cryptonyms and pseudonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), the names of CIA employees, internal organizational data, and filing information (see paragraph 39).

4195 Memorandum, 16 May 74	306	8	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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The first page of this document is actually a Transmittal Slip regarding the disposition of the attached memorandum. The memorandum, which consists of one page, is in the form of questions and answers with respect to three individuals, one of whom is the Source of this Category. It appears that the document originally consisted of more than the one page, but it is not included in the HSCA collection. The questions relate to an investigation that was being conducted. Attached to the one page is a six-page detailed summary of the chronology of CIA's association with this Source.

This document must be withheld because the very specific nature of the information contained in it, even if released in segregated form, would reveal the Source's identity and the operational use made of him. (See paragraphs 13-19, 25-32.) The document also contains the name of a CIA employee (see paragraph 39).

4207 Form, 26 Aug 78	307	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This is a non-record document, classified CONFIDENTIAL, which provides the dates and the signatures of the House staff individuals who reviewed this Source's file in conjunction with the HSCA investigation. The document contains the Source's name (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and a file number (see paragraph 39).

CATEGORY 15--"MISCELLANEOUS"

<u>Doc. No., Date & Description</u>	<u>Plaintiff's Req. No.</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>	<u>Determination</u>	<u>FOIA Exemption Basis</u>
30 Note, undated	1	1	Released in part	(b)(1); (b)(3)
<p>This document is a one-page undated note entitled "Proposed Questions on Oswald Case." The material which has been deleted from paragraph 12 concerns a certain letter, which had been furnished to this Agency through the FBI and the Secret Service, and requests that the contents of the letter in question not be disclosed. The deleted information is currently and properly classified SECRET and relates directly to intelligence methods (letter code F; see paragraphs 13,20-32).</p>				
32 Inventory of Documents	3	2	Release in part	(b)(3)
<p>This document entitled "Inventory of Documents Contained in the Oswald Dossier Forwarded to the Commission" is being released in part. The only deletions from this document consist of internal CIA filing numbers and organizational data (letter codes K and J, see paragraph 39). This document is unclassified.</p>				
33 Memorandum, Undated	4	4	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
<p>This internal CIA memorandum, which consists of five paragraphs, is from a Branch Chief to a Division Chief. This document deals with a specific problem regarding sensitive human intelligence sources and provides an assessment of the problems arising from this situation and a recommended course of action that should be undertaken in order to resolve the matter. As a result, the document contains detailed information concerning the activities of these human intelligence sources, as well as their operational methodology. The document is denied in order to protect the identities of these human intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), operational methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), location of CIA field installations (see paragraph 37), cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), organizational data, employee names and filing information (see paragraph 39). The document is classified SECRET.</p>				
37 Note, undated	5	1	Release in part	(b)(1); (b)(3) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

This document is a note which contains a brief biography of an individual named Jack Rubenstein, whose name is the same as Jack Ruby's but whose background obviously shows that he is a separate individual in

no way related to the Jack Ruby who killed Lee Harvey Oswald. Information which is deleted from the first sentence of this note refers to the name of a human intelligence source (letter code A, see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and internal filing information (letter code K, see paragraph 39). Information which concerns the personal privacy of third parties is deleted as disclosure of such material would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of these individuals (letter code L, see paragraphs 44-49). Information in this document originated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is being withheld to protect confidential information provided to the FBI by a confidential source during the course of a legitimate law enforcement investigation (letter code M, see paragraphs 50-53). This document is classified SECRET.

38 Notes, undated 6 9 Release in (b)(1); (b)(3)
part

This document contains notes regarding Project ZRRIFLE. The deleted portions of the document refer to the location of a CIA field installation (letter code G, see paragraph 37), information which identifies an intelligence source (letter code A, see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and classification markings (letter code N, see paragraph 51). This document is classified SECRET.

45 Transcript 163 8 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
22 Nov 63 entirety

This document consists of a foreign language transcript of various conversations and an English translation of one of these conversations. The conversation which has been translated is between two individuals who were discussing the assassination of President Kennedy, what was publicly known so far regarding his assassin, and the implications of the assassination. The document identifies the precise location abroad at which these conversations took place and thus, by implication, the existence of a covert CIA field installation in that country. The transcript was obtained by the CIA through a liaison arrangement with a foreign government and is denied in its entirety to protect the fact of the existence of this liaison relationship (see paragraphs 33-36), the intelligence collection methods by which the transcript was obtained (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38), and a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

69 Cable, 13 1 Release in (b)(6)
1 May 42 part

This document is released in part, the only deletions made to protect the privacy of the individual whose papers were being discussed. (Letter code L, see paragraphs 44-49). The document is in this collection because the HSCA requested information on this individual. However, since the individual is still alive and would be embarrassed, to say the least, should this document be released in full, we are withholding under

exemption (b)(6) the information which would identify the subject of this cable. This person also had a later relationship with the source described in Category 5.

102	Dispatch	15	8	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	21 Oct 48, with a Routing & Record Sheet				

This dispatch is from one CIA field installation to another CIA field installation. The document, which consists of three paragraphs, provides a list of communists and suspected communists in Central America. The list was forwarded to the CIA field installation for purposes of evaluating the productivity and reliability of a human intelligence source. The document is denied in order to protect information pertaining to an intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), information which would reveal the existence of a foreign liaison relationship (see paragraphs 32-36), the location of CIA field installations (see paragraph 37), filing information (see paragraph 39), and pseudonyms (see paragraphs 40-43). The document is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

103	Card,	16	1	Release in part	(b)(3)
	4 Nov 48				

This photocopy of an internal card on an individual is being released in part. Deletions from this card refer to internal filing instructions (see paragraph 39).

126	Note,	165	1	Released in part	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	undated				

The deletions in this document contain the following: the name of a CIA employee (letter code I, see paragraph 39); CIA organizational data (letter code J, see paragraph 39); the full name of an intelligence source (letter code B, see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); and a cryptonym (letter code H, see paragraphs 40-43).

138	Table of	18	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	Contents, Undated				

This document is a table of contents of material which was used in Executive Session Testimony during the Richard Helms hearing. The document is being denied to protect information which would identify an intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), operational methodology (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). This document is classified SECRET.

142	Table of Contents, undated	166	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document consists of a Table of Contents listing and describing various CIA documents in connection with an executive hearing at which Richard Helms testified. A number of the documents listed are cables received from covert CIA field installations abroad, intelligence information reports and memoranda concerning the activities of Lee Harvey OSWALD, documents reporting on information received concerning allegations of foreign involvement in the assassination of JFK, and memoranda concerning the debriefing of a human intelligence source (identified by cryptonym). The document is denied in its entirety to protect the location of covert CIA field installations overseas (see paragraphs 37-38), the cryptonym of an intelligence source (see paragraphs 40-43), and information which could reveal methods utilized by the CIA in collecting foreign intelligence (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

149	Notes	19	35		
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This document was originated by a staff member of the House Committee on Assassinations. Pursuant to this Court's previous decision and order, these notes are not "Agency records" for purposes of this litigation. Therefore, they should not have been included in the installments of documents processed for release to the plaintiff. These notes will not be described any further.

156	Memorandum, with attachment, 4 Apr 50	20	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This memorandum is from an internal CIA division to another CIA internal division and transmits as an attachment a secrecy agreement. The document is being denied to protect the identity of a human intelligence source who is clearly identified in the document (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). In addition, information pertaining to intelligence methods is being withheld (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), as well as the names of CIA employees and CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is classified SECRET.

166	Report, with attachments, 21 Jun 50	22	9	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3), (b)(6)
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This report concerns an individual who is described as an American dealer in arms. The information contained in the report is very detailed and was provided by various intelligence sources. This information is

being withheld to protect the intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). Information which reflects material received from a foreign liaison service is also being withheld (see paragraphs 32-36). Disclosure of any information regarding this individual's activities would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and is being withheld (see paragraphs 44-49). The attachments to this report consist of two internal CIA routing and record sheets, an internal cover sheet and an internal source evaluation card. Other information being withheld is the location of CIA field installations (see paragraph 37), CIA employee names, filing instructions, organizational data (see paragraph 39), and a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43). The document is classified SECRET.

174	Dispatch	23	17	Released in	(b)(1); (b)(3);
	9 Aug 51			part	(b)(7)(C);
	with attachments				(b)(7)(D)

The CIA deletions in this document contain the initials of a CIA employee (letter code I, internal organizational data (letter code J) and classification markings (letter code N; please see paragraph 39.)

The United States Customs Service has deleted information in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the dispatch and also all of the first attachment. The material deleted from the dispatch identifies three individuals involved in an investigation conducted by the Department of the Treasury and is deleted in order to protect the personal privacy of these individuals, one of whom furnished this information in confidence to representatives of the Customs Service. The first attachment is a letter, dated 20 March 1951, from a field office of the Customs Service to the Commissioner of Customs. It contains a detailed account of an illegal arms traffic plot between two foreign countries. The attachments to this letter contain re-typed copies of various documents substantiating the claims of the illegal plan. This attachment is withheld in order to protect the privacy of individuals concerned in the investigation of this plot, as well as the identities of individuals who furnished information regarding this plot and the information provided by these confidential sources (Letter code M; see paragraphs 50-53).

The second attachment to the dispatch is a memorandum dated 31 May 1951 from an FBI field office to the Department of Treasury representative in a foreign country and concerns smuggling activities. It, and a portion of paragraph 3 of the CIA dispatch, are withheld to protect the identity of the confidential informant who reported these matters to the FBI and the privacy of other individuals who were identified in connection with these matters (Letter code M; see paragraphs 50-53).

176	Dispatch,	24	3	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	18 Sep 51			entirety	

The first page of this document is a nonrecord Routing and Record Sheet with no substantive information on it. It does contain CIA filing information and CIA employee initials (see paragraph 39). The two pages of

the dispatch concern a foreign individual who made an extended trip through several foreign countries and did it in an unusual manner. During the course of this sojourn, this person presumably met, but in any event carried a letter from, an individual who was of interest to the HSCA but about whom there is only a peripheral reference in this document. Release of this document would reveal the identity of the source who provided a detailed description of the travels of this individual. The dispatch was sent to Headquarters as well as two other field offices where the subject was likely to travel. (See paragraph 13-19, 25-32). The location of three CIA overseas installations (see paragraph 37); a pseudonym (see paragraphs 40-43); CIA internal organizational data, CIA filing information, as well as classification markings (see paragraphs 39), also appear in the document. Portions of the document are classified CONFIDENTIAL.

179	Form,	25	3	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	16 Nov 51			entirety	

This document contains biographical data on an individual who was of operational interest. The document is being denied to protect the fact of a U.S. intelligence interest in this individual. Information pertaining to operational methods is being withheld (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). Other information being withheld from this document concerns CIA filing instructions (see paragraph 39). This document is classified SECRET.

180	Dispatch	26	9	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3);
	26 Nov 51			entirety	(b)(6)

This document is a two-page dispatch with a five-page attachment from a CIA field installation to CIA Headquarters. The dispatch outlines the escape of a number of individuals from a Communist Bloc country. The administrative procedures involved with their subsequent relocation and evaluation of potential operational interest is discussed in the dispatch. The attachment describes in great detail the events surrounding their escape. The document is being withheld to protect operational methodology (see paragraphs 13, 20-32) and to protect the personal privacy of these individuals as disclosure of such information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of their personal privacy (see paragraphs 44-49). Additional information which is being withheld is the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37), CIA organizational data and filing instructions (see paragraph 39), and pseudonyms and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43). This document is classified SECRET.

198	Form,	30	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	29 Feb 52			entirety	

This form is a name trace request of a potential intelligence source. The document is being withheld to protect the identity of this intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), as well as operational methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). Internal file instructions are also being withheld (see paragraph 39). This document is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

241	Memorandum	37	4	Released in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	26 Jan 53			part	

This document consists of a one-page CIA inter-office memorandum attached to a three-page report entitled "Indoctrination Approach Used to Induce U.S. Department of Defense Reserve Officers to Serve in Combat Duty with a Foreign Government." The information in this report was furnished to the CIA by the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Naval Intelligence Command has reviewed this report at our request and has determined that it contains no information currently requiring classification for national security reasons; therefore, the report is being released in full to the Plaintiff.

The covering memorandum merely forwards the report from one CIA division to another, identifies yet another CIA division to which the report is being disseminated, and indicates that it will not be published. This memorandum is classified at the CONFIDENTIAL level and must be withheld in order to protect names of CIA staff employees, CIA report and file numbers, and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39).

248	Memorandum	39	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	3 Mar 53			entirety	

This memorandum requests a name check on a potential intelligence source. The document is being withheld to protect the identity of this intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) as well as operational methods (see paragraph 13, 20-32). CIA organizational data is also being withheld (see paragraph 39). This document is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

257	Dispatch	40	9	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	30 Mar 53			entirety	

This document is a nine-page dispatch from a CIA field installation to CIA Headquarters. This document forwards an overview of communist activities in a specific country in Central America. The information in this dispatch was provided by a number of human intelligence sources and by a foreign intelligence service. Due to the very specific nature of the information provided, release of this material would be recognized by these intelligence sources and by the foreign intelligence service. The information is being withheld to protect these intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19; 25-32) and also because the relationship between CIA and the foreign intelligence service would be damaged as a result of the disclosure (see paragraphs 32-36). Other information being withheld is the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37), a pseudonym (see paragraphs 40-43), CIA organizational data and filing instructions (see paragraph 39). The document is classified SECRET.

267	List	41	1	Denied in	(b)(3)
	28 Aug 53			entirety	

This is a non-record document which lists the numbers of ten documents which one CIA component located following a request for information

concerning one U.S. defector. Its release would reveal CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

278	Report	43	3	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	10 Mar 54			entirety	

This two-page report with a one-page cover sheet concerns revolutionary activities in Cuba. The information in this report was provided by a human intelligence source. The report discusses specific events which took place and release of this information would reveal the intelligence source who provided the information; therefore, the document is being withheld to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19; 25-32). The location of a CIA field installation is being withheld (see paragraph 37), as well as pseudonyms, a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43), a file number and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). This document is classified SECRET.

295	Memorandum	45	1	Released	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	29 Jul 54			in part	

The material deleted in paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as a portion of paragraph 2, relate to methods by which information is obtained (letter code F, see paragraphs 13, 20-32). Some of that information is also reported. In addition, the document contains CIA organizational data and filing information (letter codes J and K, see paragraph 39) as well as the name and signature of a CIA employee (letter code I, see paragraph 39). The full text copy of the document is classified SECRET. No attachments accompany this document.

503	Dispatch, with attachment	53	8	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	5 Jun 59			entirety	

This document is a two-page dispatch with a six-page attachment from a CIA field installation to CIA Headquarters. The dispatch forwards an attachment which is a form that contains biographic data on a specific individual. The information from this form is used to assess an individual's capabilities for use as a potential intelligence source. The document is denied in order to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19; 25-32) and the operational method used by the CIA for intelligence collection (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). Additional information which is being withheld is the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37), a pseudonym (see paragraphs 40-43), CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). The document is classified SECRET.

522	Dispatch, with	55	4	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	Routing & Record			entirety	
	Sheet, 17 Jul 79				

This document is a three-page dispatch from a CIA field installation to CIA Headquarters, with a one-page internal Routing and Record Sheet. The dispatch records several meetings which the writer had with an intelligence source. The source provided information on the activities of certain individuals who were of operational interest, as well as comments regarding source's personal life. The document is denied to protect the identity of the intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19), 25-32). Additional information being withheld is the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37), a pseudonym and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), CIA organizational data and filing instructions (see paragraph 39). This document is classified SECRET.

540	Dispatch,	167	10	Denied in	(b)(1), (b)(3)
	28 Sep 1959			entirety	

This document, a dispatch from an overseas CIA installation to the Chief of an operational division, contains a detailed report on the activities of a human intelligence source, a Cuban exile who was a member of an anti-Castro organization which was conducting military training for anti-Castro rebels in the country in question. The dispatch also details the assistance given this individual by the CIA Station after his passport had been stolen and he was fearful of imminent arrest and interrogation by the the security services of the country at issue. The document identifies this source by both cryptonym and true name and also contains the true name identity of a covert CIA staff employee. Disclosure of this information would reveal CIA targets of interest and the Agency's connections with and support of these anti-Castro groups, as well as specific details of operational methodology utilized by the Station in assisting this source. The document is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of the human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), CIA operational methodology (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), location of a CIA covert field installation abroad (see paragraphs 37-38), a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43), and the identity of a CIA staff employee (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

587	Memorandum	57	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	29 Oct 59			entirety	

This internal CIA memorandum, from the Chief of an operational division to the chief of a division within the Office of Security, indicates that the operational division has no further interest in contacting a particular subject and, therefore, its request for security checks on that individual may be cancelled. This document is denied in order to protect the identity of the subject concerned, a potential human

intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), the identity of a CIA employee and identity of CIA organizational components (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL.

588 Cable 58 1
31 Oct 59

This document originated with the Department of State and was forwarded to that agency for review and direct response to the Plaintiff.

632 Newspaper 71 1 Release in full
Clipping, 16 Nov 59

This document, an article from The Washington Post about Lee Harvey Oswald, has been released in full.

637 File card, 76 1 Release in (b)(7)(C)
18 Nov 59 part

This document is a copy of a file card which lists two FBI documents by date, classification, subject, and FBI file number. The subjects have been deleted at the request of the FBI in order to protect the identities of individuals named in law enforcement files (letter code M, see paragraphs 50-53).

675. Note 105 1 Released in (b)(3)
23 Dec 59 part

The only deletions in this document are the name of a CIA employee (letter code I, see paragraph 39) and a file number (letter code K, see paragraph 39).

676. Note 106 1 Released in (b)(3)
24 Dec 59 part

The only deletion in this document is a file number (letter code K, see paragraph 39).

682 Form, 1960 111 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
entirety

This document is a case processing record transmittal sheet requesting national agency name traces on a named individual, a human intelligence source. The document is denied in order to protect the identity of this intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); operational methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); the name of a CIA employee and internal filing, and information processing information (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL.

683 Memo, 1960 112 4 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
entirety

This document is an internal CIA memorandum from the chief of a domestic office to a division chief. It contains information received from a sensitive human intelligence source concerning the programs and activities of a foreign political opposition group. The document identifies the source by name and the circumstances under which the information was obtained. It is denied in order to protect the identity of this human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); the location of an unacknowledged domestic installation (see paragraphs 37-38); the name of a CIA employee and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

685 Memo, 1960 114 4 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
entirety

This document is an internal CIA memorandum from the chief of a domestic office to a division chief. It contains contact and personal biographic information concerning members of a foreign political group who might be of possible operational interest to this Agency. The information was provided by a sensitive human intelligence source. The document is denied in order to protect the identity of this human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), and the name of a CIA staff employee and internal filing information (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

686 Cable, 115 1 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
6 Jan 60 entirety

This cable discusses the personal situation of a sensitive human intelligence source, as well as the source's current intelligence value and future operational potential. It proposes a recommended course of action with regard to future use of this intelligence source or termination of his intelligence activities. As such, it reveals detailed information concerning CIA operational methodology and the activities of this source. The document is denied in order to protect the identity of this human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); CIA operational methodology (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37); cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43); and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

688 Memo, 8 Jan 60 116 3 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
entirety

This document presents a proposal for renewal of a sensitive intelligence collection project and, in support of this renewal request, discusses the intelligence objectives of the project, the operations and

activities of the principal agents involved, and the funding required to support the various phases of the project. As such, the document contains detailed information regarding the activities of these intelligence agents, their operational methodology, and intelligence collection techniques utilized by the CIA. The document is denied in order to protect the identities of these intelligence agents (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); operational methods utilized by the CIA in the collection of foreign intelligence (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37); pseudonyms and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); and the identity of CIA organizational components (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

689	Memorandum	117	10	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	w/att.			entirety	
	8 Jan 60				

This internal CIA document consists of a three-page memorandum (a duplicate of No. 688) with a seven-page attachment. The attachment reviews the intelligence objectives of the project, the activities and accomplishments of the various intelligence sources involved with it during the preceding year, and the funding required to support the various phases of the project. As such, the document contains detailed information concerning the activities of human intelligence sources, their operational methodology, and intelligence collection techniques utilized by the CIA. The document is denied in order to protect the identities of these human intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); operational methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37); pseudonyms and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); and information identifying a CIA organizational component (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

712.	Note	119	1	Released in
	6 Feb 60			full

NOTE: Document No. 707 (Plaintiff's No. 119) was not listed as a "Note, 6 Feb 60." A check with Plaintiff's attorney confirmed that No. 712 was the correct number.

720	Cable,	120	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	12 Feb 60			entirety	

This cable concerns the arrival of a group of Soviet musicians at an overseas location for concert engagements. The information does not pertain to the request which is the basis for the instant litigation. It is denied in order to protect the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraph 37); cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

742	Memo,	124	3	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	9 Mar 60			entirety	

This document is an internal CIA memorandum from the chief of a domestic office to a division chief. It contains information received from a human intelligence source concerning his recent travels abroad and his impressions of certain foreign personalities and groups with whom he came in contact. As such, it reveals an intelligence methodology utilized by the CIA to obtain foreign intelligence, as well as information pertaining to the sensitive human intelligence source. It is denied in order to protect the identity of the source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); CIA operational methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); and name of a CIA employee and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

766	Report,	127	6	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	10 May 60			entirety	

This report contains biographic and personal information on diplomatic personnel and other staff at a certain foreign embassy located abroad. The information was provided to this Agency in confidence by a foreign liaison source. The document is denied in order to protect the fact of the existence of this liaison relationship and, thus, a method utilized by the CIA to collect foreign intelligence (see paragraphs 13, 20-36); the location of a CIA overseas installation (see paragraph 37); pseudonyms and a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43); and CIA file number and internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

772	Report	130	7		
	12 May 1960				

This document was incorrectly listed as No. 769 on Plaintiff's List No. 1. A check with his attorney confirmed that the document which he wanted described was Document No. 772.

Unfortunately, this document should not have been included in CIA's initial listing. It is an FBI document which has been forwarded to the Bureau for its review and direct response. The only CIA deletions in the document are the names and initials of CIA employees, internal organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

802	Memorandum,	173	10	Denied in	(b)(1), (b)(3)
	28 July 1960			entirety	

This document consists of a 1-page memorandum from the Chief of a CIA domestic field installation to the Chief of an operational division, transmitting a 9-page attached letter. The attachment is a letter of resignation, written to Fidel Castro by a former Cuban official who had

long since left Cuba. The letter presents this individual's statement of disillusionment with Castro and his indictment of Castro's pro-Communist activities and deliberate deception of the Cuban people. The transmittal memorandum outlines the methods by which this letter came into the possession of the CIA and, in combination with other information, could identify the human intelligence source who ultimately obtained the letter and passed it to the CIA. The document is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of this human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), the names of CIA staff employees (see paragraph 39), and the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

828	Memo,	136	4	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	20 Sept 60			entirety	

This internal CIA document is a memorandum from an Acting Division Chief to the Director of Central Intelligence. It presents a summary of an intelligence collection operation conducted by the CIA in a foreign location. The document names the CIA case officers and employees involved in the technical aspects of this operation, identifies American diplomatic personnel who were peripherally involved with the operation, and details the operational methodology utilized. It is denied in order to protect the identities of the non-Agency personnel involved; intelligence methods used in collection of foreign intelligence (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37); cryptonyms and aliases of CIA employees (see paragraphs 40-43); names of CIA employees and internal CIA filing and distributional instructions (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

835	Report, with	174	19	Denied in	(b)(3); (b)(6)
	attachments			entirety	
	and routing				
	slip,				
	4 Oct. 1960				

This document consists of a routing slip and a very brief report transmitting four letters and a copy of the Bulletin of an International Committee. The attached letters were written to a representative of a CIA domestic installation by an intelligence source who describes himself as having, over the years, established himself as a loyal pro-Communist propagandist. This individual describes his pro-Communist contacts and activities and, in one letter, suggests ways in which the CIA could utilize his services as an intelligence agent in the Iron Curtain countries. The document is denied in full to protect the identity of this human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), the identity of a CIA staff employee (see paragraph 39), CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39), and information which, if publicly disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of other individuals (see paragraphs 44-49). The document is UNCLASSIFIED.

843	Document Listing, 14 Oct 60	137	2	Release in part	(b)(3)
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This is a listing of FBI document referrals. It has been sanitized for partial release. Those portions which have been redacted contain information identifying a CIA staff employee, internal CIA organizational data, and internal file numbers and information processing data (letter codes I and K, see paragraph 39). This document is UNCLASSIFIED.

857.	Letter 25 Oct 60	138	2	Released in part	(b)(3)
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This letter has been referred to the Department of State for review and direct response to the Plaintiff. However, a CIA covering Routing Slip is being released in part. The deletions contain CIA organizational data (letter code J, see paragraph 39) and the initials of CIA employees (letter code I, see paragraph 39).

859	Cable, 30 Oct. 60	176	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3), (b)(6)
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This cable, from a CIA field installation to Headquarters, concerns the plans made by two individuals to cooperate in the organization of a certain anti-Castro operation. The cable indicates that the CIA case officer is continuing to support these organizational activities, outlines the plans made by these individuals, identifies other anti-Castroites involved in the potential operation, and requests Headquarters approval for CIA support of this operation. Disclosure of this information would reveal CIA targets of interest and the Agency's connection with specific anti-Castro organizations and activities. The document is denied in its entirety to protect the identity of human intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), the location of a covert CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38), a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43), file numbers and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39), and information which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of other individuals (see paragraphs 44-49). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

860	Index Cards 30 Oct. 60	177	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(1), (b)(3)
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This document consists of a reproduction of two index cards reflecting receipt of funds for foreign travel by an intelligence source. Its release could identify the human intelligence source involved and methods utilized by the CIA in foreign intelligence collection. The document is denied in full to protect the source's identity (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32) and CIA intelligence collection methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

861. Memorandum 178 2 Released in (b)(3)
1 Nov 60 part

The only deletions in this document are names of CIA employees (letter code I), CIA organizational data (letter code J), filing information (letter code K) and classification markings (letter code N). See paragraph 39.

872 Cable, 181 1 Denied in (b)(1), (b)(3)
11 Nov. 1960 entirety

This cable, from a CIA covert overseas installation to Headquarters, advises that a human intelligence source would shortly complete his shots and would travel to an identified foreign location on a certain date. The cable further mentions two foreign national contacts recommended by this source who have agreed to undertake an unspecified job if Headquarters is interested. The cable reveals the cryptonym assigned to this source, the cryptonym of the operation in which he was involved, as well as the pseudonym of a CIA staff employee. It is denied in order to protect the identity of the source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), CIA operational methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), the location of a covert CIA overseas field installation (see paragraphs 37-38), a pseudonym and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43), and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

877 Report, 182 9 Denied in (b)(1), (b)(3)
15 Nov. 1960 entirety

This document is an operational report submitted by an individual who was a source of information to the CIA on anti-Castro organizations and activities. In his report, this source provides details on his operational activities in a certain foreign country, including the operational problems he encountered, his contacts with various anti-Castro individuals and groups, the assistance and support he provided in the organization of various planned anti-Castro activities, and the internal assets he developed for future operational use. The document reveals detailed information concerning the operational activities of this particular source and CIA operational connections with anti-Castro organizations and activities. It is denied in full to protect the identity of this human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), and CIA operational methodology (see paragraphs 13, 20-32). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

886 Memorandum 140 1 Release in (b)(3)
18 Nov 60 part

This is an internal memorandum from the Acting Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, to the Deputy Director (Plans). The text of the memorandum is released in full. The redacted portions of the document

would reveal names and initials of CIA employees, identities of CIA organizational components, and internal CIA filing and distributional data (letter codes I, J and K, see paragraph 39) and classification markings (letter code N). The full-text copy of this document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

890	Extract, 22 Nov 60	141	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(3)
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This document is an extract of information concerning a former United States citizen who had defected to the Soviet Union and who was obviously of interest to this Agency. It is denied in order to protect CIA intelligence methods (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), and internal CIA information processing, storage, and retrieval markings (see paragraph 39). The document is UNCLASSIFIED.

895	Memorandum, 26 Nov. 1960	183	6	Denied in entirety	(b)(1), (b)(3)
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This Memorandum for the Record is a preliminary debriefing report concerning the activities of a CIA operational asset in a specific foreign country. (See document number 877, Plaintiff's request number 182, for a description of the report submitted by this human intelligence source.) The debriefing report contains a summary of this source's operational activities in assistance of various anti-Castro resistance groups, lists the potential assets he developed for future operational use, and names other CIA operational assets whom he contacted while abroad. The document concludes by commenting on this agent's operational strengths and weaknesses and projected future operational assignments. The document reveals detailed information concerning CIA operational methodology and CIA support for specific anti-Castro organizations and activities. In addition, disclosure of the detailed activities of this agent would enable a knowledgeable person to ascertain his true identity. The document is denied in full to protect the identity of the source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), CIA operational methodology (see paragraphs 13, 20-32), names of the CIA staff employees conducting the debriefing (see paragraph 39), the cryptonyms assigned to this agent and others mentioned in the debriefing report (see paragraphs 40-43), and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

897	201 File Request, 9 Dec 60	142	1	Release in part	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This document is a request from a CIA component for the personality (201) file maintained on Lee Harvey Oswald. Those portions which have been redacted are names of CIA employees, internal CIA organizational data, CIA file numbers, internal information processing and retrieval data, and classification markings (letter codes I, J, K and N, see paragraph 39).

The full-text copy of this document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

943	Memo, w/atts., 144	7	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3);
	31 Jan 61		entirety	(b)(6)

This document is a memorandum from the chief of a field office to a division chief. It details a meeting between CIA staff employees and an individual who at that time was of interest to this Agency as a possible intelligence source on the political and military situation in a certain foreign country. The purpose of the meeting was to ascertain this individual's qualifications to speak as a qualified observer on these matters; and to facilitate this assessment, the source was asked to express himself on tape concerning the current situation in the country at issue. A transcript of his remarks is appended as Attachment B to the report. Attachment A is a form containing biographic data on the source. The document is denied in order to protect the identity of this human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); the location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37); names of CIA staff employees, CIA document numbers, and information processing data (see paragraph 39); and information which, if publicly disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties (see paragraphs 44-49). The document is currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL.

969	Memo. w/att., 145	4	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	3 Mar 61		entirety	

This internal CIA memorandum forwards a report received from a sensitive human intelligence source. The source provides contact instructions for and information concerning another individual who had organized an opposition group in a certain foreign country and had requested assistance from this Agency. The source also reports on a meeting he had with a former military officer of a foreign country who discussed the current military situation in the foreign country concerned. The document is denied in order to protect the identity of the human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); intelligence methods utilized by the CIA (see paragraphs 13, 20-32); a cryptonym (see paragraphs 40-43); and identities of CIA employees and CIA internal organizational data (see paragraph 39). This document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

1050	Memorandum, 185	2	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
	23 May 61		entirety	

This memorandum is addressed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation following their forwarding of a report concerning a named individual and company. Another individual was named in that report and this document

forwards information in CIA files concerning this individual, including his travel, his documentation, his activities, appearance, etc., as had been reported by several sources.

Release of the document could reveal the identity of the CIA foreign sources of this information. (See paragraphs 13-19, 25-32.) In addition, the document contains filing information (see paragraph 39) and is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

1052 Report, 24 May 1961	187	2	Denied in entirety	(b)(1), (b)(3)
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This document, in the form of a memorandum from the Chief of a CIA domestic field installation to the Chief of an operational division at Headquarters, is a report on the personal experiences of a third country national during and after the invasion of Cuba. The source, who was debriefed in the United States while en route from Cuba to another country following the invasion, had supported the anti-Castro underground movement and identifies other members of the anti-Castro group to which he belonged. The information contained in the report is specific enough to identify the source even were his name excised. Accordingly, the document is denied in full to protect the identity of this human intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32), the name of a CIA staff employee (see paragraph 39), file number and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

1060 Report 4 Jun 61	148	6	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This report is properly classified CONFIDENTIAL and contains summaries of comments regarding Cuba as provided by four sources to the named CIA reporting officer. The document contains a great deal of detail regarding a wide variety of subjects, release of any portion of which could reveal the identity of any of the sources. For the specific nature of the information to be available outside of Cuba would point to the individuals who provided it to the reporting officer; some of these individuals are undoubtedly still in Cuba. (See paragraphs 13-19; 25-32.) In addition, the document contains the name of the CIA employee, filing information and internal organizational data. (See paragraph 39.)

1073 Dispatch, 17 Jun 69	149	3	Denied in entirety	(b)(1); (b)(3)
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This dispatch contains suggestions for possible future intelligence operations to be targeted against a foreign diplomatic official stationed abroad. The discussion concerns such facts as known or potential susceptibilities of the target, CIA accessibility to the target, and other parameters which had indicated that this individual could be a prime target of an intelligence operation aimed at eventual recruitment of this

individual as a foreign intelligence source. As such, it presents a detailed picture of CIA operational methodology utilized in such situations. The document is denied in order to protect the identity of this potential intelligence source (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); information concerning CIA operational methods; location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37); pseudonyms and cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); and names of CIA employees, internal CIA organizational data and filing, and distributional data (see paragraph 39). The document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

1074 Cable	150	1	Denied in	(b)(1); (b)(3)
27 May 69			entirety	

This cable transmits information received from human intelligence sources concerning home leave travel arrangements and itinerary of a foreign diplomat stationed abroad and his wife. The foreign diplomat concerned was of operational interest to the CIA. The document is denied in order to protect the identities of human intelligence sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32); location of a CIA field installation (see paragraph 37); cryptonyms (see paragraphs 40-43); and names and initials of CIA employees, identities of CIA organizational components and internal filing, and distributional data (see paragraph 39). This document is currently and properly classified SECRET.

1230 Cable	204	1	Denied in	(b)(1), (b)(3)
9 Dec 63			entirety	

This very brief cable reports on a postal matter and the future public release of certain information. The document appears on the surface to be innocuous, but its release would identify two sources who are named by cryptonym (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32, 40-43) as well as some of their activities. In addition, release of the document would reveal the location of two CIA overseas installations (see paragraphs 37-38) not only in the heading but through the substance of the document. The document also contains CIA organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39).

1294 Cable,	162	1	Denied in	(b)(1), (b)(3)
26 Nov. 1963			entirety	

This document is a cable from a CIA overseas field installation to Headquarters transmitting corrected portions of a message which was originally garbled in transmission. The message represents the suggestions of named CIA staff employees regarding having a named individual informed of certain details. Release of this document would reveal CIA interest in or connection with this named individual. The document, which is currently and properly classified SECRET, is denied in its entirety to protect the names of CIA staff employees and internal CIA organizational data (see paragraph 39) and the location of a covert CIA field installation (see paragraphs 37-38).

4310 Memorandum, 308 2 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
6 Jul 61 entirety

This document contains a report from a CIA field installation concerning an interview which a CIA employee had with a source regarding attempted sabotage of an important element in the economy of Cuba.

The document must be withheld to protect the identity of the named source and two of his associates. (See paragraphs 13-19, 25-32.) Further, the name of a CIA employee and filing information are contained in the document (see paragraph 39). The document is properly classified SECRET.

4547 Memorandum, 326 3 Denied in (b)(1); (b)(3)
8 Mar 78 entirety

The first page of this document is a routing sheet which forwards the memorandum and contains the name of a CIA employee, organizational data and filing information (see paragraph 39). The memorandum itself lists the file number for material concerning several named individuals, some of whom are the subject of other categories of the instant Index and who were CIA sources (see paragraphs 13-19, 25-32). This material was marked for retention. The document is withheld to protect the identity of those sources, filing information, internal organizational data and the name of a CIA employee (see paragraph 39).

I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Louis J. Dube
Louis J. Dube

Dated: 19 June 1986