5/16/77

Harold—the attached memb and document assume added importance in light of your 5/11 to Les Whitten and the Anderson column that I have not yet seen. I think your friend Les would be interested in this 6/4/64 memo about the conversation with Rocca and might be even more interested in the story that was "withheld" from the WC in such a manner that the WC published it, as CE 1348. Were the 26 volumes withheld from the Commission?

Note that willens and Rankin initialed the memo on 6/4/64. This is in the latest archives release, so you may have a copy

already.

Howard

May 12, 1977

MEMO re Rocen, CIA and Castro Agle by MCWARD ROFFM AN

Today I received some of the latest Archives release end there is one memo of considerable interest to me, especially in light of Raymond Rocca's May '75 memo to the Ecckefeller Commission. The decument is a memo of June 4, 1964 from Slawson to Rankin, Willens and Redlich in re his phone conversation with Rocca at the CIA.

The two very talking about a book by a London newsman named Eisenberg published 2 months before the assassination which alleged that right wing elemtus in the US were planning JFK's death. Rocca drew Glawson's attention to the fact that the publishing date of the book coincided with the time Castro allegedly made his remark at the Brazillian Embassy in Cuba, as Slawson puts it, "to the effect that 'Two can play at this game.'" Slawson's formulation of the press acounts reporting Castro's remark is interesting because he pretends that Castro was referring to the Bay of Figs and "aubsequent guerrilla activities financed by the CIA which had resulted in the deaths of many Cuban citizens." The emphasic is mine, for the actual AP story by Daniel Harker had a significantly different twist. (By the way, the Commission did publish the story, as CE 1348). Harker quotes Castro as saying "US leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe." (emphasis mine)

Also note that Slawson declined to make a "formal request" for a report on this matter. I will write to Archives for whatever followup there was.

Recall now how Rocca stressed precisely this story—as it appeared in the N.O. Times-Fiegune, which is CE 1348—in his May '75 memo to the Rockefeller Com ission, criticizing the WC for not having left a "wider window" for the contingency. Evidently, Rocca was pushing the story on the WC back in '64 and his 1975 memo seems to reflect his disappointment that the WC did not accept the bait he offered it.

This is also similificent is light of the crap in the Church committee's report to the effect that the CIA kept into from the VC which prevented the VC from edequately investigating the Cestro acids.

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Toz

J. Lee Rankin Louwed P. Willens Morrow Redlie

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U. David Glauson

Publicate Telep one conference with Mr. Rocca of Central Intelligence Agency

About a week or two ago I telephoned in. Rosea and drew his attention to the fact that my coordination of the documents furnished to us by the flussian Colorment, encluding the medical documents, which had not arrived at that time, showed that a high percentage of the simulatures of our than the Covalds' was said to be illegible by the State Department translators. I asked Mr. Rocea that the CIA examination of these documents expectifically take this observation into a count and account on it. I said that my opinion, as a lagram, was that the it is percentage of illegible signatures eight are been intentional, in order to pretent the CIA from checking lack on actual persons and places when it seems to authorities the alleged illegibility was in some cases simply a reflection of the translators' reluctance to work techand. In Rocea said that he would bring this matter to the attention of those who were analyzing the documents.

Correlation decreased No. 1911, which is the CIA report on the Boffet documents, once to up dock today. It does not content on the matter continued a c.c. I telephoned by. Roses to ack him about this. His reply has that he had interpreted by request as might that the CIA translators do their best to read and translate all signatures. I repeated that we were not so interested in that as we were in the general analysis of what if my significance could be attributed to the high percentage of illegable adjustures. I tellihm that since talking to him the first time I had made a personal check and found that out of the 9 signatures appearing on the non-cederal documents 0 were like this or at least stated to be tilegable by the translators. (Actually the percentage is even higher. The of the decreases which contained likegible of matures contain two filegable signatures coin, so the ratio is actually 10 to 1 rather than 0 to 1.)

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Hosea said that he now fully understood my concern and would bring it to the attention of the "higher upo." I told him that we would be happy to make a formal request if this was desirable, and he said that perhaps it would be, but he did not think so. He said that he would ask for a formal request from us later if he or others at CIA thought it was necessary. He told no that the CIA translators had commented that the illegibility of the eignatures was the usual thing in Passian decements. He said that he got the impression from telling to them that this is a recurring problem. Apparently the average Amesian official has so many documents to sign that his signature combecomes a scrawl. However, Recea did not purport to be on every entities, and he agreed with me that a more formal analysis is called for.

(I note here for the record that the following documents contain at least one illegible signature each: 1 A, 3 A(1), 3A(2), 5 A (3), f A, 7 A, 9 A, that 1 E. 3 A (1) and 5 A (3) contain two illegible signatures each. The following documents contain no signatures at all other than Marina's or Loc Countain: 2 A, k A, 5 A, 2 B, 3 B, k B. The single legible signature other than an Osmald signature is contained on document 6 A. The foregoing includes only the non-modical documents. There are so many signatures on the medical documents that I have not tried to itemize them, but it can be seen by a plance through them that they also contain a high percentage of illegible ones.)

While on the telephone with Rocca he brought up the New York Times article on commirmey theories contained in the Times of June 1, 19.4. He made specific reference to the book by a London necespaper non by the name of Dermis Miscoberg mentioned in the Austrian newspapers. This look was published about two months before the assessination and contained an assertion that the right wing elements in America were at that time planning the assassination of Konnowy. Ho said that the CIA has already put procedures in motion to get the book and to obtain further information about the author. The New York Times, as you are probably already aware, describes this as a "striking collectedo." Rocca believes that this may be correct but, of course, cannot be sure. He dren to my attention the fact that the publishing time of this particular book appears to have been almost exactly then Castro was approsed to have made his remark in the Cuban Labassy in Brazil (or the Brazilian Bebanay in Cuba, I have Forgotten at this point) to the effect that "Two can play at this game." According to the Miani newspaper which published this allegation, Coutro was referring to the Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent guerrilla activities finamed by the CIA which had resulted in the deaths of warr Culca citizans.

WhSlawson: ame 6/4/64