

In one of the parts of COUP that had to be cut out of F-U, I refer to his book, "The Real Cia", saying at long last we knew the real purposes of the CIA, to reorganize itself. And how fortunate it was that each succeeding director was more brilliant than those who preceded him in effective more magnificent reorganization. There is nothing else "the Real CIA" ever did, according to K.

I found myself wondering in reading it is he were rational, and before the end I had the same question about his editor and publisher. Unless they considered anything pro-CIA save and anything on it would sell enough to pay its cost. Or were subsidized. The USIA alone could make it break even.

The whole speech at The Newport R.I. Naval War College was rubbish, as reported by Jeremiah O'Leary via the Times service, 8-I-12/13/72 O'L. is a Star staffer and the story carries a Washington dateline, not Newport.

Because of the late hour, I'll quote and make few comments (for me, anyway!)

"...Lisner to have trained the invasion force inside the United States to preserve the security of the anti-Castro operation." Absolute nonsense. Made no difference where if the recruits were Cubans. All their families would have known, none could keep secrets, and Castro had all the anti-Castro groups well penetrated. I think he used them regularly to plant what he wanted believed in the US government. The problem had nothing to do with the fact of the operation being known in advance. The CIA was worst of all in this. K conveniently forgets those B25s that landed in Florida with an untenable cover story, well pointed, and that seems to have been an indispensable part of the CIA plan. Hunt et al.

K: "If the President (sic) make the policy to get rid of Castro... Of course, I am being critical of the President (Kennedy)..." Parens, caps in original. Now if there is one thing that crooked bastard knows it is that this was NOT Kennedy's decision; that it was well within the Eisenhower administration, and nobody ever told JFK the same thing.

"Should be at a much lower level of government than the president's office" O'Leary's words. The only time it got there is when the CIA took it upon itself to get the US armed forces openly involved without ever taking it up with the President, and what the hell was he to do, let the CIA be President?

Blame belongs on the CIA, not the military, where he says JFK placed it. I think JFK took the blame rather dramatically and personally. However, the military was given a choice of two plans and did not disapprove either. I think they gave sort of approval to both, and both were insane. Blame for more than the failure belongs on the CIA. Blame for designing a failure belongs to both the CIA and the military. They both wanted to use that failure to get us involved in an invasion to throw Castro out. There is where JFK bridled. The astounding thing is that K spells this out and nobody caught it. "...the President never really understood that this proposal entailed a military operation in the true sense of the word. No assault force, even if a good one, of a mere 1,500 fits this description. And there never was any concept that they'd all be infiltrators. What the hell did they set up the CRC for? The WH knew all about that. It was to be the government inside, then de facto. Not by infiltration!

Recruiting was under goldfishbowl conditions in Miami and Central America. Any other possible way. That "not even Helms was involved" is beyond belief, unless Hunt was really chief of operations instead of Helms.

If only two documents in opposition were written, the CIA succeeded. Its purpose was to keep it secret from the US and the government. If more had known, there would have been more opposition for failure was built-in.

How 1500 men could be recruited from the loudest and longest and freest talking people in the hemisphere only a K can understand, so there is childishness in his saying it should have been done on a US base for security. With defections to be suppressed, US soldiers to know, all those around the camp to see or the brigade to be prisoners? Rubbish, lowgrade

In today's world such things remain vital! And not nor to do stupid things or reprehensible or anti-democratic ones is not "the most vital lesson". That is "the failure to secure accurate intelligence." Pretty good for the world's top (ask it!) intelligence agency! Thus alone they failed. Not bio-degradable!

How CIA survived him or how he survived his own career provoke wonder. Almost as much as the quality of reporting.

New Orleans
States - Item

'Should Have Trained Here'

DEC 13 1972

Former CIA Chief Views Bay of Pigs

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
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WASHINGTON — The man who was inspector general of the CIA during the Bay of Pigs fiasco now believes it would have been wiser to have trained the invasion force at a military base inside the United States to preserve the security of the anti-Castro operation.

Prof. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., now on the faculty of Brown University, disclosed this view in a lecture delivered at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. The speech has been published in the current college review.

Kirkpatrick also said: "If the President makes the policy to get rid of Castro, that is about the last he should hear of it. If something goes wrong

he can fire and disavow, which is what a president should do, not acknowledge and accept blame. Of course, I am being critical of the President (Kennedy) but I think this is essential."

The former CIA official said control of "covert" operations such as the Bay of Pigs exercise in 1961 should be at a much lower level of government than the president's office. Having covert operations run out of the White House or even out of the office of the secretaries of state or defense "makes absolutely no sense whatever in any society."

Although he said he was speaking only his personal views, Kirkpatrick laid the blame for failure of the Cuban exile invasion belongs to the CIA, not on the military

where President Kennedy tried to place it.

"It can be concluded," said Kirkpatrick, "that the President never really fully understood that this proposal entailed a military operation in the true sense of the word. Instead of an assault landing consisting of some 1,500 men, Kennedy seemed to think this was going to be some sort of mass infiltration that would perhaps, through some mystique, become quickly invisible."

Kirkpatrick said the recruiting and training of the exile force was done under goldfish bowl conditions in Miami and Central America while the bulk of the CIA, Pentagon and State Department was excluded from it. He said that even Richard Helms, who was chief of the CIA operations, was not involved.

To his knowledge, Kirkpatrick said, only two documents were written in the federal government opposing the operation: one by then-Under-Secretary of State Chester Bowles, who had inadvertently heard of the invasion and the other by Roger Hillsman, then assistant secretary for research and intelligence, who asked to be briefed on it and was turned down.

Yet the raising of the invasion brigade and its training were well-known in Miami, Central America and to Fidel Castro's intelligence. News stories had appeared beforehand that told almost every-

thing but the date of the landing.

Kirkpatrick said it would have been more feasible to use a U.S. base instead of those in Guatemala and Nicaragua for the invasion of Cuba because the United States could have isolated the brigade and trained the pilots without disclosure.

"The Bay of Pigs experience," he said, "does not mean that we should forget covert operations as a tool for implementing national policy. In fact, that's the last thing it means. The capability to mount a covert operation is an exceedingly important capability for our government to have."

Reflecting on the Bay of Pigs operation, Kirkpatrick said the most vital lesson learned was from the failure to secure accurate intelligence. He said inaccurate intelligence was the basis for the disaster adding, "there is no other place to put the blame for that than on the agency mounting the operation."

Excerpted from THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT, by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross; Random House 1964, Bantam 1965

Chapter 1 - The Invisible Government

p. 2 "The National Security Act of 1947," in the words of Allen W. Dulles, ". . . has given Intelligence a more influential position in our government than Intelligence enjoys in any other government in the world."

..... It has been accused by some knowledgeable congressmen and other influential citizens, including a former President, Harry S. Truman, of conducting a foreign policy of its own, and of meddling deeply in the affairs of other countries without presidential authority.

p. 3 The agents maintain communications and codes of their own. And the ambassador's authority has been judged by a committee of the United States Senate to be a "polite fiction".

At home, the intelligence men are directed by law to leave matters to the FBI. But the CIA maintains more than a score of offices in major cities throughout the United States, it is deeply involved in many domestic activities, from broadcasting stations and a steamship company to the university campus.

Eisenhower policy -
(Duke's Moscow
retaliation / US
only apocalyptic
Soviet's posturing)

: Michael
Harrington, NY.
"1960s" Harrington
proud Kennedy's
policy "flexible"
and and
improvement was it

**Give A Man A Fish And
He Will Eat For A Day.**

**Teach A Man To Fish And
He Will Eat The Rest Of
His Days.**

Donnelly knew there was no
"military" support for the
Bay of Pigs invasion, despite
all the carefully nurtured guff

S 629

And that "military free"
(which he also did not have) was
not enough!

D & G The Originator of S. P. F. Commercial Diets

Post
11/16/75

Was the Cuban Missile Crisis Necessary?

It is, I hope, forgivable that on the first day of my retirement, I feel compelled to write a "Letter to the Editor," something I could not have done while I was a working newsman. But Prof. Bernstein's melodramatic article, "Was the Cuban missile crisis necessary?" so prominently displayed on the front page of Outlook on Oct. 26 brought me back to the typewriter, last but not least because I was one of the "skillfully managed, often trusting, usually uncritical press" Mr. Bernstein writes about with benign condescension.

No time should be wasted on what your author thinks about us. But some of the questions Mr. Bernstein raised should not be left unanswered:

— There could be a never-ending argument on whether Soviet missiles in Cuba have altered the military balance. The single fact, acknowledged by Bernstein, that the radar warning system was outflanked, was decisive in persuading newsmen that the balance indeed has changed. It was easy for McNamara to say — if he said it — that "a missile is a missile" whether fired from Cuba or the Soviet Union, but I doubt that people living in Florida were indifferent in this respect. After all if the Soviets were nervous about the Jupiters in Turkey — children's toys compared with what the Russians have installed in Cuba — then the Floridians, too, were justified to be excited.

— That Kennedy rejected a summit, is new to me. Khrushchev certainly did not propose such a get together and while it might have come up during the endless discussions in the NSC, no firm proposal was made by anyone. "Private negotiations?" What good would have come out of them? Khrushchev demolished Kennedy when they met in Vienna, the full story was told by James Reston who talked to Kennedy when he returned to the US embassy, com-

pletely crushed by Khrushchev. It is less known that a few days after Vienna Khrushchev assured Walter Ulbricht in East Berlin that "we have nothing to worry about Kennedy, he is just a frightened kid." His words were overheard. Private negotiations, summitry, would have given the Soviets time to procrastinate, to haggle, as they usually do, when quick action was needed.

— Bernstein says that Kennedy "feared that the news of the missiles would leak out at home." What is he talking about? The late Sen. Keating made speeches weeks before the White House announcement about the Soviet missiles in Cuba and newsmen were flooded with the same information from Cuban exile sources.

— In fact Bernstein is arguing for secret diplomacy, instead of what he calls "public confrontation." A rather strange argument in a period when Congress is demanding that secrecy should be abolished completely.

— Bernstein in his concluding paragraph asked the "painful question: was the crisis necessary? I wish he had the courage to say that in his view it was not. This would be an honest opinion with which one could argue, but raising a rhetorical question might be effective journalism but surely one may expect something else from a history professor.

— Bernstein is also asking, again without answering the question, "what would have happened if the Soviet Union, 13 years ago, had proved intransigent and refused to back down?" Well, it just could not have happened, and a historian should know the why. The Russians are not suicide-prone and in 1962 they were militarily the underdogs, in nuclear weapons, planes and naval vessels. Not even the critics of Kennedy's actions, and there were some, ever thought

about the possibility that Khrushchev would not "back down."

— Bernstein asked, was the crisis necessary? My answer is, for whatever it is worth, that it was. But he might have asked, and as a historian he should have, was it worthwhile? My answer, should he have raised this question, would be no. I do hope that Prof. Bernstein's students know that Moscow's defeat in Cuba, because defeat it was, started the arms race which resulted in the present unhappy "equivalence."

Kissinger once wrote that "deterrence is greatest when military strength is coupled with the willingness to employ it." Whether Kennedy knew about Kissinger's thesis, I do not know. But Kissinger, the secretary of state, must have remembered it when the administration ordered the world-wide alert during the 1973 Middle East war to demonstrate the credibility of American power and to preserve the status quo. This, if you will, was brinkmanship, considering the "equivalence" in 1973. But it was necessary, and it worked.

ENDRE MARTON

Chevy Chase

(AP Staff Writer, 1947-78)