

94TH CONGRESS }
2d Session }

SENATE

{ REPORT
No. 94-755

THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN F. KENNEDY: PERFORMANCE
OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

BOOK V

FINAL REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Note omission of Legat SA Eldon
Rudd's flight to Dallas and FBI's
11/23/63 viewing of alleged LHO
pix, auditioning of tape and JEH's
11/23/63 letter to Secret Service
reporting the agents say it is
not the real Oswald. Note also
relevance to withheld DFO 11/23/63
TT FBI HQ also returned to Dallas
at this general time.

APRIL 23 (under authority of the order of APRIL 1976)

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APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY

1959

January 1—Fidel Castro takes over the Cuban government. Batista and his personal aides leave Cuba.

December 11—Dulles approves "thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro."

1960

Late September—Bissell and Edwards brief Dulles and Cabell about operations against Castro.

Initial meeting between Rosselli, Malheu and CIA Support Chief. A subsequent meeting takes place in Florida.

1961

January 22—President Kennedy succeeds President Eisenhower.

March—President Kennedy raises subject of assassination with Senator Smathers, indicating his disapproval.

April—Rosselli passes poison pills to a Cuban in Miami.

April 15-17—Bay of Pigs invasion fails.

May 22—Hoover memorandum to Attorney General Robert Kennedy noting CIA had used Giancana in "clandestine efforts" against Castro.

November 16—President gives speech mentioning opposition to assassination.

November 29—John McCone succeeds Allen Dulles as Director, CIA.

November—Operation MONGOOSE is created.

December—FBI meets with Lansdale re: MONGOOSE.

1962

February 19—Helms succeeds Bissell as Deputy Director, Plans, CIA.

April—Harvey establishes contact with Rosselli.

Late April—Harvey passes poison pills to Rosselli in Miami.

May 7—Houston and Edwards brief Attorney General on pre-Bay of Pigs underworld assassination plot.

May 10—Attorney General Kennedy tells Hoover that the CIA has used underworld figures in an effort to assassinate Castro.

September 7—Rosselli tells Harvey the pills are still in Cuba.

October 22-28—Cuban missile crisis.

November—Operation MONGOOSE ends.

1963

Early 1963—William Harvey tells underworld figures the CIA is no longer interested in assassinating Castro.

March 18—Attack on a Soviet vessel off the northern coast of Cuba by members of Alpha 66, assisted by members of the Second National Front of Escambray reportedly occurs.

March 26—Attack on a Soviet vessel by members of Commandos L-66, another anti-Castro group, reportedly occurs.

April—Special Group discusses the contingency of Castro's death.

May-September—Lee Harvey Oswald moves to New Orleans; becomes involved with FPCC. He contacts anti-Castro Cubans as well.

Mid 1963—Series of meetings among major leaders of the anti-Castro movement.

June—Special Group decides to step up covert operations against Cuba.

July 24—Ten Cuban exiles arrive in New Orleans from Miami and join the "training camp" north of New Orleans. This "training camp" is directed by the same individuals who were previously involved in procuring dynamite. "A", a life long friend of AMLASHI, had helped procure the dynamite.

Late July—Carlos Bringuier is requested to assist exiles at the "training camp" in returning to Miami.

July 31—The FBI seizes more than a ton of dynamite, 20 bomb castings, napalm material and other devices at a home in the New Orleans area. Articles appear in the New Orleans *Time Picayune* on August 1, 2, and 4, 1963.

August 16—*Chicago Sun Times* carries an article that reports CIA had dealings with the underworld figure Sam Giancana.

Helms informs McCone of the CIA operation involving Giancana, and tells him it involved assassination.

August—According to FBI report, a Latin American military officer attends a Cuban exile group meeting and talks of assassination.

Early September—Talks between the Cuban delegate to the United Nations, La Chuga, and a U.S. delegate, William Atwood, are proposed by the Cubans.

September 7—CIA case officers, after their first meeting with AMLASHI since prior to the October 1962 missile crisis, cable headquarters that AMLASHI is interested in attempting an "inside job" against Castro and is awaiting a U.S. plan of action.

Castro gives an impromptu, three-hour interview with AP reporter Daniel Harker. He warns that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders will themselves not be safe.

September 12—Cuban Coordinating Committee meets to conduct a broad review of the U.S. Government's Cuban contingency plans. They agree there is a strong likelihood that Castro would retaliate in some

way against the rash of covert U.S. officials within the U.S.

Late September—Oswald Cuban and Soviet Consulate

September 27—The coordination listing assignments retaliatory actions by the CIA for attacks on U.S. officials w

October 6—FBI Headquarters.

October 10—The FBI is meeting with AMLASHI.

October 24—Jean Daniel interview with President Kennedy in Cuba. President Kennedy betrayed the revolution.

October 20—Desmond F. AMALSHI. Fitzgerald tells support. Fitzgerald is representative of Attorney General

November 1—Diem is assassinated.

November—Case Officer is told the rifles, telescopic

November 17—According to the home of a member of telephone call from Cuba w to leave the U.S.

November 18—President Tampa and delivers a speech

November 19—Castro confers to him about U.S.—Cuban re

November 20—CIA officers will be a meeting on November meeting he has requested.

According to FBI reports tourist card at the Consulate

November 22—President Kennedy

The Case Officer meets w Kennedy's speech of November gerald helped write the speech rifles with telescopic sights offers AMLASHI the poison with it. As the meeting breaks has been assassinated.

Daniel spends the day with news of the assassination.

McCone requests all Agency Mexico Station cables concerning them of Oswald's October visit

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way against the rash of covert activity in Cuba; however, an attack on U.S. officials within the U.S. is considered unlikely.

Late September—Oswald is in Mexico City and visits both the Cuban and Soviet Consulates.

September 27—The coordinator of Cuban Affairs circulates a memorandum listing assignments for contingency papers relating to possible retaliatory actions by the Castro regime. No responsibility is assigned for attacks on U.S. officials within the United States.

October 6—FBI Headquarters learns of Oswald contacts in Mexico City.

October 10—The FBI is told by an informant that the CIA is meeting with AMLASH.

October 24—Jean Daniel, the French reporter, conducts a brief interview with President Kennedy before setting off on an assignment in Cuba. President Kennedy expresses his feeling that Castro had betrayed the revolution.

October 29—Desmond Fitzgerald, a senior CIA officer, meets AMLASH. Fitzgerald tells AMLASH that a coup would receive U.S. support. Fitzgerald is introduced to AMLASH as a personal representative of Attorney General Kennedy.

November 1—Diem is assassinated following a coup.

November—Case Officer is told by Fitzgerald that AMLASH may be told the rifles, telescopic sights and explosives will be provided.

November 17—According to FBI reports, the Cuban-American is at the home of a member of the Tampa FI'CC. He is there awaiting a telephone call from Cuba which is to give him the "go-ahead order" to leave the U.S.

November 18—President Kennedy makes a public appearance in Tampa and delivers a speech on Cuba policy in Miami.

November 19—Castro contacts Daniel and spends six hours talking to him about U.S.—Cuban relations.

November 20—CIA officers telephones AMLASH and tells him there will be a meeting on November 22. AMLASH is told that it was the meeting he has requested.

According to FBI reports, the Cuban American obtains a Mexican tourist card at the Consulate in Tampa.

November 22—President Kennedy is assassinated.

The Case Officer meets with AMLASH. He refers to President Kennedy's speech of November 18 in Miami and indicates that Fitzgerald helped write the speech. He tells AMLASH the explosives and rifles with telescopic sights will be provided. The Case Officer also offers AMLASH the poison pen device but AMLASH is dissatisfied with it. As the meeting breaks up, they are told President Kennedy has been assassinated.

Daniel spends the day with Castro and later reports his reaction to news of the assassination.

McCone requests all Agency material on Oswald.

Mexico Station cables CIA Headquarters, 1730 hours, to inform them of Oswald's October visit to Mexico City.

FBI Headquarters dispatches a teletype at 9:40 p.m. to all field offices requesting contact of all informants for information bearing on the assassination.

FBI Headquarters dispatches a teletype at 11:00 p.m. to all field offices requesting they resolve all allegations pertaining to the assassination.

November 23—Director McCone meets with President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy and briefs them on information CIA Headquarters had received from Mexico Station.

CIA Headquarters cables the AMLASH Case Officer and orders him to break contact with AMLASH because of the President's assassination and to return to Headquarters.

CIA personnel on the CI Staff prepare a memorandum suggesting that Oswald's contacts in Mexico City with Soviet personnel might have sinister implications. This information is transmitted to CIA's liaison with FBI by telephone at 10:30 a.m.

Desk officer is put in charge of CIA investigation of the assassination.

CIA Headquarters telephones the Mexico Station to get the planned arrest of Duran called off, but learns the arrest could not be called off. Karamessines sends a cable to Mexico Station saying, the arrest "could jeopardize U.S. freedom of action on the whole question of Cuban responsibility."

Legat informs FBI Headquarters that the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico is concerned that Cubans were behind Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy. The Ambassador requests both the CIA and FBI do everything possible to establish or refute this Cuban connection.

FBI Headquarters dispatches a teletype to all field offices rescinding the early teletype of November 22, 1963.

November 24—Mexico Station dispatches a cable to Headquarters with the names of all known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City. Among the names in the cable is that of AMLASH.

At 10:00 a.m., Director McCone meets with the President and briefs him about CIA's operational plans against Cuba.

Cablegram is sent from Mexico to CIA Headquarters stating that the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico feels that the Soviets are too sophisticated to participate in a direct assassination of President Kennedy, but the Cubans would be stupid enough to have participated with Oswald.

Oswald is murdered at 12:21 p.m. EST.

November 25—The Case Officer prepares a "contact report" on the November 22 meeting with AMLASH. On Fitzgerald's orders, no mention is made of the poison pen being offered to AMLASH.

At noon, "D" shows up at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. He tells Embassy personnel that he was in the Cuban Consulate on September 18 and saw Cubans pay Oswald a sum of money and talk about Oswald's assassinating someone.

At 12:00 p. m., Mexico dispatches a cable to CIA Headquarters reminding Headquarters of Castro's September 7, 1963 statement threatening U.S. leaders.

A senior U.S. Embassy official in Mexico City tells a senior Mexican Government official known facts about Oswald's visit to Mexico City and raises questions of Cuban involvement.

November 26—McCone President tells him the FBI the President's death and able to assist the FBI's investigation.

The American Ambassador Department through CIA Cubans were involved in the

CIA Headquarters cable all information on the assassination fully examine material of

Deputy Attorney General Bill Moyers, stating "that a way as to satisfy the public have been told and a statement public should be satisfied about his motive ought

November 27—Legat cable release referencing to Cast

One CIA Station cable resources that AMLASH

FBI sends a supervisor investigation and to pursue it obtained.

November 28—CIA Headquarters Station to "follow all lead ability of Cuban or Soviet in

CIA Headquarters warn ambassador was pushing the to a "flap" with the Cubans

November 29—President Warren Commission after for Hoover.

November 30—Director 11:00 a.m. and they discuss

December 1—McCone memorandum. McCone's memorandum

CIA Headquarters cable information from a sensitive Havana had been delayed p.m. on the day of the assassination passenger who arrived in through customs. The passenger Havana.

December 2—At 10:00 a Bundy.

At 3:00 a.m., McCone's call CIA with the subject being

December 3—CIA Headquarters that the Cuban—American Mexico City to Havana on 1

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November 26—McCone again meets with President Johnson. The President tells him the FBI has responsibility for the investigation of the President's death and directs him to make CIA resources available to assist the FBI's investigation.

The American Ambassador in Mexico sends a cable to the State Department through CIA channels. He gives his opinion that the Cubans were involved in the assassination.

CIA Headquarters cables CIA stations in Europe and Canada for all information on the assassination issue, noting they should carefully examine material obtained from a specified resource.

Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach writes Presidential Assistant Bill Moyers, stating "that the facts should be made public in such a way as to satisfy the people of the U.S. and abroad, that the facts have been told and a statement to this effect be made now." The public should be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin and speculation about his motive ought to be cut off.

November 27—Legat cables FBI Headquarters and notes a press release referencing to Castro's speech of September 7, 1963.

One CIA Station cables information received from the specified resources that AMLASHI had been indiscreet in his conversations.

FBI sends a supervisor to Mexico City to coordinate the investigation and to pursue it vigorously until the desired results are obtained.

November 28—CIA Headquarters cables a reminder to the Mexico Station to "follow all leads" and to continue to investigate the possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement.

CIA Headquarters warns the Station Chief in Mexico that the Ambassador was pushing the case too hard and his proposals could lead to a "flap" with the Cubans.

November 29—President Johnson announces formation of the Warren Commission after discussing other possibilities with Director Hoover.

November 30—Director McCone meets with President Johnson at 11:00 a.m. and they discuss the Cuba question. "D" is mentioned.

December 1—McCone meets with both Bundy and President Johnson. McCone's memorandum indicates they discussed "D's" story.

CIA Headquarters cables Mexico Station indicating it has received information from a sensitive source that a Cubana Airlines flight to Havana had been delayed in Mexico City from 6:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. on the day of the assassination. It was awaiting an unidentified passenger who arrived in the twin engine aircraft and failed to go through customs. The passenger rode in the cockpit on the flight to Havana.

December 2 At 10:00 a.m., McCone meets with the President and Bundy.

At 3:00 a.m., McCone's calendar reveals he attended a meeting at the CIA with the subject being Cuba.

December 3—CIA Headquarters receives information from Mexico that the Cuban-American left the U.S. on November 23 and flew from Mexico City to Havana on November 27.

December 4—CIA receives a report from one of its Cuban agents that he thought he had met Oswald in Cuba, Mexico City or the United States. This agent believes that the Cuban government employed assassins and had carried out at least one assassination in Mexico.

FBI memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont indicates there is no evidence that Oswald's assassination of the President was inspired or directed by [pro-Castro] organizations or by any foreign country.

December 5—Mexico Station cables that someone who saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana on November 27 reported that he "looked suspicious."

December 6—Warren Commission holds its first meeting, as the FBI and CIA are completing their own investigations.

December 8—CIA Headquarters cables its Miami Station ordering a halt to an operation to supply weapons to AMLASH, pending a high-level policy review.

December 9—A memorandum to Director McCone discusses U.S. operations against Cuba, but does not mention the AMLASH operation, or any other specific operation.

FBI's 5-volume report on the assassination is completed.

Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach writes the Warren Commission and recommends that the Commission immediately state that the FBI report clearly shows Oswald was a loner.

December 10—Hoover receives report on the investigative deficiencies in the handling of the pre-assassination Oswald case. Results in disciplinary action against 17 Bureau officials.

Director McCone meets with CIA staff and the subject of the meeting is Cuba.

December 12—CIA Mexico Station reports the FBI is pushing to wind up the Mexican aspects of the case.

Late December—CIA desk officer completes a brief report on his investigation, which is submitted to the President.

The CIA decides to have the Counterintelligence Division continue the investigation.

1964

January 23—A subordinate to the Chief of Counterintelligence is designated the "point of record" for all matters relating to the assassination and the Warren Commission.

January 24—FBI liaison is told by CIA official that there are no active plots against Castro.

January 28—Rankin meets with Hoover and they discuss the allegation that Oswald was an FBI informant.

January 31—Hoover indicates in his memorandum of the January 28, 1964 meeting, that he did not appreciate the statement by Chief Justice Warren that the Bureau's report was a "skeleton report."

March 26—The President's Commission requests the FBI to respond to 52 questions. In a subsequent memorandum (4/3/64) by a Bureau Supervisor to William Sullivan, he states the Commission is cross-examining the Bureau in regard to its investigation of the President's assassination.

Rankin requests the information on certain pro-

May 14—Both Hoo open.

May 20—Rankin re Castro and anti-Castro

June 11—Warren C tions from the field of letter informs the of the Army "may organizations."

July—The FBI lea tion from one of the F.

September 9—The ing Attorney General accurate insofar as its

September 25—Bur Report.

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October 1—An FB informs him that "he McCarthy'd McCarthy

Late 1964—AMLA tion of Cuban leader Government cannot b contact with B-1 and plotting.

May—"A" contacts operation. He is turn forms the CIA about "

June—Both agenci who was involved in t

June 23—CIA Hea AMLASH group is ir to CIA operations.

July 2—FBI writ the CIA were sent to DCI.

Late January—Dre informs Warren that that Castro planned R

January 31—Rowle lawyer's story.

Rankin requests that the FBI furnish the Commission with information on certain pro-Castro and anti-Castro organizations.

May 14—Both Hoover and Helms testify the case will always be open.

May 20—Rankin requests additional information on certain pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups.

June 11—Warren Commission receives a summary of the organizations from the field offices but not from FBI Headquarters. Hoover's letter informs the Commission that the CIA and Department of the Army "may have pertinent information concerning these organizations."

July—The FBI learns some details of the CIA's AMLASH operation from one of the FBI's informants.

September 9—The Bureau informs the White House and the Acting Attorney General that "the Commission's report is seriously inaccurate insofar as its treatment of the FBI is concerned."

September 25—Bureau receives a copy of the Warren Commission's Report.

September 30—Assistant Director Gale presents a memorandum that reviewed the Commission Report "as it pertained to FBI shortcomings." Bureau again disciplines agents.

October 1—An FBI inspector telephonically contacts Rankin and informs him that "he did the Bureau a great disservice and he'd out-McCarthy'd McCarthy."

Late 1964—AMLASH becomes more insistent that the assassination of Cuban leadership is a necessity. He is told that the U.S. Government cannot become involved in the "first step." He is put in contact with B-1 and the CIA through B-1 is kept informed of the plotting.

1965

May—"A" contacts I&NS with information about the AMLASH operation. He is turned over to the FBI for handling. The FBI informs the CIA about "A".

June—Both agencies interrogate "A" and establish that he knew who was involved in the AMLASH operation, including the CIA.

June 23—CIA Headquarters cables its Stations stating the entire AMLASH group is insecure and further contact constitutes a menace to CIA operations.

July 2—FBI writes that the details of the meeting with "A" and the CIA were sent to the White House, the Attorney General and the DCI.

1967

Late January—Drew Pearson meets with Chief Justice Warren and informs Warren that a lawyer was told by an underworld contact that Castro planned Kennedy's assassination.

January 31—Rowley meets with Warren, Rowley is informed of the lawyer's story.

February 2—Warren calls Rowley and informs Rowley that he spoke with Pearson who said the lawyer wanted to see Warren.

February 8—Tentative date set by Pearson with Warren for the lawyer to meet with Secret Service. Neither Pearson nor the lawyer contacted Secret Service.

February 10—Rowley advises Warren that neither Pearson nor Warren have contacted Secret Service. Rowley tells Warren the information would be passed to the FBI.

February 13—FBI is informed by James J. Rowley that Chief Justice Warren had recently been informed of U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro in 1962 and 1963, that Castro had decided to utilize the same procedure and that Warren wants these allegations looked into.

February 15—Hoover informs Rowley that the Bureau "is not conducting any investigation" but would accept volunteered information.

March 4—Robert Kennedy's secretary calls Hoover and requests a copy of Edward's memo of May 7, 1962 at which time Robert Kennedy was briefed on assassination plots.

March 7—Drew Pearson's column is published.

March 17—Presidential Assistant Marvin Watson advises DeLoach that President Johnson has instructed the FBI to interview the lawyer concerning any knowledge he had in the assassination of Kennedy. Watson says request "stemmed from a communication the FBI had sent the White House some weeks ago."

March 20—The lawyer interviewed by the Washington Field Office would not identify his source of the information that Castro plotted to kill Kennedy. Agents interviewing the lawyer were instructed to make it clear the FBI was "not interfering with any current investigation in New Orleans."

March 22—The FBI forwards results of the interview with the lawyer to the White House. The information indicates that the lawyer's sources allegedly were used by the CIA in attempts against Castro. The White House also receives information originally from CIA relating to CIA's use of Mahen and Giancana in a plot against Castro. Material also includes information that Robert Kennedy advised on May 9, 1962 that CIA should never take such steps without first checking with the Department of Justice. Helms meets the President at the White House in early evening.

March 23—Helms assigns the Inspector General the task of reporting on CIA assassination attempts against Castro.

April 4—Watson calls DeLoach and advises that the President is convinced there was a plot in connection with Kennedy's assassination.

April 24—I.G. Report is delivered to Helms in installments.

May 22—Helms returns copy of report to I.G.

May 23—All notes and other derived source material of the I.G. Report are destroyed.