

1/25/62 - Almost immediately upon receipt of JFK's reply to his appeal to Thant, within minutes, a covered memo appeared in both JFK's & Loh. To the former, it was to "do everything possible to ~~keep~~ avoid a confrontation with Soviet ships for the next few days in order to minimize the risk of an unprovoked confrontation." To Loh, for the ships on the way to help in stay-out of the intervention line for a short while so the "modalities of a possible agreement" could be ~~discussed~~ discussed in line with the charter of the UN" (A.127) According to A, R put his "presidential intuition" to work in advance. He had ~~been~~ decided that the first ship to be boarded was to belong to a neutral - within the USSR or an ally of the US. (Which may have been as much p.r. as caution) Also according to A (168) "The undersigned of the Council of Admin. relations, for the most part, believed that even the limited present use was an extreme remedy" (check out all it will board low that is broken down than it would have been) But it is clear that the US showed signs of intervention which JFK didn't want & wouldn't stand that he had less international support than he wanted & needed, and that he could do nothing to speed things up. Once called upon by the UN, he couldn't ignore it, and the risk was too great to even want to.