

10/26/62 - Scali - 175

Frank Ball

ABC's state dept independent was in that agency's
 June room at 1:30 pm eating a ~~to~~ Bologna sandwich when he was ~~pleased~~
 by Alexander S. Fomin, a ~~comrade~~ in the USSR embassy suspected of being a
 much more important informant functionary. He is some expert who is
 Abel felt it, asked Seale to lunch with him ~~and~~ had before. When ~~Seale~~
 Seale pleaded preoccupation, Fomin urged the ~~importance~~ of the ~~meeting~~
 meeting upon Seale & they both sped to Air Decid at Post, where Fomin
 immediately the following settlement of the ~~proposed~~ ~~174~~: 1) USSR
 with a view of missiles under a UH inspection; 2) ~~to~~ ~~accept~~ ~~no~~
 more "offensive weapons in future; 3) ~~us~~ ~~pledge~~ ~~not~~ ~~to~~ ~~produce~~ ~~later~~ ~~(if~~ ~~is~~
 certain this was not Fomin's language - it is not in quotes - but he would
 never have ~~misheard~~ those ~~missiles~~ were "offensive" but ~~what~~ ~~is~~ ~~the~~ ~~word~~
 him is ~~misheard~~, do ~~most~~ ~~of~~ ~~a~~ ~~pre~~ ~~pro~~ ~~gram~~ ~~drive~~. Fomin urged Seale to
 take this up at the State Dept & presence of Stevenson was to "pressure" this
 time at the UN he would find Zorin "interested". The remarkable thing
 is that this is more of a ~~concessing~~ than Stevenson would have ~~been~~ ~~asked~~
 had he been permitted to offer his original plan - but ~~that~~ ~~was~~ ~~is~~
 very close to his resolution. - which had not ~~committed~~ ~~US~~ ~~to~~ ~~do~~ ~~anything~~
 in the US to peaceful behavior & later had ~~you~~ ~~stopped~~ ~~I~~ ~~think~~ ~~it~~
 would have been apparent in ~~later~~ ~~could~~ ~~commit~~ ~~later~~ ~~but~~
 with any understanding it would have ~~been~~ ~~apparent~~ that
 one ~~promised~~ ~~peace~~ ~~later~~ ~~decided~~ ~~the~~ ~~missiles~~ & once ~~permitted~~
 the USSR had achieved its purpose in moving ~~back~~ ~~in~~ ~~it~~ ~~had~~ ~~no~~
 need to return them. This was ~~supra~~ ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~g~~ ~~necessary~~
 to ~~commit~~ ~~US~~ ~~interest~~ ~~to~~ ~~make~~ ~~of~~ ~~FK~~ ~~look~~ ~~good~~. Zorin did not, so he
 could have, made the proposal at the UN, openly or to others, for this
 would have put of FK under public pressure to soon it would have ~~been~~
 the ~~request~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~UN~~ ~~before~~ ~~it~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~ ~~adequately~~ ~~considered~~. Fomin
 thought the deal, outside channels ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~at~~ ~~all~~, but in a way that would not ~~be~~ ~~known~~ ~~to~~
 Seale.

106661 (scat-2) Sudi notes to Hillman, who decided this would be, in all hands,
"the first information that the USSR was sending for a way out." Both statements
Pruett's office, when the Secretary of State Lygia wanted to his yellow ruled pad
rather than to his secretary and ~~had~~ wrote out a message in red ink
cleaned with the white board by phone and told Sudi, "I want you to go back
to Hillman & tell him this: (177) US "Sudi red frontal it is in this" &
suggests representations of both governments "could work this matter out with U
Pratt & ask them." Sudi dictated the message at 7:35 in the Statler
lounge shop, almost next door to US R Embassy. (While this is fact, it is not
nearly so fast as Abel was capable of. On the other hand, it reflects her
little time for reflection by the US Govt, & perhaps most conspicuously, Abel's
account indicates it never had a clear chance to get lost in the US (Lynn)
Morrison's assurance that his reply came "from the highest
sources" Fermis ran off to "communicate immediately with the highest
sources in Moscow" (Abel words) Meanwhile, at 6 pm, a teletype message
started coming in from the US Emb in Moscow. Copy from A 177-181.

There is nothing in the way Abel quotes a paraphrase to justify
his comment & description ^{"containing"} "an argumentative" "verbal" "the importance of
a frightened man" Only in a mind dedicated to the justifications of US policy &
paraphrase would such a description occur. By the latter is an eloquent, person-
ate, straightforward expression of what should have been obvious from the
beginning. It is now why it exists & in no way suggests the USSR is going
to retreat from its position or its commitment or defend later. Or
completely explains its intentions (but as Abel presents it, not its reasoning of
how missiles would defend later, which they could not) It even in Abel's
version openly chides Kennedy for his description at Vienna over the Bay of
Pigs and then goes even further, implying Kennedy had "lost your self
control" & very stiff dice. It puts the ~~blame~~ blame of mutual extermination
directly up to Kennedy. And at the same time at least to show that all the
entire world would be already in later. It is honest in declaring the
would not speak for Castro (or so, even though this would have been a

Saudi-4 This eloquent & articulate man, powerful & respected despite
a record of consistent error in policy & lack of understanding, whose
failures had been ~~repeatedly~~ sustained only because of the tremendous
power of US arms, the magnitude of its wealth & the blindness of
the man which lets her drag every the major combatants with
her hand movement for her economy less hand, whose mind
& heart were in fact so to say laudable but not aware whose moti-
vation was just fixation of his own record, would have found John
Mafia's Hephales was of ~~the~~ glow from a halo blinder. Or suppose
she in this place & office and if the glory of the brought in hand
shown in all its glory from that land, or perhaps it would have
~~been~~ been the light of hell's fire. ~~Suppose~~ Suppose the stupidity or
the simplicity of the man who believed or at least would say that
"he had the Shumbarow on Shumbar" and his monumental
lack of understanding of ~~it~~ - a ~~man~~ man, in difference to the
magnitude of the catastrophe that could at any second through
~~the~~ any one of ~~a~~ countless thousands of errors or mischances
(some of which befell us) end civilization! He wanted to turn
his unexpressed Shumbarow on the unimagined ~~to~~ captive hand
"another turn a day" for untold days - any one of which
frustrated modern war - for nothing but the indulgence of hate!
What would ~~the~~ possibly have profited from his ~~stupid~~ ^{ADVICE?}
Only dangers & hazards beyond description, multiplying in
portifying geometrical proportions. Was there ~~any~~ any

Sec 5] chance of a better solution - a more favorable "deal" in his terms? There was not - and if there had been, there was absolutely no way the U.S. could have ~~been~~ ^{been} compelled to do it. It would not, in fact, even have ~~been~~ ^{DEMANDS} ~~been~~ ^{been} done. Events were soon to show the other metrics were all less desirable, but this man, who had built a reputation as a source of a great deal of wisdom in a record of failure tried his best to frustrate solution of the worst crisis in recorded history & direct those who ~~had~~ ^{had} seen the way out here provided. He had to be "drunk" like Park & Thompson (no mention of Bull!!) "to convince & liquidate this thing". Is it possible that liquidation of such an impending holocaust could come too fast?

The dreams & illusions these grown men, supposedly mature and acute of mind, here & now permitted themselves are more like the troubled night visions of a child whose development has been early arrested. They "thought they could discern the slope of an eventual settlement." Their ^{shifting} ^{prejudgments} ~~lost~~ ^{some of} stomach for a direct confrontation" (by then had he so carefully arranged and in the moment of truth, that pendant moment of history hanging like a drop of ~~the~~ dew on the very end of a twig, stood firm and declared "let it fall. Here I stand."?) He found the cost of what he had calculated in advance "too horrendous" - but Kennedy & Johnson & ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~going~~ ^{did} ~~not~~?

Scott-7

in George Ball's words "with a vast sense of relief."

and back at the "O.K. Cornell" in Foggy Bottom Roger
Hilsman left to two Soviet bastards spinning
the better ~~of~~ ~~the~~ "to make ^{sure} ~~the~~ ~~text~~ ~~contained~~ ~~no~~
broody traps."

Certainly reports who had been so completely lacking in
comprehension of what they had done to the world or under-
standing of ~~what~~ why the world would not let ~~it~~ ~~go~~ ~~to~~ their
policies continue; naturally such sinister men who accepted
all night but ~~to~~ was born to them who which practicing
international law like ~~a~~ Philadelphia lawyers, such
diplomatic shysters who had invented most of the
shady deals of recent years, would not trust
anyone else. Even if their hearts, hearts & minds had
been clean, they had the right & obligation to be as
certain & minutely possible about the true facts of
this offer.

But did concerned men have to suspend while
Herbert Sonnenfeldt & Joseph Neubert, Hilsman's
reports, spent the long night sus parting, studying,
analyzing & closing angles? While the common sleep?

Sudi's

Knowing of the possibility of the Turkey-missile plot
(and being relieved it had not been used) in itself should
have compelled some more some effort no matter how
slight & furtive, to take an option on the deal. Before
~~the~~ going home could not a query be sent to K. H. the
enclaving, teletyping, ~~according~~ teletyping, decoding,
message carrying & translation taking place
while they slept, or would they not have phoned
Dobrynin to slip over and pick up a little note, ~~for~~
with his legs ~~dragging~~ riding the mechanical
diplomatic pony express of the last half of the 20th
century. Could not they have slept after getting
W. from promptly or in promptly, at billet doors
for K. H. on his awakening, ~~sending~~ simply ~~the~~
"Dear Nikita - We understand you offer -----
If our understanding is correct, by your get a
deal?"

Everybody could then have gone to ~~sleep~~
sleep, & slept ~~in~~ in peace. And they'd have

ambushed a better deal than they later needed

Scena

They forgot that by their bed-thrives a part of the
deadline Robert Kennedy had given to the Democrats
had run out. They didn't think that they were not
~~at~~ alone ^{with} the power to impose deadlines. Nor did
they consider their deadline worked ~~against~~ against them
as well as for, or that there are all sorts of varieties of
deadlines.

With the first lull break in the clouds they imagined
the storm had passed.

So, they went home to sleep, "with a vast sense of
relief", leaving the world in crisis - for K. did not
know of the vastness of their relief - and he wanted
relief, too. But they failed to catch a better deal
than the one they soon grabbed.

PS to
Scali

Even the question of the removal of the missiles from Cuba did not really exist, for that, for, was in Khrushchev's hands. But so far removed from the normal thought processes of diplomatically handling the U.S. government in an era when it was ^{other} manipulated by governments of their ownable leaders like monkeys in a game of "chimpanzee" that it failed to detect the niceties of the ~~set as~~ ^{cut} Khrushchev, for all his pleasant origin and lack of formal schooling was careful to observe them.

The Russian leader was careful not to impinge upon Cuban sovereignty. Like wise, whether or not he intended the missiles as defensive only, he would not either acknowledge or claim that he ran the Cuban Defense Ministry. So he did not, as he would not of a government. In the language of diplomacy, which always permits a certain amount of double-talk in both expression & interpretation, he gave the necessary assurances: he "had reason to believe," in Khrushchev's paraphrase, that Castro would "allow to be his base." The only "force" that interested the U.S. were the missiles. ^{best of these,} again in Khrushchev's words, the "problem" would appear in a different light. ^{of the letter meant}

It depended on how the U.S. experts chose to interpret ~~these~~ passages of the letter. Khrushchev may not have intended the meaning here attributed to them. There is at least as much reason to believe he did. But whether or not he did, the fact that he might have should not have been missed by the Secretary of State, his closest advisor, his ^{with the} ~~once~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{best} man. The President of the U.S. had to counsel him. They may ~~pretend~~ ^{PRETEND TO HAVE} MISSED IT.

Scoti-PS

Abel agrees with the then & subsequent U.S. line that Kennedy was always careful to leave NK an "out," to use no more force than was necessary in another formulation, or give him a good pro quo. What he does not acknowledge is that it was NK who gave this surprising victory - his out - to JFK by the manner in which he handled the situation, especially by making it possible for the young President, who he throughout had ~~not~~ but himself wanted to pretend to be making the offer & dictating the terms. The opposite was true.

As the older man knew & probably anticipated JFK had committed himself so publicly & irrevocably that any other pretense for him other than that of "veteran" was political suicide, which he could not accept.