

10/26/62 - Scali - 8 175

Note Fresh Bait

A.B.C.'s State Dept. would present this in that year's
plan now at 1:30 pm fitting a to Strega Conference when he was informed
by Alexander S. Forman, a counselor in the USSR embassy anticipated of being a
much more important participant in it than any. He is some expert who is
able to fit it, as he used to think with him nothing had happened. When told
Scali pleaded preoccupation, Forman urged the US to postpone the ~~meeting~~
meeting upon Scali & they both agreed to the document of Post. While Forman
immediately the following settlement of the postwar crisis (176): 1) agree
with removal of missiles and no UH inspection, 2) US to accept no
more "offensive weapons in future," 3) US pledge not to invade Cuba if US is
certain this is not Forman's language - it is not in quotes - but he could
never have intended those missiles were "offensive!" but accepting the word
form is, unless agent, do honest & a propaganda device. Forman urged Scali to
take this up at the State Dept & former of Stevenson were to "persuade" this
line at the UN the world would find this "unacceptable." The remarkable thing
is that this is more of a concession from Stevenson would have been made
had he been permitted to offer his original plan - but ~~that was~~
very close to his resolution. "by which did not commit Cast to do anything
or the US to peaceful behavior to Cuba the more it applied to Cuba, so
would have been apparent in Cuba ~~that~~ could commit Cuba but
with any understanding it would have been apparent that
one promised peace Casto didn't need the missiles & once removed
the USSR had achieved its purpose in moving them in & had no
need to return them. This was superfluous, necessary
to protect US interest & make a PR look good. Cast did not, so he
could have made the proposal at the UN, openly or to others, in this
would have put of PR under public pressure too soon & would have forced
the rejection of the idea before it had been adequately too considered. Forman
planted the idea, outside channels immediately, but in a way that would not prove to
scant.

10/26/61 (cont'd) Salk wrote to Hissman, who decided this would be, in effect, "the first information that th. was searching for a very hot." Both statements prove this, while the Secretary of State again reiterates his yellow ruled card written down to his secretary advised wrote out a message in plaintext placed with the White House by phone and told Salk, "I want you to go back to Nixon & tell him this! (77) US "Says red friend it is in this" & suggests representatives of both governments "would work this matter out with U Thant & each other." Salk advised the message at 7:35 in the letter to the White House, almost immediately after Kennedy. While this is fast, it is not nearly so fast as Abel has implied. On the other hand, it reflects but little time for reflection by the US Govt, & perhaps most conspicuously, Abel's account indicates it never had a chance to get lost in the system. (ppm.) Upon Salk's assurance assurances that his reply came "from the highest sources" FDR in turn off to "immediately communicate with the highest sources in Moscow" (Abel writes) meanwhile, at 6 pm. a teletype message started coming in from the US Envoy in Moscow. (ppm) from A 77-181.

There is nothing in the long message Abel quotes a purplesses to justify his comment & description of it as "unintelligible", "verbose", "the most unnecessary & frightened man". Only in a mind dedicated to the justification of US policy, a propagandist would such a statement occur. As the letter is an eloquent, forceful etc., straight forward exposition of what should have been obvious from the beginning. It is now very difficult in no way suggests the last is going to retreat from its position or to commit itself to defend Cuba. Or crudely implies its intentions (but as Abel presents it, not its reasoning) how missiles would defend Cuba, which they could not) In view of Abel's version he openly blames Kennedy for his deception at Vienna over the Bay of Pigs and then goes even further, implying Kennedy had "lost yourself completely" a very stiff dose!! It puts the ~~class~~ choice of mutual destruction directly up to Kennedy. And at the same time at least. That all the intended missiles are going to Cuba. It is honest in declaring "I do not speak for Castro (ppm), even though this would have been a

Scall-3) normal & safe presumption for the U.S. to make, like make it specific from
the first). It says one ships about their upon agreement with the Thru's [sic] president
the Russian ships would be searched returning they had no such cargoes as
the American people military people wrongfully recognized " (this ends)
(but this was never done, so it is certain that Kennedy must
have been satisfied with what he thought. It was a very foolish offer if
he was lying.) This letter is a remarkable document of the reasons for
its suspension by the U.S. is ~~not~~ ^{it is} often apparent. The finding is
also origin of name may not be the reason and ignores it in
his book. On Moscow the letter was to be first translated, then
translated encoded too before the slow process of ~~type~~ tele typing
began. Either it was given to the U.S. Emb. at Moscow yet word of
the delivery of the same message to them of Rusk or Fomin was
not noted & after delivery the Soviets say about when the message
was handed over. The first fact is the more likely probability. In
the State Dept. as the typists pointed the long letter, it was
short by short, dictated then given to Rusk, who had Ball & Thompson
with him. why this had to be coded, especially under the cir-
cumstances, escapes me. It was a hideous waste of time & had
ended while the world waited on the brink. Rusk & company in
other words " kept looking for the ~~last~~ catch " What ~~about~~ blind men!
What evil & closed minds! How could anyone in Ich's position have been
tried to pull a fast one? Had he been seeking war, he would have
either pressed his button & sent the missiles flying, and he clearly explained
how the missiles would not be used to fight a war - only preventive invasion.

Rusk made a fearful mistake whose possible consequence can
only be imagined after setting to the leaves. He consulted Dean
Acheson. (I quote verbatim "marked part 17 182)

Scri - 4] This eloquent & articulate man, powerful & respected despite a record of consistent error in policy & lack of understanding, whose failures had been sustained only because of the treacherousness of US arms, the magnitude of its wealth & the blindness of the men which left the Army knowing the major combatants with half blind ignorance per ~~ten~~ economy law but, whose mind & heart were in fact so hopelessly twisted and whose motto ~~truth~~ was just fiction? his own record would have proved to Memphis tipholes ~~an~~ of the glow from a halo blinding. Or anyone else in this place & office; and if the glory of the almighty had shone in all its glory from that land, so blinding it would have been the light of hell itself. Imagine him giving the stupidity in the simplicity of the man who believed it best would say that "we had the Sherman on Shursho" and his monumental lack of understanding of ~~or~~ - a ~~was~~ was, in difference to the magnitude of the latest rifle that could at any second through ~~any~~ any one of a countless thousands of errors or mischances (some of which befell us) end civilization! He would do from his unexpressing Sherman on the imagined ~~to~~ captive hand "another turn a day" for weeks days - any one of which destined modern war - for nothing but the indulgence of hate! What would ~~we~~ possibly have profited from his ^{ADVICE?} Only dangers & hazards beyond description, multiplying in fortifying geometrical proportions. Was there ~~any~~ any

[Sect 5] chance of a better solution - a more favorable "deal" in his terms? Then we met - and if there had been been, there was absolutely no way the US could have been ^{DENIED} compelled it. It would not, in fact, have done ~~anything~~. Events were such to show the alternatives were all less desirable, but this man who had built a reputation as a Seer & apostle of wisdom on a record of failure tried his best to frustrate solution of the most crisis in recorded history & divert those who ~~wanted~~ saw the way out here provided. (He had to be ~~driven~~ like Rusk & Thompson (no mention of Bull!!) "to ^{shaking} ~~convince~~ liquidate this thing!" Is it possible that liquidation of such an impounding holocaust could come too fast?

The dreams & illusions these few men, supposedly mature and acute of mind, have & now permitted themselves are more like the troubled night visions of a child whose development has been early arrested. They "thought they could dismiss the Slope of an eventual settlement." Their last ^{shaking} ~~convince~~ some of whom was offered free (as was it Arheson). "Thruston" had no stomach for a direct confrontation "Lobby then had been carefully arranged and in the moment of Truth, that fateful moment of history hanging like a ~~day~~ of ~~doe~~ drew on the very end of a thing, stood firm and declared "Let it fall. Here I stand."? He found the last of what he had calculated in advance "the tremendous" - but Kennedy & Arheson & bombing did ~~not~~?

(Cont'd) Could they be human & not find the lost "horrendous"?

He had not even demanded - as he might have and soon offered as an alternative - the removal of ~~Amherst~~ as his master not 90 miles from his slave but standing on his ~~toes~~ toes in Turkey. (183)

Only Roger Sherman could add 1+1+get 2, which he apparently did among the intellectual acumen of U.S. diplomacy had the mental capacity to do (Jackson must have given him to play with his gifts - just as they did of Sherman (that ministerial brat). He put Sashi's offer & this letter together & saw what must be taught in freshman class honesty, that the kind of a state cannot put in writing what "he would like to own if need be." And at last, it would seem, that it was finally understood that Mr. had made a damned good offer, "his way of spelling out... the mutual shape of a settlement tolerable to both sides" (ibid.) (Nov. 1, 183)

So the "ad locum" just at 10 p.m. in "extraordinary session" Mac says, but did it ever have a session of other characters? They ~~don't~~ decided it ~~too~~ to that "the letter as a true title of property meriting a serious reply."

Fine! The world teeters on a cliff over oblivion and the cliff begins to shake. At 11 p.m. it is Dick Darlings to the rescue! ~~and~~ A whole committee of Dick Darlings. So what do they do? They let the world teeter and "went so bee"

Scal-7

in George Ball's hands" with a very sense of relief.

and back at the "OK corner" in Foggy Bottom Room

Hilsmann left to two Soviet bastions so running

The letter ~~of Stalin~~ ^{of} "to make ~~sure~~ ^{sure} the text contained no
boby traps."

Certainly experts who had been so completely lacking in
comprehension of what they had done to the world in under-
standing of ~~that~~ why the world could not let off ~~them~~ their
polices continue; naturally such minister men who enjoyed
all night long ~~to~~ writing to themselves which practising
international law like Philadelphia lawyers, such
diplomatic Shysters who had invented most of the
shady deals of recent years, could not often trust
anyone else. Even if their hands, hearts & minds had
been clean, they had the right & obligation to be so
certain & reasonably possible about the fine points
of this offer.

But did we never see how to wait while
Hermann Sonnenfeldt & Joseph Neubauer, Hilsmann's
experts, spent the long night ^{was} poring, studying,
analyzing & doping angles? While the column slept?

Sadis

Knowing of the possibility of the Turkey-missles flying (and being relieved it hadn't been used) in itself should have compelled some more firm effort no matter how shift & tenuous, to take an option on the deal. Before ~~the~~ going home would not a query be sent to Dzh, re enlisting, teletyping, ~~decoding~~ teletyping, decoding, message carrying & translation taking place while they slept, or would they not have planned Dzhypni & sleep over and pick up a little note, ~~etc~~ with his legs ~~string at the~~ holding the mechanical difficulties from issues of the last half of the 20th century. Could not they have slept after getting ~~etc~~ news formally or informally, a billet does for Dzh. on his awakening, reading simply ~~etc~~ "Dear Nikita - We understand your offer --- If our understanding is correct, by you've got a deal!" Everybody would then have gone to ~~sleep~~ sleep, & slept ~~for~~ in peace. Good ~~they'd have~~ ~~without better fact than their~~ ~~wishes~~

Scenes

They forgot that by their bid - twice a breach of the deadline Robert Kennedy had given to the Diby group had run out. They didn't think that they were not alone with the power to impose deadlines. In fact they consider their deadline worked against them as well as them, & that there are moments & varieties of deadlines.

With the first look break in the clouds they imagined the storm had passed.

So, they went home to sleep, "with a vast sense of relief", leaving Pace to work in crisis - for K.H. did not know of the vastness of their relief - and he wanted relief, too. But they failed to catch a better deal than them the one they soon grabbed.

PS to
Scali

Even the question of the removal of the missiles from Cuba did not really exist, for that, tho, was in Khrushchev's letter. I set so far removed from the Monroe thought processes of diplomacy as had the U.S. government in an era when it ^{other} manipulated governments & their internal leader like monkeys in a zone of "monopoly". That it failed to detect the niceties of the act as Khrushchev, for all his peasant origin and lack of formal schooling was care ful to observe them.

The Russian leader was careful not to impinge upon Latin Americanity. Likewise, whether or not he intended the missiles as defensive only, he could not either acknowledge or claim that he ran the Cuban Defense Ministry. So he did not, as he could not & even if he had run it, should he claim to speak for the Cuban government. In the language of diplomacy, which always permits a certain amount of double talk in both expression & interpretation, he gave the two necessary assurances: he "had reason to believe," in Abel's paraphrase, that Castro would "allow to belligerent forces" only "forces" that interested JFK were the missiles "out of there," again in Abel's words, for good. The problem "would appear in a different light." At what these passages of the letter meant depended on how the U.S. experts chose to interpret ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~passages~~ of the letter then. Khrushchev may not have intended the meaning he attributed to them. There is at least as much reason to believe he did. But whether or not he did, the fact that he wrote here should not have been missed by the Secretary of State, his closest advisor, his wife, a once Chief of the best men the President of the U.S. had to counsel him. They may pretend PRETEND TO HAVE MISSED IT.

Senti-ps

Abel agrees with me then & subsequent U.S. line that Kennedy
was always useful to have NT as "out," to use no more force
than was necessary in another formulation, to give him a good pro
gno. & how he does not acknowledge is that it was NT who
gave this seeming victory - his ret - to JFK by the manner in
which he handled the situation, especially by making it
possible for the young President, who he thought had
not his self entirely to pretend to be making the offer
directly on terms. The opposite was true.

As an older man doesn't formally anticipated, FBI had committed himself to publicly & officially that every other posture for him other than that of "victim" was political agenda, which he could not accept.