

Not accurate of Tarrants
specified incorrectly

themselves. When the situation was at its worst in Mississippi, a local Klan group decided to demolish the home of a Meridian businessman who had been acting as one of the main fundraisers. Most of the money he raised had gone to pay informants, and through one of these informants I found out about the plot and alerted the local law enforcement officers.

On 30 June 1968, the Meridian police were there waiting when a twenty-one-year-old Klansman named Thomas A. Tarrants III drove up. He got out of his car with enough dynamite to demolish not only the businessman's house but also the houses on both sides of it. He carried a machine gun too, and when the police called out to Tarrants to stop and put up his hands, he dropped the dynamite and started firing the machine gun in the direction of the voices. The police returned the fire, and in the exchange of gunfire, Tarrants was hit and a woman friend he'd brought with him in his car was killed. Tarrants survived the gunfight although he had fourteen bullets in his body when the police finally picked him up.

The counterintelligence techniques we brought to our fight against the Klan have been thoroughly damned by the press and the public, but our successful use of these techniques is what finally broke them up. As far as I'm concerned, we might as well not engage in intelligence unless we also engage in counterintelligence. One is the right arm, the other the left. They work together.

Actually, these counterintelligence programs were nothing new; I remember sending out anonymous letters and phone calls back in 1941, and we'd been using most of the same disruptive techniques sporadically from field office to field office as long as I'd been an FBI man. In 1956, under Assistant Director Belmont, five years before I came in to take over the Domestic Intelligence Division, the decision was made to incorporate all counterintelligence operations into one program directed against the Communist party. I merely redirected the use of those techniques toward investigating the Klan.

Although we certainly wouldn't have broken the Klan without them, informants could cause tremendous problems for the bureau. After they've been working for us for a while, informants get to know the kind of information we want and many of them tailor their stories

to suit the occasion. exaggeration here at its money's worth. together, however,

That's why we i same group. Three l unknown to the oth separate reports of major discrepancies is mistaken or lying

When I left the time informants wh them were involved and kidnapping. Bu Black Panthers, the about everybody, ri the early 1970s the taining informants in

Sometimes an i ends up participatin activity he was being formants, and they participation. If our leader says "Let's go would be hard for ou The others would as must make decisions

But because of c the whole damn Kla

After the Philac fice. Toward the enc agent in charge of th these fellows, just u outstanding agent. F ferent Klan organiz keep them separate other for support, or

Wm Rushman "The Bureau"

Cointelpro