Dear Paul, re Legend, appendix

3/28/78

While the conditions under which I went over the appendix after the so-called evidence precluded real care I think I can represent them faithfully. (The representation of the assassination evidence is virtuoso if not contemptuous display of ignorance. You'll enjoy outting that up!)

Also, because I had mislaid a letter to him and after reading more of the book thought I should mention some of the things not apparent to most, I phoned george tardner. If he did not tell you when he phoned, he did so at my suggestion because I did not want to take unauthorized liberties with your notes when you have done a review for publication. If you disagree with the few comments I'll be making feel free to give any differ/ing view to Lardner, to whom I'm sending a carbon.

The appendix on Oswald's real and alleged contacts is puffery - even in the form of presentation. Meaningless as "scholarship" because there is virtually nothing that can be related to any interview and most interviews are ignored in the book.

They are not really questions. They are argument. As such they also would have seared the hell out of Mosenko, all of whose statements to this point are ignored in the questions. Mosenko had to worry about a predictable "heart attack" or any disappearance. "e was without any protection, any rights (remember those three years?) or any means of defending himself.

Many of the questions have built-in conclusions or are built on some.

As initial questions many are unwise in other ways. Including by in effect calling Nosenko a liar, a real threat in his aituation, thus an overt intimidation to change what he had said.

When the questions are less than argument they are almost never without an advance expression of view.

They reflect what I interpret as other than an impartial quest for straight information. Again, threatening to Mosenko in his situation. Also offensive, which is less serious but no way to carm cooperation. Why rehash all he had told the FMI at this juncture and how were he and the FMI to take that effort?

There is a State parallel. There also the CIA wanted to do what State would not agree to. The Commission, to which that problem went, agreed with State.

In both cases the CIA knew better and could have done better. In both cases the CIA did not have jurisdication. In the Nosenko case it went cut of its way not to have its conclusory questions asked. So I wender why. If there were unanswered questions it believe should be asked, restricting to new questions phrased quietly or including some described as needing clarification would have been a much better initial approach. It was not wise to do what was certain to get Hoover's back up and give the FBI legitimate reason to take offense or to give it what anyone experienced with the plight of defectors had to recognize as project threatened. The characters who drafted these questions made no reference to any earlier Nosenko exercises until 24. I did not check to see if there were others or how many.

The questions of Appendix D are more than a third on deMohrenschildt, of 19, seven. In itself this had to raise questions about what Epstein was up to, especially at CIA. He and his lawyer both knew they had to ask for existing records under FOIA. They deliberately avoided doing this even though it would have been simple with some of the questions. Why? No reason I can think of consistent with proper intentions. ... Hastily,