

(First of Two Parts)

Inside the FBI

FBI Opens Cases on the Public Library, the Bus Station and the County Hospital

Early in March I received a long distance call from a lawyer who said, "I have a client, a former FBI agent, who is very upset by the illegal activities of the FBI and their continued coverup. He has had some disillusioning experiences and wants to tell the American public about them but he's concerned about his safety. Although he has no proof, he doesn't believe that William Sullivan [former number three man in the bureau] died in a hunting accident. From his 20 years experience in the FBI, he's convinced that Sullivan was murdered to prevent him


from testifying before Congress, and he doesn't want to become a target for accidents himself."

The caller went on to say that the agent knew me from his FBI work and would like to meet with me. "I don't know how much he will be willing to say for publication, but I think it would be worthwhile for the three of us to sit down together to see if there is a way that he can begin to get his story out without undue risk."

A few days later we met. For security reasons we met not in the city in which he

lives nor in New York, where I live, but in a neutral setting. I was reminded of earlier meetings I had had with fugitives from the law—blacks in the South during civil-rights days; deserters and draft resisters during the Vietnam war; more recently with my colleague Abbie Hoffman of the Chicago Seven. This was my first surreptitious meeting with a disillusioned FBI agent but almost everything else was the same, including the need to take precautions against detection by the FBI.

In the present instance, the former agent clearly had more to lose than I did,



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but as near as I could tell, I was the more suspicious. I weighed his every word and gesture against the possibilities of entrapment. Was he a double agent on a fishing expedition for some obscure missing link that would help the FBI in any one of a number of nefarious schemes? After several hours of mutual exploration and discussion, we felt sure enough of one another for him to speak and for me to turn on the tape recorder.


What impressed me most about the two days we spent together was this former FBI agent's down-to-earth description of the daily routine dishonesty, corruption and inefficiency of the FBI. The more he talked, the more I realized that ironically the FBI is a prime victim of the very capitalist ethic it is dedicated to defending: in brief, it's everyone for himself in a relentless struggle for more power, privilege and affluence than one's associates, not to mention rival agencies. He told about attempts, mostly successful, to pad payrolls, expense accounts, statistics on caseloads and convictions; he recalled information supposedly supplied by informants who, in many cases, don't even exist; he described exploitation of the informer, the criminal, the public and the courts alike. The former agent said that false information was supplied by the FBI to government investigatory agencies as well as to Congress, the press and the public.

— Dave Dellinger

Can you give examples of this misinformation disseminated by the FBI?

Top executives of the FBI falsified their testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976. They started out saying they were going to have an open door policy, they were going to tell the truth, but it was the same old violin music. They admitted a few things. Big deal. They admitted 238 bag jobs (surreptitious entries for purposes other than planting microphones) between 1942 and 1968. I know that's a lie; I've done more than that myself.

Different offices around the country in the 1950s had squads that did nothing but bag jobs. Chicago had a 24-man squad. Seven days a week. Figure it out. Some people did a bag job every day, and some two or three times a day, every time they left the house. If there wasn't a particular bag job to be done on a particular day, it was the agent's responsibility to be out surveying the neighborhood where the target lived, trying to get keys or figure out the daily routine—when he goes out to work, when he comes home, who stays



at the house, and so on. If the FBI had said, "Folks, we may have done 10,000 or 20,000 or 30,000 bag jobs no one can really tell," it would have been one thing. But 238! That's fantastic.

(Thomas Coll, Chief of the F.B.I.'s Press Services Office, declined to comment on these allegations because the matter is in the courts.)

The FBI also stated that there were only 15 domestic targets of bag jobs, which is also false. If the FBI says 15 targets, the average layman is going to assume that there were 15 different people whom we bagged during this time or maybe the offices of 15 different organizations. I can think of 50 individuals in Chicago we pulled bag jobs on regularly. Just the ones I did, with this squad of 24 agents. That doesn't include other agents in Chicago working the Socialist Workers Party, the Nation of Islam, the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and all that.

The only way I can arrive at 15 is by making each target a general category. One would be the Communist Party, all its front groups and all the organizations that might be influenced by the Party. Another target would be New Left groups. Another might be racial groups, which would include the Black Panthers and the Nation of Islam and any other black groups. You can see right away we're talking about hundreds, maybe thousands of targets.

By what methods did you gain entry?

The most efficient was to obtain keys. If it were an office building, like Commu-



nist Party Headquarters, you would get keys from the building manager.

You'd show him your identification?

And you'd do flag-waving. Before we would approach anyone like that, say the building manager or the night watchman, we'd conduct an investigation on them to get some idea of whether or not they'd be sympathetic. If we felt they were good, strong Americans who were opposed to the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, and they'd stand up right away and salute, that kind of person would let you have the key for an hour. You'd make a copy and bring it back.

Would you slip them money sometimes?

Sometimes. We would try to graciously determine whether they would prefer money or maybe a letter. A lot of people liked the idea of having a letter from J. Edgar Hoover thanking them for being such an upstanding citizen and helping their country.

Didn't anybody ever expose you, go to the press?

When we got the key and gave them a letter, an implied threat would go along

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with it. Once they've cooperated, they realized the position they were in, so the last thing they were going to do was to go out and tell anyone.

How were people selected for the bag job squad?

In a majority of instances, by the agents who were already on the squad. If an individual could work well under pressure and keep his mouth shut and not talk to his wife or girlfriend or parents or anybody at the office, then there was the possibility he would work out. Before they were actually used in a bag job, they would work maybe six weeks to two months on surveillance, just to see how they handled themselves in driving a car in traffic situations where you can't lose the individual, whether they've got nerve enough to run a red light or a stop sign or cross a double line. We used to practice following the *Daily News* trucks in Chicago. They absolutely did not stop for anything. If anybody gave one of those trucks the right of way, we might seriously consider dropping him from the squad.

Would you photograph files or actually remove them?

I never stole files. And I don't know anyone on our 24-man squad who did. But I can think of instances where if they knew they were going to be back in a day or two, they might take documents and plan on bringing them back the next time they were in, which in their minds is not really stealing.

Did the FBI take care to avoid putting incriminating directives on paper?

Yes. For instance, if for some reason the FBI wanted to pull a bag job on you, and you're traveling around the country, FBI headquarters would send instructions out to different offices saying something like: "An imaginative, aggressive approach should be used to obtain information in his possession." You don't have to be too smart to know what they're talking about. And when they say, "Use all available investigative techniques"—well, a bag job was an investigative technique.

Blowing the Whistle.

What made you decide to speak out?

I was forced for all these years to do things against the law. I started to realize that here we are, fighting this so-called Communist enemy who has not visibly broken any laws, and here we were violating the Bill of Rights all over the place. Hoover would stand up and say

he's defending the Constitution, while at the same time we'd be out there breaking into people's homes.

You come up to retirement and you think you can sit back and you don't have any problems. Then all of a sudden, everyone wants to prosecute you and go way back into time. By bringing this out and getting the proper legislation, I think you can keep these FBI administrators from ever forcing agents to violate the law again. They also jeopardize people's careers. John Kearney is being prosecuted, and he's not responsible. [John J. Kearney, a former supervisor in the New York FBI office, was indicted last year on five felony counts stemming from alleged illegal wiretapping and mail openings committed by agents under his command in their search for Weather Underground fugitives.] If it was his idea and his idea alone, I'd say fine, I'd even help put him in jail. But he doesn't deserve to go to jail.

After WW II the U.S. prosecuted the Nazi war criminals, the poor guys at the bottom of the totem pole following orders. They didn't have a chance. Same thing with the FBI. People were given orders; they had no choice. You either follow the order or give up a whole career. The individual agent cannot turn to anyone for assistance. Theoretically, according to the Constitution, he can go to Congress for redress of grievances, but you might as well go out here on the street corner, because if it doesn't suit Congress politically, they're gonna look upon him as some nut.

I was considering doing something similar to what William Turner did, and try to have redress of grievances from Congress. [William W. Turner is a former FBI agent who wrote a book called *Hoover's FBI* in 1970.] He actually sat down while he was still at the FBI and he was writing to different Congressmen. And Hoover just tore him apart.

No matter who it is in the FBI, if you seek little nit-picking things, you can find something wrong with him, even if it's the way he combs his hair, or the fact that he has the wrong-sized paper clips in his little bowl on his desk. I even saw an inspection report criticizing a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) because the flags in his office were crossed improperly. You have a state flag and a federal flag, and I guess the federal flag is supposed to be in front of the state. It was the other way around.

After Turner resigned from the FBI and attempted to practice law in Arizona, Hoover wrote a letter to the head of the American Bar Association in Arizona saying that Turner was unfit to be an attorney.

Juggling Statistics.

What other kinds of abuses were prevalent in the FBI?

For one thing, the way Hoover padded statistics so he could get more money for the Bureau when he went before Congress. For example, if the police arrested someone in a stolen car, the FBI would claim one car recovery even though the police had actually recovered the car. If Bernardino Dohrn had been arrested by the San Francisco police department, the FBI would claim one arrest, since she's one of our fugitives. Deserters the same way. The majority of deserters are arrested by local police or military police. In some instances, they even surrender. If we could get the information through headquarters before anyone else, we could claim these as apprehensions. In offices near army bases, agents would check the stockade every day to see who had been returned and not cleared from the arrest list in Washington. If someone surrendered the day before, the agent would report him as one fugitive apprehended. And the guy gave himself up!

The FBI took credit, in its annual report, for 10 convictions in a case involving only one person, who wrote 10 worthless checks totalling \$887. If he had written 25 or 50 checks, 25 or 50 convictions would have been claimed. The General Accounting Office, which investigated the FBI in 1974, cited one case in which a \$1.5 million medical malpractice suit, brought against the doctor, was settled for \$7,000. The FBI, which assisted the U.S. Attorney defending the case, claimed a savings to taxpayers of \$1,493,000. Then the FBI went before Congress and claimed that it had saved taxpayers a dollar and a half for every dollar allocated to its budget. The GAO said all-told the FBI claimed \$3.3 million in fraudulent "savings" that year.

During the 25 years I was in the FBI, I cannot recall a single budget testimony by J. Edgar Hoover that was not based upon grossly misleading statistics presented to Congress. The GAO found that only 9 percent of the FBI's investigative cases were ever prosecuted, and that one-third of the cases listed as accomplishments were inaccurate, duplicative or misleading.

Since the Bureau's major interest is in inflating case loads, it will investigate any old minor violation that comes its way. According to the GAO, agents from three field offices spent seven months investigating the theft of a \$100 bicycle from a national park. They finally dropped the case.

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How do you generate a fake case load?

It's easy, especially in security cases. In one instance, an agent in Los Angeles checked the telephone toll records on an address of a suspected Weatherman fugitive who bought some dynamite.

Under normal conditions an agent would identify the subscribers to the telephone numbers, and if they had no connection with the fugitive, that would be the end of the matter.

In this case, the agent's supervisor was

a typical pompous bureaucrat who could envision a whole new squad of 20 agents under his guidance, since he was the Security Coordinator of all the security squads in the Los Angeles office. So he directed that cases be opened on each of

LOGISTICS OF A BAG JOB

A bag job is not just a matter of breaking into someone's home and photographing his papers and possessions, unless you want it to end like Watergate. A successful operation requires the most careful planning possible with attention given to every detail in an attempt to anticipate every obstacle.

1. Identify the subject.
2. Determine subject's place of employment and type of employment.
3. Identify the mode of transportation.
4. Identify other residents of the household.
5. Determine whether subject has any other visitors in his residence.
6. Identify the landlord if the residence is not a privately owned residence or condominium.
7. Perform a trial run.
8. The bag job.

a. All members of the surveillance team, regardless of their position, must be in radio contact with one another or in contact with a reasonable relay. No bag job should be allowed to start or to continue if any member of the team is out of radio contact.

Everyone involved must be physically and mentally alert, aware of his surroundings, attentive and aggressive and a team player. Successful execution of a bag job depends upon everyone doing his job right; there is no room for error, bad judgement or heroes. A successfully planned and executed bag job will never give you any serious surprises.

A bag job is a tremendous strain on the nerves. Emotions can build up in these tense situations, and each member of the team must be able to control himself mentally and physically and have confidence in the others that they can do likewise. Getting down to basics, a bag job is no place for anyone who cannot control his appetite, bladder or bowels.

b. The surveillance team will follow the subject and any members of the residence. Depending upon the persons

to be followed, no less than two surveillance agents should be used per person, unless school children are involved, then one agent per child will suffice. In the case of very young children, it is sometimes advisable to have two agents present so as to avoid the appearance of being a child molester.

c. Once all members of the residence have been surveilled away from the residence or accounted for in another location, and there are no other apparent obstacles, then the plan is ready for a trial run.

d. When the "ball players" are ready to begin the "game," those agents designated to telephone the residence and any neighbors in a position to observe the front should place their calls at a precise moment as instructed by the "outside man."

e. The "outside man" will call the "inside team" into position and will alert the various surveillance teams that the "ball players" are approaching the field. The inside team on the trial run will consist of the lock picker and one radio man.

f. The "pickup man" will deliver the inside team to the front door or to the most suitable location to avoid attention; this could be the front, back, nearby alley or parking garage. The inside team is dropped off and the "pickup man" departs the immediate area to stand by for further instructions through the outside man.

g. The "inside team" approaches and examines the entrance for obvious alarm systems. If no alarms are noted, the inside team will make the surreptitious entry into the residence. The radio man of the inside team will announce to the outside man that the "players are on the field."

h. The trial run inside will consist of an immediate search of all rooms for friends, relatives or maids to be sure the "field" is clear. The inside team will announce to the outside man some description of the events taking place inside such as if a quick observation reveals no information available for

future bag jobs, the inside man may announce the game is being called for lack of interest in today's game.

If prospects look good, the photographer will be called in through some phrase such as, "Send in the press photographer, we may need photographs for a starting line-up for future games."

If the situation is such that a quick "game" can be played, that is, the bag job can be done with one quick photographic session, the inside man will ask the outside man to check with other players to see if three or four innings can be played.

If the surveillance team has everyone under control, the outside man will announce something like "weather permitting, the relief pitchers can go a full nine innings." This alerts the inside team that a regular bag job of one or two hours can be handled by the surveillance team with no problem.

i. Depending upon the inside condition and the number of records to be examined, photographs may be needed to rearrange articles on completion of the bag job. Once an examination of the inside layout is clearly in mind and notes have been taken on placement of various articles on the desk, file cabinets, etc., the ball game can be played.

A progress report from inside should be given to the outside man every few minutes. When the inside men are through, they will announce the completion by saying something like, "The game is in the bottom of the ninth with two men out and the count two and two; have the pickup man ready to transport the players back home."

The outside man may then relay the message to all surveillance units that the physical surveillances may be discontinued. The outside man will remain in place until the pickup man announces his departure from the scene with all players accounted for. In a bag job, you don't assume anything; you check and double check everything.

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the 200 numbers. Among them were the bus station, the public library, country hospital, weather bureau, local movie theaters, restaurants, dry cleaners and so on. Believe it or not, some agents were able to milk these telephone cases for nearly a year. And we did generate a new squad that came to be known as Squad 19. The entire office grew in this way. It went from one SAC and an assistant SAC in the summer of 1972 to an assistant director and three SACs one year later.

When the GAO investigated the L.A. office, the FBI started closing some of the phony cases—one case involved a man who had been dead for over a year—but they put more effort into keeping cases away from the GAO so they could maintain the caseload. According to Bureau regulations, at the end of 90 days you have to advise headquarters in Washington if a field office has a case open. So they would open a case, then close it after 89 days, and no one was the wiser.

I know for a fact that the Los Angeles office kept from the GAO files on the American Indian Movement (AIM) which were opened on the basis of AIM records stolen by FBI informants.

Why was that?

So the GAO would not know about the bag jobs and illegal actions by informants. It was part of the policy of pretending there were no more bag jobs after 1966, when Hoover supposedly ordered them stopped.

stopped. Of the hundreds of questionable new cases opened by the Bureau in L.A. during 1973 and 1974, only two cases were shown to the GAO. The supervisor who saw to this received a \$500 incentive award for a good job done with the GAO.

(The F.B.I.'s Thomas Coll commented, "That's hard to believe. It was my understanding that we made available to the GAO all the files that they wanted.")

Losing the Weather Underground.

Speaking of the Weather Underground, some people have always felt that the FBI has infiltrated the group, knows where members are, but is just letting them run around loose for its own purposes. Is there any truth in that?

No, the FBI didn't have any informants in the Weather Underground. I worked the Weathermen for almost seven years. And it was a great source of aggravation to me because of ineptness of the super-

visors and the unimaginative way they would administrate the search. The way the FBI had historically looked for a fugitive is to surveil the home, the subject's mother and father and talk to the boyfriend or girlfriend. When they had a bank robbery, and the robber is running around the country, he always runs home. It worked in about 95 percent of the cases. But when the Weathermen came along, they were an intelligent group of young people, who were following the old Communist Party underground procedures which were fairly effective in the early 1950s. Instead of recognizing that these people were going to work in a clandestine fashion, were going to trust the old SDS friends that they'd developed in college and probably be contacting some of the more militant National Lawyers Guild attorneys, and instead of letting us direct our activities along those lines, they'd flood the field offices with directives to contact the parents and interview all the relatives. They were not willing to accept the fact that these young people would not have any contact whatsoever with their parents. That's why they became Weathermen in the first place, because they were rejecting their parents. Maybe one out of 50 would contact a parent.

The morale on the squads that were investigating the Weathermen just began to crumble because you couldn't really go out and investigate in the way an investigation should be conducted. You had to follow all the Mickey Mouse rules.

Plus you couldn't get the agents in charge interested in the Weathermen. They liked cases that would bring in more statistics. If you're looking for just those fugitives for almost 10 years, your statistics are going to be zero if you don't arrest someone. In fact, when William A. Sullivan came to L.A. as assistant director in charge, he said, "There are no Weathermen," and he wanted to do away with the

Weathermen squad. About two months after that, they set a bomb off in L.A., so then he had to acknowledge that they existed.

But Bernardine Dohrn was on the Most Wanted list.

She was taken off because it was embarrassing that the FBI wasn't able to catch her. At the same time, they maintained a guy named Klausner on the Ten Most Wanted List for stealing a car 15 years ago because he used to write letters to J. Edgar Hoover saying, "Guess where I am now?" And that just drove Hoover right up the wall.

Here's an example of the way the Weather Underground investigation was conducted. In 1972, six agents, the "cream of the crop," were chosen to investigate the Weathermen and other underground fugitives. No Weathermen have ever been located by these agents. Some of them, disguised as "hippies," had a "pad" in the hippie section of L.A. for which they paid (and charged the FBI) \$30 a month for a gardener. I never heard of a hippie having a gardener.

I was working weekend duty on one occasion when a female called inquiring about one of the "FBI undercover agents in the Weatherman Underground," whom she had met at a local bar a few nights before and wanted to leave a message for him to call her. She identified the undercover agent by his initials. The cream-of-the-crop agents, while assigned surveillance duty in Santa Barbara, regularly returned to Los Angeles on weekends, but submitted expense vouchers at the end of the month indicating they had remained in Santa Barbara the full time, claiming \$25 per day for Saturday and Sunday.

There are a handful of agents who are very interested in the Weathermen, from a standpoint of personal pride, but the rest of them couldn't care less.

