

On the other side of the world there is an ironic situation in Portugal. Commander Jesuino, Portuguese Minister of Information, is in the United States seeking "understanding." Secretary Kissinger is reportedly misled, both at Jesuino, and at U.S. Ambassador Frank Carlucci, for advocating some understanding of this government. Secretary Kissinger disapproves of Portugal for allowing too many Communists in their government. How can he possibly be surprised, either at Portugal or Carlucci, when he has been relentlessly promoting détente for as long as he has had any influence in the government? Why is it acceptable for Secretary Kissinger to seek "understanding" and mutual agreements with the brutal masters of the Kremlin, but not acceptable to seek understanding of a government which has not yet turned completely to communism?

The San Diego Union of May 3 has printed an excellent editorial calling for a reappraisal of détente from yet another perspective—the disastrous effect which détente has had on NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. The editorial concludes, succinctly:

Détente, it is plain, has helped our enemies and has done us no good whatever. Furthermore, it has shaken the confidence of our allies. Had we the sense of Vietnam, we would be well advised to ask ourselves if it is not, in the long run, better to have a meaningful détente with our friends than a worthless détente with our enemies.

I endorse those thoughts, and commend this editorial to my colleagues.

**THE "DELUSION" OF DÉTENTE**

As we raise our eyes from the embers of Vietnam and look in other directions we must concede with the wag who said, "The whole world is a rat race and the rats are ahead."

A case in point is NATO, the grand alliance that has held Soviet imperialism at bay for 25 years. Now, NATO is in trouble, partly because of the dynamism of Soviet diplomacy and the size of the Soviet's military buildup, and partly because of misplaced American priorities as to the relative importance of the thing we call "détente."

The Soviet power has grown with almost dramatic speed. The Russians are spending more on military defense by far than the United States, and their progress is almost terrifying. They have developed a massive and modern fleet, and are procuring the bases necessary to make it a worldwide strategic force.

The NATO European command is now faced with a formidable force of 26,000 Warsaw Pact tanks, an array of tactical nuclear weapons and armies at least twice the size of the NATO forces.

NATO, itself, is in fragile disarray. Great Britain is impoverished, suffering brutally at the hands of a leftist government that is disinterested in defence. Portugal is turning slowly leftward, as is Italy. Greece and Turkey, former stalwart anchors of the NATO flank on the Mediterranean, are totally disenchanted. Turkey can no longer be regarded as a United States base in that area and Greece, suffering brutal internal political and economic problems, is about to leave NATO completely.

It is against this backdrop that the United States should hasten to reexamine its attitude on détente.

If our interest in mollifying the Soviet Union through détente suggests a corresponding disinterest in our relations with NATO,

the alliance could very well collapse, with the NATO nations trying, one way or another, to accommodate with the Soviet Union.

It is time for the leadership of our country to see détente as an abstraction, simply a theatrical camouflage on the Soviet Union's part, for pursuing its political war.

Stripping off the camouflage, we see that détente did not keep the Soviets from arming the North Vietnamese in violation of the Paris Peace accord. It did not cause the Soviets to work for peace during the October, 1973, Middle East war. It has resulted in the two Strategic Arms Limitation meetings, SALT I and SALT II, which actually limited nothing and, since the Soviet Union is ready and willing to spend far more on arms than is needed for defense, it has moved her clearly into the position of No. 1 in the nuclear world. In that world, it might be observed, being No. 2 is not better than being No. 20.

Détente, it is plain, has helped our enemies and has done us no good whatever. Furthermore, it has shaken the confidence of our allies. Now, in the wake of Vietnam, we would be well advised to ask ourselves if it is not, in the long run, better to have a meaningful détente with our friends than a worthless détente with our enemies.

**CALL FOR REOPENING OF INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF JOHN KENNEDY**

**HON. GLADYS NOON SPELLMAN**

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 14, 1975

Mrs. SPELLMAN. Mr. Speaker, recently I was visited by several students from the University of Maryland who represented many of their peers who are concerned about the Warren Commission and the investigation into the Kennedy assassination. Members of the Organization of Students To Investigate the Assassination, Mr. Floyd Lamore, Mr. Michael Diamond, Ms. Terri Weifenbach, Mr. David O'Neill, Ms. Maryann Hainley, Mr. Daniel Kinder, and Ms. Christina Mazzanti presented me with a petition from the University of Maryland containing 1,175 signatures in support of resolutions before this House calling for the reopening of the investigation of the assassination of John Kennedy.

These students are sincerely concerned that the FBI, the organization investigating the assassination, had a "predilected opinion of the outcome of their investigation." The students believe that the Warren Commission decided to withhold and suppress evidence contrary to the predilected opinion of the FBI. It is the coverup aspects of the assassination investigation that are of the greatest concern to these students, and I share this concern.

In support of their belief that some coverup existed in the investigation, the students presented me with a copy of the transcript of the executive session of the Warren Commission of January 22, 1964. I would like to include for the Record this portion of the transcript, along with the accompanying petition from the Organization of Students to

Investigate the Investigation of the Kennedy Assassination.

Mr. Speaker, these students are taking their summer to work on a petition survey of Prince Georges County, Montgomery County and the counties comprising the district of our distinguished colleague, Congressman PAUL SARRANES, in an effort to further determine the beliefs and concerns that exist on this subject. They are also planning a symposium to be held on the University of Maryland campus, tentatively scheduled during the second week of June. This symposium will be made up of experts in the field as well as concerned citizens and Members of Congress.

Mr. Lamore and his fellow students have emphasized again and again that it is the coverup aspects of the assassination investigation that are of major concern to them. If the FBI, the CIA and the Secret Service are not doing their job, and if, in the process, they covered up their mistakes, the American people should know about it.

Mr. Speaker, I support these and other efforts to answer the many puzzling questions that have arisen around the investigation of the Kennedy assassination, and I applaud the efforts of the Organization of Students to Investigate the Investigation of the Kennedy Assassination.

The January 22, 1964, transcript of the Warren Commission executive session and the petition of the organization follow:

To: The Honorable Gladys Noon Spellman, Congresswoman, 5th District, Maryland.

We the undersigned, do hereby petition the Honorable Gladys Noon Spellman, Congresswoman from the fifth district of Maryland, to support in particular, House Resolution No. 204 and in general, a full and open investigation by either body of Congress on the Kennedy Assassination. The essence of House Resolution No. 204 is to reopen the investigation of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy. Its sponsor is Representative Gonzalez of Texas.

We think the Warren Commission was inaccurate, dishonest and incomplete in their investigation, findings and their conclusion that there was no conspiracy and that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in assassinating President Kennedy. We question the "lone assassin" theory in light of previously suppressed and/or ignored evidence; evidence which plainly suggests more than one gunman and thus a conspiracy.

House Resolution No. 204 is in rules committee at this time and we would appreciate your efforts to support his resolution and follow its progress through till a vote before the House.

As your constituents, we most humbly appreciate your attention on this petition and being familiar with your record of involvement, feel that you will take an active position of approval of the resolution.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,  
Washington, D.C., March 10, 1975

Mr. KAROL WEISBERG,  
Route 8,  
Frederick, Md.

DEAR Mr. WEISBERG: Some years ago you requested a copy of a transcript of the executive session of the Warren Commission of January 22, 1964. At that time, as we informed you, there was no transcript of that

session. A transcript of the reporter's notes for that session has been prepared and is now available for research. Enclosed is a copy of the transcript.

Sincerely,

MISS JANE F. SMITH,  
Director, Civil Archives Division.

TRANSCRIPT OF EXECUTIVE SESSION OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY OF JANUARY 22, 1964

GENTLEMEN: I called this meeting of the Commission because of something that developed today that I thought every member of the Commission should have knowledge of, something that you shouldn't hear from the public before you had an opportunity to think about it. I will just have Mr. Rawkin tell you the story from the beginning.

Mr. RAWKIN. Mr. Wagner Carr, the Attorney General of Texas, called me at 11:10 this morning and said that the word had come out, he wanted to get it to me at the first moment, that Oswald was acting as an FBI Undercover Agent, and that they had the information of his badge which was given as Number 179, and that he was being paid two hundred a month from September of 1962 up through the time of the assassination. I asked what the source of this was, and he said that he understood the information had been made available so that Defense Counsel for Ruby had that information, that he knew that the press had the information, and he didn't know exactly where Wade had gotten the information, but he was a former FBI Agent.

That they, that is, Wade before, had said that he had sufficient so that he was willing to make the statement.

FORN. Wade is?

A. The District Attorney.

FORN. Carr is the Attorney General.

BOGGS. Right, of Texas.

RAWKIN. I brought that to the attention of the Chief Justice immediately, and he said that I should try to get in touch with Carr and ask him to bring Wade up here, and he would be willing to meet with him any time today or tonight to find out what was the basis of this story. I tried to get Carr and he was out campaigning in Texarkana and so forth, and so it took us quite a while to get back to him and talk to him. I just got through talking to him and he told me the source of the information was a member of the press who had claimed he knew of such an agency, that he was an undercover agent, but he now is coming with the information as to his particular number and the amount he was getting and the details as to the time when the payments started. Wade said he as well as him did not know the name of the informant but he could guess who it was, that it was given to his assistant, and he was sure that he knew, and he said he was trying to check it out to get more definite information. Carr said that he could bring Wade in some time the first of the week, but in light of the fact that it was this man of the press and that they did not think it would be broken by the press immediately, although there had been all kinds of stories down there but Carr said there were some 25 to 40 different stories about this being the case admonishing the press themselves, but this was the first time that he got something definite as to how they were handling it or how it could be handled by himself. But I was concerned of an undercover agent. He thought that the press would not bring the story without some further proof, and they are working on that now, he said. So he thought that if he brought Wade back on Monday or Tuesday, that that would still take care of any major problem. When he first told us, he said the press had it and he was fearful because he hadn't even gotten this from Wade. He got it from another man

that the press would bring it before we could know about it and the Commission would be asked all kinds of questions without having information about it. Now he said Wade told him that the FBI never keeps any records of names.

Mr. BOGGS. Wade is the District Attorney for Dallas County?

RAWKIN. Right.

Q. And the other man, Carr, is the Attorney General?

A. That is right.

Q. And the other people who have knowledge of this story?

A. He indicated that the press down there had knowledge of this story, and that the information came from some informant who was a press representative, and he, that is, Wade, could guess who it was but his assistant knew and he never asked him. They were trying to get more explicit information.

A. Lee, would you tell them?

Mr. DULLES. Who were you talking with when you got this information, Wade himself?

A. I was talking with Carr.

BOGGS. There is a denial of this in one of these FBI records, as you know.

A. Yes.

COOPER. In this file we had yesterday, one of the lawyers for this fellow who claims to represent—

BOGGS. Thornhill, I think.

COOPER. Oswald or one of them, Ruby, told about this, do you recall it, he said it was being rumored around.

RAWKIN. Yes, it was being rumored that he was an undercover agent. Now it is something that would be very difficult to prove out. There are events in connection with this that are curious, in that they might make it possible to check some of it out in time. I assume that the FBI records would never show it, and if it is true, and of course we don't know, but we thought you should have the information.

A. Lee, would you tell the gentlemen the circumstances under which this story was told?

A. Yes, when it was first brought to my attention this morning—

BOGGS. What time was this, Lee?

A. 11. 10.

BOGGS. That is after the Ruby episode of yesterday?

A. That is right.

Q. Yes.

A. And Mr. Carr said that they had used this saying before the Court that they thought they knew why the FBI was so willing to give some of these records to the Defense Counsel, and they were \* \* \* to the Defense Counsel being able to rule the records and asking the Court to rule that they couldn't get them.

Q. That is, the District Attorney was?

A. That is right, and he said a number of these records were furnished by the Texas authorities, and that they should not be given up to the Defense Counsel, and that the reason he thought that they were so eager to help Ruby was because they had the undercover, that Oswald was the undercover agent and had the number of his badge and so much, he was getting two hundred a month and so forth, and that was the way it was explained as his justification to the Court as a basis for determining the records and that that was the excuse the FBI, the reason the FBI had for being so eager to give the records up. That is the way it was developed. Now Mr. Jaworski, who is associated with the Attorney General working on this matter was reported to you before, and, \* \* \* Story, I don't talk to Story about it but I did talk to Jaworski and he said he didn't think Wade would say anything like this unless he had some substantial information back of it, and thought he could prove it, because he thought it would ruin many in

politics, in Texas, to be making such a claim, and then have it shown that there was nothing to it.

A. And Jaworski is an able lawyer, mature and very competent. We have complete confidence in him as a person. Now that is the evaluation of the situation.

FORN. No. He hasn't made any investigations himself?

A. No, he has not.

FORN. Was Wade or anyone connected with Wade?

A. No.

DULLES. Talking about Story, just a few minutes ago just telling him I wasn't going to be down in Texas, I had told him I was going to be down at the time, he didn't indicate that he had anything of any importance on his mind. Maybe he won't offer it to him obviously.

RAWKIN. I don't know that it was even brought to his attention.

DULLES. I don't believe it was, now. Of course, he is not in the hierarchy.

A. Well, I think they were planning on telling the Attorney General and Jaworski.

FORN. How long ago did they get a feeling that there was some substance to the rumors that apparently had been—I just assumed, and I didn't ask them that, that Carr called me and seemed to be in a matter of great urgency at 11:10 this morning, and that he was fearful that they would bring in the papers before we would even get to know about it, and that is the way he was talking and acting about it.

COOPER. He felt there was . . . He didn't know the name of the informant?

A. No, he did not.

Q. When then would lead him to think it had substance?

A. Well, he said that the reason he thought it might have substance was because Wade had heard these rumors constantly, and his assistant had gotten this information from the informant as to a definite badge number, and the amount and the date.

COOPER. How would you test this kind of thing?

A. It is going to be very difficult for us to be able to establish the fact in it. I am confident that the FBI would never admit it, and I presume their records will never show it, or if their records do show anything, I would think their records would show some kind of a number that could be assigned to a dozen different people according to how they wanted to describe them. So that it seemed to me if it truly happened, he did use postal boxes practically every place that he went, and that would be an ideal way to get money to anyone that you wanted as an undercover agent, or anybody else that you wanted to do business that way with without having any particular transaction.

FORN. There might be people who would see what was going on with that particular box, because the postal authorities do watch, they have means of watching in many places that no one could see. They can watch the clerks as to what they are doing in these boxes, and they can watch the individuals that are going in and out. They do that only when they have an occasion to be suspicious, but they might, in watching for somebody particularly, they might also see other things that they just have to note. That is a possibility.

DULLES. What was the ostensible mission? I mean when they hire somebody they hire somebody for a purpose. It is either . . . Was it to penetrate the Fair Play for Cuba Committee? That is the only thing I can think of where they might have used this man. It would be quite ordinary for me because they are very careful about the agents they use. You wouldn't pick up a fellow like this to do an agent's job. You have got to

watch out for your agents. You have really got to know. Sometimes you make a mistake.

**FORD.** He was playing ball, writing letters to both the elements of the Communist parties. I mean he was playing ball with the Trotskyites and with the others. This was a strange circumstance to me.

**DULLES.** But the FBI get people right inside you know. They don't need a person like this on the outside. The only place where he did any at all was with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

**BOGGS.** Of course it is conceivable that he may have been brought back from Russia you know.

**A.** If he was in the employ from 1962, September 1962, up to the time of the assassination, it had to start over in Russia, didn't it, because didn't he get back in February? When did he get back here from Russia?

**A.** I think it was February; February of this year.

**Q.** Of '62. Was it of '62?

**A.** Oh yes, that is right, it was '62.

**DULLES.** They have no facilities, they haven't any people in Russia. They may have some people in Russia but they haven't any organizations of their own in Russia.

**A.** Yes.

**DULLES.** They might have their agents there. They have some people, sometimes American Communist agents go to Russia under their guidance and so forth and so on under their control.

**COOPER.** Of course there are rumors all around Dallas, of course the FBI is surrounded with rumors too.

**A.** One of the strange things that happened, and it may have no bearing on this at all, is the fact that this man who is a defector, and who was under observation at least by the FBI, they say they saw him frequently, could walk about the Immigration Office in New Orleans one day and come out the next day with a passport that permitted him to go to Russia. From my observations of the case that have come to us, such passports are not passed out with that ease.

**DULLES.** Mr. I think you are wrong on that.

**A.** I could be.

**DULLES.** Because the passports are issued valid for anywhere except specified countries. There is a stamp as I recall that says not good for Communist China, North Vietnam, and so forth. For a long time they had on the stamp not good for Hungary. But any American, practically any American, can get a passport that is good for anywhere. An American can travel and Russia is one of the countries that you can now travel to.

**A.** Well, maybe you can.

**DULLES.** You can get them quick.

**A.** I think our General Counsel and I both have some experience in cases that have come before our Court which would indicate that that isn't exactly the fact.

**DULLES.** I think in the State Department.

**A.** They have great difficulty, some of them, in getting a passport to go to Russia.

**BOGGS.** Particularly for someone who has any Communist.

**A.** Oh, yes.

**DULLES.** Is there any evidence the State Department has that record in the files? I don't think that record has ever turned up.

**COOPER.** They admitted there wasn't any.

**A.** What record, that he was a defector?

**DULLES.** Yes, I don't think the State Department or in the Passport Bureau, there was no record. It didn't get down to the Passport offices. That is one of the things we ought to look into.

**A.** The State Department knew he was a defector. They arranged for him to come back.

**DULLES.** But it don't get . . . passport files or the passport records. They are issuing hundreds and thousands of passports. They have their own particular system.

**A.** Yes.

**DULLES.** They don't run around from time a man comes in. If they don't find any clue, and they don't according to our record here they don't find any warning clue in his file—they should have a warning clue in his file but as I recall they don't.

**COOPER.** That is what they admitted, that they had not supplied the warning.

**DULLES.** And the Passport Office don't on its own usually go around and inquire. They wait until it is assigned there. Then they follow it up.

**COOPER.** This may be off the point a bit, but as I re-read the report, the chronology of the FBI checks on Oswald, they knew that he had gone to Texas. They learned from Mrs. Payne; they knew where Mrs. Oswald was living. They talked with her. They knew where he was working.

**BOGGS.** Sure. That is all in the file.

**COOPER.** I know that. I say they knew where he was working.

**BOGGS.** I am sure you went over that material that we received a few days ago. You will find the report from the FBI dated back last summer, and months before that and then months after that, why some agent would make a report on it.

**A.** I thought first you should know about it. Secondly, there is some factor too that a consideration, that is somewhat an issue in this case, and I suppose you are all aware of it. That is that the FBI is very explicit that Oswald is the assassin or was the assassin, and they are very explicit that there was no conspiracy, and they are also saying in the same place that they are continuing their investigation. Now in my experience of almost nine years, in the first place it is hard to get them to say when you think you have got a case tight enough to convict somebody, that that is the person that committed the crime. In my experience with the FBI they don't do that. They claim that they don't evaluate, and it is uniform prior experience that they don't do that. Secondly, they have not run out all kinds of leads in Mexico or in Russia and so forth which they could probably—It is not our business, it is the way.

**DULLES.** What is that?

**A.** They haven't run out all the leads on the information and they could probably say—that isn't our business.

**Q.** Yes.

**A.** But they are concluding that there can't be a conspiracy without those being run out. Now that is not, from my experience with the FBI.

**Q.** It is not. You are quite right. I have seen a great many reports.

**A.** Why are they so eager to make both of those conclusions, both in the original report and their experimental report, which is such a departure? Now that is just circumstantial evidence, and it don't prove anything about this, but it raises questions. We have to try to find out what they have to say that would give any support to the story, and report it to you.

**COOPER.** Sure.

**A.** I think it was in October.

**RAWKIN.** They had a report on many, they had an agent go and see him when he was in prison.

**BOGGS.** In New Orleans?

**A.** In New Orleans.

**Q.** Right.

**A.** And he lied to them before the police. He said his wife was a Texas girl, and he married her in Texas, and a whole string of stuff, and in Dallas they had a report prior to that that was definitely contrary to it.

**BOGGS.** The fellow Butler, who works for the profit organizations that Dr. Oswald

heads to disseminate and tie Communist propaganda to Latin America, is the one who confronted him on the streets in New Orleans. I know Butler. He is a very fine young man. It was . . . Butler says that this was the first time that they established that he had been in Russia and that he had defected at one time and then returned. You have that undoubtedly in your files, that film, that tape that was made and borrowed in New Orleans?

**A.** Yes.

**BOGGS.** Of course on that tape—I listened to that tape—he gives the normal Communist line, reaction to everything.

**A.** That is right.

**Q.** The same old stereotyped answer?

**A.** Yes.

**COOPER.** How do you propose to meet this situation?

**BOGGS.** This is a serious thing.

**FORD.** Who would know if anybody would in the Bureau have such an arrangement?

**A.** I think that there are several. Probably Mr. Belmont would know every undercover agent.

**Q.** Belmont?

**A.** Yes.

**Q.** An informer also would you say?

**A.** Yes, I would think so. He is the special security of the division.

**DULLES.** Yes, I know.

**A.** And he is an able man. But when the Chief Justice and I were just briefly reflecting on this we said if that was true and it ever came out and could be established, then you would have people think that there was a conspiracy to accomplish this assassination that nothing the Commission did or anybody could dissipate.

**BOGGS.** You are so right.

**DULLES.** Oh, terrible.

**BOGGS.** Its implications of this are fantastic, don't you think so?

**A.** Terrific.

**RAWKIN.** To have anybody admit to it, even if it was the fact, I am sure that there wouldn't at this point be anything to prove it.

**DULLES.** Lee, if this were true, why would it be particularly in their interest—I could see it would be in their interest to get rid of this man but why would it be in their interest to say he is clearly the only guilty one? I mean I don't see that argument that you raise particularly shows an interest.

**BOGGS.** I can understand it.

**A.** They would like to have us fold up and quit.

**BOGGS.** This closes the case, you see. Don't you see?

**DULLES.** Yes, I see that.

**RAWKIN.** They found the man. There is nothing more to do. The Commission supports their conclusions, and we can go on home and that is the end of it.

**DULLES.** But that puts the men right on them, if he was not the killer and they employed him, they are already it, you see. So your argument is correct if they are sure that this is going to close the case, but if it don't close the case, they are worse off than ever by doing this.

**BOGGS.** Yes, I would think so. And of course, we are all even gaining in the realm of speculation. I don't even like to see this being taken down.

**DULLES.** Yes, I think this record ought to be destroyed. Do you think we need a record of this?

**A.** I don't, except that we said we would have records of meetings and so we called the reporter in the formal way. If you think what we have said here should not be upon the record, we can have it done that way. Of course it might.

**DULLES.** I am just thinking of sending around copies and so forth. The only copies of this record should be kept right here.