

Accuracy to "within two or
r achieved.

s problem: It did not dare
evidence and its meaning had
one shot having missed the

eds of the fact that three
published in WHITEWASH II.

urveyor Robert West to prepare
s then marked the location of
HITEWASH II, 167, 243).

et Service placed a "replica"
each of the three shots struck,
ITEWASH II, 248). These are part

le-bullet" theory, was familiar
3 Secret Service Inspector Tom
o other photographs that are
S. Specter, however, made no
s showing the President's car
struck. Inspector Kelley was
out the unwelcome evidence.

n in the Commission's record or
timony. With Dr. Humes on the
t was identified as Exhibit 397
d this exhibit as identical with
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copies, rather, of various notes
ing the performance of the exami-
rt after ..."

rned by Humes (WHITEWASH 187) and
on the witness stand, are essen-
ation or the autopsy report. Notes
of the time of Humes's testimony,
vidence Specter was in charge of,
From that evidence.

ay has been further tampered with,
certainly improperly. These notes
in the National Archives in any
doubt, that this also happened in
len Specter had charge.

"coincidence" that these Specter
with his sponsorship of the "single-
this suppressed evidence.

the Washington Post to read WHITE-
ory, after asking former Commission
ice to which they got no satisfactory
the statements in the FBI report
the Commission's medical and autopsy
seen the autopsy report. Incredi-
wever, this cannot be claimed for
y received all eight original copies
roxed additional ones, and all the
was in Secret Service possession
isions here cited were prepared.

s after the Commission officially had
tent Counsel David W. Belin wrote a
in on the subject of Oswald's possibi-
This, he said, could have been November

19, when the papers announced it.

The third paragraph discloses that the month-old Commission, by
this early time in its "investigation", had determined to limit itself
to only three shots having been fired. This is how Belin accounted for
them:

In determining the accuracy of Oswald, we have three major
possibilities: Oswald was shooting at Connally and missed two of the
three shots, the two misses striking Kennedy; Oswald was shooting
at both Kennedy and Connally and all three shots struck their
intended targets; Oswald was shooting only at Kennedy and the second
bullet missed its intended target and hit Connally instead. [See p.492]

In an effort to make this legible, I have darkened the file copy.

It reads:

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bilities: Oswald was shooting at Connally and missed two of the
three shots, the two misses striking Kennedy; Oswald was shooting
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tended targets; Oswald was shooting only at Kennedy and the second
bullet missed its intended target and hit Connally instead.

Expediently, Belin ignored the "missed" shot, of which everyone
in government knew, for spray from it caused James T. Pague to bleed
(WHITEWASH 158). It was immediately reported by the police. However he
explained it, Belin had each shot hitting - none missing. He used up
three shots without accounting for all the shooting.

Of course, to the government Oswald was already the lone assassin.
But with the second shot striking Connally alone, as this memo also has
it, that was not possible. The only thing that later "changed" the
facts, apparent to the Commission at the very beginning, was its need to
account for the "missed" shot without acknowledging an additional shot.
To admit a fourth shot was the same as acknowledging an additional assas-
sin, which it would not do for that, in turn, was proof of a conspiracy
to kill the President.

Almost three months later, on April 22, the Commission was still
satisfied that each of the three shots struck a man. It was still ig-
noring the "missed" shot. On that day Assistant Counsel Melvin A. Eisen-
berg drafted a "Memorandum For The Record" on the "Conference of April
21, 1964, to determine which frames of the Zapruder movies show the im-
pact of the first and second bullets." Each of these shots "impacted".
There never was any question of the "impact" of the third or fatal shot.
This is unmistakable, unforgettably preserved in Frame 313. All par-
ticipants are not named. Those who are include five doctors, three FBI
agents, five Commission lawyers, including Rankin, the Connallys and
Commissioner McCloy.

Specter alone dissented from the conclusion that Connally's chest
wound could not have been inflicted after Frame 236.

By this time what was never proved was being assumed, that the
whole bullet had been "recovered from Connally's stretcher". Only one
doctor (a veterinarian) considered it even remotely conceivable that this
bullet could have caused the damage to Connally's wrist. To put it an-
other way, the "single-bullet" theory was eliminated while it was being
dressed up.

This paragraph of the memorandum reads:

In a discussion after the conference Drs. Light and Dolce ex-
pressed themselves as being very strongly of the opinion that Con-
nally had been hit by two different bullets, principally on the
ground that the bullet recovered from Connally's stretcher could
not have broken his radius without having suffered more distortion.
Dr. Olivier withheld a conclusion until he has had the opportunity
to make tests on animal tissue and bone with the actual rifle.

The Commission's solution to this problem was simple and direct.

*See pp. 501ff.

Dr. Dolce, consultant to the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal, was not called as a witness. Thus, his "very strong" scientific opinion contrary to what the Commission was cooking up is not in the evidence.

An earlier, similar conference for the identical purpose had been held April 14. Eisenberg also drafted the memorandum on that one, again underscoring "impact of the first and second bullets". This memo also is dated April 22.* Present were all three autopsy surgeons, Doctors Light and Olivier, five FBI and two Secret Service experts and three Commission lawyers, again including Specter, who noted the same dissent.

Two days later, Eisenberg prepared a memorandum on "Determination of the Trajectories of the Three Shots". It again accounts for all three shots without acknowledging what was known, that one had missed the motorcade entirely. He proposed what actually was staged a month later, a Dallas reconstruction. His purpose was to locate the car at each of the three "impacts". He also said that, instead of the "replica car" that was used (WHITEWASH II, 164-8), "preferably, the actual car" should be used.

His paragraph 4 repeats that all "three shots struck" the men.

From the very beginning, as this memo also reflects, no consideration was given to a shot from any other point or any shot that did not strike the President or the Governor. Not until it was obvious that the "missed" shot could no longer be ignored was any consideration given to it. When it had to be accounted for, the Commission grimly refused to admit more than three shots had been fired. Acknowledging a fourth concedes a conspiracy. All the evidence is that no single man, not Oswald, not the best shots the Commission could gather, could have fired even these three shots. By misrepresenting its evidence, the Commission did get its false claim that Oswald could have fired these three shots believed. However, there was no possibility of achieving acceptability for a "four-shot" theory.

These Commission staff and Secret Service conclusions, that all three bullets hit the two men, are amply supported by the investigations and conclusions by the FBI and the Secret Service. The very first Commission file, No. 1, is the FBI summary report of December 9, 1963, made by order of the President (see above; WHITEWASH 192-5). It says, "... three shots rang out. Two bullets struck President Kennedy, and one wounded Governor Connally".

The FBI amplified this report with another on January 13, 1964 (Commission File 107). If, as government defenders, including J. Edgar Hoover, argue, the first report was written without benefit of the autopsy report (and there is no reason why it should have been), this can not be said of the second report, whose second paragraph contains reference to its findings. The FBI did not retract or withdraw what it said in the first report, that each of the three shots struck home.

Until the official position changed, the FBI's representation and reporting fact did not change. After the first shock wore off and it got to work, it prepared elaborate scale models of the entire area, with care and infinite accuracy. It then prepared, with customary FBI neatness and trim plastic binding, a booklet of explanation. This is File 298. It is not, you may be certain, in the Report or printed evidence, which carefully culled out all proofs of more than two impacting shots.

Section 12 begins on page 14. It is headed, "What was the aiming pattern of the assassin's target?" It could not be more explicit than it is in the first words of each of the first four subdivisions of this section:

- a. SHOT ONE hit the target from a distance of 167 feet...
- b. SHOT TWO hit the target from a distance of 262 feet...
- c. SHOT THREE hit the target from a distance of 307 feet, measured downward along a 15-degree angle from the horizontal...

*See pp.503ff.

There are no ifs or buts but told the Commission that each of the target. It placed the target precision. It also specified the shots hitting the target. There shot, no reference to it that can of this listing by the FBI (WHITE

In short, well after the when simple error could not be Secret Service be of such unequal both together - that they could Commission that each of the three

There is no evasion, no qu later. This, like the others cit ment: The President and the Gove to have been fired.

The problem is not one of any doubt of the missed bullet. bled from the slight injury was al also, immediately broadcast it (W this (R116). The broadcast was b dispatcher, "I have on- guy that bullet off the concrete." Even b broadcast, Tague's wounding was k who had gone to that area, severa tion was perpetrated, because wit area.

Although it was known - pu both the FBI and Secret Service p for all three shots they admit w thus not conceding or accounting caused Tague's injury. When the the curbstone struck by this "mis tended it could not be found, ever diately and the photos were avail As late as July 17, 1964, Dallas not find where the bullet struck. knowledge that, if three bullets President or the Governor several three could not have looped its w feet from the Triple Underpass on the curb and spray concrete or fr on the cheek.

J. Edgar Hoover, ultimately "missed" bullet could not be asso welcome intelligence was postponed August 12, 1964 - nine months afte the tremendous printed Report was reader wonder if this is the vaun newspapers, magazines, cereal box else accessible to the FBI's publ that unsurpassable FBI speed, per efficiency constantly touted, I quo "That is the FBI for you."

Bitter-ending by the Dallas sion sent FBI Photographic Expert find that curbstone with the bulle bird-dogging, it worked. Shaneyf average intelligence would have de photographers, went where they sa it was - where it had been withou curbstone's first move was when S Washington with him.

Belatedly, that curbstone

timed doubt that the President just that a bullet had been hit - as I show in WHITEWASH proves that Phil Willis took and that the Zapruder film, had taken the picture and government's problem is that been fired by Oswald or any required a fourth bullet.

the editing of the Zapruder margins of this film that Phil camera's view at just the Although they are said to with Frame 171, Frames 208-11. How remarkably this coincidence 210 in evidence! That, it for the first time the Commission hit by a shot from the sixth-

ing was that "the reaction ... as early as frame 199 ... at frames 204-6 ...". It struck by the first bullet as "reaction began", although it would us, he may have been struck as two seconds, or 36 frames, if a Frame 199. (However, in WHITEWASH at about Frame 192, or with that struck the President as ... this is my analysis, first 47, that at Frame 190 Zapruder's he had seen a little earlier. that the assassination began the Report, unblushingly not ... claimed this as its own dis- film, although the executive than a year earlier in WHITEWASH,

ity - and it without doubt was Report while the memorandum was ble. It casts suspicion on all his means that all were silent at conclusions, that the President at a time when Oswald could not as the result of a conspiracy, man could have inflicted all these School Book Depository window.

this suppression and of what was ry, for here is the first credi- government. That this intelligence Report, is really beyond immedi- act, one that stuns the mind.

and previously undisclosed al- film, Life's private property, which an earlier bullet could with Zapruder's emotional de- lephoto lens, a bullet hitting not know this when I wrote PHOTO- cious account of how the above- the original (pp.19ff.). In a destruction of only those

ined proof of the disappearance

from the original of two more frames, at precisely the point this suppressed Eisenberg memo says the experts agreed the President could have been struck! I have the proof in my possession but must protect my source.

The splice is more professional than that which eliminated the frames beginning at 207. It is so close to the horizontal edge of the frames and so neatly done that it long escaped detection. Once perceived, it is quite obvious.

This memorandum repeats twice in a single paragraph (e) that the so-called single bullet to which all the non-fatal wounds were attributed in the Report, according to the consensus, "does not appear to have penetrated a wrist". It also says of Governor Connally's wounds the opposite of the foundation of the Report, that "It is not possible to say whether prior to 236 Governor Connally was ever in a position such that one bullet could have caused the five wounds he sustained" and that "the likelihood of an instantaneous reaction is particularly great in regard to a wrist wound ... since pain is usually felt more quickly in a limb than in the torso".

The expectant reader will not find this most essential intelligence in the Report, which, to the contrary, assumes without proof that: The Governor was struck by one bullet only, prior to Frame 224 and at or after 210; he was also lined up with the President; this same bullet had also gone through the President's neck; and, contrary to the evidence, the President did not have a delayed reaction while the Governor did.

This, of course, has nothing to do with the additional evidence that makes the single-bullet theory a scientific impossibility, some of it in this very same suppressed memo.

Dr. F. J. Light, Deputy Chief of the Biophysics Division of Edgewood Arsenal, is listed as a participant in both conferences. Dr. Joseph Dolce, consultant to that division of the Arsenal, is listed as participating in the April 22 conference only. This memorandum seems like a carefully expurgated version of the earlier one, some of the information in which it duplicates. It is half as long and, predictably, eliminates what we have just quoted.

However, it has this concluding paragraph:

In a discussion after the conference Drs. Light and Dolce expressed themselves as being very strongly of the opinion that Connally had been hit by two different bullets, principally on the ground that the bullet recovered from Connally's stretcher could not have broken his radius without having suffered more distortion. Dr. Olivier withheld a conclusion until he has had the opportunity to make tests on animal tissue and bone with the actual rifle.

It is an unusually naive reader who now will be startled to learn that Dr. Dolce was not called as a witness before the Commission and that there was no duplication of the history attributed to the heroic bullet of Specter's saga, hence nothing upon which Drs. Light and Olivier could base altered testimony. Dr. Dolce's name, in fact, is not mentioned a single time in all the volumes of testimony.

Dr. Light testified May 13 (5H94ff.). His testimony is fairly invoked in the Report:

... testified that the anatomical findings were insufficient for him to formulate a firm opinion as to whether the same bullet did or did not pass through the President's neck first before inflicting all the wounds on Governor Connally (R109);

and,

Based on the other circumstances, such as the relative positions in the automobile of the President and the Governor, Dr. Light concluded that it was probable that the same bullet traversed the President's neck and inflicted all the wounds on Governor Connally (R585).

How Dr. Light knew "the relative positions" at the time of this alleged shot, when no one else does and when no one else knows when the

(a) In many frames up to 250, the Governor's wrist is held in a position which exposed him to the type of wrist wounds he actually received.

(d) After viewing the films and slides, the Governor was of the opinion that he had been hit by frame 231.

(e) The Governor stated that after being hit, he looked to his right, looked to his left and then turned to his right. He felt the President might have been hit by frame 190. He heard only two shots and felt sure that the shots he heard were the first and third shots. He is positive that he was hit after he heard the first shot, i.e., by the second shot, and by that shot only.

In a discussion after the conference Dr. Light and Dolce expressed themselves as being very strongly of the opinion that Connally had been hit by two different bullets, principally on the ground that the bullet recovered from Connally's stretcher could not have broken his radius without having suffered more distortion. Dr. Olivier withheld a conclusion until he had had the opportunity to make tests on animal tissue and bone with the actual rifle.

If the conference of April 14 was destructive of the case being fabricated against Oswald, the conference of April 21 was worse, as Eisenberg's memo reveals. See p. 56. Of course, it was nothing new that wound ballistics experts could not accept as fact that 399 had struck a wrist; it is common knowledge and experience that even jacketed bullets do not cause such substantial bone damage and suffer no distortion. All the expert testimony before the Commission was to this effect. But consider what this conference says of the Commission's investigation:

—Dr. Dolce, who "was very strongly of the opinion" that 399 "could not have" caused the wrist wound, was never called to testify before the Commission. The Report and the published evidence are silent about his strong dissent from this finding essential to the government's case;

—Dr. Light, who agreed with Dr. Dolce, did testify before the Commission but was never asked why he felt 399 could not have wounded the wrist. In response to Specter's hypothetical question, Dr. Light indicated that the passage of a single bullet through the two victims was a possibility based on the circumstances outlined by Specter (e. g., that 399 was found on Connally's stretcher!). Specter even had the audacity to ask Light, "And what about that whole bullet [399] leads you to believe that the one bullet caused the President's neck wound and all of the wounds on Governor Connally?" Light's reply was polite but firm: "Nothing about that bullet. Mainly the position in which they were seated in the automobile." (5H95). Thus Dr. Light's expert opinion was kept carefully kept out of the record;

—Dr. Olivier's tests, in anticipation of which he withheld an opinion at this conference, produced nothing but mangled, distorted bullets (CE's 853, 856, 857). Specter never asked Olivier if 399 could have done what the official theory demands and emerged in such perfect condition;

—Nothing was done to investigate the suggestion of the wound ballistics experts that Connally might have been hit by 2 separate bullets, a possibility incompatible with the lone assassin finding. Particularly helpful in this area might have been the spectrographic and NAA tests so carefully kept out of the record.

This memo takes criticism of Specter's Commission work out of the realm of "Monday morning quarterbacking." Specter knew the fatal flaws in his theory at the very time he was trying to build a record in support of that theory; he knew what scientific tests had to be done, which experts had to be called. He ignored the flaws, ignored the tests and ignored the experts and devised a solution to the crime he had to know was impossible.

And can it be regarded as anything less than culpable that, with a record like this, especially a suppressed memo of a secret conference like this, the authors of the Report could write: "All the evidence indicated that the bullet found on the Governor's stretcher could have caused all his wounds"? (R95).

1

The following from Mr. JACK REYNOLDS, November 29, 1963, which of Governor JOHN G. CON 1963.

Dr. JACK REYN accompanied this x-ray

"SUPPLEMENTAR APPEARANCE AND LOCATION THE SOFT TISSUE SHADOWS OF GOVERNOR JOHN G. CON

"AP and later thigh were obtained and the region of the k and the other the later beam from medial to lat lateral aspect of the t

"No fractures densities are seen on t appear on one and not t as artifacts.

"There is, hov on both films and appear of the subcutaneous fat. By measurements on these film distance and object 15.2 cms. above the dist the AP film and, on this surface of the skin. It On the lateral film, the 15 cms above the distal lies 4.9 cms posterior t thigh and it is superimp to the femur, the densit to the exterior of the a

on 11/29/63 of Dallas

by Special Agent: VINCENT E. D

This document contains neither recommenda your agency; it and its contents are not to be