

THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

AS RELATED TO

THE BAY OF PIGS, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, AND THE VIETNAM WAR

In the last several years, an increasingly number of private investigators of the assassination of President Kennedy have advanced the thesis, based on a considerable amount of evidence, that the origin of the conspiracy behind that assassination can be traced, at least partly, to the U.S.-Cuban relationship, but more specifically to the failure of the CIA sponsored operation known as the Bay of Pigs.

The impact the Bay of Pigs operation had on President Kennedy and the steps he and his brother had taken to prevent its repetition has been recently reported by several observers. According to Messrs. Tayler Branch and George Crile III in an article in Harper's of August, 1975 ("The Kennedy Vendetta"), after the Bay of Pigs fiasco President Kennedy ". . . was known to be seething with anger at his advisers and especially at the CIA, which he told his aids he would like to 'splinter . . . into a thousand pieces and scatter to the winds.' He demonstrated his displeasure by establishing a commission, which included his brother, Robert, to investigate the Agency's performance. Not long afterward, CIA Director Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, architect of the plan for the Bay of Pigs, resigned. The President was said to have 'throttled' the CIA."

To the knowledge of this writer, the most authoritative account of the impact the Bay of Pigs operation had on President Kennedy and the means he and his brother had adopted to prevent its

repetition, along with the opposition they encountered in their efforts to reform the CIA, was provided by Colonel (Retired) L. Fletcher Preuty in his book, "The Secret Team" (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1973). The Colonel, who served as a liaison officer between the Pentagon and the CIA, points out that despite the attempts of the CIA, but particularly of its Director, Allen Dulles, to disrupt the investigation of the Bay of Pigs episode, the evidence shows that "Bobby Kennedy was not misled in his appraisal of the real problem underlying the serious and tragic failure of the Bay of Pigs operation. He came very close to seeing how terrible significant the real meaning of clandestine operations can have upon national prestige and credibility." Colonel Preuty also quotes Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, who upon recalling a discussion he and Kennedy had about the Bay of Pigs said: "This episode seared him. He had experienced the extreme power that these groups had, these various insidious influences of the CIA and the Pentagon on civilian policy, and I think it raised in his own mind the spectre: Can Jack Kennedy, President of the United States, ever be strong enough to really rule these two powerful agencies? I think it had a profound effect. . . it shook him up." After a lengthy and comprehensive discussion of the steps President Kennedy had taken to limit the power of the CIA, steps that "sealed the fate of Dick Bissel and Allen Dulles," Colonel Preuty concludes that "Kennedy knew that he had been badly burned by the Bay of Pigs incident, and by June 1961 he

and his brother knew that he had been let down by the ST (Secret Team)." According to Taylor Branch and George Crile III, ". . . the Bay of Pigs became a virtual synonym for international humiliation, as well as the most egregious display of official American lying yet entered into the public record."

In view of the above, one can only imagine President Kennedy's reaction about two years later (early 1963) upon being informed that the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, during which the CIA was clamoring for an invasion of Cuba, was intended to develop into another Bay of Pigs fiasco, this time on a much larger scale involving the U.S. armed forces. This information he may or may not have received either from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), or from one of the four Senators to whom I had sent copies of my analysis of the Cuban missile crisis in March 1963, while serving as an intelligence analyst in the United States army. (See Enclosure No. 1). My analysis, showing how the Soviet Union attempted to evoke a U.S. military response against the island of Cuba, was prepared by me shortly after my return from a temporary duty assignment with the G-2 (Intelligence) Section of the U.S. armed forces that had assembled in the southern United States during the crisis. (See Enclosure No. 2).

Briefly, my analysis showed that the Soviet operation in Cuba in the fall of 1962 was intended to produce a reckless American response in the form of an all-out military assault on Cuba. Such action was to be followed by: 1) an American defeat in a conventional land battle against the combined conventional military forces of the Soviet Union and Cuba; 2) the use of American tactical nuclear

weapons on Cuban soil; 3) a Soviet-American accommodation after the total or near-total destruction of Cuba and seemingly at the brink of nuclear disaster, and after a U.N. on-site verification of the absence of offensive missiles on the island of Cuba.

Later I learned that at the height of the crisis the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended an air strike to be followed by an invasion, pointing out that a blockade would be far too weak a measure and that direct military action was the only action the Russians would understand. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this time was General Maxwell D. Taylor, whose aspirations, according to Colonel Preuty, closely matched those of Allen Dulles. About a month after I had forwarded my analysis of the missile crisis to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the four Senators, the second part of my work dealing with the Chinese-Indian border war, while being typed in final form, was reported stolen. The soldier, whom I had hired to type the manuscript in his off-duty time, reported to me that on the night of April 10th-11th, someone had broken into his locker and had stolen the unfinished manuscript. The following day, April 11th, I telephoned the office of Senator John Stennis to inform him that the second part of my work dealing with the Chinese-Indian border war would not be sent to him, as I had promised in my letter of March 3rd (See Enclosure No. 1), because of the theft. I also complained to the Senator's assistant, who answered the telephone, that I objected most strenuously to the surveillance, particularly to the electronic eavesdropping, to which my wife and I were being

subjected. I received no response from the Senator.

As you will see upon reading my book, the Chinese-Indian border war formed an integral part of the Cuban missile crisis; and that, in the eyes of most of the world, the belligerent party in this conflict was India, not China, as the U. S. government was made to believe. A week after the theft of my manuscript dealing with this aspect of the operation, on April 19th, a UPI dispatch to the New York Times of that date reported the following:

TAYLOR INDICATES INDIANS
STARTED CLASH WITH CHINESE

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated in secret Congressional testimony made public today that India might have started the border fight with Communist China. The previously accepted version of the border fighting that flared last fall was that Communist China had attacked Indian troops. . . .

Asked by one Congressman, "Did the Indians actually start this military operation?"

"They were edging toward in the disputed area," replied General Taylor. "Yes, sir."

At this point the testimony was censored out of the public transcript.

Shortly thereafter, I received military orders assigning me to the island of Okinawa, arriving there in late August. Three months later, the President was killed. For the next three years, while on the island, I was subjected to constant surveillance, intimidations, delegations, and dirty tricks. Later I learned that two of the other Senators to whom I had sent my analysis of the Cuban missile crisis were, at the time of that crisis, unwittingly supporting the Soviet objective by calling for an invasion of the island. The two were Senators Richard B. Russell, who later served on the Warren Commission, and C. William Fulbright,

the then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The above analysis of the Cuban missile crisis and the Chinese-Indian border war was published in book form (copy enclosed) in October 1966, a year after my retirement from the military service, and some months before Robert Kennedy's book, "Thirteen Days," was published. My book was suppressed; and I was subjected to more surveillance, intimidations, and dirty tricks, including the possible use of behavior-modifying drugs. (See Enclosure No. 3)

As you will discern upon reading my book, the CIA was either wittingly or unwittingly (but presumably both) supporting the Soviet objective. It was Robert Kennedy who failed that objective by insisting on a moderate course of action. Such a course was adopted by the President and his brother, not because they had been made aware of the presence in Cuba of large and well equipped Soviet armed units, the presence of which the CIA failed to detect during the crisis, but because of philosophical and political considerations concerning the purpose and objectives of the United States of America as the world's leading democracy. (See "Thirteen Days," by Robert Kennedy.).

Could the Soviet Union afford to have it become known that it attempted to induce its major rival, the "arch-enemy" of revolutionary movements, to attack and destroy one of these movements? Certainly not as long as the Soviet Union wished to maintain its image (as it saw it) as the protector and supporter of revolutionary movements throughout the world. It is not difficult to imagine the devastating effect such a disclosure would have had not only on the Soviet Union in its relationship with the world's revolutionary

movements, but with respect to the Soviet Union's position among the civilized nations of the world. It is doubtful whether the Soviet Union could recover from such a blow to its international prestige.

But how about the CIA? Could the CIA afford to have it become known that it was pursuing the Soviet objective? Would such men as Howard Hunt, Frank Sturgis, and many others, have knowingly participated in any operation designed to benefit the Soviet Union? It has been reported that Howard Hunt harbored great animosity toward President Kennedy because of Kennedy's failure to provide air cover for the Bay of Pigs operation. Messrs. Michael Canfield and Alan J. Weberman in the book, *Coup d'etat In America*, point out that "Hunt laid the blame for the Bay of Pigs fiasco almost entirely on Kennedy, and there is reason to believe that he suspected the President of being part of the 'international Communist Conspiracy.'" What Hunt and many others like him did not realize was that the Bay of Pigs operation was intended to fail before its implementation. Neither a mass invasion nor an internal (Cuban) uprising was ever intended to take place. The Bay of Pigs operation and the Cuban missile crisis were KGB operations designed to weaken and destroy the international position of the United States. Howard Hunt's war plans, both large and small, were known to the enemy before they were known to Hunt in the same general way General MacArthur's war plans (as received by him from Washington) were made known to the enemy before they were made known to the General. (See *"The Korean War"* by Matthew B. Ridgway, New York: Popular Library, 1967, and *"The Actor,"* by Alan Stang, Boston: Western Islands, 1968).

Would the CIA attempt to cover up the truth about the Cuban missile crisis and other similar operations in which it participated as an adjunct to the Soviet KGB? The answer to this question I believe was provided by Messrs. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks in their book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." The authors point out that the widely circulated books, "The Penkovsky Papers" and Khrushchev Remembers" are considered by "a number of highly regarded American and British scholars and intelligence officers dealing with Soviet affairs" as fraudulent documents, having been introduced either by the KGB or the CIA, or both. The authors point out that the complete story of the Khrushchev memoirs of which "Khrushchev Remembers" is only a part dealing with the Cuban missile crisis and other events, "may never be publicly known," but that "if it is, it may turn out to be another example of secret U.S.-Soviet cooperation of two hostile powers giving wide circulation to information that each wants to see published, while cooperating to keep their operations away from the eyes of the general public on both sides."

The above books are only a small part of the massive Soviet disinformation campaign directed against the West. Simulantur quae non sunt, quae sunt vere dissimulantur - To simulate that which is not, to dissimulate that which exists." The real purpose of the introduction of these false documents can be readily discerned upon reading my book. Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, instead of being the celebrated KGB defector who, according to the CIA, contributed immeasurably to the Western cause, particularly during the Cuban missile crisis, emerges as a Soviet double agent whose mission

was to mislead the CIA and cause irreparable damage to the international position of the United States.

The Soviet or KGB motive for eliminating President Kennedy from the international scene is not confined to the Cuban crisis, but is inextricably related to the subsequent resumption of hostilities in Vietnam, first under the direction of Communist China (culminating in the Tonkin Bay incidents, August-September 1964) and later (after Communist China's withdrawal from the international scene, 1965-68) under the direction of the Soviet Union.

As my research shows, the United States was lured into Vietnam, as well as in Korea, the Middle East, and other unfavorable (for the United States) areas after World War II, as part of a well planned and adroitly executed Communist strategy of exhaustion or attrition. This strategy is known as "strategic defense" or "luring the enemy deep" and was used successfully by the ancient Parthians against the Romans, by the Red (Bolshevik) army against the White (Tsarist) Army, and contrary to modern historians of the "disconnected and unrelated facts" variety, against Germany and the West between the two World Wars.

A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS STRATEGY AND HOW IT IS BEING USED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST.

Very briefly, Sino-Soviet strategy during the period following the Cuban missile crisis called for an intensification of the conflict in Southeast Asia. (A detailed analysis of this period is included in the above mentioned discussion of Sino-Soviet strategy). However, from all available evidence, President Kennedy was planning to disengage the United States from that area. As

early as the spring of 1963, the President reportedly told one of his aids, Mr. Kenneth O'Donnell, of his determination to withdraw U.S. military forces from Vietnam, stating that "In 1965 I'll be damned everywhere as a Communist appeaser, but I don't care." In October of that year, slightly over a month before President Kennedy's death, a White House spokesman announced the planned withdrawal of 1000 to 1300 military personnel from South Vietnam, reducing the U.S. troop strength there to approximately 14,500 men. In other words, the President appeared to be in the process of denying the enemy ~~of~~ the area of the planned military engagement.

The U.S. plans to expand the war in Southeast Asia began immediately after President Kennedy's death.

FOR A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THESE PLANS SEE, "THE SECRET TEAM." BY L. FLETCHER PROUTY, AND "THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION AND THE VIETNAM WAR," BY PETER DALE, ³⁰⁷AS REPORTED IN "THE ASSASSINATIONS", EDITED BY PETER DALE SCOTT, PAUL L. HOCH AND RUSSELL STETLER (A GUIDE TO COVER-UPS AND INVESTIGATIONS), VINTAGE BOOKS, 1976.

The reversal in U.S. policy with respect to Southeast Asia from one of phased disengagement to one of expanded military commitment was in complete harmony with the plans being laid at that time by the Soviet Union and Communist China. The Jenkin Bay incident, which provided the Johnson administration with Congressional authority to pursue the ground and air war in Vietnam, was unmistakably planned by the Communist powers simultaneously with the resumption of Communist China's peace offensive in the latter part of 1964, following President Kennedy's assassination.

Colonel L. Fletcher Preuty in his book, "The Secret Team," points out that the report which provided the groundwork for expanding the war in Southeast Asia, prepared by the CIA and other related operations (secret) areas, was submitted to President Johnson on December 21, 1963. On the same day, the following article, written by former President Harry Truman, appeared in the Washington Post:

For some time I have been disturbed by the way CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the government. . . . This quite intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role that it is being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue. . . . There is something about the way the CIA has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historical position.

It is my firm belief, based on my experience in the military intelligence service and my own private research, that the CIA is indeed "a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue." The United States government is being manipulated by the CIA and other secret related individuals and groups in the same general way the government of the Third Reich was manipulated by the Gestapo and the SS. The CIA is, without the slightest doubt, controlled at certain levels by the Soviet KGB in the same general way the Gestapo and the SS were controlled at the very top by the Soviet NKVD. (See "The Berzans Brotherhood," by William Stevenson, A Bantam Book, 1974).

I am prepared to show that the domestically based conspiracy behind the assassination of President Kennedy was only a part of a much wider, deeper, and more sinister foreign based conspiracy; that the motive of the foreign based conspiracy was by far greater than any motive that could conceivably be attributed to the domestically based conspiracy; that the goals and aspirations of the foreign based conspiracy were, and still are, far greater than those attributed to the American based conspiracy; that President Kennedy was an obstacle to both conspiracies, but by far a more serious obstacle to the foreign based conspiracy; and finally, that the domestically based conspiracy was an unwitting organ of the foreign based conspiracy.

The assassination of President Kennedy, as well as other political assassinations of that period, formed an integral part of Communist strategy aiming at the destruction of Western civilization. These assassinations formed an integral part of the following inextricably related events:

The Bay of Pigs episode, as related to the overall Sino-Soviet simulated offensive of 1960-64.

The Cuban missile crisis and the Chinese-Indian border war.

Communist China's peace offensive directed against U.S allies and neutral nations, 1961-64.

French recognition of Communist China

The advance of West European trade and aid to Communist China (including nuclear aid) in the mistaken belief (induced partly by the CIA and CIA-controlled academic establishments) that the Soviet Union and Communist China were mortal enemies.

The nature and objective of the Tonkin Bay incident and the war in Vietnam.

Sino-Soviet strategy as related to the sudden demise of Elvire Tegliatti and Maurice Thorez, leaders of the Italian and French Communist Parties, respectively, 1964.

The real nature and purpose of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

(Approximately 150,000 words)

THE ABOVE, ALONG WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE MODUS OPERANTI USED
IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE
TO A RELIABLE PUBLISHER.

4. Enclosures:

1. Letter to Senator Richard B. Russell, March 3, 1963
2. Letter of Appreciation, December 6, 1962
3. Letter to Congressman Otis Pike, October 13, 1975
4. Book, "The Cuban Crisis and the Chinese-Indian border war."

Sp7 Andrew Dapondes
1826-C Annapolis Road
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
3 March 1963

Honorable Richard B. Russell
Chairman, Armed Forces Services Committee
United States Senate
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The enclosed study, an individual analysis of the Cuban crisis, was originally planned as part of a chapter of a book, tentatively entitled "The Slaying of the Minotaur," to be submitted for publication after my retirement from the army in 1966.

In view of the present international situation, particularly as it pertains to Cuba and our European allies, I feel compelled to forward this part of the unfinished work to you at this time. I believe that this study will be of value to your committee in particular and to the government and people of the United States in general.

The remainder of the chapter, which pertains to the Sino-Indian border war and Sino penetration of Latin America - events which I consider an integral part of the Sino-Soviet offensive in Cuba and India - will be made available to you upon completion in the near future.

Chapters I and II, reference to which is made in the enclosed study, are presently in a state of rough draft and will be completed as time allows.

For aid in preparation of the enclosed study, as well as the remainder of the unfinished work, I am indebted to my wife Vera, who laboriously and diligently correlated, for my use, newspaper and magazine articles for a period of one year, devoting many hours daily to that task.

This study, which is based exclusively on information obtained from news media, was prepared on my own time, and is in no way connected with my military assignment. I am presently assigned to the 325th Military Intelligence Group, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

Enc. #2

You can refer to the following persons as to my reliability:

Major General Daniel A. O'Connor
Chief of Staff
Caribbean Command
Quarry Heights
Canal Zone

Colonel P. W. Thompson (USA, Ret.)
H. A. 535, N.E. 9th Avenue
Gainesville, Florida

Lieutenant Colonel Corby Gray III (USA Reserve)
6737 Mango Avenue, South
St. Petersburg, Florida

Sincerely yours,

Sp7 Andrew Dapondes

Encl. 1

Copies sent to:

Senator James O. Eastland
Senator J. William Fulbright
Senator John Stennis
Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll

HEADQUARTERS
ARLANT FORWARD
Homestead AFB, Florida

ARINT

6 December 1962

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

THRU: Commanding Officer
525 MI Group
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

TO: SP7 Andrew Dapondes, RA 46082263
525 MI Group
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

1. I wish to take this means to express to you my official, as well as personal appreciation for your outstanding performance of duty as an Intelligence Specialist, with the G-2 Section, Headquarters, ARLANT FORWARD, during the period 27 October to 20 November 1962.

2. Your professional competence, coupled with your evident desire to successfully accomplish your mission, permitted the hastily-organized G-2 Section to become operational with minimum delay and with maximum effectiveness.

3. It was a distinct pleasure to have you as a member of this section. I feel certain that you will display the same enthusiasm and aggressiveness in all of your assignments that you manifested during this operation. May I wish you continued good fortune in your military endeavors and sincerely hope I have the pleasure of serving with you in the future.

Copy furnished:
201 File

James F. Hughes, Jr.
JAMES F. HUGHES, JR.
Colonel GS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ENC. #1

1323 Ridge Road
Raleigh, North Carolina 27607

October 13, 1975

Honorable Otis Pike
Chairman, House Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As a former member of the military intelligence service, I feel compelled to send you the following rather brief description of what happened to me and my family as a result of my deviation from and disagreement with CIA or CIA sponsored evaluations and analyses regarding the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union and other nations.

- a. Around-the-clock surveillance of myself and my family, including electronic eavesdropping, telephone tapping, and surreptitious entry into my home.
- b. Tampering with my personal mail, including the opening and reading and possible withholding of same.
- c. Conducting a psychological operation (dirty trick-type) against my family, including the possible use of behavior-modifying drugs.
- d. Causing my findings in the form of a book on the Cuban missile crisis and the Chinese-Indian border war, either directly through the publisher or indirectly through the manipulation of the mails, or both, to receive a very limited, if any, dissemination, particularly during the latter part of 1968 and the early part of 1969.
- e. Applying pressure on private citizens with whom I came in contact for the purpose of forcing them to refrain from assisting me in my effort to bring my findings to the attention of the public.
- f. Breaking and entering surreptitiously into my place of residence for the apparent purpose of gaining access to my private research papers (findings) regarding the policies and objectives pursued by the Soviet Union and Communist China.

In view of the recent disclosures regarding the CIA, but particularly as a result of those made by Messrs. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks in their book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence", I strongly feel that the CIA was either directly or indirectly involved in my ordeal.

Enc # 3

I respectfully request that your committee look into this matter and inform me accordingly.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Andrew Dapondes". The signature is fluid and elegant, with a large, sweeping initial 'A'.

Andrew Dapondes
Intelligence analyst
U.S. Army (Retired)