



P/HO-2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 3, 1974

Dear Mr. Weisberg:

Your recent request for information has been referred to this office for reply. I am enclosing material which I hope will be of assistance to you.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Edwin S. Costrell".

Edwin S. Costrell
Chief, Historical Studies Division
Historical Office

Enclosures:

The Department of
State Bulletin,
November 19, 1973.

Mr. Harold Weisberg,
Route 8,
Frederick, Maryland. 21701



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXIX, No. 1795

November 19, 1973

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

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Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's News Conference of October 26

Secretary Schlesinger: I thought that it was possible that you might have some questions that you would like to raise this morning, and I'm prepared to take them.

Q. Most of our NATO allies have apparently taken the position that they're not going to allow the United States to use their airspaces or their facilities for our effort to resupply Israel, and we can understand the individual reasons for doing that—it's not a NATO operation. Can you comment on reports that some of our NATO allies, particularly Turkey, have allowed overflights of Soviet aircraft to resupply the Arabs?

Secretary Schlesinger: I won't comment on the particular issue that you indicate.

Q. Can you repeat that. There is microphone trouble.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think we have had a demonstration in recent days of the importance of readiness. I wish that it were reflected better in this room.

The question referred to the suggestion that Turkey had permitted overflights by the Soviet Union. My response was that I would not comment on that particular allegation, but we will investigate all aspects of the responsiveness of various countries in this crisis and will take them into consideration in the future.

Q. Can you tell us what steps the Soviet Union was taking that led us to a military alert?

Secretary Schlesinger: I'll mention a number of them, but there were a plethora of indicators. We were aware that the Soviets had alerted comprehensively their airborne forces. In addition, the Soviet air was stood

down, I believe, starting on Monday, and diminished to zero flights on Tuesday. The standing down, along with the alerting of airborne units, plus certain ambiguous developments to which Dr. Kissinger referred yesterday, suggested the possibility of a movement that was unilateral on the part of the Soviet Union, and we took the normal precautions under those circumstances, adjusting our DEFCON [defense condition] status.

Q. You said that we took the normal circumstances—normal adjustments. It has been suggested, and I wonder if you'd comment, that in fact we took extra-firm, extra-quick reaction in order to leave no misunderstanding or no possibility of misunderstanding on the part of the Soviets that the President is still able to act despite his domestic difficulties. Would you comment on that?

Secretary Schlesinger: I would say that our reaction was timely; that it was not extra-quick. Given the indicators that existed, the reaction was taken at the appropriate time. On the question of comprehensiveness or firmness, opinions may differ with regard to that. I think that it's quibbling about details, however. I think that it was important in view of the circumstances that have raised a question or may have raised a question about the ability of the United States to react appropriately, firmly, and quickly, that this certainly scotched whatever myths may have developed with regard to that possibility.

Q. Can you tell us how long the alert is going to go on—U.S. alert?

Secretary Schlesinger: We have begun to phase down the alert. CINCSOUTH—the Southern Command—and the Alaskan Command went back to normal DEFCON status at 12 o'clock midnight last night. We will be making other adjustments as the circumstances warrant, as the President directs. I would expect that there may be some adjustments in the near term, but it will depend on the circumstances and the views of the President.

Q. Are there any other adjustments today, sir?

Secretary Schlesinger: It is certainly possible that there will be other adjustments made.

Q. Secretary General Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party] has said that Soviet representatives have already gone into the war zone. Do we have any indications of what they are—the numbers, types, et cetera?

Secretary Schlesinger: The Soviet representatives, I assume, would be associated with the observation teams to which Dr. Kissinger referred yesterday. They would not be Soviet combat forces. The need [is] for small numbers of people and any indications we have suggest that they would be in small numbers.

Q. Wasn't he talking about observers under the U.N. auspices, where the Russians evidently are talking about sending representatives to Egypt on request of [President Anwar] Sadat?

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure just what the Russian suggestion is. In the judgment of the U.S. Government, there should be no combat forces, major combat forces, introduced by any of the permanent members of the Security Council. Now, there may be small numbers of forces, of individuals rather than forces, who would be moving into the combat area—or recently the combat area, since at the present time all is quiet out there—and, hopefully, they would be associated with the U.N.-controlled observation teams.

Q. Has the airlift been resumed by the Soviet Union?

Secretary Schlesinger: The airlift of the Soviet Union is going on at the present time, much diminished from the prior level.

Q. Mr. Secretary, being an expert in the intelligence field, could you comment on the fact that we are spending \$3 billion a year on this and we come up with a big fat zero. Mr. Kissinger has to be waked out of a sound sleep to find out that this happened. He said that the other countries were caught flat-footed also. Could you comment on the efficacy of our intelligence effort in this area?

Secretary Schlesinger: As a general comment, intelligence with regard to the intentions as opposed to capabilities is a very difficult task, and one cannot expect to have to bat 1,000 in that area. The purpose of our intelligence expenditures is to improve, and substantially—and we believe it has substantially improved—the intelligence available to the United States. We had indications of the movements of forces. In the estimating process, of course, one must make that decision or come to a conclusion whether or not the forces will be utilized. I think that the technical performance—the technical performance of the intelligence agencies—cannot be criticized; in fact, it must be highly commended. There are always limitations in the performance, in the estimating process. I think that the technical performance of the intelligence community with regard to the indicators of the possibility of Soviet movement, rather than being a flat zero as your question implied, was extraordinarily good.

Q. Is it the administration view now that because the administration took a strong stand by declaring this alert it turned the Russians around?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that I would refrain from making so generalized a comment. I think that what we would say is that it was necessary to go on alert because of the possibility, the possibility of the

movement of forces in a certain region of the world, that the alert was necessitated by that movement of forces. The alert also had the function of demonstrating the strong belief of the U.S. Government that the movement that was being speculated on would be disadvantageous to the world's peace. Consequently, to the extent that that message was conveyed, I think that this has been a success. But I should stress that the selection of DEFCON III was a normal procedure under those circumstances.

Q. I would like to go into that a little bit. When you used the phrase earlier that the Soviet air was stood down—I don't understand what that means—I guess it's a technical military term. What does that mean, the Soviet air was stood down, and what are the implications of that?

Secretary Schlesinger: The implications of any standing down are that one must consider the possibility that those equipments are being mobilized for a new purpose.

Q. So the reading here was that the Soviets might be putting themselves in a position to move troops into the Middle East and you wanted to warn them not to do it. Is that correct?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think the first part of it is the correct reading. The second part is your inference, and you're welcome to it. I wouldn't confirm that.

Q. They wouldn't move a lot of airborne troops without some kind of air cover—fighter planes and things like that. Were there indications of that kind of alert as well? Did that tend to soften the concern any, or was it just felt that they didn't need that?

Secretary Schlesinger: As one will recognize, there has been major air transportation into the Middle East during the last three weeks. All of it has gone through unimpeded, so it was not judged that fighter cover would be a necessity.

Q. Once more, for the fourth time. Is there

anything that the Russians are now doing that prevents us from calling off the alert now? Why do we have to space out this call-up or alert or stage it out?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that the answer to that is that we do not know at this stage whether the Soviets have reduced their alert status, we are carefully watching the circumstances, and that we are adjusting downward as the circumstances permit. Is that a complete answer to that question?

Q. You say we are carefully watching their alert status. Have they begun to adjust downward?

Secretary Schlesinger: As I indicated a moment ago, it is easier to determine when forces have been put on the alert than when that alert status has been terminated.

Q. What's the status of the American airlift to Israel right now?

Secretary Schlesinger: The American airlift is continuing.

Q. At what stage? Are we still at 20 flights a day?

Secretary Schlesinger: Approximately 20 flights a day. There has been no adjustment of the American airlift. It will continue until such time as sea transportation permits the discontinuation of the airlift. Because of the geographic proximity, Soviet sealift, which is now in high gear, has taken over in large measure from the airlift.

Q. Nothing that you have said, or Mr. Kissinger said yesterday, has indicated that Soviet nuclear or strategic forces were alerted. Why was it necessary to alert our SAC [Strategic Air Command] forces in connection with this Mideast crisis, given the nature of the fighting that has gone on in recent days and the type of troops—airborne troops—that were alerted by the Soviets? Why did we have to apparently, from what we can tell, escalate it into terms of nuclear forces?

Secretary Schlesinger: That is a precautionary measure, as I indicated. We chose

a DEFCON status that is an intermediate status. Under circumstances that existed at that time one wishes to have one's forces in enhanced readiness posture. This was, of course, not the highest readiness posture. We have had circumstances in the last 15 years in which we have gone into a higher readiness posture than was decided upon the other evening. The Soviet buildup of naval forces in the Mediterranean, associated with the possibility—the possibility of actions taking place that might have involved U.S. naval forces, leads one to take precautionary steps involved in putting all U.S. forces that could be involved in a higher state of readiness.

Q. Certain moves were taken during this alert which gave the implication that we were prepared to move paratroopers on our own side to the Middle East. This would indicate also a possible confrontation with paratroopers coming from Russia. Dr. Kissinger indicated that he was not ever thinking of such a confrontation. Why would you then alert the 82d Airborne for that purpose?

Secretary Schlesinger: A lot is tied up in your word "prepared." The increase in the readiness condition of U.S. forces may have been misunderstood by some in recent days. To increase the readiness condition does not mean that one is prepared to move those forces or, even more strongly, commit them to battle. We were, of course, in a position in which, if the circumstances required, we would have been prepared to move the 82d Airborne, but we were only putting ourselves in a readiness posture. And it is important to be in a readiness posture because frequently that removes the necessity of taking actions that might have to be considered if one were not in a readiness posture.

Q. [Inaudible] raise the possibility for the point, that you know of, that prior to their alert we had sent an additional helicopter carrier with marines into the Mediterranean and that you had attended a maneuver of

the 82d Airborne down in Fort Bragg. Did they say that those actions by the United States precipitated their alert?

Secretary Schlesinger: Not to my knowledge, but I would indicate that I would not care to comment upon the extent of diplomatic communications. That is a prerogative of Dr. Kissinger. The movement of the marines was a normal replacement of the marines in the Mediterranean. It was accelerated by a few days—I don't remember whether it was five days or so. There is a long voyage between here and the Mediterranean. One might regard that as a precautionary measure, but the basic answer to that, I think, is that this was part of a normal replacement. Similar activities have gone on with regard to the Soviet fleet. My visit to Brass Key II to which you referred had been laid on for some months.

Q. Can you give us to some degree the scenario leading up to this alert? The group here says that it was started at 12 o'clock (midnight); Dr. Kissinger said 3 o'clock (a.m.). I realize that there's a three-hour housekeeping maneuver, but did you make the decision by yourself or were you acting on the orders of the President or what?

Secretary Schlesinger: The meeting, and one is a little vague on times, started about 11 o'clock (p.m.). It may have been a little bit later than that.

Q. What meeting is this you are referring to?

Secretary Schlesinger: This was the meeting of the abbreviated National Security Council.

Q. Could you start by telling us who was there?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think most of the people who were there have been mentioned in their normal statutory capacities. Dr. Kissinger was there, Mr. Colby [William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence], Admiral Moorer [Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff],

and myself. The meeting started at approximately 11 o'clock (p.m.) as I recall it. The decision to notify the commands of an enhanced readiness status was taken at approximately 11:30 (p.m.). There's a whole series of decisions that went on between approximately 11:30 (p.m.) and about 3:30 in the morning; somewhere around 2 o'clock (a.m.)—I don't remember the precise time—Admiral Moorer and I returned to the Pentagon in which further action was taken to complete the package of measures that were undertaken at that time. The initial decision was made by myself, however, at approximately 11:30 (p.m.), and I instructed Admiral Moorer to go ahead with the enhanced readiness condition.

Q. Had you talked with the President at this time?

Secretary Schlesinger: I had not talked with the President at that moment. Dr. Kissinger had, I believe, just spoken with the President. The President was in complete command at all times during the course of that evening.

Q. Was he aware that you had alerted the troops?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, sir.

Q. Did he approve that?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, indeed. As Dr. Kissinger indicated, he approved the entire package about 3 o'clock in the morning.

Q. Could you tell us what it was, according to our assessment, that led the Russians to make a move toward moving troops into the Middle East?

Secretary Schlesinger: I would be inclined not to speculate on motives regarding events that did not take place. The Soviets did not move any forces. There were, as I indicated, some actions that increased our wariness and some ambiguous diplomatic signals to which Dr. Kissinger referred, but those events did not take place. You can speculate for yourself with regard to the kinds of dis-

cussions that might have been ongoing in the Kremlin during that period of time.

Q. Would you tell us how many Soviet troops were alerted and characterize their state of alert? Also, outside of those troops and the potential for a Soviet airlift of troops, were there any other indicators that caused us to go on our own alert?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, sir, there were additional indicators—some of them, as I have indicated, in the diplomatic area, but there were also additional military indicators in this area.

Q. What were they?

Secretary Schlesinger: I believe I mentioned the enhancement of the Soviet naval forces. They are now up to about 85 ships in the Mediterranean, which is approximately double the normal level of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. In addition, there were a number of other indicators of military intelligence nature into which I shan't go.

Q. What about the number of men involved?

Q. And troops in state of readiness?

Secretary Schlesinger: It was a comprehensive alerting of the Soviet airborne.

Q. Where?

Secretary Schlesinger: I will refrain from answering that at the present time.

Q. How many divisions?

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not going to go into the Soviet force structure.

Q. It wasn't a comprehensive alert of all their forces—

Secretary Schlesinger: No, the airborne.

Q. There are some reports that roughly 50,000 airborne were alerted—the Soviets. Is that a rough approximation?

Secretary Schlesinger: As a matter of fact, I'm not sure of the precise number, but that number is in about the right ball park.

Q. One other question: Their (Soviet) two

helicopter carriers—did they go into the Mediterranean?

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't believe so; I can check on that.

Q. Are they still moving around the Black Sea?

Secretary Schlesinger: I've indicated, I think, the full extent of the activities.

Q. Could you tell us why the U.S. Government viewed the apparent decision, or tentative decision, of the Soviets to send forces in as a peacekeeping measure when they combined that with an appeal to us to send troops in—I mean, why did we think this was such a dangerous thing? They've had 15,000 troops there before, and they said they were going just to secure peace.

Secretary Schlesinger: You are dealing with a hypothetical question, once again. I think that the movement of Soviet forces, the postulated movement of Soviet forces, which is designed, ostensibly designed, to restrain the behavior of one of the nations engaged in military hostilities, with the possible longrun implications of such stationing of forces, is not something that would be conducive to the development of what is the fundamental objective of U.S. foreign policy—which is a stable and permanent settlement in the Middle East.

Q. If you could just clarify, earlier you said, I think, that the CINCSOUTH was making adjustment. Now, why would a NATO command be involved in this type of thing? Did you misspeak?

Secretary Schlesinger: SOUTHCOM.

Q. Both you and Secretary Kissinger have gone to great lengths to indicate that we were not at the brink of war at any time. There are many questions still left unanswered regarding your intelligence estimates as to Russian moves. Is there any way you could help us clear some of this up? It's still ambiguous. I myself am not clear how close we were to actually coming to a confrontation.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think we were very far away from a confrontation—

Q. I couldn't hear the question.

Secretary Schlesinger: The questioner wished to obtain some assurance with regard to the issue of how close we were to a confrontation, and I indicated that we were very far away from a confrontation. If the question refers to a military confrontation, under the circumstances I think that we were taking the actions that were necessary to preclude the development of a military confrontation. Now, there were, of course, some elements of confrontation in the sense of political adversaries. They were, I think, as Dr. Kissinger indicated the other day, a normal development that occurs between great powers which have considerations in which they are in conflict and also considerations which force them toward a common approach to problems.

I think that this whole episode indicates the limitations, in a sense, of détente, but it also indicates the strength of détente. The fact that Dr. Kissinger, with considerable skill, I must say, a great deal of energy, was able to work out in collaboration with the Soviets the arrangement for two cease-fires, is, I think, a tribute to the strength of détente—the communications that existed between the two so-called superpowers. However, of course, there were some elements of conflict but the overall episode did indicate some of the strengths of détente and some of the advantages to both sides—and to the world at large—in this relaxation of tension. I should underscore that détente refers to mutual relaxation of tension and that détente must be a two-way street, as in the close of this episode it turned out to be.

Q. Was part of the formula, as it existed around 11 to 11:30 (p.m.), that there were Soviet transports en route and we didn't know whether they had troops but given all the other circumstances we felt we couldn't take the chance that there were troops aboard those planes?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that there were mixed reactions and different assessments of the probability. I think that the probability of Soviet forces being en route was considered by some to be quite low but that the probability might rise was a matter of concern universally.

Q. [Inaudible] thought those planes were en route might have troops on them?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, indeed, as I indicated that there is a different assessment of probabilities by different individuals. So that when you say that they might have troops aboard, nobody under those circumstances could dismiss that as a possibility no matter how low he placed the probability.

Q. Could you tell us when exactly you first learned that the seven Soviet airborne divisions, or whatever the force may have been, had been placed in an alert status? Wasn't that some time back, about the time Kosygin [Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers] was in Cairo—quite a way back?

Secretary Schlesinger: It was in an earlier point; I don't remember the precise day. I think that one must recognize that in these assessments it's a pulling together of a number of strands. While the airlift is fully preoccupied, quite obviously that is of lesser importance than when there is a standdown. Simultaneously, if there are diplomatic signals that cause wariness, that adds to the total picture. But you are quite right.

Q. Is he right, was it several days before that when you first learned about it?

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't remember precisely the number of days or even whether it was days rather than a day. But it had occurred earlier.

Q. Let me jog your memory on that. Our colleague Joe Alsop reported that on either the 19th or 20th of this month that an airborne division was alerted.

Secretary Schlesinger: I would not raise any question about the authenticity of the comments of any of your colleagues. I don't

remember the precise day. I think that the statement is correct. We can probably check on that for you.

Q. We've had a situation over the past two weeks where our client state got into trouble. We sent in nearly a billion dollars' worth of military equipment to help it out. We then got a cease-fire; our client state took advantage of the cease-fire to strengthen its position on the west bank, to encircle the 3d Army. It plunged us into a one-day crisis with our major adversary. What does this all say about our future relations with Israel, and specifically, what are we telling Israel now as to what it should do on that 3d Army?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that the answer to your final question will be eminently satisfactory, but I cannot give it to you now. With regard to our posture in general, I would not use the term "client state," particularly in an exclusive sense. Our purpose has been to restore peace to the area and to maintain a balance so that there can be some stabilization in an area which over the past 25 years has had a notably tragic history. I think that it is evident that in order to have a long-term settlement, the relationship between Israel and her neighbors must be based on something far broader than a military preponderance by the State of Israel. In the working out of that relationship, which we hope has been fostered by the total resolution of the United Nations, the agreement of the parties to negotiate one with another for the first time in many years—for the first time since 1948 in effect—will be instrumental in bringing about the kinds of stable relationships, or increased stability in those relationships. The United States desires stability in the area, equity for all parties in the area, protection of the security of all parties; and consequently, I would tend to adapt the assumptions that underlay your question. The United States has sought to achieve a degree of balance—sometimes the phrase "evenhandedness" is employed—with regard to the countries in the area.

Longrun stability, however, would not have been achieved if Israel had been inundated after the war started on October 6. The United States delayed, deliberately delayed, the start of its resupply operations hoping that a cease-fire could be implemented quickly. Soviet resupply operations started on the 10th of October, if I remember correctly. We hoped that we could discourage that activity on the part of the Soviets and that once again we could bring an immediate cease-fire. By the morning of the 13th, it was evident, I think, that without resupply there would be extreme difficulty in maintaining a balance. There were some who believed that the existence of the State of Israel was seriously compromised and therefore in order to achieve what is our objective—a longrun settlement with equity for all parties—that that action was necessitated on the part of the United States. But the United States, I think, seeks to have in the Middle East a condition of stability and a condition in which the rights of all parties are respected. I hope that many of the nations in the Middle East, without regarding themselves as our clients, regard themselves to a high degree friends and partners of the United States.

Q. How much equipment have we sent to Israel and how much will we send?

Secretary Schlesinger: At the present time, I think we have delivered approximately 10,000 tons directly.

Q. What is that in terms of dollars?

Secretary Schlesinger: About \$850 million at this stage.

Q. You mean we stopped since last Friday? The White House said it was \$825 million then.

Secretary Schlesinger: You can get the precise number; I think it's about \$850 million.

Q. How much will we deliver in terms of dollars before we stop the resupply?

Secretary Schlesinger: There is a tendency in these kinds of deliveries for high-

value items to be delivered at an earlier point in time so that the value per ton tends to decline with the passage of time. I'm sorry I did not answer your full question. What was the rest of the question?

Q. What will be the total value?

Secretary Schlesinger: The President has asked for a supplemental of \$2.2 billion. We do not know whether that is the precise requirement.

Q. Does your remark just now indicate that we have completed delivery of expensive items such as planes, tanks? There'll be no more?

Secretary Schlesinger: No, what my remark suggested was that in the immediate environment after the 13th of October, that certain high-value consumables and subsequently certain replacement items were delivered. For the time being there is a reduction in the flow of such items and there is more of a flow of consumables.

Q. Is there a tentative cutoff date for the American airlift? Do you have a date in mind by which you can complete it?

Secretary Schlesinger: For the airlift? I can't give you a precise date, but it could go on. I gave you an imprecise date—at the point that the sealift begins to take over which should be in about two to three weeks' time.

Q. How are we going to create this condition of stability that you talked about in that area if we pump in 2 billion dollars' worth of arms and rearm the Israelis and Russia pumps in numbers of rubles of arms and re-arms the Egyptians and Syrians and equips them to fight all over again? What kind of a fruitful policy is that?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that it's quite obvious from your question that if that were the sole basis of policy on our part or on the part of the recipient states or the supplier states, that it would be difficult to obtain the kind of longrun settlement to which we have both referred. The settlement must be based upon restraint and

balance on the part of the supplier nations, but most fundamentally on the development of a political relationship that can only come from direct negotiations and from the beginning of the appreciation of both parties in the conflict of the requirements that the other party sees which are fundamental and those that can be compromised.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one point about the timing, I hadn't known before our meeting here that you had known for some time about the Soviet alert of its airborne forces. In the light of that, what specific thing caused this 11 o'clock meeting of the National Security Council; what was the immediate precipitating factor; what had been learned that led to that late night meeting?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that the direct precipitating cause falls in that area that we have not discussed and I do not wish to go into, which relates to ambiguous signals that caused increased wariness. These were not of a military nature.

Q. Are our deliveries by sea and air going to proceed more or less with those of the Russians?

Secretary Schlesinger: Our deliveries are based upon our assessment of what the requirements are to maintain a balance in the area. As you are aware, the American airlift was based upon that premise as was the provision of certain equipments. In tonnage, this is less than the tonnage that was carried initially by the Soviet airlift. In addition, the Soviets are moving about 60,000 tons at the present time by sea. We have moved little by sea ourselves at this stage. There have been a number of Israeli vessels that have begun to move certain equipments by sea, but I believe that the total movement is about 10,000 tons. So, once again it's much smaller.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to Southern and Alaskan Commands, can you say what portion of U.S. forces they represent; does that mean nuclear forces are still on alert?

Secretary Schlesinger: Nuclear forces; let me underscore once again that we have a

scaled set of postures ranging from DEFCON V to DEFCON I. We have chosen an intermediate readiness posture. As a matter of fact, for most of the forces concerned, we regard it as a minimum or the lowest degree of readiness that was required by those circumstances. So when you use the phrase "alert," all we are referring to is enhanced readiness of a moderate degree. That has not as yet been changed. As I indicated earlier, we will begin, I think, to make selective adjustments in the readiness posture of all of our forces, including the Strategic Air Command, as the circumstances warrant and in response to the directives of the President.

Q. You've gone through an elaborate discussion of all the military reasons for the alert and then you say, however, none of these reasons was the precipitating cause of the alert and you're not going to tell us what that reason was. I think you owe us an obligation to give us some idea about those ambiguous statements that the other—

Secretary Schlesinger: I do not think that that would be in the interest of the American public at that time or the question of world peace. As my response to an earlier question indicated, the episode has underscored the strengths of détente, it has also underscored its limitations, and consequently in a matter so delicate it would seem to me to be inappropriate at this time to go any further into the kinds of matters to which you refer. I indicated that it was of a non-military nature.

Q. I gather from what you said in answer to your first question that we are disappointed with the behavior or the actions of most of our NATO allies and that this may influence us in things like military aid, et cetera, in the future. Is that a correct interpretation? You said we would take this into account in planning our future actions.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that obviously that the circumstances force one—any new set of circumstances forces one—to consider established notions, estab-

lished doctrine. We maintain our forces in Germany, to cite one example, because it provides us with enhanced readiness. The reactions of the Foreign Ministry of Germany raised some questions about whether they view readiness in the same way that we view readiness, and consequently we will have to reflect on that matter.

U.S. Urges North Viet-Nam To End Violations of Paris Agreement

Following is a U.S. note delivered to the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam at Paris by the U.S. Embassy on October 26. The note was also delivered to other participants in the International Conference on Viet-Nam.

Press release 394 dated October 30

The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has the honor to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam of January 27, 1973.

The United States refers to recent statements by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam that the United States is illegally providing military assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam and states that these charges are without any foundation and intended to mask the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam's own continuing violations of the Paris Agreement. The United States draws the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam's attention to the fact that, as set forth in the United States note of April 20, 1973, to the signatories of the March 2, 1973, Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam and in the United States note to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam dated September 10, 1973, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam side has shipped vast quantities of war material into South Viet-Nam since January 28 in

violation of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement.¹

The United States notes that also in contravention of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam side has dispatched large numbers of North Vietnamese troops into South Viet-Nam since January 28, 1973. Some of these troops entered South Viet-Nam by crossing the Demilitarized Zone in violation of Article 15(b) of the Agreement, while others entered through Laos and Cambodia, violating Article 20(a).

The United States further notes that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has failed to honor its commitment in the Joint Communiqué of June 13 to designate three additional points of entry and to discuss in the Two-Party Joint Military Commission modalities for the supervision of the replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material permitted under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement.

In addition, because of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam side's failure to cooperate with the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and to provide it assistance and protection as required by Article 10 of the ICCS Protocol, the ICCS has been unable to station and maintain teams at certain locations where Article 4(d) of the ICCS Protocol requires that such teams be stationed: Gio Linh, Lao Bao, Duc Co and Xa Mat. In consequence of these failures by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to honor its commitments under the Paris Agreement and its Protocols, the machinery provided for in the Agreement to supervise replacement of war materials by the two South Vietnamese parties has never been established. Responsibility for the lack of supervision of, and control over, import of war materials into South Viet-Nam lies entirely with the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

The United States urges the Democratic

¹ For texts of the notes, see BULLETIN of May 14, 1973, p. 599, and Oct. 1, 1973, p. 423.

Republic of Viet-Nam side to remedy this dangerous situation by ceasing all violations of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement; by at once formally designating three additional points of entry; by at once beginning discussions in the Two-Party Joint Military Commission regarding the modalities for the supervision of the replacement of war materials permitted under Article 7; and by immediately inviting the ICCS to send its teams to Gio Linh, Lao Bao, Duc Co, and Xa Mat, providing them with suitable quarters and other amenities. Only in this way can Article 7 of the Paris Agreement be implemented and violations by either side be prevented.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam will recognize that it has a grave responsibility in this matter and that on the course it elects to follow the prospects for lasting peace in Viet-Nam will depend.

Funds Requested for U.S. Contribution to Multilateral Lending Institutions

Message From President Nixon¹

To the Congress of the United States:

As their role in conveying financial assistance to developing countries has steadily enlarged in recent years, multilateral lending institutions have become vital to our hopes for constructing a new international economic order.

One of the most important of these institutions is the International Development Association, a subsidiary of the World Bank that provides long-term loans at low interest rates to the world's poorest nations. During the 13 years of its operation, IDA has provided over \$6.1 billion of development credits to nearly 70 of the least developed countries of the world. Two dozen countries have contributed funds for this effort.

By next June, however, the International

Development Association will be out of funds unless it is replenished. As a result of an understanding reached in recent international negotiations, I am today proposing to the Congress that the United States join with other major industrialized nations in pledging significant new funds to this organization. Specifically, I am requesting that the Congress authorize for future appropriation the sum of \$1.5 billion for the fourth replenishment of IDA. Initial payments would be made in fiscal year 1976 and the full amount would be paid out over a period of years.

I am also requesting that the Congress authorize an additional \$50 million for the Special Funds of the Asian Development Bank. The bank is one of the major regional banks in the world that complements the work of the International Development Association and the World Bank.

Legislation for both of these authorities is being submitted to the Congress today by the Secretary of the Treasury.

STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Just over a year ago, in September 1972 at the annual meeting in Washington of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, I stressed the urgent need to build a secure structure of peace, not only in the political realm but in the economic realm as well. I stated then that the time had come for action across the entire front of international economic problems, and I emphasized that recurring monetary crises, incorrect alignments, distorted trading arrangements, and great disparities in development not only injured our economies, but also created political tensions that subvert the cause of peace. I urged that all nations come together to deal promptly with these fundamental problems.

I am happy to be able to report that since that 1972 meeting, we have made encouraging progress toward updating and revising the basic rules for the conduct of international financial and trade affairs that have guided us since the end of World War II.

¹ Transmitted to the Congress on Oct. 31 (White House press release).

Monetary reform negotiations, begun last year, are now well advanced toward forging a new and stronger international monetary system. A date of July 31, 1974, has been set as a realistic deadline for completing a basic agreement among nations on the new system.

Concurrently, we are taking the fundamental steps at home and abroad that will lead to needed improvement in the international trading system. On September 14, while meeting in Tokyo, the world's major trading nations launched new multilateral trade negotiations which could lead to a significant reduction of world trade barriers and reform of our rules for trade. The Congress is now considering trade reform legislation that is essential to allow the United States to participate effectively in these negotiations.

ESSENTIAL ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

While there is great promise in both the trade and monetary negotiations, it is important that strong efforts also be made in the international effort to support economic development—particularly in providing reasonable amounts of new funds for international lending institutions.

A stable and flexible monetary system, a fairer and more efficient system of trade and investment, and a solid structure of cooperation in economic development are the essential components of international economic relations. We must act in each of these interdependent areas. If we fail or fall behind in one, we weaken the entire effort. We need an economic system that is balanced and responsive in all its parts, along with international institutions that reinforce the principles and rules we negotiate.

We cannot expect other nations—developed or developing—to respond fully to our call for stronger and more efficient trading and monetary systems, if at the same time we are not willing to assume our share of the effort to ensure that the interests of the poorer nations are taken into account. Our position as a leader in promoting a more

reasonable world order and our credibility as a negotiator would be seriously weakened if we do not take decisive and responsible action to assist those nations to achieve their aspirations toward economic development.

There are some two dozen non-communist countries which provide assistance to developing countries. About 20 percent of the total aid flow from these countries is now channeled through multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank group—which includes IDA—and the regional development banks.

These multilateral lending institutions play an important role in American foreign policy. By encouraging developing countries to participate in a joint effort to raise their living standards, they help to make those countries more self reliant. They provide a pool of unmatched technical expertise. And they provide a useful vehicle for encouraging other industrialized countries to take a larger responsibility for the future of the developing world, which in turn enables us to reduce our direct assistance.

The American economy also benefits from our support of international development. Developing countries today provide one-third of our raw material imports, and we will increasingly rely upon them in the future for essential materials. These developing countries are also good customers, buying more from us than we do from them.

NEW PROPOSALS FOR MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE

Because multilateral lending institutions make such a substantial contribution to world peace, it must be a matter of concern for the United States that the International Development Association will be out of funds by June 30, 1974, if its resources are not replenished.

The developing world now looks to the replenishment of IDA's resources as a key test of the willingness of industrialized, developed nations to cooperate in assuring the fuller participation of developing countries in the international economy. At the Nairobi meeting of the World Bank last month, it

was agreed by 25 donor countries to submit for approval of their legislatures a proposal to authorize \$4.5 billion of new resources to IDA. Under this proposal, the share of the United States in the replenishment would drop from 40 percent to 33 percent. This represents a significant accomplishment in distributing responsibility for development more equitably. Other countries would put up \$3 billion, twice the proposed United States contribution of \$1.5 billion. Furthermore, to reduce annual appropriations requirements, our payments can be made in installments at the rate of \$375 million a year for four years, beginning in fiscal year 1976.

We have also been negotiating with other participating nations to increase funds for the long-term, low-interest operation of the Asian Development Bank. As a result of these negotiations, I am requesting the Congress to authorize \$50 million of additional contributions to the ADB by the United States—beyond a \$100 million contribution already approved. These new funds would be associated with additional contributions of about \$350 million from other nations.

MEETING OUR RESPONSIBILITIES

In addition to these proposals for pledging future funds, I would point out that the Congress also has before it appropriations requests for fiscal year 1974—a year that is already one-third completed—for bilateral and multilateral assistance to support our role in international cooperation. It is my profound conviction that it is in our own best interest that the Congress move quickly to enact these pending appropriations requests. We are now behind schedule in providing our contributions to the International Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank, so that we are not keeping our part of the bargain. We must show other nations that the United States will continue to meet its international responsibilities.

All nations which enjoy advanced stages

of industrial development have a grave responsibility to assist those countries whose major development lies ahead. By providing support for international economic assistance on an equitable basis, we are helping others to help themselves and at the same time building effective institutions for international cooperation in the critical years ahead. I urge the Congress to act promptly on these proposals.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, October 31, 1973.

U.S.-Denmark Extradition Treaty Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Nixon*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Denmark, signed at Copenhagen on June 22, 1972. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaty.

The Treaty is one of a new series of extradition treaties being negotiated by the United States and contains provisions for offenses of aircraft hijacking, narcotics, and conspiracy to commit listed offenses.

The Treaty will make a significant contribution to the international effort to control narcotics traffic. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, October 30, 1973.

¹ Transmitted on Oct. 30 (White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. U, 93d Cong., 1st sess., which included the text of the treaty and the report of the Department of State.

Science and Technology and World Economic Affairs

*Address by William J. Casey
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

In my remarks today I would like to consider with you the national stake in technological innovation and in the strengthening of our country's scientific and technological position and their close connection with our international relations and our economic strength and posture in the world.

Until recently our research funding and the level of our scientific education were taken as insuring for the future the technological and industrial leadership we had enjoyed in the past. In the private sector, the remarkable American record of technological innovation in the past seemed to offer assurance of our future competitiveness.

Then, toward the end of the 1960's, the downward trend of our balance of trade called into question many assumptions we had been making—including our assumptions about technology. It became clear that we had relied too heavily on a long lead and heavy funding in a few conspicuous areas and forgotten that commercial competition is waged in terms of thousands of items in many markets.

Our balance of trade involves more, of course, than the state of our technology. Productivity, quality, and price were—and remain—important factors. Successive devaluations of the dollar are serving as an important corrective, and our efforts to reduce trade barriers can also play a significant role.

But today we consider none of these more important than supporting science to nourish

technology and enlisting our technology to pay our way in the world and to meet the world's development and environmental needs. No traces of overconfidence or complacency are to be found in government today. And I trust that none is to be found in the private sector; for although the government's view and efforts have broadened, it is to the private sector that we must look to reinvigorate our competitiveness in these "thousands of items in many markets" that have a marked effect on our balance of trade and to produce the energy, the environmental progress, and the development of poor nations which are fundamental to peace and prosperity in the world.

While our position has weakened on many fronts of the trade competition, we have remained strong in the export of "technology-intensive" products. Sophisticated products, including components and equipment, continue to contribute importantly to our balance of trade in manufactures: Some \$8 billion in 1972 came from nonelectric machinery, machine tools, farm machinery, printing and reproduction equipment, aircraft and aircraft parts, and computers and parts.

If we look beyond the balance of trade to receipts from royalties and fees, we find an additional benefit from technology. In 1972 our royalty and fee earnings from foreign subsidiaries and licensees were in net surplus by \$2.8 billion. Whether the technology involved should all be counted as "advanced" is perhaps open to question, given the inadequacy of data. Nonetheless, these earnings clearly accrued from technology that

¹ Made before the Industrial Research Institute at Chicago, Ill., on Oct. 17.

has not been made obsolete in the market in which it is employed.

Looking to the future, there is another way in which advanced technology will have an important bearing on our international economic situation: through assisting in meeting the mounting demand for energy and raw materials, and accomplishing this in ways which will not further despoil the environment.

The United States has an enormous economic stake in science and technology. As we look ahead, we can see that the outflow of dollars necessary to bring in from abroad the fuel and the raw materials needed to keep our plants and households going and to maintain our living standards will grow sharply.

Looking at our own economy and at the policies of other nations, we see forces and programs which will put still heavier responsibilities on our high-technology industries and our engineering and managerial skills. Our economy is increasingly a service economy. Two out of three of us work in service industries. Only one out of three of us work in producing the goods which are the main substance of world trade.

We find our chief competitors, Japan and the European Community, with more or less conscious plans to shift labor-intensive, energy-intensive, and fuel-intensive industries beyond their boundaries—to Taiwan, Korea, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa. At the same time we see them developing policies to subsidize and otherwise promote the development of high-technology industries at home—aircraft, computers, nuclear power, communications equipment, and so on.

Many of our own corporations find it necessary to shift labor-intensive industries to Latin America and Asia in order to meet world competition. At the same time, the Soviet Union and the oil-rich Persian Gulf states are seeking to attract industries which find a significant economic advantage in cheap power and proximity to raw materials which they have to import in order to manu-

facture in the United States. These are fundamental economic forces which are loose in the world. We will have to adjust to them, and we will have to look to science and technology to fill the gap in our employment and national earning power which seems likely to arise from these forces.

As this implies, our position in the world economy hinges on:

- The export of products incorporating advanced technology;

- The international diffusion of advanced technology; and

- The introduction within the United States of technological advances whose effects will reach beyond the domestic economy.

International Transfer of Technology

What is the government doing to promote continuing technological innovation? Dr. Stever [H. Guyford Stever, Science Adviser to President Nixon] has dealt with funding basic and applied science and programs to stimulate innovation. Let me discuss the State Department activities in developing a worldwide climate making for a satisfactory flow of technology and for international cooperation in science and its application.

Most of our specific concerns with technology arise from its proposed or ongoing transfer to foreign countries or foreign industry. In an open society and close-knit world, it's neither desirable nor possible to completely shut off the flow and diffusion of technology, nor can the flow always be completely turned on. Whether across divisional boundaries in your own company or across national boundaries, the management of technology transfer is an elusive, complex process. It challenges the best talent available in your organizations even under favorable circumstances.

Our mutual objectives are to assure the adequacy of controls and mechanisms for the protection of private and government technology, the appropriate payment for private and government technology, and the develop-

ment of guidelines that represent U.S. national interests, short-term and long-term. This requires attention to questions of national security, economics, domestic employment, and business interests. Doing this in a dynamic environment of international relations and commitments is an extremely difficult and complex task. There is now a broad effort in several government agencies to evolve such an understanding, with a vigorous level of discussion indicative of the importance of the problem.

To protect our technology and enhance its application and value, we work:

- To secure patent protection abroad;
- To secure fair treatment of foreign branches and affiliates of U.S. corporations;
- To preclude the emergence abroad of industrial standards which could serve as non-tariff barriers or lead to a mismatch of different segments of global systems (such as those in the telecommunications field); and
- To obtain fair value for our technology.

U.S. Private Industry and the U.S.S.R.

Now let me quickly, by way of an example or two, deal with both government and business cooperation and international cooperation. An exceptional recent instance of vital cooperation between government and your organization occurred in the evolving U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade relationships, stemming from the 1972 summit agreements on trade, science and technology, environment, and space. Since 1972 the U.S. Government and private industry have increasingly explored useful and profitable ways of doing business with the Soviet Union. There is no question but that the Soviets are intensely interested in American technology. In the agreements with the U.S.S.R., both governments pledged to find ways for establishing mutually beneficial relationships in science and technology. Such cooperation can be governmental or private and commercial.

The Soviet Union fully recognized the importance of American industry in this proc-

ess. The State Committee for Science and Technology (SCST) in recent months has signed agreements with 13 American companies, all of which make reference to the May 24, 1972, science and technology agreement.

While this is a matter primarily between U.S. private industry and the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology, the U.S. Government also has a major interest in seeing that the relationships between the powerful and well-coordinated SCST and individual companies are carried out in conformance with U.S. national interests.

We discussed this matter with the officials of the Industrial Research Institute, and the suggestion was made that a letter be sent to some 220 member firms of IRI which represent 90 percent of the research conducted by medium- and high-technology companies in the United States. The letter was sent by the President's Science Adviser, Dr. Stever, and was accompanied by a letter from the president of IRI urging cooperation with the government in providing on a strictly voluntary basis information on their relationships with the SCST. The U.S. Government offered to make information obtained from these replies available to the companies and offered assistance to American companies dealing with the SCST. The responses to Dr. Stever's and Dr. [Herbert I.] Fusfeld's letters have been most gratifying, and we want to especially thank IRI for its fine part in this cooperative effort.

We have received about 125 replies, and we can expect that others will continue to come in. The Department of State, Dr. Stever's office, and the Bureau of East-West Trade of the Department of Commerce have carefully analyzed these replies and in addition have interviewed in depth senior executives of about 10 companies. From these analyses we have drawn some tentative conclusions:

1. Thirteen firms have signed agreements with the SCST. About 20 additional firms are engaged in exchanges of visiting groups

from which additional agreements may emerge.

2. Eighty percent of those responding have stated they have no present negotiations or discussions.

3. None of the responses showed any reluctance to respond to the government's request for information. Rather, there has been often expressed appreciation for information and a desire to continue to cooperate.

4. Further tentative conclusions might be cited:

a. Clearly, the Soviets have been active, but apparently the SCST is highly selective as to with whom they finally sign agreements. U.S. firms for the most part find that negotiations and arrangements for visits are lengthy and tedious.

b. The Soviets are not concentrating (with the possible exception of the computer industry) on any particular industrial sector. The Soviets seem to be interested in research-intensive industry and prefer large firms, especially multinationals and conglomerates.

c. The SCST, in the eyes of American companies, appears to become increasingly powerful and a principal means through which business with the Soviets must be carried out in high-technology areas.

d. With few exceptions, the Soviets have shown interest in buying American high technology but have been less than forthcoming in making reciprocal offers.

As you explore further business opportunities with the Soviet Union, we would appreciate your continuing to keep us informed so that we in turn may be of greater assistance to you in your dealings with the U.S.S.R.

Energy Research and Development

Another area I would like to touch on, in which international cooperation can be vital, is energy R. & D. Within the U.S. Government we have completed a first pass at evaluating the projects and the capabilities of the major industrial governments in work-

ing on new sources, reduced environmental impact, and more efficient use and transmission of energy. This is the basis for our bilaterally sitting down with these nations and determining if and where we can develop joint R. & D. projects which can contribute to the solution of our energy problems. At the same time we are working with the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] to develop on an urgent basis an evaluation of the status and relative priorities of energy research in the OECD member countries. This report, which will identify gaps in research or areas of insufficient coverage, should provide a basis for and encourage increased cooperation between countries—at both governmental and industrial levels—on the research and development aspects of energy problems.

Two findings in this work will be of special significance to you:

1. The U.S. Government doesn't know all that it should about domestic energy R. & D. in the private sector and the extent of communication and cooperation in this field between U.S. industry and its counterparts abroad.

2. If an expanded program of international cooperation is to succeed, private industry—with its technological skills and great experience—must be brought in to play a major role.

The questions that need to be addressed are:

1. What, if anything, should the U.S. Government do to encourage and facilitate the U.S. industry efforts to support the government objective of increasing international cooperation in energy R. & D.?

2. What are the barriers, if any, to effective industrial international cooperation? Are there restrictions or impediments by legislation, taxation, or antitrust that affect the role of industry?

The Industrial Research Institute's Federal Science and Technology Committee has already had initial conversations with Mr. [Nelson F.] Sievering, Deputy Director

of the Department of State's Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, and his staff in an effort to assist us in assessing the role of private industry in international cooperation in energy R. & D.

One of the difficulties we face in the broad area of attitudes and policies regarding the international transfer of technology is specifying the national interests involved—which are frequently conflicting—and establishing their appropriate priorities. We must, of course, protect our national security. Where our proper course lies as regards our industrial competitiveness in the world market has been widely debated. We do not believe in protectionism as the basis for continued U.S. leadership in advanced technology. You know, better than most, that continued technological leadership in a dynamic economy rests on our own innovative capabilities and not on attempts to weaken or limit the technological enterprise of other nations. When the benefits of our own enterprise are made available to others, we do ask that the quid pro quo include an appropriate financial recompense for the R. & D. investments, public and private, which we have made. This is essential to our continued innovative efforts.

As we develop appropriate precepts for assessing the diffusion of our technology abroad, we should not forget that the national technological reservoir must be kept full by the energy, initiative, imagination, and risk-taking ability of our R. & D. community in industry and in government. I emphasize that the continued strength of industrial R. & D. is essential if we are to maintain an advantageous technological position in the international arena.

At the same time, neither the United States nor other industrialized countries can depend wholly on indigenous efforts. We can benefit from advances originating abroad

just as others will benefit from advances originating here. Advanced technology is thus a dynamic force in world economic affairs.

The United States enjoys a strong position. We intend to maintain a strong position, and we rely heavily on you.

United States Offers Increases of Cotton Textile Imports

Press release 396 dated October 30

The United States is offering all of its bilateral cotton textile agreement partners the opportunity to export to the United States additional amounts of cotton fabric and cotton yarn, the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements announced on October 30.

Twenty-eight countries have been told that the current market situation with respect to cotton fabric and cotton yarn will permit the United States to offer on a one-time basis additional imports of cotton fabric and yarn up to an amount equal to 5 percent of the aggregate ceiling of each bilateral agreement.

Each country with which the United States has a bilateral cotton textile agreement is being asked to inform the United States by November 15, 1973, as to the additional amounts and categories which it may wish to export to the United States under this arrangement. The added amounts will not become part of the base of each country's bilateral agreement.

The Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, chaired by the Department of Commerce, includes representatives of the Departments of State, the Treasury, and Labor.

Messages Exchanged by President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev During the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962

In response to requests from the public under Executive Order 11652, the Interagency Classification Review Committee has recently taken declassification action on a series of messages exchanged between President Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. During October 1962 President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev exchanged a total of 10 messages about Cuba, only the last four of which were made public at the time. All 10 messages, with annotations supplied by the Historical Office of the Department of State, are printed here as a matter of general public interest. For each of the five messages from Chairman Khrushchev there are included both the informal translation which was made immediately available to President Kennedy and the official translation prepared later. Related documentation was published in the Department of State Bulletin of November 12, 1962, and in "American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962."

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 22, 1962¹

[WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1962.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: A copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereto has been handed to your Ambassador in Washington.² In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter.

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one

thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.

At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made clear that in view of the objectives of the ideology to which you adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that

¹Text communicated to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington at 6 p.m. on Oct. 22, 1962; text had previously been telegraphed to the American Embassy at Moscow for simultaneous delivery there.

²For President Kennedy's television and radio address on Oct. 22, 1962, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

an attempt to force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command.

It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy. Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgment on your part.

I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 23, 1962

Informal Translation ³

MR. PRESIDENT: I have just received your letter, and have also acquainted myself with text of your speech of October 22 regarding Cuba.

I should say frankly that measures outlined in

³ Informal translation by the American Embassy at Moscow of text received by the Embassy from the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 3 p.m. Moscow time on Oct. 23, 1962, and transmitted to the Department of State by telegram at 5 p.m. Moscow time (received at 11:56 a.m., Oct. 23, Washington time).

your statement represent serious threat to peace and security of peoples. United States has openly taken path of gross violation of Charter of United Nations, path of violation of international norms of freedom of navigation on high seas, path of aggressive actions both against Cuba and against Soviet Union.

Statement of Government of United States America cannot be evaluated in any other way than as naked interference in domestic affairs of Cuban Republic, Soviet Union, and other states. Charter of United Nations and international norms do not give right to any state whatsoever to establish in international waters control of vessels bound for shores of Cuban Republic.

It is self-understood that we also cannot recognize right of United States to establish control over armaments essential to Republic of Cuba for strengthening of its defensive capacity.

We confirm that armaments now on Cuba, regardless of classification to which they belong, are destined exclusively for defensive purposes, in order to secure Cuban Republic from attack of aggressor.

I hope that Government of United States will show prudence and renounce actions pursued by you, which could lead to catastrophic consequences for peace throughout world.

Viewpoint of Soviet Government with regard to your statement of October 22 is set forth in statement of Soviet Government,⁴ which is being conveyed to you through your ambassador in Moscow.

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

Official Translation ⁵

Moscow, October 23, 1962.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have just received your letter, and have also acquainted myself with the text of your speech of October 22 regarding Cuba.

I must say frankly that the measures indicated in your statement constitute a serious threat to peace and to the security of nations. The United States has openly taken the path of grossly violating the United Nations Charter, the path of violating international norms of freedom of navigation on the high seas, the path of aggressive actions both against Cuba and against the Soviet Union.

The statement by the Government of the United States of America can only be regarded as undisguised interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Union and other states. The United Nations Charter and international norms give no right to any state to institute in interna-

⁴ For text, see *New York Times* of Oct. 24, 1962.

⁵ Prepared subsequently by the Department of State.

tional waters the inspection of vessels bound for the shores of the Republic of Cuba.

And naturally, neither can we recognize the right of the United States to establish control over armaments which are necessary for the Republic of Cuba to strengthen its defense capability.

We reaffirm that the armaments which are in Cuba, regardless of the classification to which they may belong, are intended solely for defensive purposes in order to secure the Republic of Cuba against the attack of an aggressor.

I hope that the United States Government will display wisdom and renounce the actions pursued by you, which may lead to catastrophic consequences for world peace.

The viewpoint of the Soviet Government with regard to your statement of October 22 is set forth in a Statement of the Soviet Government, which is being transmitted to you through your Ambassador at Moscow.

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 23, 1962⁶

[WASHINGTON, *October 23, 1962*].

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have received your letter of October twenty-third. I think you will recognize that the steps⁷ which started the current chain of events was the action of your Government in secretly furnishing offensive weapons to Cuba. We will be discussing this matter in the Security Council. In the meantime, I am concerned that we both show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make the situation more difficult to control than it already is.

I hope that you will issue immediately the necessary instructions to your ships to observe the terms of the quarantine, the basis of which was established by the vote of the Organization of American States this afternoon, and which will go into effect at 1400 hours Greenwich time October twenty-four.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

⁶ Text transmitted by the Department of State to the American Embassy at Moscow at 6:51 p.m. Washington time on Oct. 23, 1962, and delivered in Moscow at 7 a.m., Oct. 24, Moscow time.

⁷ So transmitted to the American Embassy at Moscow, but corrected there to read "step".

CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 24, 1962

Informal Translation⁸

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of October 23, familiarized myself with it and am answering you.

Imagine, Mr. President, that we had posed to you those ultimative conditions which you have posed to us by your action. How would you have reacted to this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And that would have been comprehensible to us.

Having posed these conditions to us, you, Mr. President, have challenged us. Who asked you to do this? By what right have you done this? Our relations with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations with other states, regardless of what sort of state it may be, concern only the two countries between which those relations exist. And if one is really going to talk about a quarantine, referred to in your letter, it can be established, according to accepted international practice, only by the agreement of states between themselves, and not by any sort of third party. There exist, for example, quarantines on agricultural goods and products. But in the case at hand, the question is in no way one of quarantine, but rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this.

You, Mr. President, are not declaring quarantines, but advancing an ultimatum and threatening that unless we subordinate ourselves to your demands, you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you wish to convince me to agree to this! What does agreement with such demands mean? This would mean to guide oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason but to indulge arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.

And, Mr. President, I cannot agree with this and think that in your heart you recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.

Reference to the decision of the Organization of American States cannot in any way substantiate the demands now advanced by the United States. This organization has absolutely no authority or basis to make decisions like that of which you speak in your letter.⁹

⁸ Informal translation by the American Embassy at Moscow of text received by the Embassy from the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 11:30 p.m. Moscow time on Oct. 24, 1962, and transmitted to the Department of State by telegram at 2 a.m., Oct. 25, Moscow time (received at 9:24 p.m., Oct. 24, Washington time).

⁹ In the Russian original the four sentences which follow form part of this paragraph. See the official translation below.

Consequently, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists, generally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly support the principles of international law, strictly observe the norms regulating navigation on the high seas and in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by all states.

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you are attempting to legislate in questions of international law, you are trampling upon the generally accepted norms of this law. And all this not only out of hatred for the Cuban people and its Government, but also as a result of considerations of the election campaign in the USA. What morality, what law can justify such an approach by the American Government to international affairs? You cannot find such a morality and such a law, because the actions of the USA with regard to Cuba are outright banditry, or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, the peoples of all countries, and at least of all the American people,⁹ can suffer gravely from such folly, since the USA has fully lost its former inaccessibility with the advent of contemporary types of armament.

Consequently, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, then you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the USA. When you confront us with such conditions, try to put yourself in our situation and think how the USA would react to these conditions. I do not doubt that if someone had attempted to dictate conditions of this sort to you, the USA, you would have rejected such an attempt. And we also say—No.

The Soviet Government considers that violation of freedom of the use of international waters and international air space is an act of aggression, pushing mankind towards the abyss of a world missile-nuclear war. Consequently, the Soviet Government cannot give instructions to the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the instructions of the American naval forces blockading that island. Your instructions¹¹ to Soviet mariners are strictly to observe the generally recognized norms of navigation in international waters and not to retreat from them by even one step. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize what sort of responsibility will rest on it in that case. Of course, we shall not be simply observers of piratical actions of American ships on the high seas. We will then be

⁹As received by telegram in Washington. The passage should read "and not least of all the American people". Compare the official translation below.

¹¹As received by telegram in Washington. The Russian text, however, read "Our instructions". See the official translation below.

forced for our part to take the measures which we deem necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. For this we have all that is necessary.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

Official Translation ¹²

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of October 23, have studied it, and am answering you.

Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had presented you with the conditions of an ultimatum which you have presented us by your action. How would you have reacted to this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And this would have been understandable to us.

In presenting us with these conditions, you, Mr. President, have flung a challenge at us. Who asked you to do this? By what right did you do this? Our ties with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations with other states, regardless of what kind of states they may be, concern only the two countries between which these relations exist. And if we now speak of the quarantine to which your letter refers, a quarantine may be established, according to accepted international practice, only by agreement of states between themselves, and not by some third party. Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural goods and products. But in this case the question is in no way one of quarantine, but rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this.

You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.

No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that in your own heart you recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.

Reference to the decision of the Organization of American States cannot in any way substantiate the demands now advanced by the United States. This Organization has absolutely no authority or basis for adopting decisions such as the one you speak of in your letter. Therefore, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists and universally

¹²Prepared subsequently by the Department of State.

recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles of international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the high seas, in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by all states.

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and you are violating the universally accepted norms of that law. And you are doing all this not only out of hatred for the Cuban people and its government, but also because of considerations of the election campaign in the United States. What morality, what law can justify such an approach by the American Government to international affairs? No such morality or law can be found, because the actions of the United States with regard to Cuba constitute outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, such folly can bring grave suffering to the peoples of all countries, and to no lesser degree to the American people themselves, since the United States has completely lost its former isolation with the advent of modern types of armament.

Therefore, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States. When you confront us with such conditions, try to put yourself in our place and consider how the United States would react to these conditions. I do not doubt that if someone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you—the United States—you would reject such an attempt. And we also say—no.

The Soviet government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet Government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions to Soviet mariners are to observe strictly the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters and not to retreat one step from them. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize what responsibility will rest upon it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so.

Respectfully,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

MOSCOW, October 24, 1962.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 25, 1962¹³

[WASHINGTON,] October 25, 1962.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurances from your Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. If you will review the statement issued by Tass in September, you will see how clearly this assurance was given.

In reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied—namely, that all these public assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of missile bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

¹³ Text communicated to the Soviet Embassy at Washington at 1:45 a.m. Washington time on Oct. 25, 1962; transmitted to the American Embassy at Moscow at 1:59 a.m., Oct. 25, Washington time for delivery also in Moscow.

**CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE
OF OCTOBER 26, 1962**

Informal Translation ¹⁴

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of October 25. From your letter, I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed and (some) ¹⁵ sense of responsibility. I value this.

Now we have already publicly exchanged our evaluations of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his understanding of these events. Consequently, I would judge that, apparently, a continuation of an exchange of opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, will hardly add anything to that which one side has already said to the other.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, still more, communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We, communists, are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a game nor as a means of the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy and a calamity for all the peoples.

It is thus that we, Soviet people, and, together with us, other peoples as well, understand the questions of war and peace. I can, in any case, firmly say this for the peoples of the socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among peoples.

I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, of understanding, and of what war entails.¹⁶ What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you would

¹⁴ Informal translation by the American Embassy at Moscow of text received by the Embassy from the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 4:43 p.m. Moscow time on Oct. 26, 1962, and transmitted to the Department of State at 7 p.m. Moscow time (received in four sections between 6 and 9 p.m., Oct. 26, Washington time).

¹⁵ The parentheses are in the source text.

¹⁶ On Oct. 27, 1962, the Department of State sent to the White House the following corrected version of this sentence: "I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, of understanding and a proper evaluation of the character of contemporary war and of what war entails."

experience the same consequences as those which you sent us. And that must be clear to us, people invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. We must not succumb to intoxication and petty passions, regardless of whether elections are impending in this or that country, or not impending. These are all transient things, but if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction.

In the name of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, I assure you that your conclusions regarding offensive weapons on Cuba are groundless. It is apparent from what you have written me that our conceptions are different on this score, or rather, we have different estimates of these or those military means. Indeed, in reality, the same forms of weapons can have different interpretations.

You are a military man and, I hope, will understand me. Let us take for example a simple cannon. What sort of means is this: offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive means if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But if one concentrates artillery, and adds to it the necessary number of troops, then the same cannons do become an offensive means, because they prepare and clear the way for infantry to attack. The same happens with missile-nuclear weapons as well, with any type of this weapon.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our means on Cuba are offensive. However, let us not quarrel now. It is apparent that I will not be able to convince you of this. But I say to you: you, Mr. President, are a military man and should understand: can one attack, if one has on one's territory even an enormous quantity of missiles of various effective radiuses and various power, but using only these means. These missiles are a means of extermination and destruction. But one cannot attack with these missiles, even nuclear missiles of a power of 100 megatons because only people, troops, can attack. Without people, any means however powerful cannot be offensive.

How can one, consequently, give such a completely incorrect interpretation as you are now giving, to the effect that some sort of means on Cuba are offensive. All the means located there, and I assure you of this, have a defensive character, are on Cuba solely for the purposes of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. You, however, say that these are offensive means.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba can attack the United States and that even we together with Cuba can attack you from the territory of Cuba? Can you really think that way? How is it possible? We do not understand this. Has something so new appeared in military strategy that

one can think that it is possible to attack thus. I say precisely attack, and not destroy, since barbarians, people who have lost their sense, destroy.

I believe that you have no basis to think this way. You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you, you will respond the same way. But you too will receive the same that you hurl against us. And I think that you also understand this. My conversation with you in Vienna gives me the right to talk to you this way.

This indicates that we are normal people, that we correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation. Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die, could do this. We, however, want to live and do not at all want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: to compete with your country on a peaceful basis. We quarrel with you, we have differences on ideological questions. But our view of the world consists in this, that ideological questions, as well as economic problems, should be solved not by military means, they must be solved on the basis of peaceful competition, i.e., as this is understood in capitalist society, on the basis of competition. We have proceeded and are proceeding from the fact that the peaceful coexistence of the two different social-political systems, now existing in the world, is necessary, that it is necessary to assure a stable peace. That is the sort of principle we hold.

You have now proclaimed piratical measures, which were employed in the Middle Ages, when ships proceeding in international waters were attacked, and you have called this "a quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the zone which your Navy is patrolling. I assure you that these vessels, now bound for Cuba, are carrying the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that we only occupy ourselves with the carriage of so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your military people imagine that these (cargoes)¹⁷ are some sort of special type of weapon, I assure you that they are the most ordinary peaceful products.

Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that on those ships, which are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The weapons which were necessary for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that there were not any shipments of weapons at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense.

I don't know whether you can understand me and

believe me. But I should like to have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions; it is necessary to control them. And in what direction are events now developing? If you stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that would be piracy. If we started to do that with regard to your ships, then you would also be as indignant as we and the whole world now are. One cannot give another interpretation to such actions, because one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were permitted, then there would be no peace, there would also be no peaceful coexistence. We should then be forced to put into effect the necessary measures of a defensive character to protect our interests in accordance with international law. Why should this be done? To what would all this lead?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, with his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals come to this, that our side should not transport armaments of any kind to Cuba during a certain period of time, while negotiations are being conducted—and we are ready to enter such negotiations—and the other side should not undertake any sort of piratical actions against vessels engaged in navigation on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way out of the situation which has been created, which would give the peoples the possibility of breathing calmly.¹⁸ You have asked what happened, what evoked the delivery of weapons to Cuba? You have spoken about this to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what evoked it.

We were very grieved by the fact—I spoke about it in Vienna—that a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was committed, as a result of which many Cubans perished. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake. I respected that explanation. You repeated it to me several times, pointing out that not everybody occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you had done. I value such frankness. For my part, I told you that we too possess no less courage; we also acknowledged those mistakes which had been committed during the history of our state, and not only acknowledged, but sharply condemned them.

If you are really concerned about the peace and welfare of your people, and this is your responsibility as President, then I, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Moreover, the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war

¹⁸ In the corrections to this message which the Department of State sent to the White House on Oct. 27, 1962, it was indicated that a new paragraph should start at this point.

¹⁷ The parentheses are in the source text.

not only between the reciprocal claims, but a worldwide cruel and destructive war.¹⁹

Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with military and economic aid? The answer is: we have proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitarianism. At one time, our people itself had a revolution, when Russia was still a backward country. We were attacked then. We were the target of attack by many countries. The USA participated in that adventure. This has been recorded by participants in the aggression against our country. A whole book has been written about this by General [William Sidney] Graves, who, at that time, commanded the US expeditionary corps. Graves called it "The American Adventure in Siberia".

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to reconstruct a country on new foundations. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people, but we are not interfering in questions of domestic structure, we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union desires to help the Cubans build their life as they themselves wish and that others should not hinder them.

You once said that the United States was not preparing an invasion. But you also declared that you sympathized with the Cuban counterrevolutionary emigrants, that you support them and would help them to realize their plans against the present government of Cuba. It is also not a secret to anyone that the threat of armed attack, aggression, has constantly hung, and continues to hang over Cuba. It was only this which impelled us to respond to the request of the Cuban government to furnish it aid for the strengthening of the defensive capacity of this country.

If assurances were given by the President and the government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the

¹⁹ On Oct. 27, 1962, the Department of State sent to the White House the following corrected version of this sentence: "Moreover the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war not only between the Soviet Union and the USA, between whom, strictly speaking, are no reciprocal claims, but a worldwide cruel and destructive war."

armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different.

I spoke in the name of the Soviet government in the United Nations and introduced a proposal for the disbandment of all armies and for the destruction of all armaments. How then can I now count on those armaments?

Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them, this damages the economy, and if one puts them to use, then they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human energy, and what is more are for the destruction of man himself. If people do not show wisdom, then in the final analysis they will come to a clash, like blind moles, and then reciprocal extermination will begin.

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

We welcome all forces which stand on positions of peace. Consequently, I expressed gratitude to Mr. Bertrand Russell, too, who manifests alarm and

concern for the fate of the world, and I readily responded to the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant.

There, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you agreed with them, could put an end to that tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.

These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire to relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

Official Translation ²⁰

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your letter of October 25. From your letter I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed and a sense of responsibility. I appreciate this.

By now we have already publicly exchanged our assessments of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his interpretation of these events. Therefore, I would think that, evidently, continuing to exchange opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, would probably not add anything to what one side has already said to the other.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned for the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and all the more, communists—people who know how to value not only their own lives but, above all else, the life of nations. We communists are against any wars between states at all, and have been defending the cause of peace ever since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, not as a game or a means for achieving particular purposes, much less as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means of achieving them is work. War is our enemy and a calamity for all nations.

This is how we Soviet people, and together with us, other peoples as well, interpret questions of war and peace. I can say this with assurance at least for the peoples of the Socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among nations.

I can see, Mr. President, that you also are not without a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, not without an understanding and correct assessment of the nature of modern warfare and what war entails. What good would a war do you? You threaten us with war. But you well know that the very least you would get in response would be what you had given us; you would suffer the same consequences. And that must be clear to us—people invested with authority, trust and responsibility.

²⁰ Prepared subsequently by the Department of State.

We must not succumb to light-headedness and petty passions, regardless of whether elections are forthcoming in one country or another. These are all transitory things, but should war indeed break out, it would not be in our power to contain or stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have taken part in two wars, and I know that war ends only when it has rolled through cities and villages, sowing death and destruction everywhere.

I assure you on behalf of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people that your arguments regarding offensive weapons in Cuba are utterly unfounded. From what you have written me it is obvious that our interpretations on this point are different, or rather that we have different definitions for one type of military means or another. And indeed, the same types of armaments may in actuality have different interpretations.

You are a military man, and I hope you will understand me. Let us take a simple cannon for instance. What kind of a weapon is it—offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive weapon if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But when artillery is concentrated and supplemented by an appropriate number of troops, then the same cannon will have become an offensive weapon, since they prepare and clear the way for infantry to advance. The same is true for nuclear missile weapons, for any type of these weapons.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our armaments in Cuba are offensive. However, let us not argue at this point. Evidently, I shall not be able to convince you. But I tell you: You, Mr. President, are a military man and you must understand: How can you possibly launch an offensive even if you have an enormous number of missiles of various ranges and power on your territory, using these weapons alone? These missiles are a means of annihilation and destruction. But it is impossible to launch an offensive by means of these missiles, even nuclear missiles of 100 megaton yield, because it is only people—troops—who can advance. Without people any weapons, whatever their power, cannot be offensive.

How can you, therefore, give this completely wrong interpretation, which you are now giving, that some weapons in Cuba are offensive, as you say? All weapons there—and I assure you of this—are of a defensive nature; they are in Cuba solely for purposes of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. And you say that they are offensive weapons.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba could launch an offensive upon the United States and that even we, together with Cuba, could advance against you from Cuban territory? Do you really think so? How can that be? We do not understand. Surely, there has not been any such new development in military strategy that

would lead one to believe that it is possible to advance that way. And I mean advance, not destroy; for those who destroy are barbarians, people who have lost their sanity.

I hold that you have no grounds to think so. You may regard us with distrust, but you can at any rate rest assured that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we launch an offensive against you, you will respond in kind. But you too will get in response whatever you throw at us. And I think you understand that too. It is our discussion in Vienna that gives me the right to speak this way.

This indicates that we are sane people, that we understand and assess the situation correctly. How could we, then, allow [ourselves]^a the wrong actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and before they die destroy the world, could do this. But we want to live and by no means do we want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: to compete with your country in a peaceful endeavor. We argue with you; we have differences on ideological questions. But our concept of the world is that questions of ideology, as well as economic problems, should be settled by other than military means; they must be solved in peaceful contest, or as this is interpreted in capitalist society—by competition. Our premise has been and remains that peaceful coexistence of two different sociopolitical systems—a reality of our world—is essential, and that it is essential to ensure lasting peace. These are the principles to which we adhere.

You have now declared piratical measures, the kind that were practiced in the Middle Ages when ships passing through international waters were attacked, and you have called this a "quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels will probably soon enter the zone patrolled by your Navy. I assure you that the vessels which are now headed for Cuba are carrying the most innocuous peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that all we spend our time on is transporting so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Even though your military people may possibly imagine that these are some special kind of weapons, I assure you that they are the most ordinary kind of peaceful goods.

Therefore, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that the ships bound for Cuba are carrying no armaments at all. The armaments needed for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not mean to say that there have been no shipments of armaments at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already obtained the necessary weapons for defense.

I do not know whether you can understand me

^a The brackets are in the source text.

and believe me. But I wish you would believe yourself and agree that one should not give way to one's passions; that one should be master of them. And what direction are events taking now? If you begin stopping vessels it would be piracy, as you yourself know. If we should start doing this to your ships you would be just as indignant as we and the whole world are now indignant. Such actions cannot be interpreted otherwise, because lawlessness cannot be legalized. Were this allowed to happen then there would be no peace; nor would there be peaceful coexistence. Then we would be forced to take the necessary measures of a defensive nature which would protect our interests in accordance with international law. Why do this? What would it all lead to?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the U.N., containing his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals are to the effect that our side not ship any armaments to Cuba for a certain period of time while negotiations are being conducted—and we are prepared to enter into such negotiations—and the other side not undertake any piratical action against vessels navigating on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way out of the situation which has evolved that would give nations a chance to breathe easily.

You asked what happened, what prompted weapons to be supplied to Cuba? You spoke of this to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what prompted it.

We were very grieved by the fact—I spoke of this in Vienna—that a landing was effected and an attack made on Cuba, as a result of which many Cubans were killed. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake. I regarded that explanation with respect. You repeated it to me several times, hinting that not everyone occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you did. I appreciate such frankness. For my part I told you that we too possess no less courage; we have also acknowledged the mistakes which have been made in the history of our state, and have not only acknowledged them but have sharply condemned them.

While you really are concerned for peace and for the welfare of your people—and this is your duty as President—I, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Furthermore, the preservation of universal peace should be our joint concern, since if war broke out under modern conditions, it would not be just a war between the Soviet Union and the United States, which actually have no contentions between them, but a world-wide war, cruel and destructive.

Why have we undertaken to render such military and economic aid to Cuba? The answer is: we have done so only out of humanitarian considerations. At one time our people accomplished its own revolution, when Russia was still a backward country. Then we were attacked. We were the target of attack by many countries. The United States took part in that affair. This has been documented by the participants in aggression against our country. An entire book has been written on this by General Graves, who commanded the American Expeditionary Force at that time. Graves entitled it *American Adventure in Siberia*.

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to rebuild a country on new principles. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people. But we do not interfere in questions of internal organization; we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union wants to help the Cubans build their life, as they themselves desire, so that others would leave them alone.

You said once that the United States is not preparing an invasion. But you have also declared that you sympathize with the Cuban counterrevolutionary emigrants, support them, and will help them in carrying out their plans against the present government of Cuba. Nor is it any secret to anyone that the constant threat of armed attack and aggression has hung and continues to hang over Cuba. It is only this that has prompted us to respond to the request of the Cuban Government to extend it our aid in strengthening the defense capability of that country.

If the President and Government of the United States would give their assurances that the United States would itself not take part in an attack upon Cuba and would restrain others from such action; if you recall your Navy—this would immediately change everything. I do not speak for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba would, probably, announce a demobilization and would call upon the people to commence peaceful work. Then the question of armaments would also be obviated, because when there is no threat, armaments are only a burden for any people. This would also change the approach to the question of destroying not only the armaments which you call offensive, but of every other kind of armament.

I have spoken on behalf of the Soviet Government at the United Nations and introduced a proposal to disband all armies and to destroy all weapons. How then can I stake my claims on these weapons now?

Armaments bring only disasters. Accumulating them damages the economy, and putting them to use would destroy people on both sides. Therefore, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they

are a forced waste of human energy, spent, moreover, on the destruction of man himself. If people do not display wisdom, they will eventually reach the point where they will clash, like blind moles, and then mutual annihilation will commence.

Let us therefore display statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will be obviated.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh carefully what the aggressive, piratical actions which you have announced the United States intends to carry out in international waters would lead to. You yourself know that a sensible person simply cannot agree to this, cannot recognize your right to such action.

If you have done this as the first step towards unleashing war—well then—evidently nothing remains for us to do but to accept this challenge of yours. If you have not lost command of yourself and realize clearly what this could lead to, then, Mr. President, you and I should not now pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied a knot of war, because the harder you and I pull, the tighter this knot will become. And a time may come when this knot is tied so tight that the person who tied it is no longer capable of untying it, and then the knot will have to be cut. What that would mean I need not explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly what dread forces our two countries possess.

Therefore, if there is no intention of tightening this knot, thereby dooming the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, let us not only relax the forces straining on the ends of the rope, let us take measures for untying this knot. We are agreeable to this.

We welcome all forces which take the position of peace. Therefore, I both expressed gratitude to Mr. Bertrand Russell, who shows alarm and concern for the fate of the world, and readily responded to the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the U.N., U Thant.

These, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you should agree with them, could put an end to the tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.

These thoughts are governed by a sincere desire to alleviate the situation and remove the threat of war.

Respectfully,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

[Moscow,] October 26, 1962.

**CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE
OF OCTOBER 27, 1962²²**

Informal Translation²³

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is with great satisfaction that I studied your reply to Mr. U Thant on the adoption of measures in order to avoid contact by our ships and thus avoid irreparable fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part persuades me that you are showing solicitude for the preservation of peace, and I note this with satisfaction.

I have already said that the only concern of our people and government and myself personally as chairman of the Council of Ministers is to develop our country and have it hold a worthy place among all people of the world in economic competition, advance of culture and arts, and the rise in people's living standards. This is the loftiest and most necessary field for competition which will only benefit both the winner and loser, because this benefit is peace and an increase in the facilities by means of which man lives and obtains pleasure.

In your statement, you said that the main aim lies not only in reaching agreement and adopting measures to avert contact of our ships, and, consequently, a deepening of the crisis, which because of this contact can spark off the fire of military conflict after which any talks would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would begin to operate—the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only a first step. The main thing is to normalize and stabilize the situation in the world between states and between people.

I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the first duty of the president. However, these questions are also uppermost in our minds. The same duties rest with me as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. You have been worried over our assisting Cuba with arms designed to strengthen its defensive potential—precisely defensive potential—because Cuba, no matter what weapons it had, could not compare with you since these are different dimensions, the more so given up-to-date means of extermination. Our purpose has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can challenge the humanity of our motives aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire.

You want to relieve your country from danger and this is understandable. However, Cuba also wants this. All countries want to relieve themselves

from danger. But how can we, the Soviet Union and our government, assess your actions which, in effect, mean that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases, surrounded our allies with military bases, set up military bases literally around our country, and stationed your rocket weapons at them? This is no secret. High-placed American officials demonstratively declare this. Your rockets are stationed in Britain and in Italy and point at us. Your rockets are stationed in Turkey.

You are worried over Cuba. You say that it worries you because it lies at a distance of 90 miles across the sea from the shores of the United States. However, Turkey lies next to us. Our sentinels are pacing up and down and watching each other. Do you believe that you have the right to demand security for your country and the removal of such weapons that you qualify as offensive, while not recognizing this right for us? You have stationed devastating rocket weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey literally right next to us. How then does recognition of our equal military possibilities tally with such unequal relations between our great states? This does not tally at all.

It is good, Mr. President, that you agreed for our representatives to meet and begin talks, apparently with the participation of U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant. Consequently, to some extent, he assumes the role of intermediary, and we believe that he can cope with the responsible mission if, of course, every side that is drawn into this conflict shows good will.

I think that one could rapidly eliminate the conflict and normalize the situation. Then people would heave a sigh of relief, considering that the statesmen who bear the responsibility have sober minds, an awareness of their responsibility, and an ability to solve complicated problems and not allow matters to slide to the disaster of war.

This is why I make this proposal: We agree to remove those weapons from Cuba which you regard as offensive weapons. We agree to do this and to state this commitment in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a statement to the effect that the United States, on its part, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern of the Soviet state, will evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey. Let us reach an understanding on what time you and we need to put this into effect. After this, representatives of the U.N. Security Council could control on-the-spot the fulfillment of these commitments. Of course, it is necessary that the Governments of Cuba and Turkey would allow these representatives to come to their countries and check fulfillment of this commitment, which each side undertakes. Apparently, it would be better if these representatives enjoyed the trust of the Security Council and ours—the United States and the Soviet Union—as well as of Turkey and Cuba. I think that it will not

²² Broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m. Moscow time, Oct. 27, 1962; Russian text delivered to the American Embassy at Moscow at the same hour.

²³ Reprinted with corrected paragraphing from BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 741-743.

be difficult to find such people who enjoy the trust and respect of all interested sides.

We, having assumed this commitment in order to give satisfaction and hope to the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to increase their confidence in their security, will make a statement in the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of the frontiers and the sovereignty of Turkey, not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available its territory as a place d'armes for such invasion, and also will restrain those who would think of launching an aggression against Turkey either from Soviet territory or from the territory of other states bordering on Turkey.

The U.S. Government will make the same statement in the Security Council with regard to Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the integrity of the frontiers of Cuba, its sovereignty, undertakes not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade and not to make its territory available as place d'armes for the invasion of Cuba, and also will restrain those who would think of launching an aggression against Cuba either from U.S. territory or from the territory of other states bordering on Cuba.

Of course, for this we would have to reach agreement with you and to arrange for some deadline. Let us agree to give some time, but not to delay, two or three weeks, not more than a month.

The weapons on Cuba, that you have mentioned and which, as you say, alarm you, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore any accidental use of them whatsoever to the detriment of the United States of America is excluded. These means are stationed in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and only in defensive aims. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or an attack on the Soviet Union, or other of our allies then, of course, these means do not threaten anyone and will not threaten. For they do not pursue offensive aims.

If you accept my proposal, Mr. President, we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them exhaustive instructions to order to come to terms sooner. If you would also appoint your men and give them appropriate instructions, this problem could be solved soon.

Why would I like to achieve this? Because the entire world is now agitated and expects reasonable actions from us. The greatest pleasure for all the peoples would be an announcement on our agreement, on nipping in the bud the conflict that has arisen. I attach a great importance to such understanding because it might be a good beginning and, specifically, facilitate a nuclear test ban agreement. The problem of tests could be solved simultaneously, not linking one with the other, because they are

different problems. However, it is important to reach an understanding to both these problems in order to make a good gift to the people, to let them rejoice in the news that a nuclear test ban agreement has also been reached and thus there will be no further contamination of the atmosphere. Your and our positions on this issue are very close.

All this, possibly, would serve as a good impetus to searching for mutually acceptable agreements on other disputed issues, too, on which there is an exchange of opinion between us. These problems have not yet been solved but they wait for an urgent solution which would clear the international atmosphere. We are ready for this.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

[MOSCOW,] October 27, 1962.

Official Translation ²⁴

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I have studied with great satisfaction your reply to Mr. Thant concerning measures that should be taken to avoid contact between our vessels and thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part strengthens my belief that you are showing concern for the preservation of peace, which I note with satisfaction.

I have already said that our people, our Government, and I personally, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, are concerned solely with having our country develop and occupy a worthy place among all peoples of the world in economic competition, in the development of culture and the arts, and in raising the living standard of the people. This is the most noble and necessary field for competition, and both the victor and the vanquished will derive only benefit from it, because it means peace and an increase in the means by which man lives and finds enjoyment.

In your statement you expressed the opinion that the main aim was not simply to come to an agreement and take measures to prevent contact between our vessels and consequently a deepening of the crisis which could, as a result of such contacts, spark a military conflict, after which all negotiations would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would then come into play—the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only the first step. The main thing that must be done is to normalize and stabilize the state of peace among states and among peoples.

I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the

²⁴ Prepared subsequently by the Department of State.

primary duty of a President. But we too are disturbed about these same questions; I bear these same obligations as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed by the fact that we have aided Cuba with weapons, in order to strengthen its defense capability—precisely defense capability—because whatever weapons it may possess, Cuba cannot be equated with you since the difference in magnitude is so great, particularly in view of modern means of destruction. Our aim has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can dispute the humanity of our motives, which are oriented toward enabling Cuba to live peacefully and develop in the way its people desire.

You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, our Government, to assess your actions which are expressed in the fact that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies with military bases; placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your missile armaments there? This is no secret. Responsible American personages openly declare that it is so. Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey.

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable.

It is good, Mr. President, that you have agreed to have our representatives meet and begin talks, apparently through the mediation of U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations. Consequently, he to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator and we consider that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission, provided, of course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good will.

I think it would be possible to end the controversy quickly and normalize the situation, and then the people could breathe more easily, considering that statesmen charged with responsibility are of sober mind and have an awareness of their responsibility combined with the ability to solve complex questions and not bring things to a military catastrophe.

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and

to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council, as well as yours and mine—both the United States and the Soviet Union—and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I do not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect of all parties concerned.

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of [to] the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states.

The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighboring states.

Of course, for this we would have to come to an agreement with you and specify a certain time limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but without unnecessary delay—say within two or three weeks, not longer than a month.

The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak and which disturb you, as you have stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidental use of them to the detriment of the United States is excluded. These means are situated in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet

Union or any of our other allies, then of course these means are not and will not be a threat to anyone. For they are not for purposes of attack.

If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. President, then we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them comprehensive instructions in order that an agreement may be reached more quickly. If you also select your people and give them the corresponding instructions, then this question can be quickly resolved.

Why would I like to do this? Because the whole world is now apprehensive and expects sensible actions of us. The greatest joy for all peoples would be the announcement of our agreement and of the eradication of the controversy that has arisen. I attach great importance to this agreement in so far as it could serve as a good beginning and could in particular make it easier to reach agreement on banning nuclear weapons tests. The question of the tests could be solved in parallel fashion, without connecting one with the other, because these are different issues. However, it is important that agreement be reached on both these issues so as to present humanity with a fine gift, and also to gladden it with the news that agreement has been reached on the cessation of nuclear tests and that consequently the atmosphere will no longer be poisoned. Our position and yours on this issue are very close together.

All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus toward the finding of mutually acceptable agreements on other controversial issues on which you and I have been exchanging views. These issues have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting urgent solution, which would clear up the international atmosphere. We are prepared for this.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

[Moscow,] October 27, 1962.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 27, 1962²⁶

[WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1962.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek

²⁶ Reprinted from BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 743. This message was transmitted by the Department of State to the American Embassy at Moscow at 8:05 p.m. Washington time, Oct. 27, 1962; delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 10:30 a.m. Moscow time, Oct. 28. Text also delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington during the evening of Oct. 27 and released to the press.

a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this weekend²⁶—in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative—an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows:

1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.²⁷ I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms

²⁶ As transmitted to Moscow, this passage read "week and".

²⁷ As transmitted to Moscow, this sentence was joined with the following sentence with the word "and."

race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26th.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

**CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE
OF OCTOBER 28, 1962**²⁸

Informal Translation²⁹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of October 27. I express my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the peace of the world.

I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable weapons indeed.

Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are.

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons constructions sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.

²⁸ Broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m. Moscow time, Oct. 28, 1962; Russian text delivered to the American Embassy at Moscow at 5:10 p.m. on the same date.

²⁹ Text of a Moscow broadcast in English; reprinted with corrections from BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 743-745.

Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier messages—that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba.

A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban emigres. Perhaps so; however, the question is from where did they shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory, they are fugitives from their country, and they have no means to conduct military operations.

This means that someone put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana and for piracy in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time not to notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean of American ships from which everything can be seen and observed. In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they even shelled a British cargo ship.

In a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal their intention to invade its territory.

The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and disposing of the fruits of their own labor. The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over Cuba are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intimidate them, and prevent them from peacefully building their new life.

Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain indifferent to this. The Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with the means of defense against aggression—only with means for defense purposes. We have supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied them to prevent an attack on Cuba—to prevent rash acts.

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear. It is for this reason that we instructed our officers—these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers—to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Rep-

representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.

I note with satisfaction that you have responded to the desire I expressed with regard to elimination of the aforementioned dangerous situation, as well as with regard to providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, fraught as it is with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, spaceships, global rockets, and other deadly weapons. All people are interested in insuring peace.

Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibility, we must not allow the situation to become aggravated and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation fraught with grave consequences to the cause of peace has arisen. If we, together with you, and with the assistance of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense atmosphere, we should also make certain that no other dangerous conflicts which could lead to a world nuclear catastrophe would arise.

In conclusion, I should like to say something about a detente between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries that you have mentioned. We have spoken about this long since and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this question with you and to find a reasonable solution. We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tension.

Although I trust your statement, Mr. President, there are irresponsible people who would like to invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical steps and proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the means in question from Cuba, in so doing we, at the same time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with them and are not absolving ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people.

We are confident that the people of all countries, like you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly. We are not threatening. We want nothing but peace. Our country is now on the upsurge. Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and created the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are enjoying these values; they want to continue developing their achievements and insure their further development on the way of peace and social progress by their persistent labor.

I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that military reconnaissance planes have violated the borders of the Soviet Union. In connection with this there have been conflicts between us and notes exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane,

whose reconnaissance flight over the USSR wrecked the summit meeting in Paris. At that time, you took a correct position and denounced that criminal act of the former U.S. Administration.

But during your term of office as President another violation of our border has occurred, by an American U-2 plane in the Sakhalin area. We wrote you about that violation on 30 August. At that time you replied that that violation had occurred as a result of poor weather, and gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted your assurance, because the weather was indeed poor in that area at that time.

But had not your planes been ordered to fly about our territory, even poor weather could not have brought an American plane into our airspace. Hence, the conclusion that this is being done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the borders of other states.

A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 October, when one of your reconnaissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President: How should we regard this. What is this: A provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step? And all the more so since the U.S. Government and Pentagon long ago declared that you are maintaining a continuous nuclear bomber patrol. Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you are assuming, especially now, when we are living through such anxious times.²⁰

I should like to express the following wish; it concerns the Cuban people. You do not have diplomatic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports that American planes are making flights over Cuba.

We are interested that there should be no war in the world, and that the Cuban people should live in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in Cuba. Under such a treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent there officers, instructors, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zootechnicians, irrigators, land reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor drivers, and others. We are concerned about them.

I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that violation of Cuban airspace by American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this to happen, it would better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise.

We must be careful now and refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the defense of

²⁰ See the official translation below for a paragraph omitted here.

the states involved in the conflict, which could only cause irritation and even serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason, and refrain from such steps.

We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we went through a terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people trust their Government, and we assure our people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences a war would bring upon them. But we are confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed and peace and the security of the peoples will be insured.

In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General U Thant and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

[Moscow,] October 28, 1962.

Official Translation ³¹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of October 27, 1962. I express my satisfaction and appreciation for the sense of proportion you have displayed, and for your understanding of the responsibility you now bear for the preservation of peace throughout the world.

I regard with great understanding your apprehension and the apprehension of the people of the United States of America over the fact that the weapons which you describe as offensive are indeed terrible weapons.

Both you and we understand what kind of weapons they are.

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible a conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give confidence to all peoples longing for peace, and to reassure the people of America, who, I am sure, want peace as much as the peoples of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to previously issued instructions for the cessation of further work at the weapons construction sites, has issued a new order to dismantle the weapons, which you describe as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I would like to repeat, as I have already stated in my previous letters, that the

³¹ Prepared subsequently by the Department of State.

Soviet Government has extended economic aid as well as arms to the Government of Cuba, since Cuba and the Cuban people have constantly been under the continual threat of an invasion of Cuba.

A piratical vessel has shelled Havana. It is said that irresponsible Cuban émigrés did the shooting. This is possibly the case. But the question arises: from where did they shoot? After all, these Cubans have no territory; they are fugitives from their homeland; they have no funds for conducting military actions.

This means that someone put into their hands the weapons for shelling Havana and for piratical acts in the Caribbean, in Cuban territorial waters. It is unthinkable in our time that a pirate ship could pass unnoticed, particularly considering the saturation of the Caribbean with American ships from which literally all of this is seen and observed. And in such circumstances pirate ships freely roam about Cuba, shell Cuba, and carry out piratical attacks upon peaceful cargo ships. It is, after all, known that they even shelled a British freighter.

In short, Cuba has been under a continual threat from aggressive forces that have not concealed their intention to invade Cuba's territory.

The Cuban people wish to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and to enjoy the fruits of their labor. The threat of a Cuban invasion and all the other designs aimed at surrounding Cuba with tension are designed to engender uncertainty in the Cuban people, to intimidate them, and to hinder them in freely building their new life.

Mr. President, I want to say clearly once again that we could not be indifferent to this, and so the Soviet Government decided to help Cuba with means of defense against aggression—means only for purposes of defense. We placed means of defense there, means which you call offensive. We placed them there in order that no attack might be made against Cuba and that no rash acts might be permitted.

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that no attack would be made on Cuba and that no invasion would take place—not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other countries of the Western Hemisphere, as your same message pointed out. In view of this, the motives which prompted us to give aid of this nature to Cuba no longer prevail. Hence, we have instructed our officers (these means, as I have already reported to you, are in the hands of Soviet officers) to take the necessary measures to stop the construction of the facilities indicated, and to dismantle and return them to the Soviet Union. As I have already informed you in my letter of October 27, we are prepared to come to an agreement with you to

enable representatives of the U.N. to verify the dismantling of these means.

In this way, on the basis of the assurances you have made and of our orders to dismantle, there appear to exist all the necessary conditions for the elimination of the conflict which has arisen.

I note with satisfaction that you have echoed my desire that this dangerous situation be eliminated and also that conditions be created for a more thorough appraisal of the international situation, which is fraught with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocket technology, space ships, global rockets, and other lethal weapons. All mankind is interested in ensuring peace.

Therefore, we who bear great trust and responsibility must not permit the situation to become aggravated but must eliminate breeding grounds where dangerous situations are created, fraught with serious consequences for the cause of peace. And if we, together with you and other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense situation, we must also concern ourselves with seeing that other dangerous conflicts do not arise which might lead to a world thermonuclear catastrophe.

In conclusion, I should like to say something about the improvement of relations between NATO and the states of the Warsaw Pact, which you mention. We spoke of this a long time ago, and are ready to continue exchanging opinions with you on this question and to find a reasonable solution. We also wish to continue to exchange opinions on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, on general disarmament, and on other questions relating to relaxation of international tensions.

Mr. President, I place belief in your statement. On the other hand there are irresponsible people who would like to carry out an invasion of Cuba at this time and thereby unleash a war. If we take practical steps and announce the dismantling and evacuation of the above-mentioned means from Cuba, in doing so we at the same time want the Cuban people to be sure that we are with them and are not relieving ourselves of the responsibility of granting aid to the Cuban people.

We are convinced that the peoples of all countries will, like yourself, Mr. President, understand me correctly. We do not threaten. We desire only peace. Our country is now on the upswing. Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and have created the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are making use of these values and want to develop their achievements further and by their steadfast labor to ensure even greater growth along the path of peace and social progress.

I should like, Mr. President, to remind you that military aircraft of a reconnaissance nature have violated the frontiers of the Soviet Union—over which matter we had a controversy with you, and

an exchange of notes took place. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 aircraft, whose reconnaissance flight over the U.S.S.R. led to the disruption of the summit meeting in Paris. You took a correct position at the time in condemning that criminal action on the part of the previous Administration of the United States.

But during your term of office as President, a second case of violation of our frontier by an American U-2 aircraft has taken place in the Sakhalin area. We informed you of this violation on August 30. You then replied that this violation had occurred as a result of bad weather and gave assurances that it would not be repeated. We accepted your assurances because there was, indeed, bad weather in that area at the time.

However, if your aircraft had not been given a mission to fly near our territory, then even bad weather could not have led an American aircraft into our air space. The conclusion follows that this is done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the frontiers of other states.

An even more dangerous case occurred on October 28, when your reconnaissance aircraft invaded the northern area of the Soviet Union, in the area of the Chukotski Peninsula, and flew over our territory. One asks, Mr. President, how we should regard this. What is this—a provocation? Your aircraft violates our frontier, and this happens at a time as troubled as the one through which we are now passing, when everything has been put in battle readiness. For an intruding U.S. aircraft can easily be taken for a bomber with nuclear weapons, and that can push us toward a fatal step. All the more so, because the U.S. Government and the Pentagon have long been saying that you continually maintain bombers with atomic bombs in the air. Therefore, you can imagine what kind of responsibility you assume, especially during such an anxious time as the present.

I should like to ask you to assess this correctly and to take steps accordingly, to prevent it from serving as a provocation to touch off a war.

I should also like to express to you the following wish. Of course, this is the Cuban people's affair—you do not at present maintain diplomatic relations, but through my officers in Cuba I have reports that American planes are conducting flights over Cuba.

We are interested in not having any war at all in the world and in the Cuban people's being able to live in peace. But, in addition to this, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in Cuba. By agreement with the Cuban Government, we have there officers and instructors who are training the Cubans; they are mainly ordinary people, including specialists, agronomists, animal husbandry technicians, irrigation and reclamation experts, common laborers, tractor drivers, and others. We have concern for them.

I should like to ask you, Mr. President, to bear in mind that a violation of Cuban air space by American aircraft may also have dangerous consequences. And if you do not want that, no cause should be given for the creation of a dangerous situation.

We must now be very cautious and refrain from any acts that would not help in the defense of the states involved in the controversy, but which could arouse only irritation, and even prove to be a provocation for a fatal step. We must therefore display sense and wisdom, and refrain from acts of that kind.

We value peace, perhaps even more than other peoples, because we experienced a terrible war against Hitler. But our people will not flinch in the face of any ordeal; our people trust their own government, and we assure our own people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not escape the responsibility and the grave consequences that war will bring to them. We are confident, however, that reason will prevail, that war will not be unleashed, and that the peace and security of peoples will be ensured.

In regard to the current negotiations of Acting Secretary General U Thant, with representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent to New York V. V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., with a view to assisting Mr. Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

[Moscow,] *October 28, 1962.*

**PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE
OF OCTOBER 28, 1962 ³²**

[WASHINGTON,] *October 28, 1962.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am replying at once to your broadcast message of October twenty-eight, even though the official text has not yet reached me, because of the great importance I attach to moving forward promptly to the settlement of the Cuban crisis. I think that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable. So I welcome this message and consider it an important contribution to peace.

The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations, as your message says, so that the United States in turn will be able to remove ³³ the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area.

You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American aircraft in the area of the Chukotsk Peninsula. I have learned that this plane, without arms or photographic equipment, was engaged in an air sampling mission in connection with your nuclear tests. Its course was direct from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning south, the pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him over Soviet territory. He immediately made an emergency call on open radio for navigational assistance and was guided back to his home base by the most direct route. I regret this incident and will see to it that every precaution is taken to prevent recurrence.

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

³² Reprinted from BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 745-746. This message was transmitted by the Department of State to the American Embassy at Moscow at 5:03 p.m. Washington time, Oct. 28, 1962; delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 6:08 a.m. Moscow time, Oct. 29. Text also delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington on Oct. 28 and released to the press at 4:35 p.m. on that date.

³³ As transmitted to Moscow, the text read "in turn can remove".

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

TREATY INFORMATION

Convention and Uniform Law on Wills Adopted by Diplomatic Conference

*Department Announcement*¹

Representatives of 48 countries meeting at the State Department in Washington from October 16 to October 26 have produced a convention and uniform law providing for an "international will."

The number of countries participating at the conference was greater than that at any previous diplomatic conference held to adopt a uniform law in the field of private law. The conference was also the first private law conference for which the United States has served as host.

The treaty and annexed uniform law produced by the conference have great practical importance. At present, for example, a will made in the United States according to the formalities prescribed by our law could fail to meet the formal requirements for disposi-

tion of property located in another country. Consequently the will might not be enforced in that country. Under the convention, however, if the maker of the will has complied with the simple provisions regarding signing and witnesses, and if the necessary certificate has been made out, the will must be accepted as to form by the courts of all other countries that are parties to the convention. This should result in substantial saving of time and money in probating wills disposing of property in two or more countries.

The new international will is an addition to and not a replacement for existing forms of will. International acceptability will undoubtedly be a strong inducement to make a will according to the simple requirements of the uniform law. Thus in an increasingly mobile world this new convention marks another advance toward the elimination of legal disputes, delays, and uncertainties.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Lesotho, September 27, 1973.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic (with a statement), July 5, 1973.

Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.²

Acceptance deposited: Panama, August 13, 1973.

Exhibitions

Convention relating to international exhibitions, as amended. Done at Paris November 22, 1928. Entered into force January 17, 1931; for the United States June 24, 1968. TIAS 6548, 6549.

Accession deposited: Australia, September 27, 1973.

¹ Issued on Oct. 30 (press release 397).

² Not in force for the United States.

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, relating to international expositions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.²

Accession deposited: Australia, September 27, 1973.

Judicial Procedure

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an international will, with annex. Done at Washington October 26, 1973.²

Signatures: Republic of China, Iran, Sierra Leone, United States, October 27, 1973; Laos, October 30, 1973; Holy See, November 2, 1973.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.²

Ratification deposited: Japan, September 27, 1973.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.

Ratification deposited: Sudan, October 31, 1973.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 30, 1973 (with declarations).

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 30, 1973.

Property—Industrial

Locarno agreement establishing an international classification for industrial designs, with annex. Done at Locarno October 8, 1968. Entered into force April 27, 1971; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7420.

Ratification deposited: Hungary (with a declaration), September 28, 1973.

Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance. Done at Washington February 2, 1971.²

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, October 16, 1973.

Entered into force: October 16, 1973.

Tourism

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization. Done at Mexico City September 27, 1970.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 30, 1973.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 23, 1972.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 30, 1973 (with a declaration).

BILATERAL

Switzerland

Amendment to the agreement of December 30, 1965 (TIAS 6059), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington November 2, 1973. Enters into force on the date on which each government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage.

World Wildlife Conference—Efforts To Save Endangered Species. Contains remarks by Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton, a message from President Nixon read by Secretary Morton, and statements made by Russell E. Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, at the World Wildlife Conference held at Washington February 12-March 2. Also contains the text of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and a list of animals threatened with extinction. Pub. 8729. General Foreign Policy Series 279. 30 pp. 50¢. (Cat. No. S1.71:279).

Remote Sensing for Earth Resources. Agreement with Brazil. TIAS 7600. 9 pp. 20¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7600).

Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground—Expanded Use of Ascension Island. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 7602. 5 pp. 15¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7602).

Fisheries—Shrimp. Agreement, with agreed minute and exchanges of notes, with Brazil. TIAS 7603. 19 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7603).

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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394	10/30	U.S. note to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Oct. 26.
*395	10/29	National Review Board for the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West, Nov. 19.
396	10/30	U.S. offers cotton textile import increases.
397	10/30	Diplomatic Conference on Wills, Oct. 16-26.
*398	11/2	Newsom to visit Africa, Nov. 5-17.
†399	11/2	International Scientific and Technological Conference on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Oct. 23-26.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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