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LOS ANGELES, July 18 — Until the administration of John F. Kennedy, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff kept their annual "war plan" a secret from the President and the Secretary of Defense, Daniel Ellsberg claimed today.

Ellsberg, a defendant in the Pentagon papers trial in federal court here, also swore in an affidavit that, as a researcher on "crisis decision-making" for the federal government, he had access to files "whose existence was a secret from the Secretary of Defense."

He contended, further, that in late 1968, after President Nixon was elected but before his inauguration, his staff—of which Ellsberg was a part—freely handled classified documents "outside the classification system" at the pre-White House headquarters in New York's Hotel Pierre.

The affidavit, filed as jury selection in the case contin-

ued, was aimed at establishing Ellsberg as an expert on the life, habits and philosophy of persons who hold security clearances and on secrecy in government.

Projecting from his own experience, Ellsberg said, anyone holding a current clearance, "unless he is heroic enough to risk or sacrifice his chances of continued or improved access to secret data . . . cannot be party to acquitting someone who is widely believed . . . to have broken security regulations."

Ellsberg's affidavit was a last-ditch effort to strike all people with clearances from the jury.

He implied that until he and Anthony Russo disclosed the Pentagon papers—the act for which they are now on trial, charged with espionage, theft and conspiracy—he could not have qualified as a juror in such a case.

"From 1959 on, virtually all of my personal associates were from what could be called 'the cleared community': civilian and military professionals whose jobs and whole careers depended on their maintaining security clearances," he said.

Tracing his career in government and with the Rand Corp., a defense-oriented think tank in nearby Santa Monica, Ellsberg described "my own sense of physical shock" on discovering in 1969 that classified special intelligence reports were "routinely lying unguarded on desks in the Executive Office Building rooms of the National Security Council staff."

"In high level offices in the defense department," he said, "such reports were carried by special couriers who normally waited while they were read; they could not be held overnight, left unguarded, or handled by secretaries."

That material, Ellsberg said, was classified "higher than top secret" in a range of super-sensitive clearances "the very existence of which . . . is carefully and effectively concealed even from the great majority of those holding top secret clearances."

Thus, anyone genuinely initiated in government security would realize that the Pentagon papers, a history of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, does not reveal "either cryptographic or nuclear weapons data," since they were marked "only" top secret, Ellsberg pointed out.

He suggested that many pro-

spective jurors in the case may have been schooled in the rules of secrecy, as he was, by making mistakes that produced "ominous responses."

He described, for example, having his shipment to the Middle East with a Marine battalion delayed in 1956, when a security officer discovered a copy of a letter Ellsberg had written to a college professor, saying that "we had been briefed that my battalion was likely to be involved in combat in the Mediterranean that summer."

While at the Rand Corp., Ellsberg said, he was cited for security violations and warned that he might lose his clearance and job because he had not "adequately spinned the dial on the security safe in his office every night."

"Spinning safe dials became a physical reflex to me," he said, because of concern to keep his job.

Jurors in the case who now have clearances or once did, Ellsberg added, might be shocked to hear testimony that some government officials do not apply the strict regulations they have been taught are standard operating procedure.

Such a juror "will probably have come to recoil, himself, from the thought of such departures, whether or not they appear to threaten national security, because he has learned—in ways that must foil any admonitions in a courtroom, to 'put such memories from his mind'—that they definitely and immediately threaten personal retribution, perhaps affecting one's colleagues," Ellsberg said.

'Top Secret' Ellsberg Paper

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Not Top, Says