

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: September 28, 1964

FROM : MR. BELMONT

cc Mr. Belmont

Mr. Mohr

Mr. DeLoach

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Sullivan

Mr. Callahan

Mr. Conrad

Mr. Malley Mr. Trotter

Mr. Brennan Mr. Gale

Mr. Branigan

Mr. Lenihan

SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION REGARDING THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN F. KENNEDY

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

*White
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DeVos*

The report of the President's Commission has been reviewed by the Administrative Division, the Domestic Intelligence Division, the General Investigative Division, the Identification Division, and the Laboratory.

COMMISSION'S FINDINGS:

The Commission's report sets forth the official facts of the assassination of President Kennedy as we knew and reported them in substance to the Commission on 12-9-63. Namely, Oswald was the assassin, he acted alone, his actions the product of a disturbed mind, showing an urge to find a place in history, a capacity for violence, a commitment to communism and a resentment of authority. Of events immediately following the assassination it found no evidence of any association with or conspiracy between Ruby and Oswald or among any outside factors, foreign or domestic.

In criticism it finds the Secret Service vastly inadequate to its assigned task in November, 1963. It castigates the Dallas Police Department for its handling of the person of Oswald subsequent to his arrest and for its dealings with news media. It recognizes the failure of the Secret Service to define the criteria they needed to properly protect the President and to make proper requests of Government agencies.

Concerning the FBI, the report states the FBI could have provided more to the Secret Service than prompt referral of specific threats to Presidential safety, as was our policy prior to the assassination. While not detailed on this point, it reports that the Bureau "took an unduly restrictive view of its role in protective intelligence work prior to the assassination."

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In recommendation of procedures to improve protection of the President, it proposes the formation of a committee at cabinet level to oversee the problems of protecting the President; the possible relocation of the duties of the Secret Service to another agency, or in the alternative the appointment of a responsible position in the Treasury Department to supervise the Secret Service and to keep the Secretary of the Treasury informed as to its performance; that the facilities of Secret Service be completely overhauled, including the establishment of criteria of information it needs to properly protect the President; that there be perfected a closer association and liaison between the Secret Service and all Federal agencies; and, finally, that the President's physician accompany him on his travels; that Congress make the assassination of the President and Vice President a federal crime; that State Department refine procedures for dissemination of information concerning defectors to Soviet-bloc countries, and that representatives of the bar, law enforcement and news media work more closely to establish ethical standards concerning collection and presentation to the public of information so there will be no interference with pending criminal investigations or rights of individuals to a fair trial. Here the Commission is not clear but the implications point to the Dallas Police Department, killing of Oswald, conduct of news media representatives, Mark Lane, et cetera.

The report states that both the Secret Service and the FBI have professed to the Commission that the liaison between them was close and fully sufficient. The Commission does not believe that the liaison between the FBI and the Secret Service prior to the assassination was as effective as it should have been. With regard to this comment, it is noted that prior to the assassination of President Kennedy the FBI disseminated to the Secret Service all information which came into its possession which it believed would be of value to the Secret Service in carrying out its responsibilities. It is noted that at no time did Secret Service express discontent nor did it furnish a written criteria regarding its needs.

Since the assassination of the President there was a complete re-evaluation of our dissemination policy with regard to information that might be of interest to Secret Service. New criteria were established and following the establishment of the new criteria we have been following the new procedures which were adopted. These criteria are the subject of a separate memorandum that was prepared on 9-22-64. Police Department and the Bureau did effect investigation concerning this report. The Bureau did effect investigation concerning this report.

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Another instance of our "unusually restrictive" policy.
A. J.

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In addition, we have determined that an Interagency Committee and program are being established by the Treasury Department to develop more effective criteria for dissemination of data to Secret Service. The Committee will include representatives of the President's Office of Science and Technology, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and Secret Service. This Interagency Committee has not reached the stage of development to extend invitations to the FBI and others, but is expected to do so soon. It is noted that since the adoption of the Bureau's new criteria for dissemination, Secret Service has made available in writing to the Bureau the criteria upon which they desire to receive information. It is noted that the Bureau's criteria is broader in scope than the written criteria furnished by Secret Service.

The report of the Commission gives the Bureau credit for the amount of investigative effort since the assassination and mentions that 80 additional FBI personnel were sent to Dallas to assist in the investigation, that we had conducted more than 25,000 interviews and as of 9-11-64 submitted more than 2300 reports comprising some 25,400 pages.

In referring to the identification of 20 latent fingerprints and 8 latent palmprints, the Commission discussed the identities other than Oswald that were identified with the latent prints. The Commission in their wording stated "most of the prints were found to have been placed on the cartons by an FBI clerk and a Dallas police officer." The true facts are that it was determined that a clerk in the Dallas Office was identified with five latent fingerprints and one latent palmprint and the remaining latent fingerprints and four of the palmprints were determined to be those of a Dallas police officer. In connection with the clerk in the Dallas Office, he was responsible for the wrapping of the cartons for transmittal to the Bureau.

In discussing the shooting of Dallas police officer J. D. Tippet, the Commission states that certain witnesses to this shooting were interviewed by the FBI "two months after the shooting." It is noted the shooting of the Dallas police officer by Oswald was completely a local matter within the jurisdiction of the Dallas Police Department and the Bureau did not attempt to conduct any investigation concerning this shooting. The Bureau did offer its

*Another instance
of our "wonderful
detective police"*

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Laboratory facilities to the Dallas Police Department in this matter. No interviews were conducted relative to the Tippit shooting until requests were received from the President's Commission to do so.

Concerning the various interrogations of Lee Harvey Oswald, the Commission comments on the small size of the interview room in the Dallas Police Department and states that up to 25 different persons participated in these interviews. There is no clear statement as to the number of individuals that participated in these interviews at any given time. In this regard it is noted that 1 Agent participated in an interview on 11-22-63 and 1 Agent participated in two interviews on 11-23-63.

Comment is also made that Oswald was not represented with counsel. The entire interviewing of Oswald was under the jurisdiction of the Dallas Police Department, not the FBI, and the Bureau had no control over the conditions under which the interviews were taking place.

The report states an FBI Agent is quoted as stating the conditions at the Dallas Police Department were like Grand Central Station or the Yankee Stadium. The Agent in the footnote is identified as Special Agent James P. Hosty. In this regard Agent Hosty's testimony does reflect that he made such a comment when testifying before the President's Commission.

The report states that the Director sent a message to Dallas Chief of Police Curry on 11-22-63, urging the Chief to afford Oswald utmost security. The report states Chief Curry did not recall receiving this message. SAC Shanklin assures that an oral message was delivered by Special Agent Manning C. Clements immediately after receiving instructions from the Bureau to so advise Chief Curry. (See SA Clements Dallas report 11/30/63, page 29, paragraph 5).

The report in discussing Chief Curry's periodic press releases on the developments in the assassination during the initial stages quotes the Director as being extremely concerned over these press releases and quotes from the Director's testimony in this regard.

In referring to interviews of Ruth Paine by Special Agent Hosty, the report states she was questioned concerning Oswald's whereabouts and promised to advise the FBI where he was residing and also to furnish the FBI any pertinent information concerning him. A comment is made

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Joseph Nicol, Superintendent
of the FBI Laboratory, Dallas

that Ruth Paine was not asked to furnish Oswald's telephone number in Dallas and that she did not volunteer this information although she had such information in her possession.

The Commission has relied very heavily upon the technical findings of the FBI Laboratory to support their conclusions as to the identity of the assassin and our Laboratory findings are not presented in an unfavorable light. In some instances, reportedly in the interests of impartiality, because of deep involvement of the FBI in the investigation of the case, the Commission had other experts examine evidence upon which we had submitted reports. Upon being challenged by the Bureau at the time on the basis of a lack of confidence, the Commission denied any such lack of confidence. There were no important or significant differences between our findings and those of the other experts. This was particularly true of all crucial examinations such as the identification of the assassination bullets as having been fired in Oswald's rifle and the identification of Oswald's handwriting on documents establishing his ownership of the assassination rifle.

As a matter of interest, in a few instances, there was a difference of degree noted in certain of the findings. These instances are discussed in detail below.

On pages 577 and 578 the report sets forth that FBI Laboratory experts identified all writing on a vaccination certificate found among Oswald's belongings as being Oswald's handwriting except the signature "A.J. Hildeel" which was too distorted to identify or nonidentify. Alwyn Cole, Treasury Department document expert identified all writing including "A.J. Hildeel" signature as being Oswald's. On the other hand, Cole was unable to identify or nonidentify a rubber stamp kit which belonged to Oswald with rubber stamp impressions on this vaccination certificate. The FBI Laboratory expert was able to identify certain of the stamped words as having been made by Oswald's stamp kit. These minor variances are not contradictory and are overshadowed by the conclusive agreement of both experts that Oswald prepared most of the writing appearing on the certificate.

not very complimentary to our Laboratory

On page 186 of the report, relative to the bullet that had been fired into the home of Major General Edwin A. Walker on April 10, 1963, the Commission relates that Joseph D. Nicol conducted an independent examination of the bullet and concluded "that there is a fair probability" that the bullet was fired from the rifle used in the assassination.

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The Nicol referred to heretofore is Joseph Nicol, Superintendent of the Illinois State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, called in by the Commission as an independent firearms examiner.

An examination of this bullet in the FBI Laboratory by three top firearms specialists conducting separate and independent examinations revealed it to be so extremely mutilated that there was not sufficient evidence remaining on which to base a conclusion as to whether or not the bullet recovered from Walker's house had been fired from the assassination weapon. One of the experts correctly testified before the Commission that the FBI does not use a category of "probable" identifications, and that unless a missile or cartridge case can be identified as coming from a particular weapon to the exclusion of all others, the FBI does not report an identification.

Another instance of an unduly restrictive policy.
In explaining the difference between his policy and that of the FBI on the matter of probable identification before the Commission, Nicol admitted that he could not identify the gun "to the exclusion of all other guns."

The Commission took due cognizance of this in its evaluation of this matter, and the Commission states in its summation that it recognizes that neither expert was able to state the bullet which missed General Walker was fired from Oswald's rifle.

Relative to the firearms examinations of the four bullets removed from the body of Dallas Police Officer J. D. Tippit, and the four cartridge cases found near the scene of the murder of Tippit, the Commission notes that both the FBI experts and Nicol identified all four cartridge cases as having been fired in Oswald's revolver, thus establishing Oswald's revolver as the murder weapon. In the case of the bullets the Commission notes that Nicol differed with the FBI experts on one of these bullets, Nicol identifying one of these bullets as having been fired from Oswald's revolver. The findings of three top FBI examiners concerning the bullets were to the effect that, because of mutilation and the inconsistent nature of the individual markings on the bullets there was not sufficient evidence remaining on which to base a definite determination.

Another "dodge" by us.
Since the findings of the FBI Laboratory were arrived at independently by three of our top firearms identification specialists and there definitely was no foundation for Nicol's conclusion, it is obvious

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that he was influenced by circumstances surrounding the case in arriving at his decision. *you are merely assuming this.*

In evaluating the evidence concerning Tippit's murder on page 176 of the report, the Commission completely ignored the identification made by Nicol. This illustrates how heavily the Commission relied upon the findings of our Laboratory experts.

And whenever possible they took a crack at the Laboratory.

ACTION

The foregoing is submitted for information concerning the report submitted by the President's Commission.

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