

Statement by Dr. Miro Cardona on His Resignation

MIAMI, April 18 (AP)—Following is the text of the translation of a statement in Spanish made public today by Dr. José Miro Cardona, who resigned as president of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

Resignation

It is my duty to approach the Cuban Revolutionary Council to present the resignation of the post which I have held until today and to which I was voted into on the 22d of March, 1961, by the voluntary majority of the organizations and personalities to whom I now have the honor of approaching.

The only reason for my irrevocable decision is extremely grave. Its basis could create transitory haste among the compatriots who anxiously await the minute of liberation. Despite this—and with awareness of the great responsibility that is mine, with knowledge of all the consequences implicated by my resolution, which puts an end to a tormented conflict of motives—a personal duty to my loyalty prompts me to anxiously correct (straighten out) this crisis.

Past Events

Before giving the cause for my irrevocable decision I must surmise events that transpired after the 17th of April, 1961. I chose to remain absolutely silent on matters between the United States and its attitude on the council's plans, believing that in this way I could better serve the cause. This decision impaired me, until today, from clarifying situations which the exiles demanded clarification on. I cannot deny them this, by any reason, now.

The two years that have passed since the debacle of the 17th of April, 1961, have been really hard and bitter ones for all the Cubans: for the men and women of the underground who were sacrificed; for the brave guerrillas in the mountains; for the proud political prisoners; for the heroic fighters at Girón; for the terror-stricken civilian populations of Cuba; for the bewildered emigrants; for the revolutionary organizations watching their ranks decimated in battle; for the council and for me.

My faith has not wavered under the blows of our adversaries; and I have not answered attacks purposely in order to avoid the sterile controversies that would ensue in the clear judgment of those who were justifiably impatient for results, and so as not to invite the return blasts of our enemies.

From the day of the episode at Playa Girón, which we shall describe at length, giving names, circumstances, precise dates and complementary data—we have worked feverishly for the native land of us all. To get back on the track after the disaster, we put Cuba above our personal griefs. We were

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Resignation From Cuban

Exile Council

able, therefore, to stifle our anger, close out rancor, refuse to listen to the ungrateful cries of wounded pride and offended dignity.

Once free of these hostile sentiments, we began the enormous task of reconstructing the plans of our lost revolution.

2 Important Days: April 20 and May 4, 1961

The 20th of April, 1961, the Honorable President Kennedy—who with exemplary honesty in a chief executive—had taken all the responsibility for the disastrous experiment, also declared his "decision not to abandon Cuba," and announced to the hemisphere that if the nations of Latin America did not do their duty the United States would comply with its obligations under the international treaties and agreements.

Thirteen days later—the 1st of May, after I returned from a trip to Nicaragua, Guatemala and the Island of Vieques at his suggestion, accompanied by Drs. Maceo and Vazquez in an anxious search for survivors, President Kennedy, in an interview, planned with me the immediate future of Cuba. His offers of cooperation were definite and his backing was total and absolute. It was by his personal decision that the permanent financial aid was made possible to the widows and orphans of the expeditionaries.

In the same way, support was made possible for the underground forces in Cuba, and the first program of recruitment of Cuban volunteers in the various military units of the United States was planned for a training period of very short duration—later they were to be grouped with their own officers in one army corps at a time when we should decide would be opportune. In his name, I

invited the officers of the armed forces of Cuba (professional "rebels" for liberation) to participate in special courses in various schools of the United States, and they were destined to do battle on Castro's island. There were other facts decided which it is not necessary to mention at this time.

The period from May to October, 1961, was rough at times. We did not hesitate to express our disagreement with the methods and the tactics of the President's collaborators, always—let it be said—in a spirit of cooperation. By the 31st of October of that year, all of our differences had been ironed out and the agreements were put together in one "agreement" which history, in its good time, will record.

One sole thought fortified my daily fatigue: the assuredness that we were on a correct road that would conduce the reconquest of independence. It didn't matter that my adversaries denied me bread and salt. The alliance between free Cubans and this nation in deeds crystallized a "basis of mutual respect" to eradicate Communism from the country of Martí and reaffirm democracy, which was in peril of perishing in the American continent.

The Council's Activities

The revolutionary organizations represented in the council

coordinated their action with Cuba's clandestine forces and pushed the plans they agreed upon. The presiding organization (the council) also had to take the struggle to other fronts. We met in October before the Inter-American Press Society in an attempt to sway continental public opinion in favor of Cuba.

The backing of the newsmen of the continent was unanimous before the Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (Oct. 1961), to denounce Castro's crimes and hold back the increasing wave of firing squad executions; before the North American [U.S.] Senate on Dec. 6, 1961, to oppose with just reasons the relo-

cation of Cuban exiles, who to date are being dispersed throughout the nation; before the Inter-American Commission of Peace of the Organization of American States (26 of December, 1961), which was in-charge of harmonizing and substantiating the leanings of Peru and Colombia, in order to provide conclusive data regarding the nature of the regime installed in Cuba, its threat to the hemisphere, its ties with the Soviet Union and Communist China; and the repeated violations of all human rights. The council also conducted interviews with diplomatic personalities from throughout the hemisphere.

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The Honorable Dean Rusk

Once the agreed action by the revolutionary organizations was under way (November and December, 1961), on the 18 of January 1962, we had a long and very pleasant interview with the Honorable Secretary of State for a briefing on the policy to be developed at the conference of ministers which was to take place at Punta del Este, Uruguay.

At this time, too, I was bearer of a message from the university student group to the distinguished chancellor. After analyzing the positions of all the nations, he politely put an end to the interview with these words:

"I assure you that the declaration of Sag José de Costa Rica will not be repeated and I beg that you convey to your people that the United States will not allow Communism to continue in Cuba. I shall inform the president of your points of view tonight. He will be very happy to know them. We are in agreement, the three of us, he, you and I."

We immediately set out for Uruguay. There we discussed the destiny of our country. We contributed to the best of our ability and within our limitations to the unification of American thinking. The hemisphere ranks closed solidly behind the Cuban struggle and exile: the right of individual and collective defense of the na-

tions of America in danger was consecrated; other measures were agreed upon. It was a brilliant and productive meeting in terms of the results. We came back jubilant. A long, complex and difficult chapter had been completed—the diplomatic negotiations—and now we could again begin the other one again, that is, military action. All indications were that we had witnessed the beginning of great events.

Richard N. Goodwin and McGeorge Bundy

Upon returning to Miami after the Punta del Este conference, we were called upon to leave for Washington to make urgent arrangements in behalf of the prisoners of war, whose "status" as such, Fidel Castro had denied in the turbulent maneuvering of the famous

trial. On this occasion, Dr. Varona and I went. We held several interviews with high officials of the Department of State, especially with Mr. Richard N. Goodwin, one of President Kennedy's closest collaborators.

With this official we discussed, besides the matter of the prisoners, various aspects of the Cuban problem; but on this occasion he avoided speaking. Instead of answering questions, he asked them. In my judgment his attitude was in contrast to the personal assurances expressed to me by the Honorable President in the interviews of the 4 of May, the 13 of July and repeated in writing in a letter addressed to me on the 25 of September, at which time we settled one of the crises I referred to earlier and which formally put an end to the "agreement" of October to which I have referred. Inasmuch as Mr. Goodwin expressed his questions about Cuba with visible distaste, I then and there requested an interview with President Kennedy.

We returned to Miami, informed the council, and in the hope that our audience would be granted, we again left for Washington. This was necessary after the announcement made by Castro of holding the iniquitous and illegal trial. In the making of the agonizing negotiations to which I will presently refer, I repeated my request for an audience with the President for Dr. Varona and myself.

We were shifted to another personage this time Mr. McGeorge Bundy. The conversation was short, but cold, imprecise, dilatory, vague. He would not state his opinion. The serenity of the punctilious gentleman was slightly ruffled only once at the certainty of an expression of Dr. Varona's concerning the fate of the prisoners who were to be sentenced the following day, the 29th of March. The great vigil of all the exiles!

I recall making the following statement: "Prevented from joining my duty as an attorney for the brigade, I send them a heartfelt salute. Among them is my son. I am at his side and proud of him. May he accept his fate with dignity. It is a privilege to suffer and die for one's country. May God help him."

Dr. Varona agreed with me

that I would stay in Washington until the end of the trial and to try in addition to have an interview with President Kennedy. He returned to Miami.

The negotiations to which I referred before were continued. We directed ourselves to the representative of the Nuncio of the Holy See in Washington, to all the embassies and by cablegrams to all the governments of the world. We were not asking clemency. We invoked the stipulations of the Geneva Convention concerning prisoners of war with the end of preventing the illegal and wicked trial. Cuba was a signer of the agreement.

For satisfaction and for our honor, the Chancellor of the Dominican Republic, Dr. José Bonilla Atlés, was the lawyer of the Cuba of [José] Martí in the Organization of American States.

He worked in an indefatigable manner until he achieved agreement on a declaration supporting the thesis stated by the council with the "inevitable abstention" of Mexico and Brazil.

The United Nations organization was deaf, as always, to our appeals. The neutralists of the useless and prejudicial organization have a narrow concept of human rights when they are injured by a Communist regime.

Robert F. Kennedy

In the course of these days, came an interview which seemed decisive for the destinies of Cuba with a person of indisputable value and essentially an executive. I refer to the Attorney General, the Honorable Robert F. Kennedy. This interview was made possible by two reporters -- in truth friends of Cuba -- Hal Hendrix and Jay Mallin, both of the editorial staff of The Miami News. I formulated two suggestions to Mr. Kennedy.

The first, for its urgency, was the liberation of the prisoners, a question which Mr. Goodwin had upset and delayed. After hearing me with singular attention and considering the arguments expressed, he promised to take charge of the solution of the affair. He consecrated himself to the same with true devotion.

The second treated of the problem of Cuba. I made a resumé of the whole question and I showed him I was worried by the differences which I had observed between the vague statements of Mr. Goodwin and the certainties of the Honorable President.

To this he responded: "I am not informed of all the details, but I assure you that the policy of the President has not changed." He made an appointment with me for another interview on Tuesday, the 10th of April at 4 P.M.

Interview of April 10

After meeting briefly with the Attorney General at his request, he invited me to go with him to the President's house. I went, as on previous occasions, with Dr. Ernesto de Aragon. Richard N. Goodwin was there. The interview with the President lasted one hour. It was a satisfactory meeting.

At the meeting I analyzed the internal crisis in Cuba, the hemispheric crisis, the crisis of discontentment among exiles and the tormented position of the council. The meeting was not impersonal. The conversation was lively and he [Mr. Kennedy] assured me that the "problem is essentially military and requiring six divisions," that the council should contribute the major contingent of soldiers, and that we should not adopt a unilateral position because this would cause grave criticism in the continent.

When I informed him that the plan agreed on was failing, through delays in procedure, the excessive demands of certain physical conditions through the age limits agreed on and because the officers had not been invited, he addressed himself to Mr. Goodwin in a demand for explanations. He (Goodwin) gave assurance that I had not communicated my complaints to him.

"For eight months," I replied, "I have been coming demanding, almost daily, the carrying out of the agreement." With trifling opposition, the Honorable President immediately dictated orders for immediate carrying out of massive recruiting with elimination of all possible requirements and for formalizing an invitation to the officers. The interview, it is obvious, involved other aspects, which it is not up to me to reveal.

He ended the conversation with words I can never forget: "Your destiny is to suffer. Do not weaken. You have my support and I reiterate my earlier pronouncements. Give the council my most cordial regards."

I left the White House with the assurance that the liberation of Cuba would follow soon with Cubans at the vanguard in battle.

Crisis on the Council

I returned to Miami. The atmosphere of exile was rarefied. We were attacked "for not making war." The crisis broke violently in the council. Absences were noted in the session we held to give information about my negotiations. The council members, with a great sense of discretion, did not want me to be too explicit.

At the petition of Dr. Varona, it was agreed to approve the plans and a vote of confidence was authorized for me to implement them and a vote of congratulations for the patriotic work carried out by me was

possible to overcome the internal crisis but I lost the efficacious collaboration of figures relevant to the national life in the moments when they were most needed. Supplications were of no avail.

From this moment, under a tremendous barrage of opposition from the exiles, while the revolutionary organizations were carrying out acts of true

Cuban Distorted Facts, Washington Says Again

Special in The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 18—The Department of State said tonight that Dr. José Miró Cardona's document was "a distortion."

The department reiterated the comment it made Monday and repeated this portion of that statement:

"This Government shares with Cubans and others in the hemisphere the desire for a return of freedom to Cuba, but the issue of war or peace in this hemisphere, where it involves the United States, will be decided by the American Government."

merity, we made a census of possible combatants; we prepared without vetoes or exclusions, the lists of officials within the limits of the specified ages; General Lansdale came to Miami to discuss with me certain aspects of the military problem, which was not the easy solution and which implied inevitable delays.

While these questions were being reduced to their essentials, the council defended the right of Cubans to the sugar quota in the House of Representatives (May 25, 1962) under the direction of Prof. Arturo Manas, to whom I express my gratitude.

Later, for reasons of internal policy, I visited the nations of Central America and Panama (June 7 to 19 of 1962), to whose unity of thought and action is owed in part the agreements of Punta del Este. The exiles who were there received us with affection. I held interviews with all the presidents and foreign ministers. The visit of President Kennedy, which had just taken place, was sketched. We found the nations of the isthmus united, proud, in solidarity with Cuba, but defenseless.

The Recruits. The Meeting of Foreign Ministers

On returning, we had to wait for another lapse of time, which was inevitable. But it was an intense period of interviews with diplomats of Latin America. Meanwhile, Khrushchev was arming the island of Castro. The clandestine organizations offered great intelligence service. Many were the public judgments, all contradictory, which were formed about the rocket bases and the presence of Rus-

sian troops.

On August 25, in a press conference held for that purpose, we denounced the arsenal of the Antilles and the invasion of the Russian troops.

We solicited a naval and aerial blockade of the island, we alerted all the nations of the continent. At this time, came a bold action through the heroism of the revolutionary student directorate and the Monte Cristi group. One month later, through many conversations in the Pentagon, I was advised of a program for massive recruitment.

I was opposed to some of its aspects. My objections were accepted and on the 25th of September, the council made its proclamation exhorting the Cubans of military age "without distinction of age, of faith or of political factions to put aside all the attitudes and motives which separated and divided them and incorporate themselves in crowds in the ranks of the combatants."

On Oct. 3 (adjusting all the factors with perfect synchronization) an informal conference of foreign ministers was carried out. The communiqué sent out was a prediction of great events. The continent was closing ranks. I felt safe, in spite of the critics of the communiqué, which was described as insipid and intransigent and of the proclamation convoking the recruitment. However, the offices were filled with volunteers of all ages. The women also responded "present."

A Most Important Meeting: Adan Yarmolinsky.

In the month of October, I went to Chicago, invited by the Chicago Council, to hold a conference to commemorate the Grito de Yara (Cry of Yara). I was invited there to concur with a Council in the city of Miami with people of importance on Sunday the 14th at 3 P.M. The meeting was held.

Mr. Adan Yarmolinsky presided with the assistance of Mr. Robert F. Hurwitch, an exemplary functionary of the State Department and officials of high grade of the Pentagon. Dr. Varona, Capt. Ernesto Despaigne and I appeared for the council. The conference, which took place in the Carrillon Hotel on that Sunday, lasted exactly four hours.

We were asked with unusual urgency for the massive enlistment of Cubans of military age, even those who were arriving day by day from Cuba "who ought to enlist before registering as refugees." All was discussed, the relative aspects of the officials (rebels, professionals and of the liberation). The problem signified by the use of aviators was studied and the triple legal situation of the doctors (refugees, residents and North American citizens) and the classification of "eadres" and of "civil advisors" according to whether one was treating of professional officers or

rebels.

This commission worked all Sunday night and in the early morning hours of Monday. The recruits of Fort Knox were submitted to the intensive training. The crisis was imminent. We were eight days from the 22d of October. I affirmed myself in the judgment that the road followed had been correct.

One worry was tormenting me: the situation of the political prisoners; but I worked with more ardor than ever. We discussed the situation with the revolutionary organizations of the council which alerted without discretion their fighting

forces in Cuba. The economic corporations worked at an accelerated rhythm to assure supplies for Cuba in the 12 following months. There was great discretion, because the soothsayers of Miami were continuing to carry out their untiring critical function.

The 22d of October arrived. I was informed that the contents of the Honorable President's proclamation would be made public at 6 o'clock that evening.

The free world responded enthusiastically to President Kennedy's proclamation. The countries that had advocated absenteeism, neutralism, or indifference, aligned themselves with the United States. Many of them mobilized their forces.

The Cubans at Fort Knox (Kentucky) were alerted and eager for action. I handled all necessary matters. The council remained in a constant session and its members were kept in touch at all times. We waited. The 23rd and 24th were days of tension.

At 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 24th, I was informed "that the circumstances vary, but not the purpose and the projected actions are momentarily delayed." Khrushchev parleyed. I noticed that he (Khrushchev) probed for legal delays, which would favor the Soviet (Khrushchev) and his Caribbean deputy.

The date agreed upon arrived; the blockade was suspended. Public spirit deflated. The deed received complaints from the camps at Fort Knox. Disconfidence grew vigorously. It was futile trying to argue.

Return of the Fighters. Orange Bowl

Another intensely dramatic fact caused a rebirth of lost confidence. I refer to the return of the Girón fighters, whose morale had not broken in the two years of imprisonment. Those who did not return, those who succumbed in the arena were there in spirit. The survivors had returned with their slogan: to return quietly to save Cuba.

This moving fact was followed by another one of great political

significance. I refer to the presence of President Kennedy at the Orange Bowl ceremony. There before those men who had recovered the flag of the brigade under fire, he made a speech of unmistakable alliance with them. He spoke as the leader of democracy and he spoke as a leader. His words were vibrant, energetic, decisive and uncompromising.

He repeated to the world his obligation to Cuba. He thus con-

firmed the words of President Villeda Morales in the city of Miami after his interview with the President in Washington, when he said: "Soon, very soon, Cuba shall be liberated."

The Present Moment

From that moment, with despairing slowness, three more months passed. During the course of these months, at my constant requests, I have been receiving the same assurances offered earlier. Nevertheless, things have happened that are obviously in contradiction to them.

These are:

The continuing changes of position with ensuing relinquishment of viewpoints on which the United States has placed too much emphasis. I refer specifically to:

1. Direct on-site inspection which the United States made an irreversible condition after the peculiar mediation session with U Thant and the mysterious visit of Mikoyan to Cuba?

2. The withdrawal of the Russian soldiers—not the agricultural technicians which number more than the 20,000 reported by the Cuban underground—for which a date was set for evacuation but which never has been accomplished, thanks to the strategy and patience of the United States who should know by this time that Khrushchev will change his strategy constantly and his fighting tactics a thousand times if necessary in the pursuit of his objectives. For Communism, "word of honor" is just that—a word. Honor to them is an outmoded bourgeois prejudice.

The forced inaction of the revolutionary organizations. These two facts made me resolve to write the two memorandums of February 14 and March 28 through the office of the coordinator established in Miami after the 22d of last October, which eventually will be made public.

The Commando Tactics

Having sent the memorandums to which I referred (the first one obtained no response) two commando actions were carried out by Cuban groups (not North Americans) against Russian ships (not American) outside of the jurisdictional waters of this country. As a consequence of these, six disconcerting facts hit us in dizzying sequence, as follows:

1. The illuminating note of protest from the Russians advising the United States that they have violated agreements.

2. The note from the Department of State "censuring the Cuban action," which contra-

dicts the joint resolution of Congress of September, 1962. It is significant that the action carried out by the student revolutionary directorate and the Monte Cristi group before the 22 of October did not receive such expressions of disapproval.

Castro's attack on a North American ship was very suspicious. Fidel Castro has observed that all he has to do is observe the courtesies of diplomatic protocol, offer his excuses and they will be accepted. Before the broken agreement that Russia referred to in the note we mentioned, Fidel Castro had machine-gunned the plane piloted by the unfortunate Rudolph Anderson without calling forth any reprisals whatsoever.

His acts of piracy, the work of a real international delinquent, are by this time well

known. The continual capture of planes, the attack on the fishing trawler manned by Americans, the kidnapping of 10 Cubans who lived on a key, far from the territorial waters of Cuba and the United States. In these cases with his habitual insolence he added insult to violation of human rights. Naturally, he made no explanation.

The strict order that went out to various fellow Cubans, confining them to Dade County.

The embargo and immobilizing of Cuban ships, two of them belonging to the Revolutionary Council organizations, and, finally,

The most incredible and disconcerting of all the measures adopted: the notice to England to impede or pursue as the case might be, the Cuban fighters who navigate in the jurisdictional waters of England's possessions in America.

Thus, Fidel Castro enjoys absolute immunity in the execution of Khrushchev's sinister designs, protected by the best naval police service of the two greatest and traditionally democratic powers in the whole world.

Overcome with uncertainty, I justified the adopted measures with three lines of reasoning. This is what they were:

These measures find their justification in the necessity for covering an immediate act of war. I discarded this because in this case the 240 Cuban patriots who had completed their training would have been retained at Fort Jackson. I was informed in Washington that, over my protests, they would be given leave in a few days.

The measures were adopted, perhaps because Cuban actions were embarrassing to a very complex strategy. I discarded this one in my line of reasoning also, because, according to the agreement, I should have been advised in advance, as I was on the 22d of October, 1962.

The measures were agreed upon probably because they did not want to interrupt the slow process of evacuating the Russian technicians who make up more than a division of Soviet

soldiers, or the freeing of the North American prisoners. This did not satisfy me, either. It was too contradictory. The reason is obvious: on Oct. 22, the Russian soldiers were in Cuba, and the North American citizens were in prison as were the Cubans who were liberated much later.

Denying all the arguments, the facts led inexorably to this conclusion: the struggle for Cuba was in the process of being liquidated by the Government. This conclusion appears to be confirmed, strongly con-

firmed, with the announcement that every refugee has received his last allotment this month, forcing them to relocate.

This order ends, at the end: Each Cuban refugee carries with him the message of the true spirit of the Cubans; his love for freedom and his anxiety to convert the sadness of leaving his home into the inspiration of preparing for a more brilliant future in free countries.

This disposition, which directs the Cubans to a brilliant future in a nation not their own, is not self-determination. I wish to say that this is an order from the office of the coordinator who has controlled all, absolutely all of the activities relating to Cuba, since the 22d of October.

The Trip to Washington

Overcome with anguish, I left for Washington. My state of mind in those moments was known to a newspaperman, a friend of mine whom I respect and admire: Howard Handelman of U.S. News and World Report. "I am going," I told him, "to ask that the orders against these brave expeditionaries be countermanded, and above all, in search of light for the obscure corners of my thinking."

At the Capitol, free of the pressure of decision-making which had me in its grip for 48 hours in Miami, after calmly analyzing the facts, I adopted, in principle, the decision which I am today making known to all. I drafted it, nevertheless, as a result of my interviews. My mind was responsive to the slightest argument that would have offered me a minuscule feeling of security. The destiny of Cuba was hanging in the balance.

The Washington Interviews

The replies that awaited all the questions I asked, with a clear conscience and a passion, did not solve the doubts that, to the benefit of the United States, I had allowed myself. When certain things were not defined, even after I had been promised following the 17th of April, 1961, that I would be told beforehand of any intended political change, my doubts were erased and I was sure. The amassing of the circumstances to which I have made reference to constitute a series of reasonable indications and traces that inevitably lead to

the following conclusions:

Conclusions

First: the United States of North America have been the victims of a master move (play) by the Russians. With the scare caused by the installation of missile bases, which had to be photographed and his rapid acceptance of their being removed, as first requirement, Khrushchev proposing pacts which he will carry out has accomplished his immediate objectives:

To maintain his attack and subversion quarters in the Caribbean;

To strengthen Fidel Castro's military capacity to destroy (quell) the first intended insurrection; and

To consolidate the Communist regime in America, which is the first step toward pacific coexistence, immobilize the United States and in this manner the rest of the continent. Second: with the United States immobilized and Cuba caught in the strange discord of the psychological war be-

between two large world powers, it has become necessary also to immobilize the Cuban patriots.

Third: heroic and martyred Cuba, abused and starving, has been used as a card in the negotiating, despite the American Monroe Doctrine, the "joint resolution" of 1898, the Reciprocal Assistance Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, the agreements of the Organization of American States, the resolutions of Punta del Este, the self-determination of nations expressed in the Congressional resolution of September, 1962, and the often repeated offers of cooperation received by me.

Fourth: that the office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs recently was created and its agency in Miami is carrying out a rapid liquidation of the Cuban case, which is reflected in the following facts, among others: The precipitous relocation and relentless dispersion of the Cubans;

The fact of preventing at any cost even temporary establishment of bases of operation for the Cuban revolutionaries outside the territory of the union and its jurisdictional waters;

The persecution of the revolutionaries described earlier and inquisitorial interrogations.

These, in all their crude reality, are the facts. The repeated assurances, the constantly renewed promises, have been suddenly liquidated, without warning and without alternatives. Until today, I was certain—and it was not unfounded optimism—with a rational feeling of security, that Cuba would soon be freed by the joint action of Cuban and North American forces and with the ungrudging support both moral and material, of the majority of the other nations in the hemisphere.

But American Government policy has shifted suddenly, violently and unexpectedly — as dangerously and without warning as on that other sad occasion, with no more reasonable

explanation than Russia's note protesting the breaking of an agreement.

Mark well this fact: The attack on the Russian ship was not made by North American forces; the ship was not within the jurisdiction of this country. Such an agreement would have been repudiated with vehemence, not only by the Cubans but by all the free men of the continent. No power can twist the destiny of our country, because our freedom is not and never will be, negotiable.

In the face of this unexpected situation, which in one minute, destroyed the patient labor of the two years I have enjoyed the confidence of the Council,

I find no alternative to resigning from the thorny office I now hold. Nevertheless, in order that my conduct may be judged throughout all of this interminable process which again ends in desolate frustration, I should at this instant make clear the principles to which I have rigidly adhered in the course of these two years.

Alliance for Progress

First: I have maintained, and I maintain, that the "experts on Latin America" are not aware of the disaster overtaking the whole continent. They assure us that the panacea for all the social ills of our countries lies in the Alliance for Progress program. This is certainly a generous and necessary effort, the success of which, in my opinion, will depend on the eradication of the Communist regime in Cuba.

Isolationism and the Economic Embargo

Second: I have sustained and I sustain that the thesis "isolationism" is a criminal action promoted by those who fear armed action. The economic strangulation of total embargo, prolonging indefinitely the martyrdom of a people who have arrived at unsupportable extremes of resistance to provoke internal rebellion, cannot be justified unless we establish the moment of its termination.

To promote, or to attempt an insurrection determined on through desperation with coordinating it with military action planned from the outside, in a country dominated by terror, would lead to: (1) a repetition of the page from Budapest; (2) create the myth of invincibility for Fidel Castro; and (3) promote the deal for coexistence which America has just rejected.

World Conflict and Permanent Revolution

I have maintained, and I maintain, that Khrushchev would not start a world war on account of the presence of North American troops in connection with the Cuban fighters. Geographically, Cuba is outside the Soviet zone of influence. Khrushchev would not provoke armed conflict. He proved it, Oct. 22 of last year.

On the contrary, under the cover of his policy of threats, day by day he will increase his army of local Communists in

different parts of the hemisphere and continue to expand his American frontiers. Permanent revolution is his goal. Venezuela is already up in arms by Castro's order, Colombia is torn by Castro's order, Argentina is beset by constant convulsions and the Marxist ferment in all the rest of the nations is the terrifying forerunner of catastrophe yet to come.

Cuba Outside the Regional System

Fourth: I have been and I am opposed to separating the Cuban problem from the regional system and placing it within the world strategy which the imperial Russian Comintern manipulates for the purposes of its own hegemony.

The Cuban problem is essentially regional. To isolate it from the American community so that some day of some year to be decided unilaterally its fate may be finally decided, is totally unacceptable to us who look for an honorable alliance. It would be a desolate travesty of the sovereignty of the nation,

shall never accept as a gift of charity and under conditions, in occupied island.

The Alliance with the U.S.

We have said and reiterated that the Cuban-North American alliance is justified for reasons of profound roots in history and it joins in a perfect manner two permanent, vital and reciprocal interests of both peoples: (a) the independence of Cuba and, (b) the security of that nation, elements which give strength to and inform the political content of the joint resolution of April 21, 1898.

"Cuba is and of right ought to be free and independent," the legislative power of this nation said on that historic occasion. In virtue of that, the Rough Riders under the command of Teddy Roosevelt and the Mambises [fighters for Cuban independence during the war with Spain] at the orders of Maj. Gen. Calixto Garcia fought together in the hills of San Juan and brought an end to Spain's power in America. This declaration is of a permanent nature. It is in effect. From it was born the relations between Cuba and the United States.

Today our fatherland is converted into a Soviet province and the security of the United States is menaced by the Communist fortress of the Caribbean.

Our Reiterated Recommendations

For the reasons expressed before and many others which could be added, I have promoted an alliance with the United States with the understanding, for abundant reasons, that Cuba should be aided by the whole hemisphere. This obligation belongs equally to all the nations of the continent because the survival of the essential values of man and of heritage of

Western civilization is involved in Cuba now: God, fatherland and family; and as a consequence, the inestimable blessings which are: democracy, independence, liberty, justice and social welfare.

The fight which Cuban patriotism is waging is something deeper than the insurrection of a people against a typical American dictatorship. It is a fight against a phenomenon new in America: the installation of a Communist regime which needs the joint effort of all the

indispensable fulfillment of the treaties.

Interventionism

I am opposed to any form of intervention in the internal political affairs of another country, when, as has occurred in the past, the intervention is made for the benefit of the intervening power. But in the Cuban crisis exactly the opposite phenomenon exists. Since our fatherland has been invaded by an extra-continental power, the Rio treaty and other international instruments demand the joint action of the hemisphere to put an end to the intervention. These instruments expressly state that this form of action does not constitute intervention.

Holocaust

I have said and I am constantly repeating that by our joint effort we must raise a monument to victory and not an obelisk to martyrdom. For this reason, I have set forth constantly and with absolute clarity, the necessity for establishing an alliance on the basis of mutual respect for the purpose of taking joint military action.

This presupposes "coordination of all efforts" and "the presence of Cubans in the leadership and execution of the plans agreed upon."

I clarify my thoughts on the subject: we ask for coordination, we offer collaboration, but we do not agree to the exclusion of Cuba from the process. Our proposition was rejected in this case. We then demanded once again that we be allowed the same war potential that Fidel Castro receives from the Soviet Union, to emerge victorious from the struggle or to succumb—alone—in the holocaust. The response was adamantly negative. The doors were all closed. Inexplicably, they have been closed by our ally of 1898.

The fixed principles that have guided my conduct in this case I should say, for the record, not for the council, but for all my countrymen, that after my last conversations in Washington, I cannot believe the vague words that roughly sketch the confused perspectives of a distant and imprecise liberation, that is denied by the objective deeds of the present. Dominated by the specter of uncertainty and with my confidence lost in the fulfillment of promised securities, I cannot continue in the position of leadership of the council.

Cuba, nonetheless, cannot hold itself back in her struggle. She needs today, more than ever

before, all of her powers to mold in historic reality the nation that her founders desired.

The Revolutionary Council— which rendered without publicity an exceptional labor that shall be recognized at an opportune moment and receive the gratitude of everyone—should spread its ranks and confront the adversary, as always, with new resolve; examine actual reality with serene objectivity; re-examine its politics in relation to Cuba, Latin America and the United States, and continue the rough route. The Cuban patriotic fronts are inexhaustible, as are the moral reserves. May God help us all on this new journey!

I leave my post to be designated to another Cuban who, with equal love of country, but with more capacity and greater ability may accomplish better results in our obligated struggle. I shall continue fighting as I have to date, without counting the hours, until Fidel Castro and his shameful regime are destroyed, unless, by the will of God, the rescue of all our anguish and suffering comes before then.

JOSE MIRO CARDONA