

April 20, 1978

Dear Harold,

Thanks for your letters of 4/5, 4/11, and 4/17. I really have been lax in replying, but things are starting to settle down a bit out here.

Enclosed: pp. 12-20 ~~of~~ of my notes on Epstein (plus the NYT clip discussed on p. 20 as #40 - very interesting), and 5 pages of clippings, as requested in your 4/11.

I found it quite interesting that Epstein indicated that Angleton was trying to get his 'mole' story out through the Senate Committee on Intelligence. In light of the rumors that they have had a continuing low-level interest in the JFK case, I certainly hope they are not getting their information from Angleton and Epstein!

You asked about the AIB operation in Washington: as I understand it, several people have left ~~w~~ Washington for a while, and those who are left would like to get back to the FBI files but are not doing so at the moment. I have sent you all the documents they have sent me (i.e., lists of all of them), ~~except~~ except for a collection of 1967 documents from the second ~~xxx~~ release which I was asked not to distribute until they had a chance to think about possible uses. I will let ~~xx~~ you know about any further documents they send me, but I'm not encouraging them to spend too much of their limited resources just ~~gix~~ going through these releases, now that the press interest has died down.

My own intention is to try to find out if any S.F. library is getting the microfiche edition, and then take a look at the documents myself. However, I am giving higher priority to the "last" CIA release, which I think I have told you about; it is due out any time now. (It should include such ~~goodies~~ goodies as the CIA ~~xxxx~~ response to the long memo I sent the Rockefeller Commission.) Also, I expect that some pre-assassination field office files will be out ~~soon~~ soon. The FBI just sent me (a couple of weeks ago) the results of their review of the WFO and NY pre-assassination files; there ~~were~~ were only a few pages I hadn't seen before, and they didn't seem at all interesting. But, from the covering memos, it appears that NO and Dallas were asked to submit the pre-ass'n files for review last October. (Incidentally, this suggests that none of the investigating ~~xxx~~ committees went after the field office files!)

I would certainly like to get anything interesting you come up with in the post-assassination field office files, or elsewhere, for that matter. Offhand, I don't think it would be worth the effort and money for you to send me everything ~~you~~ you get, but (for example) anything you copy for someone else would probably be of interest to me. Keep in mind that I can make copies for about 3.5¢, which means that it might be convenient for you to send me things if you need extra copies for other people; I could copy and forward stuff, or return it to you, making a copy for myself. I'm flexible; I would like to see what you find interesting but will probably have my hands full screening the CIA file, etc.

You asked about my access to DC ~~x~~ papers: the AIB hasn't been sending me clippings lately. I ~~would~~ would appreciate anything interesting you find in the Star. The Post gets to a convenient library about 5 days late, but I've been too busy to read it lately, so the best arrangement would be for you to mention and ~~xxxx~~ cite articles of interest. ~~xx~~ (I'll look for Szulc on Shevchenko.)

By the way, Epstein has been surprisingly un-hostile to some of the critics who have talked to him (Peter Scott, Dave Williams). I ~~wouldn't~~ wouldn't rule out asking him some of your questions about his ~~xxxx~~ FOIA access. (Dave Williams indicated that Epstein freely admitted to piggybacking on other people's requests.)

Best regards,

Paul
PLH

[Sources, continued:]

(33) There is a favorable review by John Barkham (of Saturday Review?), printed in the S.F. Examiner-Chronicle, April 9. Epstein is called an "acute researcher" whose documentation is "impressive."

Incidentally, the same page contains Barkham's review of the Weinstein book on Hiss, also positive. Victor Navasky's persuasive exposé of Weinstein (Nation, 4/8) makes his scholarship look as bad as Epstein's; in both cases the press reaction has been generally positive.

(34) Wall Street Journal, 4/7, p. 14; review by Michael Ledeen, editor of the Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies - i.e., he sounds like a rather big wheel. Ledeen understands the significance of the "mole" story, and specifically predicts that "Legend" will enter into "the general debate" on the CIA which is about to begin, as legislative guidelines are being considered.

[(17) A P.S. on the Newsweek review - the reviewer is the managing editor! I don't know if he often reviews books, but it seems that if they wanted to have someone special do the review, they could have found someone who knows more of the facts of the case.]

(35) Schorr's book has some interesting material on Angleton. My knowledge of the circumstances of Schorr's initial interest in Nosenko does not lend any support to the speculation that Angleton's side was leaking an anti-Nosenko "KGB did it" scenario back then, before Epstein got it.

(36) I am told the the new book on the Dulles family has quite a bit on Angleton. Recall that Angleton is one of the people with control over Dulles' papers at Princeton, presumably including his WC files.

(37) I am also told that Colby's forthcoming book will have a lot to say about Angleton. Supposedly Angleton is one of the few villains in the book, which complains about excessive zeal in counterintelligence. It may be that the Epstein book represented Angleton's attempt to get his side of the "war of the moles" out before Colby got the other side out.

(38) Russ Stetler got me interested in "Five Signs from Ruby," a trashy 1976 novel by Hugh C. McDonald - the same McDonald who gave us "Saul" and solved the JFK case. In the novel, the high-level penetration of the CIA is pro-PLO. As noted in Schorr's book, and elsewhere, Angleton was in charge of the Middle East account until Colby took it away, and since he's convinced that the PLO is a KGB front, pro-Arab sympathies are looked upon skeptically (to put it mildly). [As noted below, I think it is no accident (as the Russians used to say) that the alleged PLO-Weatherman link has come to the surface in the LaPrada-Gray-Felt-Miller case.]

Epstein's "Psychology Today" article [(#19) supra; April 1978, p. 97] is as bad as I expected. It deals primarily with the handwriting analysis, but Epstein has slipped in a couple of tidbits on related matters. For example, he repeats the devious analysis of the "anachronism" in Oswald's diary entry re McVickar, but this time credits the discovery to "one of my research assistants." Epstein may not yet have read the text of the entry himself!

Also, Epstein gives what I think is a new version of the Reader's Digest connection - he says that "In 1976, the Reader's Digest came to me with an offer to supply almost unlimited financing for a new investigation into the Kennedy assassination." The Digest says that Epstein agreed to their proposal in October 1975. Epstein continued: "At this late stage, however, the only question that seemed [to whom??] worth exploring" was Oswald's motive in defecting and staying in Russia. The Digest said that "the probe would focus on Oswald's associations with intelligence agencies, his access to U.S. military and reconnaissance secrets," etc. In New York, Epstein also focused on his interest in the defection, but the apparent conflict between his interests and the Digest's is not so obvious.

The most interesting thing in the Psychology Today piece is Epstein's confirmation of my hunch that the CIA got him into the graphology question. (See my question #14 for Epstein.) Specifically, an unnamed "former CIA research director" mentioned that the CIA had used Dr. Lewinson's work, with some success; Epstein called Lewinson the next day. In typically ambiguous language, Epstein reports

that Lewinson explained that "she had been an occasional consultant to the CIA but is now in private practice." Since she quite possibly was also in private practice when she was a CIA consultant, I would not conclude that she is no longer a CIA consultant.

I find it interesting that Epstein would go into Lewinson's CIA connection in such detail here, since (as far as I recall) there is nothing in the book to indicate how Epstein learned of her work, or why he had reason to believe that it should be taken seriously. Presumably Epstein realized that he could be criticized for leaving the CIA link out of the book. One possible explanation is that, by being somewhat more candid in his articles and interviews, he wants to give the impression that background information which would detract from the Angleton hypothesis had to be left out of the book - e.g., at Reader's Digest insistence. That is, Epstein may want to put some distance between himself and his function as a simple vehicle for Angleton. At least, I suspect he has some doubts about his role - but not enough to overcome the lure of all that money - and it might be productive to inquire about this if anyone gets to talk with him informally.

I certainly don't get the impression that Epstein understands Lewinson's analysis. Certainly the discussion in this article is singularly unhelpful. I gather that the vertical axis in each of the graphs on page 98 represents a percentage; i.e., the percent of the measurements of (e.g.) depth which are rated +3, +2, respectively - whatever those numbers mean! (The numbers in each graph do seem to add to 100%.)

I'm willing to believe that quite a bit of information can be obtained from analysis of handwriting, but the alleged underlying theory - "contracting and releasing tendencies" sounds questionable to me. If you can detect stress, haste, etc., this analysis can be a useful tool, although I don't get the impression that Lewinson has used it with the same critical judgment and sophistication that O'Toole applied to his PSE work on Oswald. And I would be very surprised if Lewinson can substantiate her claim that Oswald's handwriting shows that he "was an easy target for manipulation and control by others. His loyalty could switch, depending on [from] whom or where he could find support."

The superficial similarity between Lewinson's conclusions and parlor fortune telling makes me wonder how many of her conclusions are derived from clues other than Oswald's handwriting. It may not be fair to her to rely on what Epstein says, but he claims that "she determined that Oswald was traveling on a large ship [not a small ship? or an airplane?] when he wrote both these documents" [i.e., his political notes, CE 25 (presumably), and a self-questionnaire, CE 100]. [From p. 152 of the book, it is almost certain that Epstein is referring to CE 25, rather than to (say) CE 97-98.] Anyhow, one has to wonder if Lewinson's brilliant deduction was influenced by the fact that each page of CE 25 includes a picture of a large ship, identified as the logo of the Holland-America line.

Epstein is quite unfair in claiming that the Warren Commission "had accepted uncritically" the diary, "as their basis for charting Oswald's activities in the Soviet Union." In the same paragraph in which it noted that the diary was not contemporaneous, the Warren Report said that "The Commission has used the diary, which Oswald may have written with future readers in mind, only as Oswald's record of his private life and personal impressions as he sought to present them..." [WR 691]

Finally, it seems odd that the illustration in this article is a photo of Oswald superimposed on the famous letter to "Mr. Hunt," which is not mentioned in the text. Did Epstein have this letter analyzed, by any chance?

Jerry Policoff has reminded me of CIA document #376-154, dated 11 December 1963. The unnamed CIA author gives several arguments against the idea that the KGB did it. Referring to press reports about the FBI's summary report (indicating that Oswald acted alone), the author notes that "These disclosures presumably eliminate the possibility of further confrontations with Mr. Robert Slusser. In the event that Mr. Slusser continues to insist that the President was murdered by the Soviet secret police, the following additional negative indications and observations may be of some value." Can anyone out there tell me who Slusser is? Maybe a Congressional staff person?

Highlights of an interview of Epstein by Peter Dale Scott and Larry Lee (KSAN), taped 4/5/78, broadcast 4/16. Total tape is about 1 1/2 hours. [Bracketed material is paraphrase; comments in double parentheses are by PLH.]

- (064) EJE: [I was interested in how organizations work.] And when I was asked to do a book about Lee Harvey Oswald, and the - Reader's Digest magazine came to me and said they would finance a study without any strings attached - and offered me unlimited resources and as much money as I needed to find as many witnesses as I could, I of course got into the idea that perhaps the Warren Commission had missed some very important witnesses who could comment on Oswald's life. And as I began the book I began to find various evidence that the intelligence services of the United States, and of Russia, and of Cuba all had something to hide - not necessarily about the assassination of President Kennedy, but about something that I didn't even know about, and that was an open espionage case that was going against Oswald. At the time I wrote "Inquest," - the FBI, by transferring a number of agents, by destroying a number of files ((!!!)), had completely hid its involvement in this espionage case; in fact, it didn't even tell President Johnson about it. And so I began to get more interested in the espionage case....
((It's amazing how EJE can use his own ignorance of the Warren Report to bolster his 'discovery' of the FBI's interest in Oswald.))
- (088) LL: [It's a brief book, less than 300 pp.; supported by full footnoting; you remind me a little of Izzy Stone...; you had so much money from RD, and a staff;] Did you ever worry that you were going to become the sort of organization that you had written [about] before...?
- (098) EJE: Well, I worried all about the time - all about the Reader's Digest getting involved in [the] research, and I kept them out completely; and, in a sense they only entered it in the public relations phase, after the book was written; they told Time magazine, or somehow they led Time magazine to believe that it was some sort of task force, but the fact is that I simply used two previous researchers who had worked for me, did the brunt of the work, and then when I had special jobs, like finding the Marines that Oswald had served with, or finding his fellow employees at Jaggard-Chiles-Stovall, and I had a questionnaire that could be asked of these people, the Reader's Digest very kindly lent me editors, who went around the country and filled out these questionnaires.
((Cf. Legend, p. xvi: Oursler (of the Digest) "has contributed to almost every phase of the project, including research, interviewing, and organization of the book. By far, however, I am most indebted to him for his deeply perceptive editing of the manuscript." In this interview, EJE confirmed my hunch that he had thought about the complications of his hypothesis more than the book indicates; however, these comments argue against my suggestion that he has been trying (e.g., in the Psychology Today article) to make it obvious that things were left out of the book, presumably at the Digest's suggestion or insistence. -PLH))
- (195) EJE: This is the hypothesis I worked on: if the CIA was going to send anyone to Russia as a false defector - which is a possibility - it was a very delicate and sensitive mission, and something that required training; it wasn't something where you could meet someone in a bar and say, 'Now listen, you defect to Russia, and just remember everything you see.' He had to be trained. This is the - I might be wrong, but that's the hypothesis I worked on. If that was the case, there had to be - I assumed at least six months detached from his Marine career. I couldn't find six days detached from the career....
((Typical Epstein - start with the right assumptions,...))
- (258) PDS: How far do you see this KGB control of Oswald lasting, over him? Does it govern his behaviour when he comes back to this country?
- (264) EJE: Well, my view - again, and this is very speculative - is that the Soviets soon found they had no use for Oswald, [and sent him back; at worst, he'll be arrested, which will have propaganda value; more likely, the FBI will pursue him, and they'll be confused and confounded for years; at best, he'll be some sort of sleeper agent.]

[LL: The FBI followed him ineptly, which embarrassed Hoover.]

EJE: That's true, and I think the FBI involvement goes even deeper than - than we can ascertain at this point ... [whatever the KGB involvement was, it was very low level; he was just a piece of garbage to them.]

[PDS: What about Marina? A piece of garbage, or of more interest to the KGB?]

(285) [EJE: The Minkenbaum case fascinated me; went to USSR at same time as LHO; trained by high KGB people; his entire mission - open antique store in D.C. and bring back a Soviet wife, to be a radio operator. There's a CIA memo indicating that they should be interested in LHO because of this pattern of the Russians getting a spouse in that way.] And so I would think that Marina, before she was allowed to return to the United States, was told that some day someone might approach you; if he does, you still have family here, do what he says. I mean, that's all that had to be her mission, or even Oswald's mission. ((!)) Y'know, I'm talking - just to really get to the point that you were making before, it's inconceivable to me that the Soviets had anything to do with the assassination of Kennedy, or that Oswald was under Soviet control at that point. So whatever influence they exerted on him was very low level, and then he separated from them, er -

PDS: [Can you date the separation? The moment of his return, or when he went to New Orleans?]

(322) EJE: Well, I would say that the point - yes, I think we - I can't date when the Soviets - they might never have actually contacted him after he returned to America, which might have added to his frustration and caused all those letters that he wrote to the Soviet consulate, and other activities on his part, but I would say that the shooting at Walker in April of 1963 definitely was a watershed. Not only the Soviets but I think a lot of other people started to shy away from Oswald at that point, whether he did the shooting or not is another question.

PDS: [Up to then, is it possible he was under someone's control?]

EJE: [Up to that point, he might have been listed as an asset - a notational agent, as in Greene's novel - i.e. a dubious asset.]

(358) EJE: [On Marina: lied about her own name, etc.]

PDS: [Which made her very vulnerable for deportation; there were suggestions she felt she was being pressured by her interviewers after the assassination.] Does that seem credible to you?

EJE: Yes, and I would even go further and say that before the assassination the degree of pressures put on Marina might explain Oswald's more bizarre behavior.

(402) LL: [Marina's story to INS reeks of being an intelligence legend.]

EJE: Yes; I would think that conceivably the name Prusakova was given to her because someone might have seen her living at the home of Colonel Prusakova [sic], and that that would explain why she was there, or maybe even Oswald didn't know her true identity.

(423) PDS: (During discussion of Voloshin in California) Was it the Bolshoi ballet?

EJE: I think - the name was not the Bolshoi, but it was something like that. [Voloshin was in Santa Ana the day LHO applied for a passport; was in charge of Indonesian affairs for the KGB for a while; Oswald mentioned an Indonesia operation he was in, in a letter to his brother; then it wasn't publicly known.]

PDS: [The KGB was making a big propaganda issue of it at the time; the CIA was still denying involvement; I wonder why the Russians didn't use LHO as part of the propaganda operation?]

(466) EJE: [I was very interested in that; I looked at the other defectors; LHO was one of a series of 8 or 9; from his letters to his brother, it looked like he was going to start off as a propaganda asset, he was never so used.]

PDS: [Was Webster so used?]

EJE: [No; there's a similarity - if they intended to use someone for intelligence, "the assumption might be," ((whose?)) they wouldn't use him for propaganda. I think Webster offered info on plastics; I think both cases were considered intelligence, not propaganda.]

(016) EJE: [The day LHO passed through Amsterdam, Voloshin was a consul there, according to CIA traces. After reading Priscilla's book, about Marina mentioning

a Russian-speaking waiter named Didenko, which is her father's name, and we couldn't find a record of him,] I always wondered if there might not have been some final briefing on the ship.

PDS: [Angleton was concerned about Voloshin, wasn't he?]

EJE: Yes; I mean, he's a man who goes by supposition, and he thinks that when you find 3 or 4 lines intersecting, LL: That's triangulation. EJE: That's right; and - I don't know if he would assume (?) this, but he would assume that, y'know, here you have the probable recruiter, the man who handled him in Russia, and the person who gave him his briefing. ((Would assume, or does assume? -PLH))

PDS: I was just wondering whether he brought this case to your attention, or whether you brought it to his attention?

EJE: No; No; Through Freedom of Information - I brought it to his attention; I mean, I mentioned it to him; that's ... (inaudible) a good point. (?-unclear)

(070) EJE: [JJA tried to ferret out KGB penetrations, and did much more; RAND estimated that with the best quality control you would still have 1 in 10,000, but] Angleton never found - he thought he found one, two, or three; that was part of the job - his real job was to stop the KGB [which he saw as the only enemy; he didn't care about the minor countries - from manipulating the CIA via disinformation...]

EJE: He studied - tried to create a continuity of Soviet intelligence goals [and m.o.'s, from the Trust operations of the '20 thru WWI and up to today.]

(097) EJE: ((After discussion how the term "mole" came from fiction, and was then accepted:)) And by the time I wrote my book in '76, they ((no obvious antecedent)) were talking about how Angleton practically destroyed the CIA by positing that two moles existed, and then searching for them.

PDS: [How did Angleton get fired?]

EJE: [Let me tell you how the CIA operates; really aimed against the USSR; everything it does elsewhere is looked at as peripheral; politicians use the CIA for many things, like Nixon in Chile; but in the CIA what fascinates them is the chess game against the USSR; the CIA's whole job is to warn us against a Soviet advance in technology, etc.; at the bottom of this whole operation is 1, 2, or 3 agents in the USSR, all KGB people, you can't parachute Americans in and get access; Angleton suspected these people, since he knew the Russians knew we were dependent on those channels; like a magazine, the CIA needs stories every day; under Colby, there actually was a daily (inside) paper; so] there was an organizational reason not to like Angleton throughout the CIA... [Golitsin story....] Angleton's search for the moles was disruptive.]

(166) [LL brings up Colby, and Angleton's apparent suspicion of him; LL thinks that high-level people naturally do meet each other.]

[EJE agrees.] I don't suspect Colby for one reason - his career wasn't based on a set of brilliant spies that he ran; if it was, then he could be suspected, because [you promote a mole by giving him good stuff. Colby's career was] a set of dismal failures in covert action [such as Phoenix.]

[LL: I'm not saying that Colby was a mole, just that JJA thought so - wrong?]

(190) EJE: Angleton's staff suggested that he was a suspect, and at one point Angleton confronted Colby with questions about these contacts. What Angleton believes, I have never been able to fathom. But, now - y'know, it is a theory that goes around Washington, and at [a] very high level, because of things Colby did later on, but I think, y'know, one - it's not important at this point to try and find the mole, because I can't be of any help. [The fact that JJA was confronting people made him even more unpopular. When Colby got back from Vietnam and became executive director,] it became practically an obsession with him, and you can see it from his own book that he's just written, to fire Angleton. [Finally he called Hersh in, pointed to the mail cover operation;] that led to so-called "family jewels" disclosures, and practically wrecked the CIA. [When JJA was fired, all the top CI people left;] then files disappeared, then finally [according to Senate Intelligence Committee sources] the institutional memory of the CIA was totally destroyed [because other parts were running operations without knowing how they fit together; it was CI who kept the continuity (e.g. when they recruited someone...)]

[LL agrees. EJE: Using the human analogy, I think when you kill the memory, you kill the individual or the organization]; that the CIA is dead without a memory of the past.

[PDS: Your book says the CIA is inside out; linked to the Nosenko case. You are suggesting, more or less, are you not, that] the good guys were pushed out and that the people who had something to hide are now - took over the agency at that point?

EJE: That's right; the people who protected the secrets of the CIA and the FBI came to power, no matter how dirty their secrets were, and no matter what skeletons were involved, and the people who had thought the worst possibilities, that the CIA had been penetrated ... were pushed out. Yes, I think that's what did happen.

[PDS: That's more important than the background of Oswald....]

[EJE: Hacker's review suggested, aptly but critically, that my book is a jigsaw puzzle, with some pieces missing and some pieces from another puzzle mixed in. Could be; at certain points in the book I became more interested in the shenanigans in the intelligence game than in Oswald. But it all criss-crosses as follows: back in 1963, the FBI was considered omniscient,...]

(248) [EJE: The FBI, and Hoover, knew of Oswald's note, saying he would blow up the FBI building in Dallas. I can't believe, nor can any other serious student of the FBI, that that was done except on Hoover's orders. If they would destroy that, it would seem that they would have destroyed] any other evidence, more important,]e.g., that they had tried to double Oswald, or blackmail him or Marina, all of which is standard operations. My thesis is that he was perceived as being a Soviet intelligence agent. So, you try and provoke him - e.g. by giving him access to classified information.]

[PDS: E.g., at J-C-S] [EJE: Absolutely; also at Michael Paine's house.] It seems to me that what was happening against Oswald is that he was being put in positions where he should have gotten into contact with - if he had contacts - with contacts in other intelligence services. And that, whatever the FBI did - and I think that at the end they tried to blackmail him - although I think his wife was then blackmailed into not saying what happened - [I think they just threatened to deport Marina, which got him very angry; they couldn't let that come out, so they erased part of the case, which is why my book is indeed so...(cut off)]

(303) [PDS: Can't you read LHO's note as part of a conspiracy, blackmailing the FBI into responding, predictably, as it did?]

[EJE: That destruction was of the single most important piece of evidence.] What you suggest is possible. [It might turn out the note wasn't written by LHO. Just think of the situation if the Russians, or even the CIA, learned that Oswald was planning on shooting JFK, and they decided they didn't want to be involved, so they tipped off the FBI, assuming the FBI would immediately arrest someone, as they would in Russia, who threatened to blow up their headquarters.] That possibility struck me, that it wasn't Oswald who wrote the note, but someone who had become privy to the plan, and who wanted to destroy the plan...[It could also have said something different; we're relying on secretaries' memories; it could have been a diversion, saying, I'm going to Florida to blow up an FBI building, etc. If they note was authentic, it argues against a high-level conspiracy, which wouldn't tip off the FBI in advance. Destroying such evidence raises the possibility that they would destroy other evidence, which is why Legend can be described as a jigsaw puzzle with pieces missing.] I've been criticized for not drawing conclusions, but it's impossible, because we don't have some of the basic pieces.

(335) [PDS: Can we conclude that the FBI and CIA had a lot to hide?]

[EJE: CIA also hiding the 'mole' case, which they considered more important.... Inconceivable that they wouldn't be interested in debriefing him....]

[PDS: The WC didn't believe that the KGB didn't debrief him.]

(358) EJE: When I mentioned to Richard Helms that the KGB hadn't debriefed Oswald, because they - because Nosenko said they were short of manpower, which is what he told me in (the) interview, Helms laughed and said, that's crazy, if that ever happened here, we would of course, y'know, always find the people, and then I said,

but, y'know, did you debrief him, and he said, Oh my God, he started to think that of course they claimed they hadn't debriefed him. [Also, Fox of DIA said every intelligence service in the world would want to debrief Oswald. PDS: Including his own? EJE: Yes; let me give the reasons: at one point Oswald claimed to know the apartment layout of Kyril Mazarov (phonetic), who is a possible successor of Brezhnev. Also, the CIA was running a markings program on Soviet machine tools, trying to see when they changed - important re missile technology. Also, how the Russians handled defectors. Were they given drugs, isolated, etc? In case anyone wanted to send a fake defector. PDS: What about ONI? EJE ((seeming a bit evasive)): Webster case discussed. CIA psychiatrist - code name Robert Taylor ((not clear if this is Webster's or the shrink's))... So, maybe if they thought LHO was very hostile, which is the only explanation EJE could get, they would use an unwitting debriefing. PDS: Are you suggesting DeM? EJE: That's what he told me,] in the last interview he had with me. [PDS: With anybody.] ((EJE sounds a bit sensitive here.)) [EJE: He had worked for everyone. He admitted that the Russians had approached him. He's charming, very professional, not a fool during the interview.

[PDS: Reports that he was not all sane?]

[EJE: He listened to my questions, etc. Finally admitted that Moore asked him to see Oswald. DeM knew who I was, may have been trying to confuse me by blaming the CIA.]

(013) [LL: Did he strike you as on the brink of suicide? Had you gotten into an uncomfortable area? Have you ruled out murder?]

[EJE: It was a very disturbing think; if you asked 100 people about a suicide's behavior just before, they would say they saw nothing odd, because you don't want to admit you did; I saw nothing odd.... I was suspicious. PDS: When was the admission about Moore? EJE: An hour or two before; just before, he was claiming he was being blackmailed; talked about the inscribed photo. PDS: Did you see that photo? EJE: Yes. The picture seemed to implicate DeM and Marina in prior knowledge of the Walker shooting; maybe someone was blackmailing him....]

(050) [EJE: CIA was doing expedite check. CIA told him that a security check on a U.S. citizen is almost unheard of; done on an employee or applicant, or a possible penetrator. CIA wouldn't tell him why it was requested on DeM. When the Senate Committee (sic) gets the answer, we'll know if he's CIA.]

(085) [PDS: Suppose the CIA did debrief Oswald; didn't Helms lie at least about the contemplating of that? Any reason to believe Helms?]

[EJE: The CIA officer said nothing was ever done; it seems to be a technicality whether it was contemplated or not,] (but) the possibility that the CIA lied seems very live to me; [I asked people in other intelligence agencies if they thought that was possible, and they said,] yes, because once the CIA admitted a contact with Oswald, it could never prove that it broke the contact.... I'm convinced that they debriefed him, and that this paper he wrote, "The Collective" was written at the behest of George DeM [which is why his family are the only people to have seen it. The question is whether they did a witting or unwitting debriefing. He has asked the CIA if the IG checked the Dallas office.]

(115) [PDS: Did you ask Fox if DIA debriefed Oswald?]

[EJE: I'm not sure DIA existed then; Fox said he didn't know of any such debriefing, but he would assume that it was done for them by ONI, FBI, or CIA, and] that he assumed it had to be done at some level. [I'm talking about what he assumed, not what he knew. The more interesting ((who says??)) thing I discussed with Fox was the damage assessment when he defected....] ((EJE sounds evasive to me.)) (EJE commented skeptically on the alleged nonexistence of ONI records.)

[PDS: What about Angleton's pre-assassination interception of the letters; you say Angleton was aware of that correspondence, right?]

EJE: Yes, and let me just mention one other thing in support of what you're saying. [Nosenko gave CIA very important information in 1962 re the mole - defectors could confirm if Nosenko was in the tourist department in 1959 - a reason for the CIA to get info from Oswald. Thirdly, Oswald was contacting Kostikov and Gerasimov...] ((Definitely sounds like Epstein evaded this question - or, at least, he didn't get the point.))

- (180) [EJE: Kostikov was under intense surveillance; was associated with oil pipeline sabotage; CIA told FBI pre-11/22 that Oswald had met Kostikov.] The FBI probably knew anyhow; they probably traced Oswald to some little restaurant in Mexico City...]
- [PDS brings up Cubela, Cuba]
- [EJE: all these things would have brought Oswald to the attention of - in fact, the CIA asked for a list of FPCC organizers. I'm not disagreeing with your contention that the CIA and FBI had an interest in Oswald.]
- [PDS: You said the CIA intercepted Oswald's Powers letter. Wouldn't that have made him high-priority interest?]
- (207) [EJE: Not conceivable to me that it's other than as you say, but when you talk to CIA people, they say, we had so many people to debrief... Powers was so convinced that Oswald had given the Soviets information, and I couldn't see why he was so sure, just from deductive evidence; I thought he was a pretty honest guy;] I thought in the 3 or 6 months that the CIA debriefed him, they asked him questions about Oswald that triggered his mind, and [[I thought that]] he couldn't say that, because he was probably - he was still getting paid by the CIA.
- [LL talks about collection bias, the Reader's Digest connection problem, etc.; supposed LHO was an out-of-control CIA agent; was EJE's objectivity damaged; isn't Angleton the perfect person to float another legend, that the CIA was just inept? Maybe the CIA was preparing to send him to Mexico, for example?]
- (261) [EJE: There are 2 parts to that. First, was he recruited by the CIA pre-defection?] I started with that hypothesis, [and found that he was an unlikely candidate, and there was no time. Second possibility: that he was recruited upon his return. That's much likelier, because they would have had a reason. If you want to go to the idea that he was an FBI or CIA agent, you look there, not at the pre-defection stage. About the objectivity: the stuff in the RD is not exactly pro-FBI...]
- [PDS: Angleton and Sullivan were both forced out; not just personal grudges, but very committed to greater vigilance.]
- [EJE: I'll get to that, but I don't think that the RD link-] They really didn't have anything to do with the research; an outline was never submitted to them; they didn't know what the book was about until they received it. And I'm sure that the Washington office of the Reader's Digest - [interrupted - LL suggested that they could just give Angleton to Epstein late in the project, and expect him to run with it.]
- [EJE: The RD's interest was that the book on the KGB was] heavily spoon-fed to them by Nosenko, and it has a completely different tack-
- PDS: But let's face it, by the CIA? EJE: By the CIA, absolutely, absolutely. I shouldn't say absolutely! (All laugh) Certainly the CIA gave them a lot of information for the KGB book. PDS: Would that have been Angleton specifically? EJE: [No; Angleton refused to speak to Barron; he was very much against that book, because it portrayed the KGB as a bunch of thugs; Angleton considered them sophisticated and elegant opponents;] his view was that that was all a disinformation operation, from Nosenko to - so that we would lose - if you read Colby's book, [he says that Angleton spends too much time dramatizing the capacity of the KGB, which is just a bunch of thugs. Yes, the book comes in large part from Angleton, Sullivan, etc., the main part comes from the Soviet Russia Division, who are also disgruntled, although they and Angleton hate each other. I spoke to some current CIA people - Helms, IG Gordon Stewart, John Hart, who are part of the book. It's hard to be sure you're not being used. I spent 6 months going around to CI staff; when I got to speak to the Soviet Russia people in Brussels, I was told that much had been left out - the '62 Golitsin story, moles.]
- (368) [PDS: Weren't you surprised by JJA's pre-ass'n knowledge of Oswald; the Powers letter, Voloshin, etc., not given to the WC?]
- [EJE: I'm not sure about that; from the FOIA requests; they got a good deal of information; I think the WC just didn't want to deal with the problem of Russia. ((Definitely evasive this time.)) CIA didn't give me photo of Voloshin, but would have given it to the WC. CIA and FBI were hoping things wouldn't come out.]

(400)

[PDS: But wouldn't Angleton have wanted more to come out?]

[EJE: There are 2 Angleton's - in and out of power. Now he sees his only chance of getting the mole story out is to flush it out through the Senate Select Committee or a journalist; in 1963, he was practically running the CIA; he was the most powerful man there, didn't want even his name to come out. CIA had interests in the Cubela stuff not coming out.]

[Concluding discussion about whether the case can be solved, etc. EJE thinks that guns & bullets may be a blind alley; with one gunman, there could still be a conspiracy; the second alternative is looking at Oswald's connections. Epstein does think it is a live case.]

[End of highlights of interview of Epstein by Peter Dale Scott and Larry Lee of KSAN, taped 4/5/78. If the earlier pages of this interview (which starts on page 14) are missing from your copy, they can be obtained on request.]

Some general comments: Epstein has obviously thought about some of the evidence about Oswald and U.S. intelligence in a more subtle way than is reflected in the book. I don't think we have yet heard the full story of why the book is so asymmetric. It seems possible that editing was done to keep the book simple, and that Epstein actually believes it was done for stylistic reasons. I'm certainly not convinced that the book was not the result of an intelligence operation by the Angleton people, even if Epstein didn't know it.

After the taping, Epstein inscribed Peter's copy of Legend with favorable comments about Peter's work, and gave him a New York phone number. Epstein supposedly claimed familiarity with our book, and recalled my help with Inquest.

* * * * *

A few days ago, I was considering adding to these notes some speculation that the recent defection of Shevchenko at the U.N. was somehow connected to Epstein's disclosures about Fedora. I decided that this would make me sound too much like Mae Brussell or J. Jesus Angleton. However, I am informed that today's NY Times (and Time) report that Shevchenko has offered to tell us something about Fedora, for the right amount of money. Very interesting.

So, I will mention my suspicion that there is more to the indictments of Gray, Felt, and Miller than meets the eye. I don't have any idea what it is; I'll just suggest that it might be worth the effort to ask people connected with this case if they can shed any light on the cases of Fedora, Nosenko, the mole in the FBI's NY office, or the Kennedy assassination.

One thing that did catch my attention is that the NY FBI agent, LaPrade, specifically alleged that the Weathermen were tied to the PLO. It is now well known that Angleton doesn't care for the PLO at all, considering them a KGB front.

It will be interesting to see if Angleton's Security and Intelligence Fund goes to bat for Gray et al., now that charges against Kearney have been dropped.

More sources:

(39) Hacker's review (NYRev, 4/V/78) is remarkably low key. In marked contrast to Hoch & Stetler, he finds the Oswald part more compelling than the mole part, and actually complains that Epstein "allows Angleton's recollections to wander far afield from Oswald." Some of Hacker's criticisms are well taken, but phrased most gently. Inquest is praised as the best single study of the assassination, with no indication that Hacker had anything to do with it.

(40) Courtesy of Peter Scott: NYT, 3/10/76, p. 1 - a story by Crewdson about alleged penetration of the FBI. The source is a former intelligence official, presumably Angleton (or maybe Sullivan). Golitsin is named, and quite a bit of his story is told, including the claim that the FBI had been damaged worse than the CIA. The story of the stolen documents which were offered back to the FBI is mentioned. Very interesting; and another reason to wondering about the chronology of Epstein's project. By 3/10/76 he was certainly well into it. In New York, (part I, p. 38), he said he didn't know of any previous mention of Stone's story. Hmm. Was this Crewdson story Angleton's first attempt, which didn't take, without the sex appeal of the Oswald angle? Hmm.

NYT
3/10/76
p. 1

3 Foreign 'Penetrations' Of F.B.I. Offices Indicated

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 9—The Federal Bureau of Investigation may have been "penetrated" by hostile foreign intelligence agencies on at least three occasions since the end of World War II, according to a former intelligence official who says he has direct knowledge of all three incidents.

The evidence in each case, which involved bureau agents in New York, Washington and another undisclosed American city, was entirely circumstantial, the former official said, and no criminal charges were ever brought against the three agents thought to have been subverted by foreign governments.

But in one case, he said, the conclusion that an agent assigned to the bureau's Washington field office had become a paid Soviet spy was virtually

inescapable, even though the man broke off his alleged relationship with Soviet intelligence after he became aware of an internal F.B.I. investigation of his activities.

Clarence M. Kelley, the F.B.I. director, said through a spokesman that, over the years, "several allegations have come to our attention that attempts have been made to penetrate the F.B.I."

Mr. Kelley said that what he termed "exhaustive investigations" had not disclosed any evidence that a hostile foreign intelligence service ever successfully recruited or operated an employee of the F.B.I.

The director's statement did not take account, however, of instances in which the bureau's agents might have voluntarily

3 'PENETRATIONS' OF F.B.I. INDICATED

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3

approached representatives of hostile governments with offers to sell or provide information, which was understood to have been the case with the Washington F.B.I. agent.

Nor did it refer to any instances in which the results of investigations of such matters were officially deemed inconclusive, as one bureau official said today had been true of the New York incident.

Both the F.B.I. and the Central Intelligence Agency have declined repeatedly to discuss the subject of possible penetra-

tions of their organizations by double agents, a matter to which they accord the highest sensitivity and one that neither the Senate nor House intelligence committees have attempted to examine.

Penetrations of the Soviet K.G.B. and virtually all of the major Western intelligence services have been documented over the years, but there has never been any detailed public allegation of a successful penetration of the C.I.A. or, apart from the former official's assertions, of the F.B.I.

However, Anatoli Golitsin, a Soviet K.G.B. major who defected to the United States in 1961, is reliably reported to have told American and British counterintelligence officials that such penetrations had occurred. According to one official present at the meeting, Mr. Golit-

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sin employed a medical analogy in asserting that the British service was "sick," having been penetrated at various levels, that the C.I.A. "also sick" had been penetrated, broadly at a fairly low level and that the F.B.I. was "dying."

Mr. Golitsin reportedly did not elaborate on that occasion on his remark about the F.B.I., but the former American official described the circumstances of the purported Soviet penetration of the bureau's Washington field office, a unit set up apart from F.B.I. headquarters here to handle Federal investigations in this city.

The bureau's suspicions were first aroused in the early 1950's, the former official recalled, when three "top secret" documents were discovered to be missing from the field office's files.

Their whereabouts remained unknown, he said, until a disgruntled Soviet official somewhere in the world approached an American naval attaché and offered to sell him the three documents for \$10,000.

That was the first indication, the former official said, that the missing papers had fallen into Soviet hands.

F.B.I. counterintelligence specialists, he said, later received information that an agent in the Washington office who had had access to the documents had been working as a paid operative of the K.G.B., presumably to help pay off substantial gambling debts he had accrued.

The bureau was told that the agent would make contact at a certain hour with his Soviet "control" from a telephone

booth outside a restaurant in suburban Maryland, and placed the booth under surveillance.

Because the man could be expected to recognize his colleagues from the Washington office, the former official said that undercover agents from the Baltimore office were brought in for the task.

The suspected agent did arrive at the appointed time, the former official said, entered the telephone booth, dialed a number and then hung up—a standard Soviet intelligence technique for initiating a telephone contact.

A few minutes later, agents secreted in and around the restaurant heard the telephone ring and saw the F.B.I. man answer it. After an extended conversation he left the booth, only to recognize one of the supposedly incognito Baltimore

agents and make a hasty departure.

The Washington agent, the former official said, immediately broke off his relations with the Russians. A polygraph examination proved inconclusive and he was allowed to resign quietly.

Fewer details were available about the New York incident except that the internal investigation of the suspected agent there continued, as one bureau official said, "for a long time."

But several intelligence officials said that it was separate from an incident, described in published accounts several months ago, in which an agent in the New York City field office became involved with a waitress in an East Side restaurant frequented by the bureau agents at lunchtime.