

Many of those who supported the poorly-conceived Bay of Pigs blamed its built-in failure on JFK. This is particularly true of many of the anti-Castro Cubans in this country. However, the CIA itself blamed ~~the CIA~~ itself in what it has kept suppressed, its own inspector general's report on that fiasco.

As Burton Hersh reports in his The Old Boys, Scribners, 1993 (page 434), although that IG report remains tightly classified, its thrust is apparent in a speech by the IG himself to the Naval War College.

The first two pages of that ~~chapter~~ chapter of that book in which this is reported are attached.

The CIA also mounted ^{thru} campaigns against ~~people~~ who did not agree with the Warren Report. Hersh reports what was done when the British historian Trevor-Roper was critical of the Warren Report.

Frank Wisner, the CIA's dirty-works specialist, "took it on himself to try to whip up a campaign to refute the purported meretriciousness of the piece by Trevor-Roper" (page 450). The source for this, page 513, is "Allen Dulles papers, Wisner to Dulles, Box 137, December 30, 1964, Mudd Library, Princeton University."

I had without success raised the CIA intrusions into the rights of those of us who were critical of the Warren Report with the ARRB. It did not even bother to respond. I then sent it in addition FBI reports copies of which I received from Englan reflecting that Sir ^{John} Sparrow, who undertook to be critical of first Trevor-Roper and then others of us, did that under what amounts to instructions of the United States embassy in London. Still no response from the ~~ARRB~~ ARRB.

I'll send them this and see if that gets any response.

Or leads it to compel the disclosure or any such records, as the 1992 Act requires of if, I believe.

Presbyterian, with a neurotic constitution and little interest in the amenities of life." Bill Bullitt was fickle, Dulles charged, while Wilson was "inspiring."

Bullitt himself was dying. He succumbed in February 1967. Attending by his bedside in the American Hospital in Neuilly were his daughter Anne, his brother, his close cousin Dr. Orville Horwitz, and, inevitably, Carmel Offie.

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Frank Wisner's abrupt suicide caught Allen at about the midpoint of his enforced retirement. With both at leisure there had been time for extended lunches, for afternoons of bridge. Resorting to a pun, in one note Wisner chided Dulles about picking up so quickly the niceties of the "Burlingame," a variety their mutual friend Ella seems to have taught them both.⁵⁴ But Allen was not what he had been, and after one session Polly discovered Frank perhaps a bit dejected that Allen seemed to be losing his subtlety and sharpness.

After JFK was shot Lyndon Johnson tapped Dulles to serve on the Warren Commission and attempt to sort out the circumstances of the assassination. As historians would comment, most noteworthy of all was the way Allen blanked out whenever the discussion touched Castro. Some hint just then of the Agency's program to liquidate the Cuban might well have forced the expansion of the inquiry, encouraged doubts that Oswald—and Oswald alone—had perpetrated this abomination. All of the bureaucracies involved were guilty of administrative slovenliness at a minimum, and pushed the panel members hard to certify the lone killer thesis. When the English don H. R. Trevor-Roper presumed in the *London Times* to point up the sluggishness and illogic behind the Warren Commission Report, Wisner took it on himself to try and whip up a campaign to refute the purported meretriciousness of the piece by Trevor-Roper.⁵⁵

Allen shrugged it off. More markedly each season he found himself lapsing into the lineaments of the habituated Washington clubman, content to fill his days with fussing over editorial chores and correspondence required by the final two books he put his name to—*The Craft of Intelligence* and *The Secret Surrender*—remixing, arranging reunions, and holding court whenever somebody from the Great Game stopped by to buck him up. At home a bent figure in unpressed tweeds who lived in bedroom slippers to ease his gout attacks, he continued to maintain his accustomed sumptuary stan-

dards—his wines in particular were always the choicest obtainable, while his Guatemalan cook, Natalia Birdsong, was so well regarded around the District that Allen had to stay alert that nobody stole her. Between relaxing summer visits to Henderson Harbor and long, luxurious layovers during the raw months with wealthy friends like the Charles Wrightsmans in Palm Beach, Allen presented himself as ever when the company mattered—spruce, tanned, vigorous.⁵⁶

But he was slipping. "People think I'm very rich," he confided to a friend. "But I'm not." Individuals close to the household will divulge that he and Clover "spent money very foolishly, carelessly. They each had private secretaries full time, to keep their checkbooks and deal with minor things. There were a number of maids." The handsome retirement house off Q Street with its elaborate square of flanking gardens was rented at great expense. Distinguished still but starting to falter a bit with age, Clover continued to go through capital with almost a self-destructive indifference. "They never saved anything," one confidant of Allen's saw. "It worried him. His children were very expensive, and that worried him."

Those last years Clover struggled against the inroads of Parkinson's disease. If anything, this heightened the otherworldly cast of her personality, her instinct to escape the pedestrian—if not indeed sordid—realm where Allen remained involved and concerned herself with the I Ching and Saint Teresa of Avila. Much of the income which supported their fashionable tastes came out of Clover's trusts, built up several generations earlier out of iron mill proceeds and bank holdings in Baltimore. "She didn't let money trouble her," Garner Ranney noticed. Ranney was a highly refined State Department retiree who came down several days a week to help Allen out with sorting his papers and getting his library together. Garner found himself admiring Clover's feeling for detail, the "air of charming co-siness" she bestowed in passing. Agency types regarded Clover as a puzzle—"She was the sort—she was interested mainly in impractical things," one points out. "Prison reform, things like that."

"She had periods of nervous exhaustion from living with Allen," Ranney comments. "But you could see she was doing what she could. Those last years they obviously were very devoted to each other. I always thought Clover was very discreet. I know she did find it difficult to do things like play the hostess at dinner parties where most of the guests—whom she already knew—were there under assumed names. It took a great deal of concentration on her part to keep the pseudonyms straight."

Fortified by el-dopa, she "rose above her Parkinson's," Ranney

15. Allen Dulles Papers, Frank Wisner to John McCone, March 4, 1965 (copy to Allen Dulles), Box 139, Mudd Library, Princeton University.
16. Interview with Mrs. Clayton Fritchey, May 24, 1985.
17. F.O.I.A. disclosure from Wisner file.
18. Interview with William Hood, October 10, 1987.
19. Interview with Janet Barnes Lawrence, op. cit.
20. Interview with Charles J. V. Murphy, October 10, 1987.
21. Obituary, *The New York Times*, October 30, 1965.
22. Obituary, *The Washington Post*, October 31, 1965.
23. The F.O.I.A. State Department Report, Fall Term 1946.
24. Interview with Mrs. Clayton Fritchey, October 13, 1987.
25. Congressional Record, April 25, 1950.
26. Frenchy Grombach, who is believed to have slipped McCarthy most of his ammunition here, was now under suspicion himself for having received unauthorized payoffs from the Dutch electrical giant Philips. According to Christopher Simpson (*Blowback*, pp. 235, 236), one of Grombach's key assets was former SS General Karl Wolff.
27. Interview with Al Ulmer, April 8, 1988.
28. Interview with Joe Bryan, op. cit.
29. F.O.I.A., F.B.I. memo, March 4, 1950.
30. F.O.I.A., F.B.I. Field Report, August 2, 1950; F.B.I. office memo from Guy Hotel, July 21, 1950.
31. F.O.I.A., F.B.I. records, Tracey to Hoover, June 13, 1951.
32. F.O.I.A., F.B.I. records, James McInerney to J. Edgar Hoover, June 21, 1951.
33. F.O.I.A., F.B.I. records, Belmont to Keay, August 7, 1950.
34. F.O.I.A., F.B.I. records, memo Tolson to Ladd, February 5, 1953.
35. Brownell and Billings, op. cit., p. 286.
36. F.O.I.A., F.B.I. report, December 10, 1952; see also Secretary of Defense, Memo for General Olmsted from Thomas Murray, October 6, 1954; see also *The Washington Times-Herald*, November 11, 1952.
37. F.O.I.A., F.B.I. reports, W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont, November 21, 1952.
38. Interview with Paul Nitze, op. cit.
39. Interview with Cleve Gram, op. cit.
40. State Department, Herder Series, Telephone Summaries, number 939, Reel #1, March 24, 1954.
41. Interview with Mrs. Clayton Fritchey, October 13, 1987.
42. *The Washington Star*, December 8, 1952, February 27, 1953.
43. The F.B.I. memos fly thickest during 1954 (February 24, March 6, 18, 31, etc.).
44. F.O.I.A., F.B.I. reports, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney Baltimore Report, October 24, 1969, file 58-398.
45. Interview with James Angleton, March 1, 1987.
46. Office Obituary, *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1972.
47. Interview with Mrs. Lewelyn Thompson, June 9, 1987.
48. Interview with Hector Prudhomme, op. cit.
49. Interview with Mark Wyatt, op. cit.
50. Interview with Douglas MacArthur II, op. cit.
51. Office obituary, *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1972.

52. See last section Brownell and Billings, op. cit.
53. *The Washington Post*, December 15, 1947.
54. Allen Dulles Papers, Wisner to Dulles, February 3, 1964, Box 137, Mudd Library, Princeton University.
55. Allen Dulles Papers, Wisner to Dulles, Box 137, December 30, 1964, Mudd Library, Princeton University.
56. Interview with Howard Roman, November 25, 1987. As with Foster, Allen often enjoyed the hospitality of Clarence Dillon, including the use of his country homes; Dillon's generosity helped establish the specialized library system at Princeton where so many of the Cold-War archons ultimately deposited their papers.
57. Interview with Garner Ranney, June 9, 1988.
58. Interview with Howard Roman, op. cit.
59. Interview with Howard Roman, July 30, 1988.
60. *The New York Times*, February 2, 1969.
61. Interview with Garner Ranney, op. cit.
62. Thomas Powers, op. cit., pp. ix, x.

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expertise of the Pentagon was excluded because knowledge of the operation was handled on such a close basis within the Joint Staff." In fact, "the operators running the operation were assessing and evaluating the intelligence, not the intelligence directorate. . . . Much of the intelligence came from the Cuban resistance, which was not always an objective intelligence source."

At policy levels only Chester Bowles, "who had inadvertently heard about the operation," in the end opposed it, while Roger Hilsman, the senior intelligence official at State, was refused a briefing.²

Apologists for Allen Dulles insist that Kirkpatrick's report went much further. They claim he loaded the arguments to home in on Bissell's stewardship, to knock him out once and for all as DDP or, eventually, Director. Bissell himself was particularly exercised at the charge that an "adverse selection" mechanism came into play to make sure the better people would survive this collective suicide leap, which Kirkpatrick concluded followed from the insane operating principles Frank Wisner bequeathed the Agency. Several assert that Kirkpatrick himself rushed over a ribbon copy of his scaring study and pushed it on Allen Dulles's replacement, the brilliant California industrialist John McCone, while he was alighting from an open car with Dulles and JFK to accept nomination as the Agency's new boss in September.

Kirkpatrick became the scapegoat, especially after he tacked on the title of Executive Director of the CIA and promoted the retirement of a number of his chief detractors. But Kirkpatrick hadn't felled the lion. Allen's reassurances to Eisenhower and Kennedy that his operators could finish Castro had seemed so unequivocal even he couldn't walk away. "I'll never forget the arrival of McCone," Kirkpatrick says. "He was a tough, no-nonsense Irishman, very decisive, and he didn't have a high regard for Allen. They conversed, but there was a lack of warmth."³ A UPI photo survives of Kennedy, Dulles, and McCone leaving the Naval War College grounds in the back of an open convertible. Both Kennedy and McCone peer forward, while Allen, squeezed in between them, appears to be scanning the skies, perhaps for eleventh-hour redemption. His Teddy-Roosevelt mustache and seven-button Edwardian vest give him a dated look, overnight an arthritic wowsler attempting to breast the Space Age.

"I" This were the British government," the shaken President told Bissell in May. "I would resign, and you, being a senior civil servant, would remain. But it isn't. In our government, you and Allen have to go. . . ." The summer of 1961 provided a decent interval; Lyman Kirkpatrick burrowed in to compile his notorious Inspector General's report on what exactly led up to the Bay of Pigs. It remains tightly classified, but certainly the thrust comes through in a lecture Kirkpatrick gave years later at the Naval War College.

"There is no other place to put the blame," he would conclude flatly, "than on the agency mounting the operation. There was a totally erroneous estimate of the quality of Castro's fighting forces, a lack of realism in evaluating the potential resistance, and therefore as a corollary, a lack of realism in estimating the number of forces required to do the job. There was a lack of knowledge about Castro's control in Cuba, even though the British and French intelligence reports were available on the subject.

"Organizationally, a large part of CIA was excluded from the operation. The present Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, who was then Chief of Operations for CIA, was not involved in the operation. . . . In like manner, the bulk of the military