

# CIA Analysis Attacked at 'Papers' Trial

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LOS ANGELES, March 7—A Justice Department prosecutor sought today to discredit the Central Intelligence Agency's method of estimating the number of Communist forces fighting in Vietnam.

David R. Nissen, the chief government attorney in the Pentagon Papers trial, suggested that if CIA guidelines were followed, "the entire population" of South Vietnam might have to be counted among the Communist troops there.

Nissen was cross-examining Samuel A. Adams, a CIA intelligence analyst who testified in federal court here Tuesday that American military officials in Vietnam had issued reduced estimates of the opposing forces while they were actually increasing in numbers in the late 1960s.

Subpoenaed as a defense witness for Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr., Ad-

ams has been at the center of an internal government controversy for several years over who should be included in calculations of the "enemy order of battle in Vietnam."

Under questioning by Nissen, Adams acknowledged today that the CIA's responsibility in the area was "cloudy," while the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) had a clear mandate to file monthly reports on the subject.

But the intelligence analyst stood by his earlier testimony that MACV removed "components" of the Communist forces, including "self-defense" fighters, from its "order of battle" in order to make the other side appear weaker than it was.

Because it was based on the MACV statistics, Adams said, the "National Intelligence estimate" for 1967—from which American policy in Vietnam was evolved—was "less than candid."

He testified that there were "peculiar" aspects to the way the figures were arrived at, including directions from ranking officers to use deliberately low estimates of some parts of the Communist forces.

The CIA researcher also ridiculed the Army's method of deciding who should be included in the statistics.

No Communist units was entered in the "order of battle," he said, unless American or South Vietnamese troops either "took a prisoner or captured a document" from that unit.

Under that standard, anti-aircraft units that fired on American planes were not included, Adams testified. "The pilots got flak in the air, but this didn't fit the criteria," he said.

Nissen's questions were apparently aimed at showing the jury that MACV's standards and statistics on enemy forces were more reasonable and realistic than the higher ones issued by the CIA, which, after August 1966, were compiled under Adams' direction.

The point is an important one in this trial, because MACV's "order of battle" statistics are cited in some of the top-secret document duplicated by Ellsberg and Russo in 1969, including a 1968 memo by Gen. Earle C. Wheeler, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assessing the

effects of the Communists' offensive.

If those statistics were accurate, this would lend credibility to government witnesses who said that disclosure of the documents could have endangered the U.S. "national defense."

Adams and other defense witnesses contend that the disclosure was "virtually useless" to foreign nations.

The irony of the Justice Department's position here in support of the MACV figures is that, according to Adams and published reports, the White House and National Security Council began relying on the CIA figures immediately after the Communists' Tet offensive and have done so ever since.