

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARK A. ALLEN,)
)
 Plaintiff,)
)
 v.) C.A. No. 81-1206
)
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, et al.,)
)
 Defendant.)
)
)

DECLARATION

LEE E. CARLE, hereby declares and says:

1. I am currently the Information Review Officer (IRO) for the Directorate of Operations (DO) of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). I was appointed to this position on 1 December 1986 as the successor to Louis J. Dube. Prior to my appointment as DO/IRO, I held operational and executive positions in the DO. As Information Review Officer, I am responsible for the review of documents containing information originated by the DO, or otherwise implicating DO interests, which may be responsive to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and/or Privacy Act (PA) requests and ensuing litigation. As part of such review, I am responsible for ensuring that determinations as to release or withholding of such information and concerning the disposition of such documents are proper. The statements made herein are based upon my personal knowledge, upon information made available to me in my official

capacity, upon advice and counsel of the CIA Office of General Counsel, and upon conclusions and determinations reached and made in accordance therewith.

2. As DO/IRO, I have the authority and responsibility to sign declaration concerning the review of DO documents. Additionally, pursuant to a written delegation of authority from the Director of Central Intelligence, I possess original classification authority at the TOP SECRET level. I thus have the authority and responsibility to conduct classification reviews of DO documents and information involved in litigations.

3. Through the exercise of my official duties, I have become generally familiar with the proceedings in this litigation. More specifically, the FBI has referred portions or all of nine (9) FBI documents containing CIA information to the CIA for our review. These pages represent only those for which Mr. Allen has requested a Vaughn index. The purpose of this Declaration is to explain, in detail, why certain CIA information must continue to be denied in some of the nine FBI documents referred to the Agency.

4. As the Court may be aware, the CIA is presently involved in a protracted litigation with Mr. Allen, captioned Allen v. DOD and CIA., C.A. 81-2543 (Flannery, J). That action concerns Mr. Allen's request for documents pertaining to the same subject matter as this litigation, namely the assassination of President Kennedy. On June 19, 1986, Mr. Louis J. Dube, former Information Review Officer for the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, filed a lengthy Declaration justifying the withholding or deletions

of information in 350 CIA documents. Those 350 documents represented 7% of the documents processed up to that time in response to Mr. Allen's FOIA request for all documents which had been collected and sequestered in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) investigation concerning the John F. Kennedy assassination. On 26 November 1986, Judge Thomas Flannery of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting CIA summary judgment with respect to the documents processed to date. In his detailed opinion, Judge Flannery explicitly adopted many of the justifications for withholding set forth in the Dube Declaration and specifically Mr. Dube's description of the harms that could result from disclosure. In this Declaration, I will be repeating verbatim certain of the justifications enumerated by Mr. Dube in his June 19, 1986 declaration. I am not doing this in an effort to create "boilerplate" descriptions. Rather, since the information withheld herein is substantially similar to that withheld in the CIA's Allen litigation, the justifications for withholding are similar. Additionally, I feel it unnecessary and wasteful to reinvent the wording of comprehensive justifications already approved by this Court.

5. As DO/IRO, I am responsible for the determinations set forth in this Declaration. After carefully reviewing the nine FBI documents at issue in this case and addressed herein, I have personally determined and affirm that the limited CIA information withheld from plaintiff may not be released because:

(a) Certain of the information withheld is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356 as information requiring continued protection against unauthorized disclosure. Thus, such information is exempt from release pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1); and/or

(b) Certain of the information withheld, if released, could reasonably be expected to lead to the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods which the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting against unauthorized disclosure as set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3). Thus, such information is coextensively exempt from release pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3); and/or

(c) Certain of the information would reveal the names of CIA personnel, information that is within the ambit of 50 U.S.C. § 403g. Thus, such information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3).

6. I must emphasize that the amount of CIA information withheld in these pages is very limited. All of the CIA information in two documents is being released; in six documents, the CIA information is being withheld in part; and in one document, the CIA information continues to be denied.

Classification--FOIA Exemption (b)(1)

7. Exemption (b)(1) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), provides that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are:

(A) Specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy; and (B) are, in fact, properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.

As will be discussed below, the CIA has invoked FOIA exemption (b)(1) to justify withholding of classified information in some of the documents addressed by this Declaration. The final review of the information withheld on the basis of classification was conducted pursuant to the criteria established in Executive Order 12356. Thus, the standards of that Executive Order apply in evaluating the Agency's claim of exemption under FOIA exemption (b)(1).

8. As a senior CIA official and pursuant to a written delegation of authority from the Director of Central Intelligence, I hold original classification authority at the TOP SECRET level. Therefore, I am authorized to conduct classification reviews and to make original classification decisions. With respect to the information for which exemption (b)(1) is asserted in this case, I have personally reviewed the determinations under the standards of Executive Order 12356 and have determined that such information is currently and properly classified. Initially, I have determined that the kinds of information withheld under exemption (b)(1) concern one or more of the following general categories of classifiable information set forth in Executive Order 12356:

(a) Information concerning intelligence sources or intelligence methods (§ 1.3(a)(4)); and/or

(b) Information concerning intelligence activities of the United States, (§ 1.3(a)(4)).

I have further determined that unauthorized disclosure of this information, either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Executive Order 12356, § 1.3(b); 1.1(a)(2) and (3). Accordingly, I have determined that the information withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(1) is properly classified at either the SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL level, as specifically designated for each document. Because the information concerns classifiable categories of information, and because unauthorized disclosure of this information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, such information satisfies the substantive classification requirements of Executive Order 12356 and, thus, properly maintains its classified status.

9. In this regard, it is significant to note that the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources or methods is presumed to cause damage to the national security. Executive Order 12356, § 1.3(c).

Intelligence Sources or Methods--
FOIA Exemption (b)(3)

10. Exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA states that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are:

Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than §552b of this title), provided that such statute (a) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (b) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.

The CIA contends that two exemption (b)(3) statutes operate to exempt certain of the information contained in the referred pages at

issue. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) requires the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The provisions of this section are implemented further by virtue of 50 U.S.C. § 403g, which provides that the CIA shall be exempt from the provision of any other law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the CIA. Thus, information falling within the ambit of either of these two statutes is exempt from disclosure pursuant to exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA.

Intelligence Sources--FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)

11. Certain of the CIA information at issue has been withheld because its disclosure reasonably could be expected to lead to the identification of certain intelligence sources utilized by the CIA. As may be obvious, the CIA depends upon a plethora of intelligence sources -- human, technical, organizational, and otherwise -- to collect information pertaining to or affecting the national security of the United States. Human and organizational intelligence sources can be expected to furnish information to the CIA only when confident that they are protected from retribution or embarrassment by the absolute secrecy surrounding the source-CIA relationship. In other words, intelligence sources must be positive that the CIA can and will do everything in its power to prevent the public disclosure of their cooperation and that their cooperation will forever remain secret. For example, if an American businessman is willing to share

information with the CIA, such an individual would suffer serious embarrassment and loss of business domestically or in foreign countries should the fact of his collaboration with the CIA be publicized. In the case of a foreign national abroad who has been cooperating with the CIA, usually without the knowledge of his government, the consequences of public identification as a CIA "agent" are often swift and sure--ranging from economic reprisals to possible harassment, imprisonment, or even death. In light of the probable consequences of disclosure, individuals understandably are reluctant to cooperate with the CIA or with American intelligence unless they can be absolutely certain that the fact of their cooperation will forever remain secret. Moreover, intelligence sources who remain within their society are at all times subject to retribution if and when they are identified or, indeed, even suspected of being CIA collaborators. This also is true of intelligence sources who no longer may cooperate actively with the CIA. In many cases, the very nature of the information passed necessarily tends to reveal the source because of the limited number of individuals having access to the information. If such information is publicly disclosed by an FOIA release or otherwise, the source may be perpetually vulnerable to discovery, and retribution may be a real threat for him and his family for many years.

12. Moreover, the release of information which would or could identify an intelligence source most likely would have a serious

effect upon this Agency's ability to recruit other potential sources in the future. As stated previously, most individuals are reluctant to cooperate with the CIA unless they can be positive that their identities will be kept forever secret. If a potential source has any doubts about the ability of the CIA to preserve secrecy, i.e., if he learns that the identity of another source was publicly disclosed by the Agency, his desire to cooperate with the CIA naturally would be quite small. In other words, individual sources, be they present or future, simply will not work for the CIA if they are convinced or believe that the CIA cannot protect their identities. The loss of such intelligence sources, and the accompanying loss in critical intelligence which they provide, would have serious effects upon the national security of this country.

13. For the foregoing reasons, I have determined that the unauthorized disclosure of information which reasonably would or could be expected to lead to the identification of an intelligence source would cause damage to the national security. Thus, such information is currently and properly classified and, therefore, exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1). Coextensively, information which could lead to the revelation of the identity of an intelligence source precisely falls within the ambit of 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) and thus is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3).

14. I also should note that § 1.3(c) of Executive Order 12356 specifically provides that the unauthorized disclosure of information concerning an intelligence source is presumed to cause damage to the national security.

Intelligence Methods--FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)

15. Certain of the CIA information in the nine referred documents has been withheld because its disclosure reasonably could be expected to lead to the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence methods. In particular, some of the information withheld in the designated documents would identify the use of particular intelligence methods at specific times. Such information thus is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3).

16. Intelligence methods are the means by which, and the manner in which, an intelligence agency accomplishes its business. Most organized professions or businesses employ methods which are common to and, in some cases, unique to that business or profession, to accomplish their goals and objectives. A bank, for example, uses accounting and financial recordkeeping methods, some of which are unique while others are common to all banks and possibly even to other businesses which keep financial records. The same general characterizations may be applied to an intelligence agency such as the CIA and the intelligence methods it uses. Many of the methods CIA uses are unique to CIA among all of the intelligence agencies. Many of the methods are common to all intelligence agencies, and some methods CIA uses are common to activities other than intelligence. The basic element in all of these variants is that they are methods used by the CIA in its conduct of intelligence activities. The use of such methods in that capacity provides them

with a special character in CIA records which necessitates protecting the fact of their use, as well as the details of their use, from unauthorized disclosure.

17. Intelligence methods must be protected in situations where a certain capability or a certain technique or the application thereof is unknown to those individuals or entities, such as a hostile intelligence service, who would take countermeasures. Secret information collection techniques or technological devices are valuable from an intelligence-gathering perspective only so long as they remain unknown and unsuspected. Once the nature of an intelligence method or the fact of its use in a certain situation is discovered, its continued successful use is in serious jeopardy. In fact, once an intelligence method or its use is discovered, the method may be neutralized by hostile intelligence services and eventually even turned against the CIA itself. A hypothetical situation best illustrates the potential dangers of disclosure. For example, suppose that the CIA had a wiretap on the telephone line of a hostile power. So long as the use of that wiretap in that particular situation remained secret, the intelligence derived from the use of that method would be authentic and valuable. If the fact of the use of the wiretap were to be discovered, it is obvious that the target country would take immediate action to negate the method itself. Such retaliatory action could consist of destroying the wiretap or rendering it useless through technical countermeasures. On the other hand, the hostile power could allow the wiretap to

continue but deliberately feed it false information, thereby deceiving the CIA as to the authenticity and value of the information derived from the wiretap.

18. Detailed knowledge of the methods and practices of an intelligence agency must be protected from disclosure because such knowledge would be of material assistance to those who would seek to penetrate, detect, prevent, or damage the intelligence operations of the CIA. As can be seen, the result of disclosure of a particular method is the inevitable neutralization of that method. This result is true whether the intelligence methods are those used for the collection of intelligence information, the conduct of clandestine activities, the performance of counterintelligence targeting and analysis, or those techniques utilized in the analysis and evaluation of intelligence information. ←

19. It is significant to note that the term "intelligence methods" is not limited to sophisticated techniques and electronic devices. Rather, "intelligence methods" also include standard practices and procedures of an intelligence agency. These standard practices may encompass a multitude of techniques, ranging from the methods employed to evaluate a source to measures taken to disguise Agency personnel abroad or, a method may involve the targeting of a particular individual who is hostile to the United States. Such targeting frequently provides the Agency with valuable counterintelligence information concerning the practices and personnel of our adversaries, enabling us to thwart those

activities. Knowledge of or insights into such practices would be of invaluable assistance to those who wish to detect, penetrate, counter, or evaluate the activities of the CIA. In summary, it is the fact of the use of a particular intelligence method in a specific context that is the information that must be protected. As will be discussed with regard to the individual documents, part of the information withheld relates to or identifies particular intelligence methods used at specific time periods. Disclosure of this information would allow plaintiff, and presumably anyone in the public, to immediately pinpoint the intelligence methods at issue, thereby compromising the past and future value of these particular methods. For these reasons, unauthorized disclosure of details pertaining to the intelligence methods in question reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, through compromise of the method in question and a concomitant loss of intelligence produced by that method. Thus, such information currently and properly is classified and is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1). Coextensively, since release of this information could lead to the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence methods, such information falls within the ambit of 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) and thus is exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3). As a final matter in this regard, I reemphasize that § 1.3(c) of Executive Order 12356 establishes a presumption that the unauthorized disclosure of information concerning intelligence methods will cause damage to the national security.

CIA Employee Names--FOIA Exemption (b)(3)

20. Another statutory measure taken to protect intelligence sources and methods (Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403g) provides that the CIA is exempt from the provisions of any other law requiring the disclosure of information regarding the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. On the basis of this statute, certain CIA employees' names information related to specific individuals have been deleted from the documents at issue. The names of CIA employees have been deleted because the Agency does not disclose the identity and affiliation of those employees who do not come into public view during the course of their duties. Such employees may have in the past served under cover or in sensitive positions or operations, may be doing so now, or may do so in the future. The public revelation of their affiliation with the CIA could well be used to compromise past, present, or future intelligence operations or activities; to impair the usefulness of such individuals to the Agency; and/or to place their lives, the lives of members of their families, and the lives of intelligence sources they have worked with in jeopardy. Since such information fits within 50 U.S.C § 403g, deletions from portions of the attached documents have been made pursuant to exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA.

21. Detailed descriptions of the CIA-originated information in the nine FBI documents follow. For purposes of consistency, I am

incorporating the Deletion Letter Code List used in the CIA's court filings in the Allen v. DOD, et al., case even though not all of the categories and letter codes apply to this case. CIA information in the attached release documents has been properly letter coded in conformity with that List, which is also attached.

DELETION LETTER CODE LIST

- A. Name or other identifier of an intelligence source. EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) & (b)(3). See paragraphs 10-14.

- B. Circumstantial information which, in combination with other information, could lead to the identification of an intelligence source EXEMPTIONS (b)(1) & (b)(3). See paragraphs 10-14.

- F. Information disclosing an intelligence method used in intelligence collection. Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). See paragraphs 15-19.

- I. Information identifying a CIA staff employee. Exemption (b)(3). See paragraph 20.

DOCUMENTS AND DESCRIPTIONS

<u>Document No., Date and Description</u>	<u>No. of Pages Sent to CIA</u>	<u>FOIA Determination</u>	<u>Exemption Basis</u>
Item 71, Brief on FBI Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy	3	Released in part	(b)(1), (b)(3)

The only pages of this document for which Mr. Allen has requested a CIA Vaughn index are 20, 31, and 95n. The CIA information on pages 20 and 31 is being released in entirety. With respect to the information on page 95n, we understand that the FBI is withholding the entire second paragraph pursuant to exemptions (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(D). The CIA is also asserting exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) for three words in the next to last line of this paragraph. These words identify a very important intelligence source of the CIA. Release of this information would identify the source, very likely leading to a discontinuance with that source. See letter code A. This information remains classified at the SECRET level.

Item 73, Memorandum, 2 February 1964	2	Release in part	(b)(3)
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The name of a CIA employee has been deleted from the fourth paragraph on page 1 of this document. Letter code I applies. All other information pertaining to the CIA has been released.

Item 77, date and description unknown	1 (Page 33)	Release in entirety	
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The CIA information in this document, located on page 33, is being released in its entirety.

Item 98, Memorandum, 12 May 1964	3	Release in part	(b)(1), (b)(3)
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The information withheld by the CIA on page 1 of this document concerns certain contacts which Oswald allegedly had in Mexico City. This data was obtained through the use of two specific and secret intelligence methods. Disclosure of the information would clearly disclose the methods used. Letter code F. The deletions at the top of the second page also identify one of those same methods, letter code F. The CIA deletion in the third paragraph of page 2 describes an interview of a named informant by a CIA source, letter codes A and B. Release of this information would identify the CIA source, as well as its informant. The withheld information in the second paragraph of page 3

once again mentions Oswald's alleged contacts in Mexico City and one of the intelligence methods discussed above which was used to collect the information letter code F applies. This information remains classified at the SECRET level.

<u>Document No., Date and Description Basis</u>	<u>No. of Pages Sent to CIA</u>	<u>FOIA Determination</u>	<u>Exemption</u>
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Item 100, Note, undated	2	Release in entirety	
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The CIA information in the two pages of this item is being released in its entirety.

Item 101, Memorandum, 7 December 1963	1	Released in part	(b)(1), (b)(3)
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The name of a CIA employee (letter code I) has been deleted in the first line of the first two paragraphs of this document and in the center of the first paragraph. The remainder of the CIA information which has been withheld concerns one of the intelligence methods proposed for obtaining intelligence information about Oswald's activities in Russia. Release of this information could reveal certain of the precise methods which the CIA used, or contemplated using, to acquire knowledge of Oswald's activities in the Soviet Union. Included in the withheld information is the name of an intelligence source whom the CIA planned to question on the subject of Oswald's activities. This material is withheld to protect the identity of this possible source as well as a certain intelligence method which might be used to obtain the information (letter codes A, B, and F). This information remains classified at the SECRET level.

Item 146, unknown	1	Denied in entirety	(b)(3)
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I understand that the FBI is withholding the paragraph of information at the bottom of this page pursuant to exemptions (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(D). The CIA is coextensively invoking 50 U.S.C. § 403g and, thus, exemption (b)(3) to protect some of this same information. Certain of the information contained in the deleted paragraph contains the name, address, and other identifying material concerning a CIA employee (letter code I). Only exemption (b)(3) is claimed by the CIA for this information.

<u>Document No., Date and Description</u>	<u>No. of Pages Sent to CIA</u>	<u>FOIA Determination</u>	<u>Exemption Basis</u>
Item 150, Memorandum 22 December 1961	2	Released in part	(b)(1), (b)(3)

I understand that the FBI has withheld much of the information in this item on the basis of exemption (b)(7)(C). Coextensively, the CIA is asserting exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) to protect this same information. The CIA information withheld in this document concerns the possible activities of two CIA assets who worked, sometimes on their own and sometimes at the behest of the CIA, in carrying out specific missions. These individuals were financed and controlled by a foreign individual who also worked for the CIA. This individual is named and discussed in this document. Additionally, the deleted information discusses, in detail, certain intelligence activities carried out by the CIA against the Castro government. Release of the information would identify those named individual sources as well as the intelligence activities carried out by the CIA (letter codes A, B, and F). The name of a CIA employee has also been deleted (letter code I). This information remains classified at the SECRET level.

Item 238, Paper undated	2	Release in part	(b)(1), (b)(3)
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The deleted CIA information in paragraph 1.B. on the first page of this document concerns an intelligence method used by the CIA. It was originally thought that this method had collected information on Oswald and his activities. It turned out that the information collected through this method was not about him. Disclosure of this information would reveal this method (letter code F). CIA information on page 3 is being released in part. The only deletion is the identity of a group with which CIA had a relationship. Clearly, this group constitutes a source of intelligence (letter codes A, B, and F). This information remains classified at SECRET level.

22. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lee E. Carle

LEE E. CARLE

Dated: June 1, 1987

~~SECRET~~

Since early 1962, membership in and activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee have been greatly curtailed, and the Committee has been unable to muster any substantial support for such public activities as rallies and protest demonstrations. In this regard, investigation has shown that Oswald's activities in New Orleans in behalf of the Committee practically constituted a one-man operation, arising from activities he himself instituted. Vincent T. Lee, National Chairman of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was interviewed December 3, 1963, and said he had no knowledge of a charter having been issued to Oswald or anyone else for a chapter of the Committee in New Orleans.

The investigation has shown further that Oswald's contacts with the Communist Party, USA, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee were the direct result of actions initiated by him, and consisted largely of an interchange of correspondence, again initiated by Oswald.

[Contacts with Embassies] (S-1)(S)

The investigation after November 22, 1963, [confirmed Oswald's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City and revealed that his purpose was to obtain visas for himself and his family to travel to the Soviet Union by way of Cuba.] (S-1)(S)

- 20 -

~~SECRET~~

ITEM 71

~~SECRET~~

FBI INVESTIGATION OF OSWALD

QUESTION: Did any of the FBI's sources furnish pertinent information concerning Oswald and his activities?

ANSWER: Yes. Information concerning various phases of Oswald's activities in connection with both procommunist and pro-Castro groups had been furnished to the FBI through our sources. [Other sources advised of his contacts with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.] (S-1)(S)

QUESTION: Did the FBI have Oswald under surveillance at the time of the President's trip to Dallas?

ANSWER: No. The FBI's interest in Oswald at that time was to determine [the purpose of his contacts with the Soviet ~~and Cuban Embassies~~ in Mexico City.] The use of a technique S-1 B such as a surveillance would not have been relevant to the purpose of our investigation of him at the time.

QUESTION: When was Oswald last interviewed by the FBI?

ANSWER: Oswald was last interviewed by the FBI (prior to November 22, 1963) at his request on August 10, 1963, at the First District Station of the New Orleans Police Department following his arrest on August 9, 1963, by officers of that department for "Disturbing the Peace by Creating a Scene." His arrest followed involvement in an argument with three

31

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NEWS LEAKS OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION

QUESTION: Did representatives of the press pick up the story that Oswald allegedly went to Mexico and received a \$5,000 payment from the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City? (S-1)(X)U

b3-1
b1-1
b2-4
b7c-3
b7d-2

[REDACTED]

A

In this connection I would like to point out that FBI Headquarters was continually deluged with calls from press representatives throughout the country. They were attempting to secure verification of stories and rumors concerning all aspects of the case. I wish to emphasize that these inquiries were always answered by a strict "No Comment" from the FBI. It was quite obvious from their questions however, that a great amount of factual information was being fed to them by local law enforcement officials in Dallas and other sources. The local authorities were able to do this in view of FBI Laboratory reports which were necessarily furnished them.

RETYPE OF 2/27/64

*Oswald
7/2/64*

Mr. W. C. Sullivan 2/2/64

D. J. Brennan, Jr.

Leah

**JOE HARVEY OSWALD
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA - CUBA**

On 2/27/64, Mr. C. E. Wilson, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), advised Liaison that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had requested and had been granted permission to include two ONI messages regarding Oswald in a "package" CIA plans to send to the Warren Commission. The Bureau and CIA both received copies of the ONI documents when they were prepared in 1962 and a copy of each is enclosed for information.

One of the documents is a cable dated 2/12/62 from the ONI Director to the U.S. Naval Attache, Moscow. It referred to Oswald's 1939 visit to the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, when he requested revocation of his U.S. citizenship, asserted he had applied for Soviet citizenship, and allegedly said he intended to tell the Soviets information he gained in the Marine Corps when he became a Soviet citizen. The cable then informed the Naval Attache that Navy Secretary Connally had received a letter in February, 1962, from Oswald complaining about being given a dishonorable discharge from the Marine Corps.

The other ONI document is a memorandum of 4/26/62 to the Bureau, copies to CIA and Immigration and Naturalization Service, transmitting a copy of a letter of 2/22/62 from Oswald, then in Russia, to the Marine Corps. In it Oswald requested a full review of his undesirable discharge and indicated he expected to be back in the United States by the time his letter was received.

On February 27, 1964, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent on February 27 1964, that the President's Commission had requested CIA to identify in detail all material which the Agency had in its possession

Enclosures

JW/SJ: hbs/mar
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Mohr
1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. Sullivan

SR
1-Mr. Brennan (Attention: Mr. Lonigan)
1-Mr. Miller
1-Mr. Papich
1-Liaison
1-Mr. Fitzgerald

✓

100-21558

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA - CUBA

concerning Oswald immediately prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. CIA is giving this request a very legalistic interpretation and is furnishing the Commission all information in its possession, including data which had been disseminated to CIA by other agencies.

By memorandum dated February 27, 1964, we advised that we had no objection to CIA describing or furnishing the President's Commission copies of communications which we had disseminated to CIA prior to the assassination.

It is noted that Oswald's letter to Connally and his letter to the Marine Corps were both included in the Marine Corps file which the Bureau previously forwarded to the Warren Commission.

ACTION:

For information.

See 62-109060-710. ml

Navy Discharge Review
Board # 8812

WFO airtel to Bureau

11/23/63

SECRET

(28) [The information received on November 18, 1963, concerning Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy] ^(S) [ended to confirm his contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City as reported by CIA." However, the information did not explain why Oswald had gone to Mexico or why he intended to go to Cuba.] ^(S-1)
The information reported by our source raised some question regarding the relationship between Oswald and the Soviets but it certainly did not allege espionage or other subversive activity nor suggest that Oswald was a threat to the safety of the President.

[and to indicate the reasons for such contact, namely to secure visas to the Soviet Union.] ~~_____~~
^{(S-1)(S)}

MEMORANDUM TO MR. BELMONT

Levinson cc [unclear]
~~SECRET~~
8-12-84
Oswald
Fisher

The following are items of interest in the Oswald file between serials 80 and 77:

Serial 80 - Teletype to Dallas 11-23 speaks of anonymous source at FPOC Headquarters, New York, and encloses copy of letter Oswald sent to FPOC.

11-23-63 memorandum Branigan to Sullivan prepared by Turner, unserialized. This is yellow copy of Serial 76.

Seattle teletype 11-23 to Bureau, New York and Dallas, unserialized, identifies informant [redacted] by number.

11-23 memo Rosen to Belmont, unserialized, re Assassination. Deals with 3 American defectors during Korean War, one of whom, Nicholas Petrulli, renounced his citizenship 9-3-59, returned to U. S. 9-22-59. Director comments that he cannot understand renouncing of citizenship by Petrulli and State Department allowing him to return to U. S. on 9-22.

Letterhead dated 11-23, unserialized, which was enclosure to letter to the President re Assassination. On pages 4 and 8 appears information [redacted]

[redacted]

On page 8 information [redacted] The LHM is [redacted]

Atlanta teletype 11-23 to Bureau, Dallas, New Orleans and Tampa, not serialized, contains information from Airman Palmer McBride who reported that Oswald in '57-'58, when working with him in New Orleans told him he would like to kill President Eisenhower because of his "exploitation of working people." Commission is aware of this.

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by *Aut/He*
Sans BJA/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 12/7/84

~~SECRET~~

Doc #1
ITEM 90

010

060

~~SECRET~~

Teletype 11-23 Dallas to Bureau, not serialized, records

[REDACTED]

b1-1 F
3-1

11-26 New York teletype to Bureau, Baltimore, Dallas and New Orleans, not serialized.

[REDACTED]

b1-2

[REDACTED]

b1-1 F
53-1 I

Serial 54 - Letter from New Orleans 11-26 enclosing 17 items from New Orleans file (intra-office), which were not in Bureau's possession. Letter makes specific reference to telephone call 11-26 from Assistant Director James H. Gale. The 17 enclosures are all serialized as Serial 54. Enclosure #1 is a New York letter to New Orleans 7-5-63, and [REDACTED]

(c) This is anonymous source. Enclosure 16 is the enclosure to New York letter 7-5-63, which is the product of the source, namely, Oswald's letter to "The Worker" 6-10-63. Enclosure #3 is New York letter to New Orleans 7-17, which [REDACTED]

b1-2
b2-1
b7D-3

(c) Enclosure #17 is the enclosure to New York letter 7-17, [REDACTED]

b1-2

(c) Enclosure #8 is memorandum from [REDACTED] Callender to SAC, New Orleans 8-9-63, which identifies [REDACTED] as a source of information who requested her identity be maintained on confidential basis.

b1-D-2
b7C-3

Memorandum Griffith to Conrad 11-25 re Assassination, not serialized. Deals with study of photograph of rifle in possession of Oswald and states that gun in picture is similar in all respects and possibly depicts the murder weapon. Director comments conclusion was practically useless.

Brasgardner to Sullivan memo 11-23-63, not serialized [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(c) b1-2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Wannall to Sullivan 11-25, not serialized, re
FPCC. Shows anonymous source at FPCC Office, New York.

~~11-20-72~~
Cablegram Bureau to Legat, Mexico 11-25, not serialized. [REDACTED]

b-1-1
b3-1
F

Serial 57 - Bureau teletype to Dallas 11-23. Note on yellow
shows anonymous source at FPCC Headquarters, New York.

Airtel New York 11-27 re FPCC, unserialized. Refers to
[REDACTED] probably anonymous source at FPCC Headquarters,
New York.

b2-1
b7D-3

Serial 76 is 11-22 Branigan to Sullivan memo re Assassination by
E. T. Turner, reviewing Oswald investigation. Mr. Tolson asks on
page 4 "Was Oswald on Security Index?" and when was information
concerning Oswald's contacts of Soviet Embassy in Mexico furnished
State Department and why our reports of Bureau investigation
did not contain this information.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

#211,326
Classified by SAB BTJ/ku
Declassify on: OADR #2/84

Photo displayed to
Marquerite Oswald

11/23/63 - was photo
of event which was sent

up to Dallas [by legal
office of person CIA
said was Lee Oswald

who visited Soviet Embassy

REFERRAL DOCUMENT
DOI/PA # 211,326
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
E.O. # 12356
DATE 10/31/84 INITIALS GDL

(S-1) 15 CIA

See cover page c - Dallas report 12/2
See News. Bryan & Sullivan 2/6/64 set to Rankin
2-7-64
ITEM 100

~~SECRET~~

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

~~SECRET~~

These are the
photos shown
to Mrs. Oswald
(Lee's mother)
which she said
was Ruby's

sent in by Dallas
airtel 11/23/63

[as obtained by
confid source of
legat - not ident
yet -](S-1)(S)

~~SECRET~~

211 326 Classified by SA 437/ACU
Declassify on: OADR 9/30/01

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

December 7, 1963

D. J. Brennan

LEE HARVEY OSWALD
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

On December 7, 1963, [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), referred to statements previously made to him by Allan Dulles indicating that the President's Commission might show considerable interest in all available information concerning the subject's activities in Russia and particularly anything dealing with Oswald's relations with the Russian Intelligence Services. [redacted] commented that everyone recognizes it will be difficult to obtain a detailed picture of Oswald's activities in Russia. CIA nevertheless wishes to cooperate in every way possible and his Agency believes that possibly some worthwhile data could be obtained by CIA from detailed research and [redacted]

[redacted] then inquired if the Bureau would be willing to furnish CIA the copies of the following material which might assist the Agency in conducting its study bearing in mind that all results could be made available to the Bureau:

- (1) Soviet documents which have been acquired by the Bureau and pertaining to this case.
- (2) Notes and writings of Oswald's relating to his life in Russia.
- (3) Results of interrogations of Oswald and his wife.

ACTION:

If approved, the Liaison Agent will make the above material available to CIA with the understanding that the results be furnished to the Bureau.

SJP:mab (8)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Turner
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

ITEM 101

WFO 139-61

EX 3-6115 Central Intelligence Agency,
2430 E Street, N.W.

JA 3-1441 No JA 3 exchange in Washington
metropolitan area. JE 3-1441 listed
to JOSEPH BOYLE, 4013 Westmorland
Street, McLean, Virginia.

MU 6-6000 No MU 6 exchange in the Washington
metropolitan area.

CL 6-1891 JAMES P. O'CONNELL, JR., 826 Whispering
Lane, Falls Church, Virginia.

EX 3-4900 General Services Administration (U.S.
Government), General Services Building,
18th and F Streets, N.W.

LO 6-9660 No LO 6 exchange in the Washington
metropolitan area.

OL 4-4284 EDWARD P. MORGAN, 6004 Brookside Drive,
Kenwood, Maryland.

ME 8-6565 A multiple listing in the names of the
following attorneys, Suite 1004,
839 - 17th Street, N.W:

RAYMOND W. BERGAN, VINCENT J. FULLER,
JOHN W. GUIDER, CHARLES P. MULDOON,
AGNES A. NEILL, JOHN A. SELBY,
COLMAN B. SLEIN, HAROLD UNGAR, THOMAS
A. WADDEN, JR., EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS.

WFO files reflect that JAMES P. O'CONNELL, JR., resigned
as a Special Agent of the FBI on 11/30/51. ✓

b7c-l
b7D-6
63-1

[REDACTED] I

WFO files further reflect that EDWARD P. MORGAN is
a former Special Agent of the FBI. By letter dated 4/27/55, the
Bureau advised that MORGAN, a former Special Agent and presently
a Washington, D. C., attorney, is not to be contacted without
Bureau authority. ✓

- B -

ITEM 146

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum

0 277. Via

Director	/
Deputy Dir.	/
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	/
Ident.	/
Insp.	/
Intell.	/
Lab.	/
Legal Coun.	/
Plan. & Insp.	/
Rec. Mgmt.	/
Tech. Serv.	/
Training	/
Off. Liaison & Int. Affs.	/
Chief Clerk	/

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 12/22/61

FROM : S. B. Donahoe

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - Donahoe
- 1 - [redacted]

SUBJECT: ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

b7c-7

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

Classified per CIA let 9/10/81

Press reported on 12/19/61 that two planes from unidentified Caribbean base had flown over Cuba on 12/17/61 and had dropped over 250,000 anti-Castro leaflets and two parachutists with radio equipment. Financial backing reportedly came from [redacted]

B b1-1
b3-1

Press noted this was second such mission, the previous one having been made 10/21/61 by two planes which dropped anti-Castro leaflets over Camaguey, Cuba.

[Large redacted block]

Outside Scope - 1
b1-1
b3-1
A, B, F

ALL FIELD OFFICES
AT [redacted]
AT [redacted]
DATE

Classified

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-584-100

[Large redacted block]

b7c-1, 9
Outside Scope - 1
Referred
b1-1
b3-1

NOT RECORDED

[Redacted block]

b7c-9
Referred

109-584

51 JAN 5 1962

SENT DIRECTOR
12-22-61

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY SP
REASON FCIMR 1-2.4.2
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION 12/22/81

ITEM 150

Letter Donahoe to Sullivan
Re: ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
109-584

~~SECRET~~

Classification per CIA dated 9/10/05

[REDACTED]

Referred
b7C-1
b1-1
F 83-1
outside scope

[REDACTED]

Referred
b7C
F b1-1
b3-1

OBSERVATIONS:

A
F

[REDACTED]

outside scope of -
Reque
b1-1
b3-1

ACTION:

For information.

85m/5
md
[Handwritten initials and signatures]

This is a direct response to the...
[Handwritten notes in cursive script]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

A

The Federal Bureau Of Investigation

2. Early Bureau Response To The President's Assassination

A. November 22-25, 1963

1. Early teletypes; instructions to field; Hoover, Sullivan, Belmont memos; 80 agents to Dallas
2. Jenkins memo of Nov 24: Hoover says Oswald alone did it, Bureau must "convince the public Oswald is the real assassin."
3. Hoover memo on Nov 26: "wrap up investigation; seems to me we have the basic facts now" 62-109060-1490
4. Hoover memo on Nov 29: "hope to have investigation wrapped up by next week"

Classified by *21632*
 Declassify on: *OADR 1/5/84*
MULTIPLE SOURCES
SS/BJJ/GCL

B. Lee Harvey Oswald

1. Establishing chain of evidence, bullet to gun, etc.
2. November 23 memo: Basic facts, yet contradictions on Oswald in Mexico; photo not his
3. Hosty note destruction: handling by Bureau on Nov 24 and effect in subsequent days
4. Interviews of Oswald associates, Marina wiretap M. MARINES, etc.

REFERRAL DOCUMENT
FOI/PA # 211 326
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
E.O. # 12356
DATE 1/5/84

(S-1) *[redacted]* s) 61-1
 (S-2) *ARMY*

C. Jack Ruby

1. Basic facts, early memos
2. Hoover suspicion of basement entry and assistance
3. extensive teletypes and reports on organized crime connections, also Hoover's own memos
4. contacts in 1959 as P.C.I - for use as informer on criminal element in Dallas

~~SECRET~~

Doc # 1. ITEM 238

D. Investigation of Potential Cuban Aspects

CIA

CIA

CIA

1. Cancellation of orders to contact Cuban sources on May 23
2. Not communicating knowledge of CIA/Mafia plots to staff (S-1)(S)
3. Deletion of [CIA/Army Cuban involvement] from memo provided to Commission (S-2)(S)
4. Cuban experts and supervisors excluded from investigation
5. Church Committee findings on narrow Cuban focus
6. [Withholding of knowledge of CIA involvement with ██████████] (S-1)(S)

E. Investigation of Potential Organized Crime Aspects

1. Hoover memos and teletypes on Ruby connections
2. Ruby phone records
3. Justice Dept. interest in probing O.C. aspects
4. Chicago interviews with Ruby associates
5. Evans and Staffeld (and Denaby and Stanley) statements on not being consulted
6. Use of Ruby as informant on Dallas criminal element
7. LCN sources available at time

3. Bureau Relationship With Warren Commission

A. Formation of Warren Commission

1. Hoover opposition: memo and Jenkins memo
2. Katzenbach testimony and Sullivan statement
3. Early memos - adversary relationship
4. Hoover blocking Warren's choice for general counsel
5. Preparation of dossiers on staff and members.

"Classifiable" not "classified" p 6

Has he checked to see if he withholds what has been disclosed as Data source?
Can you get him to state of personal knowledge that he's ~~to~~ ^{injected} ~~injected~~ ^{injected} catalogue

of sources appear to be few page numbers? Using phone books & newspaper
classified also are getting the methods. and thus "classified."

Did not see what he disclosed.
It is "detailed knowledge" of methods + practices involved? and that all intelligence
agencies use to know other things used? where he says "is" ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~used~~ ^{used}.

Why not use because most methods + practices are known and still ~~used~~ ^{used}.

use, not "necessary" like classified and most others
How about those used by the CIA & already officially disclosed?

Have any of these CIA names been disclosed officially like Langston, Roman, etc. and
is this information that can contribute to CIA, like withholding from
and sharing not to volunteer info to W-6? Would there be an active
"revelation" or not withhold any three specific names?