

16 Jan '64

SUBJECT: CIA Work in Support of the Warren Commission

1. Below is a summary of the matters discussed in our meeting WITH STAFF OFFICERS on the evening of 15 January 1964. In turn, ANOTHER OFFICER was reporting to us the substance of his meeting with Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. J. Lee Rankin, Chief Counsel, A REP. of the Justice Department, AND OTHER STAFF OFFICERS which took place on the afternoon of 14 January 1964.

2. STAFF OFFICER said that Mr. Dulles, apparently provoked by press accusations that the Warren Commission has been dilatory, asked CIA for suggestions of questions or requests to be included in a letter to the Soviet Government. This letter, from the Warren Commission and to be transmitted through the Department of State, would seek additional evidence which is presumably available in Soviet files which could assist the Commission's deliberations. Mr. Dulles did not have a detailed idea of what he wanted to ask the Soviets for but did say that the questions should be "not too technical." Although STAFF OFFICER thought that the letter should be written only after the CIA report and comments have been completed, in order to make the letter as effective as possible, Mr. Dulles felt it should go now, be phrased in generalities and allow the Soviets more flexibility in their handling of the matter than would a more pointed letter based on our concrete findings. Mr. Dulles asked CIA only for the questions and not for a draft letter. STAFF OFFICER suggested that we ask only for certain records rather than put specific questions to the Soviets. STAFF OFFICER suggested that these might include Soviet hospital records connected with Lee Oswald's attempted suicide, city visa and registration records for Moscow and Minsk, factory personnel records from Oswald's place of employment, etc. Also Oswald's diary noted that his case had passed through two commissions in the USSR; we might ask for the records of these commissions as well. STAFF OFFICER said that in transmitting our suggestions to Mr. Dulles we can include any introductory paragraphs or explanatory comments that we

193



felt necessary to explain to Mr. Dulles the direction of our thinking about these proposals.

3. Rankin stated that the Commission wants to account in detail, minute by minute and hour by hour, for Oswald's time outside the United States. STAFF OFFICER suggested that the narrative chronology of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union be converted to a chronology tabulation which would permit us more simply to insert added details and dates as we learned of them in other documentation which we can expect to receive shortly. This was agreed.

4. Mr. Rankin said that the Commission has a waist-high stack of documents and reports received from the FBI and Secret Service which CIA has not yet received. These include Secret Service interviews with Marina Oswald, letters from Lee Oswald in the USSR and other material.

5. THE STAFF OFFICERS considered DEFECTOR SOURCE'S initial analysis of Marina Oswald's documents, and the questions to which it gave rise, to be a worthwhile and important contribution. CIA would be unable to make any serious analysis or even hypothesis until some of SOURCE'S questions had been answered. STAFF OFFICER suggested that SOURCE'S paper be recast into more of a questionnaire form and OTHER OFFICER agreed, pointing out that SOURCE'S comment and speculation could be put off to the side as explanatory comment on each question, as appropriate. STAFF OFFICERS thought that it would be desirable to send this paper to the Warren Commission in advance of other CIA reports with a memorandum informing the Commission that we would need answers to this interim questionnaire in order to reconstruct a detailed chronology of Oswald's time in the USSR and to document his activity there. The Commission would be asked to procure the information from Marina through any Agency it might choose.



6. ~~STAFF OFFICER~~ reported that he had asked the Commission representatives certain questions pertaining to our use of defectors in analysing the Oswald papers:

a. Was the Commission formally requesting us to have defectors analyse the material?

STAFF OFFICER thought that the answer to this question is yes. However, STAFF OFFICER asked for a formal request from the Commission to this effect. The FBI has stated that its reports are not to be passed to DEFECTOR SOURCE which may cause some complications.

b. Would the Commission be prepared to assume the burden of responsibility if such a defector should disagree with the Commission's opinions or come up with a radically different hypothesis or interpretation?

The persons present said that the Commission would.

c. If a defector who had contributed to the analysis of the documents should be unwilling to appear personally and formally before the Commission, would the Commission exercise its subpoena powers against him?

Mr. Rankin thought that if there was a risk involved for the defector, the Commission would not do so. However, Rankin promised to get a formal answer from the Commission on this point.

d. Will the classification we put on our correspondence to the Commission be honored?

The answer was that in principle our classification would be honored. However, Mr. Rankin warned those present that CIA should not hope to evade criticism or responsibility through classification of its material.

6. STAFF OFFICER reported that Mr. Richard Davis is representing the interests of the Department of State in this inquiry. Mr. Thompson had ruled himself out because he was Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time of the events in question.

7. One matter which had been brought to light by the Oswald case was the need for a mechanism in the United States Government to record and assimilate our knowledge of the Soviet handling of American defectors to the USSR.

CIA has not systematically collected nor compiled information on Soviet defector handling.

8. The Commission representatives at the 14 January 1964 meeting estimated that the Warren Commission would need from three to six months to complete its task.