

Bruce:

McKinney

7/22/85

Gibson is a bit partisan in his Hale Boggs on J. Edgar Hoover but I believe that he is essentially correct.

His conjecture on p. 2, that Boggs was reacting to something by the FBI, denied by his widow, has support in an FBIHQ tickler recently disclosed to Mark Allen and which I used in litigation. A few extra pages of that tickler are attached.

Of course we have no way of ~~know~~ knowing that the FBI had prepared dossiers on the committee members and its staff twice.

I know of no support for what Gibson prates about Boggs on the Commission (63) because he was absent most of the time and not really doing much the rest of the time. I think that here Gibson has Boggs and Russell confused because Russell did go after Marina.

And by now you are aware of the difference ~~between~~ between what is disclosed, including by Boggs, in the ex sess's and not included in the Report.

Nonetheless a good piece of which I'd not heard earlier.

Best,

Ken

Save for H. Weisberg!

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HALE BOGGS ON J. EDGAR HOOVER: RHETORICAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL DENUNCIATION

DIRK CAMERON GIBSON

Hale Boggs' 1971 denunciation of J. Edgar Hoover was an unexpected and highly controversial rhetorical act. This essay proposes an explanation of why only Boggs stood in Congress to complain about FBI behavior feared by many, through consideration of public and private motives. In addition the accuracy of Boggs' brief speech is explored.

When Hale Boggs took the floor of the House of Representatives on April 5, 1971, to deliver an extemporaneous denunciation of J. Edgar Hoover, the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was generally considered to be one of the most powerful men in this country. Although several Democratic presidential aspirants had expressed interest in 1971 in dismissing Hoover, there was little doubt that Hoover would remain as head of the FBI as long as Richard Nixon was re-elected.

Boggs spoke barely a minute, yet his three hundred and one words had considerable impact.¹ The House Majority Leader from Louisiana demanded that Attorney General John Mitchell request Hoover's resignation, on the grounds that the FBI had adopted "the tactics of the Soviet Union and Hitler's Gestapo" by wiretapping members of Congress and infiltrating campus groups.² Boggs' address was termed "the harshest criticism of Hoover ever heard in the House," and the reaction from the Nixon Administration was the issuance of denials of guilt, in a

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¹Congressional Record, 5 April 1971, p. 9470.

²"Congress Wiretaps Denied," *Washington Post*, 7 April 1971, Sec. A, p. 1; *Cong. Rec.*, 5 April 1971, p. 9470.

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fashion later to be called "stonewalling."³ This study will ex-
plore Boggs' motives, the rhetorical nature of his criticism, the
accuracy of his charges, and reactions to his speech.

THE MAN

Boggs, who has been described as "a mercurial man, a gifted
trader of votes, a stirring old-time orator," cannot be simplified
to fit conventional political stereotypes. Although he had signed
the Southern Manifesto—a 1956 protest by some southern legis-
lators of Supreme Court desegregation decisions—and voted
against civil rights legislation four times between 1956 and 1964,
it would be a mistake to characterize Boggs as racist.⁴ His later
years were typified by "increasingly moderate stands" on civil
rights issues, and he "even dared to support the Civil Rights Acts
of 1965 and 1968."⁵ Once he even took the floor of the House to
deliver an extemporaneous rebuttal to a reactionary speech by
another congressman, so that his state might not be unfairly as-
sociated with immoderate sentiments.⁶

Thomas Hale Boggs was born in Long Beach, Mississippi,
February 15, 1914, and twenty-one years later he attained his
A.B. in journalism from Tulane University. Boggs' career then
largely became one of public service. After his graduation from
the Tulane law school, for example, he and his wife Lindy,
current congresswoman from Louisiana's Second District, spear-
headed the New Orleans People's League, a good government
organization.⁷

³Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Mathews, *The Almanac of
American Politics* (New York: E. F. Hutton and Company, 1976), p. 332. The
term "stonewall" was used by officials in the Nixon Administration to refer
to attempts to stifle discussion or communication regarding an issue. As
Nixon noted in a March 22, 1973, meeting with John Dean and Bob Halde-
man, "you can say I don't remember. You can say I don't recall. I can't give
any answer to that that I can recall." See the *New York Times* staff, *The
White House Transcripts* (New York: Viking Press, 1974), p. 171.

⁴Barone, Ujifusa, and Mathews, p. 332; "Boggs, Begich Disappearance:
No Trace in Four Days," *Congressional Quarterly* 30, 21 October 1972, p. 2774.

⁵Barone, Ujifusa, and Mathews, p. 332.

⁶Personal interview with Hon. Lindy Boggs, 13 June 1979.

⁷Barone, Ujifusa, and Mathews, p. 304; *Cong. Quarterly*, p. 2774; and
personal interview with Hon. Lindy Boggs, 13 June 1979.

Boggs was the youngest member of Congress in 1940, when he began serving the first of his fifteen terms. Then he failed in his first bid at re-election. But following a brief tour in the Navy, he regained his House seat in 1947. His service in Congress then remained unbroken until his death in 1972.⁸ Indeed, Boggs was unopposed in the last of his campaigns, mainly because in his last general election he had massed 69% of the vote.⁹

Although Boggs voted against civil rights bills in 1956, 1957, 1960, and 1964, he later reversed his position and twice voted—as mentioned earlier—for civil rights causes. Furthermore, Boggs frequently pleased northern and urban Democratic leaders by supporting free trade and social welfare legislation.¹⁰ According to one respected political periodical, he “always supported liberal domestic legislation.”¹¹

Evidence of Boggs' popularity with different factions of the Democratic party may be found in his career. In 1954 he became the first deputy majority whip, a position ostensibly created for the Louisianan by House Speaker Sam Rayburn. Then in 1962 Boggs stepped up to the position of Majority Whip, a post he held for nine years until beating Mo Udall of Arizona for the Majority Leadership. In addition, Boggs chaired the platform committee at the 1968 Democratic National Convention, and he served on two presidential commissions.¹²

According to his widow and congressional successor, Boggs' high school and collegiate debate experience had a great deal of influence upon his speaking style. Indeed, he had been a highly successful high school debater, and his triumphs in college forensics included his being the first freshman recipient of the Glendy-Burke award, an honor granted annually to the best Tulane debater. “Hale was first and foremost a debater, who spent most of his time disregarding prepared texts,” recalled

⁸*Cong. Quarterly*, p. 2774.

⁹Barone, Ujifusa, and Mathews, pp. 302-3.

¹⁰Barone, Ujifusa, and Mathews, p. 332.

¹¹*Cong. Quarterly*, p. 2774.

¹²Personal interview with Hon. Lindy Boggs, 13 June 1979, and Barone, Ujifusa, and Mathews, p. 302; *Cong. Quarterly*, p. 2774.

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¹³Personal interview with Hon.

¹⁴William Sullivan, *The Bureau* York: W. W. Norton and Company

¹⁵U.S. Cong., Senate, Select Comi With Respect To Intelligence Act Rights of Americans,” *Final Report*, p. 8.

¹⁶*Cong. Rec.*, p. 11563.

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Boggs, 13 June 1979, and Barone,
1979, p. 2774.

Lindy Boggs, who added that he was blessed with "natural talent,
beautiful tonal qualities and a lovely speaking voice."¹³

THE MESSAGE

The message conveyed through Boggs' brief speech was a
relatively simple and straightforward one. He argued that through
campus surveillance and wiretaps on the telephones of congress-
men the FBI was endangering the freedoms guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights. Three times in the speech he mentioned the Bill
of Rights, and twice he discussed campus surveillance and con-
gressional wiretapping.

Boggs' allegations about FBI infiltration of student groups
were not disputed, in part due to a break-in a month earlier at an
FBI field office in Media, Pennsylvania. Stolen documents released
by the perpetrators "proved beyond a doubt that the FBI was
investigating students as if they were criminals."¹⁴ Indeed, a
Senate committee later observed that during the late '60's and
early '70's "student groups were subjected to intense scrutiny,
including every member of the Students for a Democratic Society
and every Black Student Union and similar group."¹⁵

Although Boggs' allegation of campus surveillance aroused
little controversy, his plea for Hoover's resignation and his claim
about FBI wiretapping of congressmen prompted considerable
criticism, as will be demonstrated later in this analysis. Sub-
stantial evidence can be cited, however, to corroborate Boggs'
specific claims about electronic surveillance and thus to make
understandable his fears about the status of the Bill of Rights.
But at that time, the Louisiana congressman was pointedly
criticized for not offering proof of his charges. Dan Rather, then
White House correspondent for CBS news, noted that it was
"Boggs' case where proof is lacking."¹⁶

¹³Personal interview with Hon. Lindy Boggs, 13 June 1979.

¹⁴William Sullivan, *The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI* (New
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1979), p. 151.

¹⁵U.S. Cong., Senate, Select Committee To Study Government Operations
With Respect To Intelligence Activities, "Intelligence Activities and the
Rights of Americans," *Final Report*, 94th Cong., 2nd Session, 26 April 1976,
p. 8.

¹⁶*Cong. Rec.*, p. 11563.

Boggs amplified his April 5 remarks at a press conference the following day, and also expanded them during a longer speech given seventeen days later. In this second address, Boggs offered several examples of senators and congressmen who believed they were under electronic surveillance. In addition, Boggs charged that in 1970 a wiretap had been found on his home telephone by an investigator for the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, but he also noted that the company later denied any tap had been located.¹⁷

Senator Joseph Montoya of New Mexico was one of the wiretap victims named by Boggs. Somewhat earlier Montoya had himself delivered a speech alleging FBI surveillance of members of Congress. Boggs also named Congressman John Dowdy and Senators Ralph Yarborough, William Benton, Birch Bayh, Charles Percy, and Wayne Morse. The Louisiana congressman claimed that each of these legislators suspected some sort of electronic surveillance was being used against them.¹⁸

Two days after the April 5 speech, four other members of Congress reported suspicions about FBI surveillance, wiretaps in particular. Representative Nick Galifianakis "said a tap had been reported to him, but he could not certify it as a fact," and Representative Benjamin S. Rosen asserted that a policeman had reported Rosen's phone as being tapped, but the telephone company denied it. Senators George McGovern and Harold E. Hughes suspected taps on their telephones, but neither had any proof.¹⁹ The evidence needed by Boggs and others in 1971 surfaced in 1975, after former top FBI officials Cartha DeLoach and Louis B. Nichols first disclosed the magnitude of FBI surveillance of members of Congress.

On January 19, 1975, DeLoach and Nichols revealed the existence of "files containing information on the personal lives of Senators and Congressmen." Specifically, Senators Mike Mansfield, Ted Kennedy, Lowell Weicker, Abraham Ribicoff, George McGovern and Adlai Stevenson III, and Congressmen Hale

Boggs, Wilbur Mills and Carl Albert, which "contained data on the personal and professional lives of members of Congress as well as their families." DeLoach as 'junk.'"²⁰ The sweeping denials issued four days later by Zeigler, and the rest of the public uproar coaxed the pontiff into motion.

The results of separate inquiries were distressingly similar. First, a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Rights of the House Judiciary Committee in FBI files that "information on the personal and professional lives of incumbent members of Congress is maintained in files on each incoming Congress." "Intelligence Activities and the same conclusions, noting that had been subjected to electronic surveillance, inquiries publicly documented circulated in the nation's capital several cases, purely political in nature, of Congress to an Administration purely personal information, and social activities of a high-level electronic surveillance and disclosure to the Federal government."²¹

In retrospect, it appears correct in his allegations about wiretaps, but erred only in specifying wiretap surveillance technology such as devices.

²⁰Ronald Kessler, "FBI Had Files on Members of Congress," *Post*, 19 January 1975, Sec. A, p. 1.

²¹U.S. Cong., House, Subcommittee on the Judiciary, *FBI Oversight*, February 1975, part one, p. 42.

²²U.S. Cong., Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, *Intelligence Activities and the Federal Government*, 1975.

²³U.S. Cong., Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, *Intelligence Activities and the Federal Government*, 1975.

¹⁷*Cong. Rec.*, p. 11563.

¹⁸*Cong. Rec.*, p. 11653.

¹⁹"Congress Wiretaps Denied," *Washington Post*, 7 April 1971, Sec. A, p. 10.

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marks at a press conference ended them during a longer. In this second address, Boggs and congressmen who believed in surveillance. In addition, Boggs had been found on his home in Chesapeake and Potomac noted that the company later

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Washington Post, 7 April 1971, Sec. A,

Boggs, Wilbur Mills and Carl Albert were the subject of dossiers which "contained data on the girlfriends and drinking problems of members of Congress as well as other information characterized by DeLoach as 'junk.'"²⁰ These revelations made suspect the sweeping denials issued four years earlier by Hoover, Mitchell, Zeigler, and the rest of the "Nixon team," and the resulting public uproar coaxed the ponderous federal investigative apparatus into motion.

The results of separate Senate and House probes were distressingly similar. First, a Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee found evidence in FBI files that "information" was to be gathered "on non-incumbent members of Congress" so that Hoover had "a complete file on each incoming Congressman."²¹ Then, the Senate report "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans" reached the same conclusions, noting that both senators and congressmen had been subjected to electronic surveillance.²² These legislative inquiries publicly documented rumors that for years had quietly circulated in the nation's capital. The Senate report noted: "In several cases, purely political information, such as the reaction of Congress to an Administration's legislative proposals, and purely personal information, such as coverage of extra-marital social activities of a high-level official, was obtained from electronic surveillance and disseminated to the highest levels of the Federal government."²³

In retrospect, it appears that Boggs was at least partially correct in his allegations about FBI surveillance. He may have erred only in specifying wiretaps, as opposed to other electronic surveillance technology such as hidden transmitters and other devices.

²⁰Ronald Kessler, "FBI Had Files on Congress, Ex-aides Say," *Washington Post*, 19 January 1975, Sec. A, p. 1.

²¹U.S. Cong., House, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, *FBI Oversight*, 94th Congress, First Session, 27 February 1975, part one, p. 42.

²²U.S. Cong., Senate, Select Committee To Study Government Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, pp. 12, 229.

²³U.S. Cong., Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, p. 13.

Regardless of whether the danger stemmed from wiretaps, "bugs," or other means of surveillance, the threat to the Bill of Rights was real. Evidence unavailable to Boggs in 1971 demonstrates that Hoover was a virtual dictator over the FBI, capable of extreme acts of revenge against critics.²⁴ However, as early as 1964 there were warnings, as Fred Cook observed, that "the reputation of the Bureau" was causing pressures which resulted in "scant regard for human or individual rights."²⁵ Tom Wicker agreed with Cook's analysis: "As time brings from Freedom of Information Act suits, more grand jury deliberations, more investigative reporting, the truth becomes clearer—the assault on Martin Luther King was only part of a long and dismal record of FBI attempts at Hoover's command to suppress dissent and social change, hound and harass supposed enemies, smear individuals and organizations, blackmail those on whom it 'had something,' and manipulate public attitudes to suit the prejudices of the Director. And all these activities were based on surveillances and infiltrations conducted with little or no regard for the law."²⁶

The very fact that Boggs and others believed they were being kept under surveillance documents the chilling effect of such "police-state" behavior. Indeed, Boggs noted in an April 6 press conference that "more important than charges and counter-charges is the fundamental fact that a substantial number of the members of Congress are firmly convinced that their phones are tapped by the FBI." He contended that fear of wiretaps was as harmful as their actual use, adding that such fear would "chill

the kind of free discourse we as a free society."²⁷

"The inescapable message of the whole system of freedom stone of an open society," said Emerson at a 1971 Princeton investigation of the FBI.²⁸ Emerson years later by the Church caused by the FBI in COINTELPRO violations of both state and federal wire fraud, incitement to violence, extortion. More fundamental, citizens engaged in lawful serious injury to the First Amendment speech and the right of the to petition the government for

Therefore, the accuracy of appears to be a matter of his choice remain: why, for exoneration against Hoover, then follow-up speech? This and a singled out wiretapping—lead

THE

Boggs' untimely death as personality combine to frustrate motives. Nevertheless, it is possible offered explanations and thus strategy.

Although Boggs told the FBI he had been tapped, he claimed that attacks on Hoover. He cited

²⁴Further information about Hoover's character can be located in two types of sources, books by ex-agents and declassified FBI memorandum. Books include those by Sullivan; William Turner, *Hoover's FBI* (New York: Dell Books, 1970); and Norman Ollestad, *Inside the FBI* (New York: Lyle Stuart and Company, 1967). FBI memorandum can be located in the cited Congressional hearings, and in the Freedom of Information Act Reading Room, J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building, Washington, D.C.

²⁵Fred Cook, "The FBI Nobody Knows," quoted in Theodore Becker, *Government Lawlessness in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 71.

²⁶Tom Wicker, "Hoover Deceit Being Condoned," *New York Times*, 2 June 1978, Sec. 1, p. 16.

²⁷"Congress Wiretaps Denied,"

p. 1.

²⁸Pat Watters and Stephen Gill Ballantine Books, 1973), p. 371.

²⁹U.S. Cong., Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Report

anger stemmed from wiretaps, illance, the threat to the Bill of Rights. Boggs in 1971 demonstrated the FBI, capable of dictatorial over the FBI, capable of critics.²⁴ However, as early as 1961 Cook observed, that "the reputations pressures which resulted in individual rights."²⁵ Tom Wicker in 1971 time brings from Freedom of Information Act jury deliberations, more in comes clearer—the assault on the right of a long and dismal record of command to suppress dissent and its supposed enemies, smear in-kind those on whom it had had ill attitudes to suit the prejudice. These activities were based on conducted with little or no regard

others believed they were being subjected to the chilling effect of such wiretaps. Boggs noted in an April 6 press conference that charges and counter-charges at a substantial number of the convinced that their phones are tapped and that fear of wiretaps was as great as that such fear would "chill

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words," quoted in Theodore Becker, *Hoover* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 139.

ing Condoned," *New York Times*, 2

the kind of free discourse we must have if we are to continue as a free society."²⁷

"The inescapable message . . . is that the FBI jeopardizes the whole system of freedom of expression which is the cornerstone of an open society," stated Yale law professor Thomas I. Emerson at a 1971 Princeton University seminar entitled "Investigating the FBI."²⁸ Emerson's argument was documented five years later by the Church committee: "The abusive techniques used by the FBI in COINTELPRO from 1956 to 1971 included violations of both state and federal laws prohibiting mail fraud, wire fraud, incitement to violence, sending obscene mail, and extortion. More fundamentally, the harassment of innocent citizens engaged in lawful forms of political expression did serious injury to the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and the right of the people to assemble peaceably and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."²⁹

Therefore, the accuracy of Boggs' denunciation of Hoover appears to be a matter of history. Still, questions of rhetorical choice remain: why, for example, did Boggs give his one-minute oration against Hoover, then wait two weeks to offer proof in a follow-up speech? This and other questions—such as why Boggs singled out wiretapping—lead us to a consideration of motives.

THE MOTIVES

Boggs' untimely death and the complexity of his public personality combine to frustrate attempts to pinpoint his motives. Nevertheless, it is possible to probe beyond publicly offered explanations and thus better understand Boggs' rhetorical strategy.

Although Boggs told the House that his home telephone had been tapped, he claimed that this wasn't the motive behind his attacks on Hoover. He cited "a far more personal experience"

²⁷"Congress Wiretaps Denied," *Washington Post*, 7 April 1971, Sec. A, p. 1.

²⁸Pat Watters and Stephen Gillers, *Investigating the FBI* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), p. 371.

²⁹U.S. Cong., Senate, Select Committee To Study Government Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, p. 139.

as the motive behind his initial criticism of Hoover, adding that two unnamed friends, Justice Department career officials, had privately expressed fears at Hoover's retention as FBI Director.³⁰ This public explanation of Boggs' motives was maintained until January 21, 1975.

But the congressman's son alleged that his father had other reasons for criticizing Hoover. These "other reasons" centered around Hoover's use of personal information against critics of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. According to the younger Boggs, the Director "leaked photographs of sexual activity and reports on alleged Communist affiliations of some authors of books and articles on the assassination." The *Washington Post* also argued that this "played a large role" in Boggs' "decision to confront Hoover."³¹

Given Hoover's collection of dossiers on private lives, it is possible to imagine that Boggs was reacting to some action taken by Hoover or his agents against him—blackmail or a threat of some kind. When this writer asked about that possibility, Boggs' widow replied, "I don't think there was anything like that. It was not because of anything directed against him, except that he didn't feel comfortable talking on his own telephone."³²

Why did Boggs risk a punishing confrontation with Hoover? He claimed initially that it was at the behest of friends at the Justice Department, yet his son revealed that Hoover's use of political intelligence affected Boggs' decision considerably. While both of these factors probably played a role, it would seem unwise to limit our analysis to these motives, since two additional causal factors can be identified.

A complete understanding of Boggs' attitudes toward Hoover necessitates an examination of their relationship during the probe into John Kennedy's assassination. Boggs was openly critical of FBI performance, which he claimed resulted in inadequate information being made available to the Warren Commission.³³

³⁰*Cong. Rec.*, 22 April 1971, p. 11565.

³¹Ronald Kessler, "Hill Data Confirmed by FBI," *Washington Post*, 21 January 1975, Sec. A, p. 1.

³²Personal interview with Hon. Lindy Boggs, 13 June 1979.

³³Edward Epstein, *Inquest* (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 48.

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Boggs placed the blame Congress," observing that " occurred without our consent During his service on two p developed contacts with inv greater insight into abuses t tion about FBI misconduct imbued with an acute perso became very incensed at him

³⁴Bernard Fensterwald, *Coincid ton Press*, 1977), p. 96.

³⁵*Cong. Rec.*, 22 April 1971, p. 1

³⁶Personal interview with Hon.

³⁷*Cong. Rec.*, 22 April 1971, p. 1

³⁸*Cong. Rec.*, 22 April 1971, p. 1

³⁹Personal interview with Hon.

criticism of Hoover, adding that department career officials, had Hoover's retention as FBI Director.³⁰ His motives were maintained until

argued that his father had other "other reasons" centered on information against critics of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Boggs, the Director "leaked" and reports on alleged Coms of books and articles on the subject also argued that this "played to confront Hoover."³¹

dossiers on private lives, it is reacting to some action taken against him—blackmail or a threat of libel about that possibility, Boggs' career was anything like that. It reacted against him, except that on his own telephone."³²

arguing confrontation with Hoover? at the behest of friends at the time revealed that Hoover's use of force was a decision considerably. While it played a role, it would seem unwise to say, since two additional causal

Boggs' attitudes toward Hoover during the probe. Boggs was openly critical of Hoover and the result in inadequate in the Warren Commission.³³

by FBI," *Washington Post*, 21

Boggs, 13 June 1979.

: Viking Press, 1966), p. 48.

Despite the constraints imposed by the FBI, Boggs was an independent and analytical member of the commission. On more than one occasion he shook incredible stories by Marina Oswald, and he generally refused to accede to majority perspectives if he felt any doubt about an issue.³⁴ But Boggs distrusted Hoover. According to a former aide, "Hale always returned to one thing—Hoover lied his eyes out to the Commission on the bullets, the gun, on Oswald, on Ruby, on their friends, you name it."³⁵ Therefore, it may be assumed that Boggs' reservations about Hoover took seed during the Louisiana's tenure on the Warren Commission.

Boggs' philosophy on democracy and good government may also have influenced his actions. From his early days in politics, as chairman of the New Orleans People's League, Boggs believed strongly that government must be accountable to the people. In fact, his first major political speech was a condemnation of a corrupt district attorney in Louisiana. "In Congress he was appalled that we had not recognized the growing invasion of liberties," claimed Lindy Boggs.³⁶ In the April 22 speech, Boggs spoke from "the stirrings of a newly awakened and aroused sense of responsibility," and he began his criticism of himself and other ineffective congressional overseers by saying "today I see what until now I had not permitted myself to see."³⁷

Boggs placed the blame squarely on "our apathy in this Congress," observing that "what has occurred could not have occurred without our consent and complicity on Capitol Hill."³⁸ During his service on two presidential commissions Boggs had developed contacts with investigative agencies which gave him greater insight into abuses of power. Possessing more information about FBI misconduct than did other congressmen, and imbued with an acute personal distaste for corrupt officials, "he became very incensed at himself for not recognizing the danger."³⁹

³⁴Bernard Fensterwald, *Coincidence or Conspiracy?* (New York: Kensington Press, 1977), p. 96.

³⁵*Cong. Rec.*, 22 April 1971, p. 11562.

³⁶Personal interview with Hon. Lindy Boggs, 13 June 1979.

³⁷*Cong. Rec.*, 22 April 1971, p. 11562.

³⁸*Cong. Rec.*, 22 April 1971, p. 11562.

³⁹Personal interview with Hon. Lindy Boggs, 13 June 1979.

In summary, it appears likely that a combination of personal and political factors resulted in the denunciation of Hoover. The evidence indicates that Boggs was personally irritated by the discovery of a surveillance device on his home telephone line. In addition, he felt professionally constrained and inhibited in his freedom of expression. Considering Boggs' inside information about the FBI, he may have felt an obligation to air his grievances with Hoover's administration.

"The most compelling motivation was the fact that we knew of various things that were happening. He was upset that the Congress of the United States was under surveillance," Lindy Boggs stated to this writer. "People would say, 'let's go somewhere to talk,'" Lindy Boggs continued, "and Hale felt that this was the fault of the Congress for not exercising its proper oversight functions." She recalls a feeling "like you never knew who was listening," adding "you didn't even discuss tactics over the telephone."⁴⁰ It is likely that Boggs spoke from a sense of self-preservation, accompanied by a desire to alert other members of Congress to reassert oversight of the FBI.

THE MULTITUDE

The immediate reaction to Boggs' speech in the House was an equally brief and blunt rebuttal by Gerald Ford, who asked that "the gentleman from Louisiana submit proof before he makes such a charge." Ford concluded that America was fortunate, both for having an organization like the FBI and for the fact that "that organization has had Mr. Hoover as its head for such a long period of time."⁴¹ Fellow Congressmen, White House aides, the Attorney General, and Hoover all reacted in similar fashion.

Although Boggs alleged that "numerous members of Congress" had advised him privately of "their firm conviction that their phone conversations and activities were the subject of surveillance," no other congressional leader stepped forward to corroborate Boggs' charges. Carl Albert, when asked if there were a wiretap on his telephone, said "I doubt it." Senate Ma-

⁴⁰Personal interview with Hon. Lindy Boggs, 13 June 1979.

⁴¹Cong. Rec., 5 April 1971, p. 9470.

Hale Boggs

majority Leader Mike Mansfield to me. As far as I'm concerned, the fact that a survey by the quarter of the members expected that their phones were being tapped was the claims made by Boggs in Congress.⁴²

Senior White House aide after the April 5 speech has any evidence to support Zeigler stated that the White House tapping of Congressmen's phones was a relatively low reaction was relatively low outspoken in defense of Mitchell replied when asked The Attorney General added the telephone of any member of the past." Finally, Mitchell political dialogue," and did apologize to a great American complete retraction of his claim.

Hoover's reactions were the office of Senate Minority a "positive assertion that Senator's phone or of the phone he added "nor has any member under surveillance by the FBI was the initiation of a

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⁴²"Congress Wiretaps Denied."

⁴³"Congress Wiretaps Denied," pp. 1 and 10.

⁴⁴Richard L. Lyons, "Boggs Denies," 6 April 1971, Sec. A, p. 1.

⁴⁵Lyons, p. 1.

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jority Leader Mike Mansfield said "no Senator has ever come to me. As far as I'm concerned, it hasn't happened." Despite the fact that a survey by the *Washington Post* revealed that one-quarter of the members of Congress said they believed or suspected that their phones were tapped or their offices bugged, the claims made by Boggs received little support from others in Congress.⁴²

Senior White House aides spent twenty-five minutes the day after the April 5 speech reportedly discussing "whether Boggs' has any evidence to support his charges." Press secretary Ronald Zeigler stated that the White House "of course does not favor tapping of Congressmen's phones."⁴³ Although this White House reaction was relatively low-key, Attorney General Mitchell was outspoken in defense of Hoover. "Slandorous falsehoods," Mitchell replied when asked to characterize Boggs' assertions. The Attorney General added that "the FBI has never tapped the telephone of any member of the House or the Senate, now or in the past." Finally, Mitchell called Boggs' remarks "a new low in political dialogue," and declared that "he should recant and apologize to a great American." Mitchell later asked for "a complete retraction of his charges, and an apology."⁴⁴

Hoover's reactions were not expressed directly, but through the office of Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott. Hoover made a "positive assertion that there has never been a tap of a Senator's phone or of the phone of a member of Congress," and he added "nor has any member of the House or Senate been under surveillance by the FBI." The unofficial reaction of the FBI was the initiation of a smear campaign against Boggs.⁴⁵

Although the immediate aftermath of Boggs' speech was marked by uniform and complete denials of guilt by the Nixon Administration, the passage of time has witnessed the erosion of the "stonewall" which greeted Boggs' charges, and the truth about FBI misconduct has come to light. Boggs died eighteen

⁴²"Congress Wiretaps Denied," *Washington Post*, 7 April 1971, Sec. A, p. 10.

⁴³"Congress Wiretaps Denied," *Washington Post*, 7 April 1971, Sec. A, pp. 1 and 10.

⁴⁴Richard L. Lyons, "Boggs Demands Firing of Hoover," *Washington Post*, 6 April 1971, Sec. A, p. 1.

⁴⁵Lyons, p. 1.

months after the April 5 speech, in an air accident off the coast of Alaska, yet he lived to see his nemesis die of natural causes in May of 1972.

Fensterwald stated that "observers were uncertain as to his exact motivation in demanding Hoover's resignation," and Boggs' widow remarked to this writer "I honestly do not know. I wish I knew what set him off."⁴⁶ While we cannot be certain of Boggs' exact motives, his emphasis on wiretaps suggests that Boggs was angered at the discovery of a wiretap on his home telephone. Other important contributing factors were the warnings from Boggs' friends at the Justice Department, Boggs' philosophy regarding responsible government, and his distrust of Hoover.

In a sense, the object of his denunciation was Congress, for Boggs alleged that legislative oversight of the FBI was deficient, allowing the threat to the Bill of Rights to persist. Seen from this perspective, Boggs' real objective was the correction of inadequate congressional performance. Judging from the Senate and House probes of FBI conduct within four years of the April 5 speech, we may evaluate Boggs' rhetoric as being successful.

⁴⁶Fensterwald, p. 100; personal interview with Hon. Lindy Boggs, 13 June 1979.

THE PERSUASIVE A REPLICAT

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This study examines concluding metaphors: sex, the extended sex metaphor, change in the direct conclusions. Three explanatory arouses and motivates the best culmination of argument speech; and (3) it's persuasive. These results provide additional metaphor functions differ language.

Although there has been in metaphor, philosophy have speculated and theorized in discourse for centuries.

Ms. Siltanen is a graduate student; the research reported here was part of South Florida M.A. thesis. She thanks Lawrence Hosman for their help.

¹For an excellent survey of metaphor see, Andrew Ortony, R. Theoretical and Empirical Research, 919-943. See also Thomas Frenn, Semantics/Classical Theory and Metaphor, *Quarterly Journal of Linguistics*, 61 (1975), pp. 1-12; Robert S. Campbell, "Metaphor and Linguistics," 96 (1973), pp. 56-116. *Thought*, (New York: Cambridge Press, 1962); Michael Osborn a Public Address, "Speech Monographs."