INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

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UNITED STATES

INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

MAJORITY AND MINORITY REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

COMMITTEE PRINT

PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES.
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, considerable fear was rife among the residents on the west coast of the United States, where approximately 120,000 citizens of Japanese ancestry and Japanese nationals had concentrated. Because of this situation and particularly for military reasons, the evacuation of certain areas of the west coast became necessary. The War Relocation Authority, established on March 18, 1942, by Executive Order No. 9102, was to carry out the evacuation and to care for the evacuees. This agency proceeded to establish evacuation centers, relocation centers, and assembly centers for the relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry, United States citizens and aliens alike, from certain areas of the west coast.

Meanwhile the War Relocation Authority was established on March 18, 1942, by Executive Order No. 9102, to carry out the evacuation and to care for the evacuees. This agency proceeded to establish evacuation centers, relocation centers, and assembly centers for the relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry, United States citizens and aliens alike, from certain areas of the west coast. The evacuation was first put on a voluntary basis, and some 8,000 persons of Japanese ancestry removed themselves into the interior of the United States. However, this procedure proved to be ineffective, and as a consequence on March 29, 1942, the voluntary evacuation was abandoned and a freezing order was issued by the commanding general of the Western Defense Command, which in effect held all persons of Japanese ancestry within the affected zones. This order was intended to disrupt the flow of personnel to the Pacific theaters of operation and to prevent the establishment of the Axis Pacific war zone. In response to this order, the War Relocation Authority proceeded to establish evacuation centers, relocation centers, and assembly centers for the relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry, United States citizens and aliens alike, from certain areas of the west coast.

The removal to the Relocation Centers began in May of 1942. Approximately 106,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated to the various centers. The evacuation was completed in September of 1942, and the centers were closed in April of 1945.

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THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION

From the second year of its work (1939) down to the present time, the Special Committee on Un-American Activities has carried on a continuous investigation of subversive and un-American activities among the Japanese who are resident in the United States.

Previous committee reports have dealt with many phases of the question of Japanese subversive activities. At the end of 1940 the committee issued a special report dealing with... Government and that numerous members of these organizations were engaged in espionage for the Tokyo Government.

The present report reflects the current stage of the committee's continuing work on the question of the subversive and un-American activities of Japanese who are resident in the United States. These activities include espionage and sabotage and the war relocation centers and with the possible release of dangerous Japanese agents of espionage from these centers.

During the latter part of 1942 and the first half of the present year, the committee received numerous complaints from citizens and organizations on the west coast and in Western States. Members of Congress and from State authorities of the affected areas to make an investigation of the relocation centers.

Early in May 1943 a member of this committee, Hon. J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey, went to Los Angeles, Calif., and conferred with State authorities, various citizens, and groups, to determine the facts under which Director of the War Re... Authority which called for the release of approximately 1,000 evacuees per week for resettlement throughout the country.

Pursuant to the recommendation of Congressman Thomas and at the request of Congressman Costello, a member of this committee, and a Representative in the House from the Los Angeles... of the various relocation centers and detailed investigators to go to the centers and conduct an investigation.

The charges which appeared in the numerous complaints received by the committee and which were reflected in the preliminary investigations of the committee's agents were as follows:

1. That Japanese were being released at the rate of 1,000 a week and that it was very possible that among those released were some whose allegiance had been pledged to the Japanese Government,

2. That there were thousands of Japanese in the relocation centers who had openly expressed their loyalty to Japan and had requested repatriation.

3. That 24 percent of the evacuees of draft age (17 to 38 years of age) had stated on the questionnaire circulated among them by the Army that they were not loyal to the United States but held their sole allegiance to the Emperor of Japan.

4. That the loyal and disloyal Japanese were intermingled without any semblance of segregation, and were receiving the same treatment in the way of accommodations, food, etc.

5. That the Japanese evacuees were being supplied food through the Quartermaster Corps of the Army in greater variety and quantity than was available to the average American consumer.

6. That the discipline in the various relocation centers was very lax, and that considerable Government property had been destroyed by some of the Japanese.

The foregoing charges, which were embodied in complaints received by the committee and which grew out of preliminary investigations, were made the basis for a more thorough and formal investigation by the subcommittee of the House of Representatives.

The subcommittee left almost immediately for California. From June 8 to June 17 the subcommittee held hearings in Los Angeles where it took more than 1,000 pages of testimony, and its report was introduced in the House of Representatives on June 22, 1943.

ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

This committee does not consider it necessary to discuss in detail the administrative errors and deficiencies of the War Relocation Authority which were indicated by voluminous evidence... chapter of this committee's report on the War Relocation Authority. The committee, however, desires to call the attention of the Government to the fact that many of the fundamental errors...生生 at the end of 1942.

LACK OF JAPANESE EXPERTS IN WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Out of an administrative personnel of the War Relocation Authority which numbers approximately 2,500 persons, an absolutely negligible percentage seems to have been qualified for their positions by any
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As an example, the need for segregation was long ago strikingly evident as a result of the operation of criminal and subversive gangs in the relocation center at Manzanar (Calif.).

Tokutaro Slocum, one of the few Japanese ever to be made a citizen of the United States by an act of Congress, was called as a witness before our subcommittee. Slocum was one of the evacuees who lived at Manzanar. When asked if he had gained any information concerning "organized groups of a secret character working in Camp Manzanar," Slocum replied:

"Well, sir, I was a special investigator there, or inspector there, so it was my duty to obtain all this information and report that to the duly constituted authorities, so I happened to come across quite a number of them. I would say they were Blood Brothers, Black Dragon, the Dunbar Corps, and the San Pedro Yogores."

Slocum then testified concerning the methods of intimidation and terrorization which were employed by these gangs at Manzanar.

Slocum's testimony was completely substantiated by confidential reports which the subcommittee obtained by subpoena. The following are excerpts from those reports:

"With more leisure time, dormant forces are beginning to create disturbances. What has seemingly appeared to most Caucasian administrators as a placid community life in reality covered a tumult of violence. Rumors, gossip, and hearsay have appeared from time to time. However, center officials have usually dismissed these symptoms with an academic leniency."

"The real threat to peace and order within the centers will not come from individual lawlessness. The bombshell that will shatter these communities will be the blow-off of accumulated tension. lambasting and mob outbreaks, mass demonstrations, gang atrocities, and acts of terrorism will recur frequently."

"War relocation Authority administrators must realize the dynamite they are dealing with; they must be realistic; they must not encourage the mushrooming of small incidents by condoning with the deleterious elements in each camp must be recognized and intelligent yet stern methods must be instituted to curb them."

"Numerically this pro-Japan element is small, but the damage their insidious propaganda can do to the peace and order of the community should not be too lightly regarded."

"Internal security should be exactly what its title connotes. Reports issuing from some centers indicate that security of life and limb for those bespeaking constructive attitudes does not exist. On the other hand, in some centers, the enemy is so condoned that their nefarious beatings of decent citizens continues not only unabated but with increasing frequency."

"Manzanar gangdom is usually identified by the people as one of three groups: (1) Terminal Islanders, known also as Yogores, or the San Pedro Gang, (2) the Dunbar Gang, (3) The Blood Brothers Corps, known also as Yuho Kesshidan."
THE LOYALTY QUESTION

The committee presents the following tabulation that shows an alarming proportion of Japanese American citizens of draft age (17 to 38) frankly refusing to declare their loyalty to the United States.

The Loyalty Question

The following tabulation presents in the most simplified form the answers to the loyalty question contained in the questionnaire which was filled out by the Japanese in the relocation centers in February of the present year. An alarming proportion of Japanese American citizens of draft age (17 to 38) frankly refused to declare their loyalty to the United States.

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The foregoing tabulation indicates that disloyalty among those of draft age at the Manzanar center was in excess of 50 percent. The committee is of the opinion that such a result obtained because of the course of action of the War Relocation Authority. The Authority's inaction in so important a matter is a loss to understand the reasoning of the War Relocation Authority which prompted its inaction in so important a matter.

PRESERVATION AND PROMOTION OF JAPANESE CULTURAL TIES

Indicative of the same type of negligence which caused the War Relocation Authority to fail to adopt prompt and drastic measures of segregation in the Centers, was the Authority's callous promotion of cultural ties with Japan.

Mr. Myer admitted in his testimony before the subcommittee that at one time the War Relocation Authority was paying at least 90 instructors in Judo at a single center. Judo is a military sport introduced into Japan in 1900. It is a fact that the military and the police forces of Japan have had an advisory interest in Judo. The U.S. is a country from which that citizen has presumably been completely separated by the very fact of his American citizenship.

Every fact adduced in evidence before the subcommittee indicated that the War Relocation Authority had before it an almost unparalleled opportunity to inaugurate a vigorous educational program to make all of the Japanese, who were eligible for draft, loyal at least should have been encouraged by every possible means to regard themselves as Americans and Americans only.

NORTH AMERICAN MILITARY VIRTUE SOCIETY (3CTOKU-KAI)

This committee has made an exhaustive study of the Japanese organization known as the Butoku-kai. It must assume that the War Relocation Authority has done the same or has at least a record of the Butoku-kai in the files of the intelligence agencies. Among other highly important items of evidence bearing upon the organization, the committee has obtained the names of several thousand members of the Butoku-kai from its own records.

There is no doubt whatever in the minds of any competent authorities, including all of the intelligence agencies of the United States Government, that the Butoku-kai is a subversive organization. The committee holds that the Butoku-kai is a subversive organization and should be considered ineligible for release from the centers. This committee concurs completely in that view.

While it is overwhelmingly evident that the Butoku-kai is of subversive character, it is extremely doubtful that the War Relocation Authority so considers it. This conclusion is borne out by the feeble efforts of the War Relocation Authority to identify and remove members of the Butoku-kai from the centers.

The subcommittee submitted a list of the names of some of the members of the Butoku-kai to the Director of the War Relocation Authority with the request that he make a check to see if that citizen has presumably been completely separated by the very fact of his American citizenship.

Of the possible 215 names which the War Relocation Authority was able to identify, 23 have been released by the Authority. The committee does not allege that all of these 23 members of the Butoku-kai will proceed to use their freedom to commit acts of sabotage or espionage. The committee does hold, however, that the War Relocation Authority to exercise proper safeguards both for the national security and for the thousands of loyal Japanese as well.

The committee offers a brief summary of the evidence of the subversive character of the Butoku-kai to substantiate its conclusion that the War Relocation Authority has been negligent or incompetent in the performance of its duties.

The Butoku-kai had approximately 60 branches in the United States prior to Pearl Harbor. About 50 of these were in the State of California. Approximately 10,000 Nisei (American citizens of Japanese ancestry) were members of the Butoku-kai in this country.

The investigations of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities have established the following additional facts concerning the Butoku-kai:

1. The Butoku-kai was the youth section of the Black Dragon Society of Japan.
2. Mitsuru Toyama, head of the Black Dragon Society in Japan, was adviser to the Butoku-kai in the United States.
3. The declared purpose of the Butoku-kai in this country was "To enhance the spirit of Japanese military virtue to guide the citizens of Japanese ancestry, and to encourage physical culture."
4. The instructors who were engaged to teach the military arts to the Nisei in the United States under the banner of the Butoku-kai came to this country from Japan, and were principally Japanese Army and Navy men. However, local priests of both the Shinto and the Buddhist cults also participated in the instruction.
5. The Butoku-kai was imported into the United States by one Tekichi Nakamura, who arrived here from Hawaii on September 27, 1929.
The committee was able to locate the numerous or names of the BRANCHES OF THE BUTOKU-KAI:

1. Monterey by Friends of Northwest League
2. Seattle by Friends of Coast League
3. Portland by Friends of Northwest League
4. Los Angeles by Friends of California Butoku-Kai
5. White River by Friends of Washington Butoku-Kai
6. Tacoma by Friends of Washington Butoku-Kai
7. San Pedro by Friends of Los Angeles Butoku-Kai
8. Oakland by Friends of San Francisco Butoku-Kai
9. Los Angeles by Friends of San Francisco Butoku-Kai
10. Seattle by Friends of Washington Butoku-Kai
11. Portland by Friends of Oregon Butoku-Kai
12. Seattle by Friends of Washington Butoku-Kai
13. Portland by Friends of Oregon Butoku-Kai
14. Los Angeles by Friends of California Butoku-Kai
15. White River by Friends of Washington Butoku-Kai
16. Tacoma by Friends of Washington Butoku-Kai
17. San Pedro by Friends of Los Angeles Butoku-Kai
18. Oakland by Friends of San Francisco Butoku-Kai
19. Los Angeles by Friends of San Francisco Butoku-Kai
20. Seattle by Friends of Washington Butoku-Kai
21. Portland by Friends of Oregon Butoku-Kai

In 1934, when the Butoku-kai held a national meeting at San Francisco, the Japanese consul general declined an invitation to address the meeting on the ground that there was, according to the organization's own report, "silent prayer for the success of the Imperial Army," and at its conclusion "three banzais for the fall of Shanghai." At a meeting of the Oregon branch of Butoku-kai in 1937, Nakamura—this teacher and leader of 10,000 Nisei in the United States—went, once more to Japan, taking with him a party of 14 Nisei. They again worshiped at the imperial palace in Tokyo, and in the course of their visit was received by Prince Nashimoto, himself a high official of the Japanese political world. The Special Committee on Un-American Activities has the names of all these sponsors.

In one of his latest reports, Nakamura boasted the following:

"In 1931, Nakamura came to the United States in the guise of a Korean, but later dropped that pretense. Nakamura began immediately to enroll Nisei in his organization and to give them instruction in sword-manship. An American propagandist included Mitsuru Toyama, head of the Black Dragon Society of Japan, 10 admirals of the Japanese Navy, 21 generals of the Japanese army, and 12 officials of the Japanese government as members of the North American College of the Imperial Way at Tokyo. The primary purpose of the college was for the instruction of Nisei sent from the United States. The college was formally opened on July 10, 1938."
The steady release since July 1942 of the Japanese from the relocation centers by the War Relocation Authority, to resettle and relocate in various sections of the United States, has ... of the War Relocation Authority is continued there is little hope that any such investigation will be made in the future.

The War Relocation Authority issues three types of leave: 1. Indefinite leave, which permits evacuees to leave the relocation centers after they have made arrangements for employment outside. There are no limitations placed upon them except to abide by the law and to remain outside of military areas from which they are excluded by military orders.

2. Short-term leave, which permits an evacuee to leave the relocation area for a limited period of time, not to exceed 30 days, to attend to affairs which require his presence or to interview a prospective employer, etc.

3. Seasonal work leave, which permits an evacuee to go to a particular locality to accept seasonal employment, such as work in beet fields, etc.

On July 6, 1943, Mr. Dillon Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, testified that as of July 3, 1943, there were 15,305 evacuees on seasonal and indefinite leave, 9,359 of whom were citizens of Japanese ancestry. He stated that 15 percent of those being released for indefinite leave were Issei.

The leave and resettlement program of the War Relocation Authority was first inaugurated July 20, 1942, by the issuance of administrative instruction No. 22 which permitted indefinite leave. It called for the War Relocation Authority, in consultation with the Office of the Coordinator of Internee Affairs, to establish the procedure for granting indefinite leave. Applicants for indefinite leave were subject to home and identification checks. On July 6, 1942, when the leave regulations were changed to permit citizens and aliens alike to apply for indefinite leave, the War Relocation Authority, in consultation with the Office of the Coordinator of Internee Affairs, established the procedure for granting indefinite leave. Applicants for indefinite leave were subject to home and identification checks.

During this period, applicants for indefinite leave were subject to only two loyalty checks or investigations: (1) Home check; (2) name check against the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The committee at this point would like to emphasize that at no time has the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated the evacuees who were released for indefinite leave although the War Relocation Authority was informed that it would be doing so. This was later denied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the War Relocation Authority.

On April 2, the War Relocation Authority further liberalized its release program by eliminating the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check and the home check. Under the present regulations, an evacuee is released only after a background check by the director of the War Relocation Authority and a recommendation by the Japanese American Joint Board, which is composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, War Relocation Authority, and other organizations.

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The Japanese American Joint Board was established by the War Department primarily to determine how many of the 38,000 citizen evacuees (Nisei) between the ages of 17 and 38 could be employed by war industries. Any question concerning the reliability of these evacuees had to be answered by the Joint Board. If the Joint Board determined that an evacuee was not reliable, the authority to release him for war-industry employment was to be delegated to the Joint Board.

SEASONAL LEAVE

During 1942 there was no check made against evacuees who were released for seasonal leave. However, this was changed late in 1942, and at the present time evacuees released for seasonal leave receive the same check as those who apply for indefinite leave. The check on the seasonally released evacuees is made by the War Relocation Authority and is based on the recommendations of the Joint Board.

The committee is definitely of the opinion that the present release procedures of the War Relocation Authority are entirely too loose and it cannot be too emphatic in its recommendation for the establishment of a competent and qualified board of agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and other pertinent agencies which would pass on every application for leave and give full authority to enforce its decisions. By such a procedure the people and the country generally and the communities where the evacuees are located will be assured that there was no question concerning the loyalty of these people. It would, therefore, relieve the released evacuees of any stigma of disloyalty and at the same time bring about a more compatible degree of community acceptance for the evacuees.

AN INDEFENSIBLE RELEASE PROCEDURE

The War Relocation Authority, through its employment and resettlement division, has recently set up a plan to place hundreds of Nisei in civil-service employment of the Federal Government. As is well known, the Civil Service Commission has always conducted a very thorough investigation of all applicants for Government positions with particular emphasis on the subject's loyalty. Such an investigation requires time and personnel.

Due to the peculiar nature of the Nisei cases which are now being submitted to the Civil Service by the War Relocation Authority, the committee believes that even a more thorough investigation of the applicants is required. The committee urges that the Civil Service Commission give every possible assistance in placing these Nisei evacuees in the Federal Government.

DIRECTOR, SEVENTH REGION,
United States Civil Service Commission,
Chicago, Ill.

DEAR SIRS: * *

* * *

It is to this type of loose and dangerous procedure on the part of the War Relocation Authority officials that this committee takes exception. The civil-service agents who are checking these applicants are members of organizations which have already determined that some of these applicants were members of and affiliated with organizations which are considered subversive.

It is, therefore, the opinion of the committee that the present procedure of the War Relocation Authority is entirely too loose and that a more thorough investigation of these applicants is required. The committee urges that the War Relocation Authority give every possible assistance in placing these Nisei evacuees in the Federal Government.

We will appreciate whatever assistance you can give in placing * * *

Very truly yours,

ELMER L. SHIRRELL,
Relocation Supervisor.
I. That the War Relocation Authority's belated announcement of its intention of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese in the relocation centers be put into effect at the earliest possible moment.

2. That a board composed of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various intelligence agencies of the Federal Government be constituted with full powers to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications.

3. That the War Relocation Authority inaugurate a thorough-going program of Americanization for those Japanese who remain in the centers.

MINORITY REPORT OF THE HONORABLE HERMAN P. EBERHARTER

It is not possible for me to agree with the findings and conclusions of the majority of this committee. After careful consideration, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the report of the majority is prejudiced, and that most of its statements are not proven. The majority report has stressed a few shortcomings that they have found in the work of the War Relocation Authority, without mentioning the many good points that our investigation has disclosed or the magnitude of the job with which the Authority is dealing.

Since the close of our hearings I have made some inquiries in order to clear up some points about which I was in doubt and on which the testimony did not seem to be sufficiently clear, the purpose of these inquiries being to obtain a more complete and accurate picture of the situation than that presented in the report of the minority.

There are a few basic matters that ought to be kept clearly in mind, which I wish to summarize here at the beginning before dealing with the body of the report of the minority. After careful consideration of the matters before us, I have come to the conclusion that theWar Relocation Authority has done its best to meet the situation as it found it and that it has done so competently and efficiently.

The majority report, however, has not presented a proper picture of the Authority's work. It has not taken into account the difficulties and obstacles with which the Authority had to deal, nor has it given proper credit for the good work that has been done. It has also failed to recognize the importance of the task that the Authority has undertaken, which is one of the most difficult and complex in the history of the United States.

It is the opinion of this committee that the report of the majority is not in accordance with the facts as they have been presented to us, and that it is not a proper basis for the recommendations that are made in the report.

MINORITY REPORT OF THE HONORABLE HERMAN P. EBERHARTER
INVESTIGATION UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

The dangerous aliens among the Japanese, population on the west coast were picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in the first few days after Pearl Harbor. But once removed from the west coast it was believed these people presented no further danger. Dillon S. Myer, Director of the Authority, has told this subcommittee that about two-thirds of the people removed from the west coast are American citizens. Such a proposition as this, the majority report continues, is in direct violation of the law and the constitution. Therefore, the majority’s report is clearly a gross misstatement of the facts. Indeed, the report of the majority makes a big point about 23 persons who were released from the camps and who are found to be members of Butoku-kai, a Japanese fencing organization. This is 23 people out of 16,000 released. Even in the case of these 23 neither the majority report nor the hearings offer any evidence that any of the 23 were subversive.

I, for one, want to emphasize that just because a person is a member of an organization alleged to be subversive, I do not ipso facto conclude that the particular person is subversive. Certainly, mere proof of membership in an organization alleged to be subversive cannot be used as evidence of subversive tendencies. If the individual is dangerous, he should be treated as a dangerous person. The fact that he was a member of a subversive organization is, in my judgment, not proof of subversive tendencies.

The majority’s report is based largely on the unsupported and irresponsible charges that were made early in our investigation. Stories about the Japanese people hiding food in the desert and refusing to work were shown to be ridiculous when a project was visited. However, the majority’s report fails to withdraw these charges.

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The report of the majority makes a big point about 23 persons who were released from the camps and who are found to be members of Butoku-kai, a Japanese fencing organization. This is 23 people out of 16,000 released. Even in the case of these 23 neither the majority report nor the hearings offer any evidence that any of the 23 were subversive.

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included some persons who were especially chosen because of their acquaintance with Japanese culture and language and who were placed in the Western States who in the past had a great deal of contact with persons of Japanese ancestry living in this country.

The fact that apart from these two groups most of the War Relocation Authority staff had no previous close contact with Japanese or Japanese-Americans seems not particularly significant since the lack of previous contact with the Japanese-American population itself is almost a national characteristic of the United States. Furthermore, the War Relocation Authority would be subject to severe criticism were it dominated by people who have previously been intimate with the Japanese or Japanese-Americans and therefore subject to the accusation of being unduly sympathetic toward them.

Americanization.

Anyone genuinely interested in the problem of continuing the Americanization of the Japanese-American population of this country must acknowledge that the greatest force for Americanization is the tendency of young persons born and reared in Japan to maintain a certain cultural identity. This tendency is especially strong among persons who have lived in Japan for many years and who have not been exposed to American culture. To say, as the majority's report does, that the War Relocation Authority had before it an almost unparalleled opportunity to inaugurate a vigorous educational program for positive Americanism—

is an almost complete inversion of the true situation. Americanization is best accomplished not by formal programs of the most popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by informal programs of the least popular form, but by inform
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No specific comment is made concerning this complaint in the majority's report. Actually, the evidence produced before the subcommittee indicated that there was much less crime of any kind in the relocation centers than in the average American community of the same size. The evidence indicates that ordinary crime at the centers has been negligible.

In the majority's report considerable space is given to certain activities attributed to the Blood Brothers Corps at Manzanar. Two statements are necessary in reference to this matter. First, the evidence before the subcommittee indicated that the Blood Brothers Corps was no longer active at Manzanar and that the evidence being referred to in the majority's report related to events which occurred before the evacuation. Second, with regard to the statement that the sources of trouble at Manzanar were the same as those at other relocation centers, the evidence before the subcommittee indicated that the problems in Manzanar were not the same as those in other relocation centers but the evidence also indicates that the sources of trouble there have now been eliminated.

Segregation.

In the majority's report the War Relocation Authority is severely criticized for not having entered upon a program of segregating disloyal evacuees from the great majority who are loyal to the government. However, the evidence before the subcommittee indicates that a program for such segregation was being worked out. Senator Chandler gave this letter to the press shortly afterward.

Had it been physically possible to make a fair determination immediately at the outset of the establishment of the relocation centers as to the loyalty or disloyalty of each evacuee, many of the difficulties of the War Relocation Authority would have been eliminated. Nevertheless, I believe that the War Relocation Authority could and should have speeded up the plan for segregation more than it did. I feel that the actual movement of segregants should have been initiated more quickly. It is true that intelligent determinations on the loyalty of more than 100,000 people cannot be made in a week or a month. Nevertheless, I feel that the War Relocation Authority should have taken steps to ensure that the plan for segregation was carried out as quickly as possible. A certain amount of criticism on this point is therefore justified.

The legal aspects of the relocation program.

The constitutional difficulty of confining citizens not charged with any crime is not discussed in the majority's report. Legality is such an important consideration that the War Relocation Authority was severely criticized for not having entered upon a program of segregating disloyal evacuees from the great majority who are loyal to the government. The principal justification for detaining citizen evacuees in relocation centers is that such detention is merely a temporary and qualified detention. They are detained until they can be sifted with regard to their sympathies in the war and until jobs can be found for them in communities when they will be accepted.

Such action may be sustained as an incident to an orderly relocation program, but any unqualified detention for the duration of the war of loyal citizens would be so vulnerable to attack in the courts as to be almost negligible. In Hirabayashi v. United States, decided on June 21, 1943, the United States Supreme Court heard an appeal by a citizen of Japanese descent who had been sentenced concurrently on two criminal charges. The Court, in this case, did not discuss the constitutional issues involved but approved the procedure of the War Relocation Authority. The Court stated that the detention accompanying the evacuation is a more drastic restriction of liberty than the mere evacuation itself, and that any unqualified detention for the duration of the war of loyal citizens would be so vulnerable to attack in the courts as to be almost negligible. In the majority's report, the War Relocation Authority is criticized for not having entered upon a program of segregating disloyal evacuees from the great majority who are loyal to the government. However, the evidence before the subcommittee indicates that a program for such segregation was being worked out. Senator Chandler gave this letter to the press shortly afterward.

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One was released for school work under an agreement with
instructed not to grant leave to the individual in question,
5 of them, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had no records what-
records which disclosed no report or derogatory information. As to
a derogatory report is received from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion has almost completed its check on all the evacuees, As soon as
Myer gave specific information concerning the circumstances under
In a letter dated July 16, 1943, to this subcommittee, Director
Investigation name check has not been eliminated, but rather that
for the thousands of loyal Japanese as well.
name check. The evidence indicates that the Federal Bureau of
release program by eliminating the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
' the release of these 23 Japanese is evidence of the incompetence of the War Re-
that on April 2, the War Relocation Authority further liberalized its
exclusion, it relies chiefly upon two arguments:. (1) 23 evacuees who have
been given leave from the centers may be dangerous because they had
Were original the Army registration.
proposes to relocate will accept him without difficulty.
Federal Register. They provide that any evacuee citizen or alien
Authority must satisfy itself that the community in which the evacuee
categories of people:
1. Evacuees who answered no or
2. Repatriates and expatriates.
3. Paroled aliens.
4. Shinto priests.
5. Those whose leave clearance has been suspended by the Director.
the problems of releasing evacuees from relocation centers. The
Second major argument advanced in the majority's report in
loyalty question during the Army registration.
Loyalty question is an essential requirement for the
the majority's report mentions a home
In the second place, in discussing checks made on loyalty of evacuees
check-up made at
Butoku-kai; (2) the present procedures of the Authority do not
apply for indefinite leave, the majority's report mentions a home
hold the right of the project director to grant leave to the following
hold the right of the project director to grant leave to:
An essential question raised by the report is whether or not the War
authority and have a record indicating that he will not
be subjected to successful legal attack. That this protection against
the disloyal from the loyal is to relocate the loyal in normal life.
was the same thing sub-
It seems unfair to the loyal, in the meantime, to
to remove
It is stated that while originally the Authority made what is called
by the Director in Washington, since April 1943 project directors have
allow them to be confused in the public mind with the disloyal, there-
from those loyal to the United States. This is the same thing sub-
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The schools are active in this work, and many of the younger people are members of Future Farmers of America. In relocation centers, there have been no established cases of sabotage while there are thousands of cases of loyal workers in industry, agriculture, and in the armed forces of the United States.

The majority's report intimates that the War Relocation Authority, with proper weight given to the importance of preserving democratic and constitutional principles in the treatment of the Japanese-American population, has set up a plan to place hundreds of Nisei into civil service employment of the Federal Government and it describes, in the spirit of Americanization, the War Relocation Administration as a genuine Americanization program rather than an experiment.

When proper weight is given to the importance of preserving democratic and constitutional principles in the treatment of the Japanese-American population, it is evident that the relocation centers and the outside relocation program are being administered efficiently and well.

Conduct of evacuees who have been granted leave by the War Relocation Authority that justifies the setting up of a board to take over this function. Moreover, it seems pretty clear to me that such a board would be helpful, and that it would probably receive the military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

On July 2, 1943, the Japanese-American Joint Board concurred in the granting of indefinite leave to Miss Nakasuji. A check of the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was made on December 12, 1942, which contained no information on the applicant. Reports were secured by the project internal security officer and by the Director of Naval Intelligence, or the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department. No recommendation for the establishment of such a board as is recommended by the subcommittee majority was made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, or the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

This project report, and this letter of endorsement, this applicant was granted leave to secure civil service rating for a Nisei. In response to my inquiry, the following letter was received:

"I have known Mary and members of her family for several years. I sincerely believe her to be a very good American citizen. We know she is of Christian faith and has demonstrated to the utmost her democratic views regarding American ideals and our American standard of living. I highly recommend her as to character."

A letter received from a Mr. George M. Osborne, 4693 Alice Street, San Diego, Calif., dated December 31, 1942, states:

"I have known Mary Nakasuji for several years. I know her to be an American citizen and I am very pleased to endorse her for any position in civil service."

After considering the results of the name check, results of the check of the Federal Bureau of Investigation record, project report, and this letter of endorsement, this applicant was granted leave to secure civil service rating for a Nisei. In response to my inquiry, the following letter was received:

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American and other agencies. Adult English classes are provided for hundreds of aliens.

Certainly, we would need an extraordinarily intensive Americanization program for loyal American citizens who are detained in seeming contradiction of American principles and the "four freedoms.

Certainly, also, the best way to push Americanization of this group is for the War Relocation Authority to go ahead with its program of restoring full freedom of movement to the loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry and the law-abiding aliens who are now in relocation centers.

I believe the War Relocation Authority should complete its segregation program, should continue its Americanization program, and should, by all means, go ahead with its resettlement program.

I think that, considering the magnitude of its job, the difficulty of the legal issues involved, and the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling a large group of people in the midst of a war, the War Relocation Authority has carried out the spirit and intent of the President's Executive order under which it was established.

Respectfully submitted.

HERMAN P. EBERHART.

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