The C.I.A.: Qualities of Director Viewed as Chief Rein on Agency

Following is the last of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and others. Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, April 28 - Russians had implanted offen-

about its meaning.

He believed such an arsenal helped carry it out. half-way around the world from , In 1963, Mr. McCone was per-Moscow had to be designed sonally in favor of the proposed ultimately to protect even more limited nuclear test-ban treaty. important installations - long- He had backed such proposals range offensive missiles and since his years as chairman of nuclear weapons yet to be pro- the Atomic Energy Commission

vided. Mr. McCone told President Kennedy about his hunch but pecified that it was a personal guess entirely lacking in con-known as fully as possible, he here a supporting evidence. rete supporting evidence. He furnished a C.I.A. staff expert scrupulously refused to impose to assist Senator John Stennis, his hunch on the contradictory permocrat of Mississippi, chairdocumentary and photoanalysis man of an Armed Services subdocumentary and photoanalysis man of an Armed Services sub-evidence being provided by the intelligence community over which he presided. He contin-ied to pass to the President und his advisers reports and estimates—based on all avail-ble evidence—that the Soviet Juion was not likely to do what he believed in his heart t was doing.

s copious evidence of a Soviet sive missiles in Cuba did come nilitary build-up in Cuba, in- in, Mr. McCone was among luding the installation of anti- those around the President who ircraft missiles, poured into argued for quick, decisive air Washington in the summer of action before the missiles could 962, the director of the Central become operative. But when the Intelligence Agency, John A. President decided on his block-McCone, had a strong hunch ade-and-ultimatum policy, Mr. McCone loyally supported it and

When the evidence that the Continued on Page 18, Column 1

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lectual effort to separate fact from fancy, evidence from suspicion, decision from preference, opinion from policy and consequence from guess that effective control of the C.I.A. must begin, in the opinion of most of those who have been surveyed by The New York Times.

And it is when these qualities have been lacking, the same officials and experts believe, that the C.I.A. most often has become involved in those activities that have led to widespread charges that it is not controlled, makes its own policy and undermines that of

its political masters.

Inevitably, the contrast is drawn between John McCone and Allen W. Dulles, one of the most charming and imaginative men in Washington, under whose direction the C.I.A. grew to its present proportions and importance.

A Gambling Man

Digging a wiretap tunnel from West to East Berlin, flyfrom West to East Berlin, fly-ing spy planes beyond the reach of antiaircraft weapons over the Soviet Union and finding a Lao-lian ruler in the cafes of Paris were romantic projects that kindled Mr. Dulles's enthu-siasm. Sometimes the profits were great; sometimes the losses were greater. To Allen Dulles a graphing

To Allen Dulles, a gambling man, the possibility of the losses were real but the chance of success was more important.

A 20 per cent chance to over-throw a leftist regime in Gua-temala through a C.I.A.-spon-sored invasion was all he wanted to give it a try. He charmed President Eisenhower with tales of extraordinary mooping on such rulers as President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic and with accounts of the ro-mantic derring-do of Kermit Hoosevelt in arousing Iranian mobs against Mohammed Mos-sudegh to restore the Shah to his throne. A 20 per cent chance to over-

As long as his brother, John Foster Dulles; was Secretary of State, Allen Dulles had no need to chafe under political "control." The Secretary had an almost equal fascination for devious, back-alley adventure in what he saw as a worldwide crusade. crusade.

Personal Judgments

Personal Judgments Neither brother earned his high reputation by tait and busi-nessilike administration. Both placed supreme confidence in their personal judgments Colleagues recall many oc-casions on which Allen Dulles would cut off debate about, say, use in the intertions of a foreign head of state with the remark: "Oh, I know him personally. He would never do that sort of thing."

would never go that solve thing." Allen Dulles was also an ac-complished politician, Through-out his regime he maintained the best of relations with the late Clarence Cannon of Mis-souri, who as chairman of the House Appropriations Commit-tee was the key figure in pro-

House Appropriations Commit-tee was the key figure in pro-viding C.I.A. funds. Mr. Dulles kept personal con-trol of the selection of other members of Congress with re-sponsibility for overseeing the C.I.A., with the result that he nvariably had on his side those C.I.A., with the result that ne nvariably had on his side those members of the Congressional establishment who could carry the rest of Congress with them. Thus, in the Dulles period fat the C.I.A., there was a

pecullar set of circumstances. An adventurous director, in-clined to reiv on his own often extremely good and informed intuition, widely traveled, read and experienced, with great prestige and the best connec-tions in Congress, whose broth-er held the second-highest of-lice in the Administration and fice in the Administration, and whose President completely trusted and relied upon both, was able to act almost at will and was shielded from any unpleasant consequences.

Kennedy Kept Him in Office

When the Eisenhower Admin-7 When the Eisennower Admin-stration came to an end in 1961, Allen Dulles's reappointment was one of President Kennedy's first acts. Mr. Dulles, like J. Edgar Hoover, who was reap-pointed head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the rame time head organt practice. same time, had great prestige and was thought to lend conti-

and was thought to lend conti-muity and stability to the new Administration. In fact, Mr. Dulles's continu-ance in office set the stage for the Bay of Pigs and the great crisis of the C.I.A. In that incredible drama of 1961, it was Mr. Dulles's weak-nesses as C.I.A. director — rather than, as so often before, his strengths—that came to the fore. He was committed to the Cuba invasion plan, at all costs.] Cuba invasion plan, at all costs, against whatever objections. The advocate overcame the planner. As President Kennedy and

As President Kennedy and others interposed reservations and qualifications, Mr. Dulles and his chief lieutenant, Richard M. Bissell, made what-ever changes were required in order to keep the plan alive. For instance, they switched the landing site from the Trinidad area to the Bay of Pigs, to achieve more secrecy, thereby area to the Bay or Pigs, to achieve more secrecy, thereby accepting an inferior beachhead site and separating the refugee force of invaders from the Escambray Mountains, where they were supposed to operate

as guerrillas, by 80 miles of

Above all, lacking his old rapport with President Eisena coldly objective approach to his plan, Mr. Dulles never realized that Plesident Kennedy

realized that President Kennedy suffered from more than tactical reservations. These misgivings—in reality a reluctance to approve the in-vasion — forced the frequent changes in plans, each weaken-ing the whole, until whatever shance of success there might have been was gone. have been was gone.

At a Critical Hour

It was John McCone who re-laced Allen Dulles at the C.I.A.'s most critical hour. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, t had barely escaped dismem-erment, or at least the divorce of its Intelligence and Opera-

ions Divisions. There were also new cries for greater conlent Kennedy were suspicious pf, if not hostile to, the agency. Like Mr. Dulles, Mr. McCone levoted much energy to resist-ing a formal Congressional watchdog committee, to court-ing the senior members of the ing the senior members of the Armed Services and Appropria-tions Committees on Capitol Fill and to converting the members of a resuscitated Presidential advisory board to is view of intelligence policies. But those who observed him work believe he also brought a keen intelligence and energy to a tough-minded administra-ion of the agency itself and to

ion of the agency itself and to vareful, challenging study of its ntelligence estimates and recmmendations.

He broke down the rigid diviion between operations and analysis that had kept the I.A.'s analysts—incredible as seems—ignorant of the Operions Division's specific plan to nvade Cuba. And he began to subject the CI.A.'s own action programs to vigorous review and criticism by the agency's own experts.

Incisive Questions

The intellectual level of meetings among intelligence of-ficials at the C.I.A. and other agencies improved greatly un-der Mr. McCone, primarily be-cause he put difficult and in-claive questions to these percause he guestions to those pre-paring formal analyses and plans, forcing them to chal-lenge and defend their own judgments.

Above all, he set the hard example himself of putting aside personal preference, in-formed guesses and long gam-bles in favor of realistic weigh-ing of available evidence and close adherence to administra-

close adherence to administra-tion policy. He brought specialists and experts into conferences and de-cision-making at a much higher level of policy than before. Often he took such men with him to meetings at the Cabinet level. This exposed them to policy considerations as never before, and put policy-makers before, and put policy-makers more closely in touch with the experts on whose "facts" they

experts on whose "facts" they were acting. As chairman of the United States Intelligence Board — a group that brings together rep-resentatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's Intelligence unit and others—Mr. McCone won a reputation for objectivity by frequentive overruing the profrequently overruling the pro-posals of his own agency, the C.I.A.

Some Criticism, Too

His regime was not without its critics. Many officials be-lieve he narrowed the C.LA.'s range of interests, which was as wide as the herizons under the imaginative Allen Dulles. For instance, they say, he was slow to mobilize the C.I.A. to

obtain information about nu-clear programs in India, Israel and other nations. Mr. McCone also tricd, but failed, to end interagency rival-ries. He/spent much time in bitter dispute with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara bitter dispute with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara about divisions of labor and costs in technological programs and about chains of command <u>in Vietnam. He is reported to have leared</u> the growth of the Defense Intelligence Agency as an invasion of C.I.A. territory. With the State Department, too, rivalry continued—and still does. Much of this can be at-

with the State Department, too, rivalry continued—and still does. Much of this can be at-tributed, on the diplomats' side, to the C.I.A.'s readier access to the upper levels of govern-ment and to its financial ability to underwrite the kind of re-search and field operations that State would like to do for itself. On the agency's side, there is undoubtedly scme resentment at the State Department's re-cently increased political con-tal of C.I.A. operations. For instance, until April 28, 1965, the day President Johnson ordered the Marines into Santo Upmingo, the C.I.A. had re-perted the possibility of a re-bellion and it knew of three Communist-controlled groups functioning in the Dominican functioning in the Dominican Republic, but the agency had not suggested an imminent threat of a Communist take. over

When the President and his When the President and his advisers became persuaded that there was such a threat, how-ever, C.I.A. agents supplied confirming intelligence — some of it open to challenge by an alert reader. C.I.A. officials seem a little red-faced about this compliance and the interathis compliance, and the intima-tion is that the C.I.A. may have gone overboard in trying not to undermine but to substantiate a political policy decision. Within the Bounds of Policy

Mr. McCone's pride and the fierce loyalty to the agency that he developed made him resent-ful of Congressional and public criticism, not always to his own advantage. Nevertheless, as a result of his single-minded efforts to control himself and his agency, other former mem-bers of the Kennedy Adminis-tration-many of whom opposed his appointment-now find it Mard to recall any time when Mr. McCone or the C.I.A. in his time overstepped the bounds of policy deliberately. Thus, they are inclined to cite him as proof of the theory

The far more general belief s that Congress ought to have much larger voice in the con-

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that in the process of govern-ment men are more important than mechanics—and in support of the widespread opinion among present and former of-ficials that the problem of con-trolling the C.I.A, must begin with men inside the agency it-celf. self.

rol of the agency. This belief s reinforced by the fact that he Congressional control that now exists is ill-informed, in he hands, of a chosen few, ubject to what the agency wishes to tell even these few, and occasionally anothetic

and occasionally apathetic. There are four subcom-mittees of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropria-ions Committees to which the

Mr. McCone met about once a month with the subcommit-Adm. William F. Raborn, meets with them' somewhat more often.

Conflicting Views There are conflicting opin-tons on the value of these seslons on the value of these ses-sions. Some who participate say that they are "comprehensive," that the director holds back nothing in response to ques-tions, that he goes into "great detail on budget and opera-tions" and is "brutally frank." Others say that "we are pretty well filled in" but that the subcommittees get no precise information on the budget or he number of employes and hat the director reveals only as much as he wants to. as much as he wants to.

These conflicting views prob-ably reflect the composition and ably reflect the composition and interests of the subcommittees. Those on the Senate side are laid to be "lackadaisical" and "apathetic," with some Sen-ators not wanting to know too rhuch. The House subcommit-tees are said to be "alert, in-terested and efficient," with members insisting on answers to questions.

members insisting on answers to questions, Representative George H. Mahon, Democrat of Texas, chairman of the House Ap-propriations Committee, has warned the Administration it, must itself police the C.I.A. budget more stringently than that of any other agency be-cause he and other Congress-men believe they should protect the sensitive C.I.A. budget, as it comes to them, from the Con-gressional economy bloc and the agency's more determined critics. critics.

As a result of this and other Congressional representations, the C.I.A, "slush fund" for emergencies has been reduced below \$100-million. And-much President Johnson's economy irives resulted in an Administration reduction in the agency's general budget.

Three things, however, are clear about this Congressional oversight.

No Real Control

One is that the subcommittee members exercise no real con-trol because they are not in-formed of all covert operations, either before or after they take place.

The second point regarding Congressional oversight is that

a handful of men like Mr. Can-non and Senator Russell, with non and Senator Russen, the their great prestige, do not so much control the C.I.A. as much control the C shield it from its critics.

shield it from its critics. Finally, even these establish-ment watchdogs can be told just as much as the C.I.A. director thinks they should know. In fact, one or two of the subcommittee members are known to shy away from too much secret information, on the ground that they do not want either to know about "lack" operations or take the chance of unwittingly disclos-ing them. For all these reasons, there

For all these reasons, there is a large body of substantial opinion—in and out of Congress — that favors more specific monitoring of intelligence ac-tivity tivity.

tivity. The critics insist that Con-gress has a duty periodically to investigate the activities of the C.I.A. and other intelli-gence arms; to check on the C.I.A.'s relations with other executive departments, study its budget and exercise greater and more intelligent oversight than the present diffused sub-committees, which operate with-out staff and with little or no out staff and with little or no representation from members most concerned with foreign affairs.

A Fountain of Leaks But the overwhelming con-sensus of those most knowl-edgeable about the C.I.A, now and in the past, does not sup-port the idea that Congress should "control" the C.I.A. A number of reasons are adduced: ¶Security. Congress is the

well-known fountain of more leaks than any other body in Washington, The political aspi-rations of and pressures on members make them eager to appear in print; they do not have the executive responsibil-C.I.A. operations could provide dramatic passages in campaign speeches.

Politics. Any standing com-mittee would have to be bi-partisan. This would give minority party members — as minority party members — as will as dissignts in the ma-jointy — unparalleled opportu-niles to learn the secrets of the executive branch and of foreign policy, and to make political capital of mistakes or controversial policies. Repub-licans, for instance, armed with all the facts and testimony that investization could have disinvestigation could have dis-closed, might well have vrecked the Kennedy Admin-stration after the Bay of Pigs. 4 The Constitution, The C.I.A. acts at the direction of the President and the National Se-curity Council. If a Congres-sional committee had to be in-formed in advance of C.I.A.

activities, covert and overt, there might well be a direct there congressional breach of the constitutional freedom of the executive branch and of the Presi-dent's right to conduct foreign policy.

¶Control. If a carefully a chosen committee conscien-tiously tried to avoid all these dangers, it could probably ex-ercise little real "control" of the kind critics desire. At best, i for instance, it could probably do little more than investigate (some guastianable operations)

for instance, it could probably i do little more than investigate i some questionable operations i in secrecy and after they had taken place, and then report privately to the President, who might or might not respond. "Ideology. Congress is full of "professional anti-Commu-nists" and has not a few "pro-fessional liberals." In its worldwide activities, the C.I.A. regularly takes covert actions that would profoundly offend either or both-for instance, supporting some non-Commu-nist leftist against a military regime, or vice versa. To re-port this kind of activity to Congress would be certain to set off public debate and re-criminations and lay a whole new set of domestic political pressures on the agency. "Policy. Knowledgeable men in Washington do not accent the

pressures on the agency. Pressures on the agency. Policy. Knowledgeable men in Washington do not accept the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a desirable model for oversight of the C.I.A. They point out that the Atomic En-ergy Committee has developed its own staff of experts in its field, in some cases abler men than those in the Atomic Energy Commission, and these Con-gressional experts now have a vested interest in their own vested interest in their own ideas of atomic policy and projects.

An Empire Foreseen

An Empire Foreseen This, these sources fear, would be the outcome of a joint committee on intelligence —a new intelligence empire on Capitol Hill that could in time exert a direct policy influence on the C.I.A., separate from and challenging the President's policy decisions. This would dif-fuse rather than focus power over the agency and confuse rather than clarify the problem of control.

over the agency and coolem rather than clarify the problem of control. Other recommendations for a Congressional intervention have been advanced. The most drastic—and in some ways the most interesting—would be to legislate the separation of the C.I.A.'s intelligence and analy-sis function from the opera-tions or "dirty tricks" function. President Kennedy, after the Bay of Pigs, rejected a proposal to create a new and autonomous intelligence and analysis agen-cy. This plan would have covert political operations under a small and largely anonymous section of the State Depart-ment.

Efficiency Drop Feared

If accepted, this plan would

have had the great advantage, in terms of control, of divorcing "black" operators and their schemes from the source of in-formation on which the deci-sion to act must be made. Thus, the covert operators would have no more information than any-one else in government, no power to shape, color, withhold or manufacture information, and could, 'n effect, do only what they were told to do by political authorities. It would also reduce the sheer size and power of the C.I.A. within the Government, much of which is based on its com-bination of functions—provid-ing information, proposing ac-tion and having the ability to carry it-out. On the other hand, as Mr. Kennedy concluded, such a di-yorce might well lower the total overt and covert efficiency of

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the intelligence effort, Those who favor the present combined agency insist that intelligence and action officers must be close enough to advise one an-other—with analysts checking operators, but also profiting from the operators' experiences in the field.

In the field. Moreover, they point out that so-called paramilitary opera-tions are more easily trans-ferred on paper than in fact to the Defense Department. They note that the department, far instance, can by law ship arms only to recognized gov-emments that undertake cer-tion obligations in return and tain obligations in return, and sannot legally arm or assist, ay, rebel groups or mercen-aries, even for laudable purposes.

Nor could the Defense Depart-ment easily acquire the skill, the convenient "covers," the the convenient "covers," the political talents and bureaucrat-ic flexibility required for quick, improvised action in time of crisis.

As evidence of that, there is As evidence of the successful polit-cal and military organization of hill tribesmen in Vietnam arried out by the C.I.A. some years ago. When the Army won control of the operation in a sureaucratic in-fight, the good beginning was lost in a classic bit of military mismanagement. and the tribal project collapsed. As for the State Department's aking over covert operations, We opponents ask, how could be department survive the in-Somble exposure of some of or polical skulduggery in some othe country, when it is sup-pose to be the simon-pure ves-sel of the United States' proper lipionatic relations?

A Less Drastic Plan A far less drastic but/ perhaps more feasible approach would be to add knowledgeable Congressional experts in foreign affairs to the military and appropriations subcommittees

appropriations subcommittees that now check on the C.I.A. Along this line is the idea backed by Senator McCarthy-that a subcommittee of the Sen-ate Foreign Relations Commit-fee should be added to the ex-listing watchdogs. Such men as J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, chair-man of the Senate Foreign Re-lations Committee Mike Mans.

man of the Senate Foreign Re-lations Committee, Mike Mans-field of Montana, the Senate Democratic leader, and George D. Alken of Vermont, a Repub-lican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, might bring greater balance and sen-sitivity to the present group of watchdog subcommittees. Most of those interviewed in the New York Times survey for these articles also believed that

these articles also believed that the C.I.A. should have no in-fluence on the selection of members of the subcommittees. While the excuse for giving the agency a voice is to make ure that only "secure" and

responsible" members of Coness are chosen, the net effect that the agency usually man-ges to have itself checked by is best friends in Congress and by those who can best slield it from more critical members like Senator McCarthy and Senator Mansfield.

Fund Slash Proposed

Finally, many observers con-sider that it might be useful for some select, nonpermanent committee of independentminded members of Congress to make a thorough, responsible study of the whole intelligence community. Such a group might set out to determine how much of the community's activity is actually needed or useful, and how much of the whole apparatus might be reduced in size and expense—and thus in the kind of visibility that brings the C.I.A. into disrepute over-seas and at home.

seks and at home. One former offical said quite seriously that he was not sure how much the nation would lose in vital services if all the activities of the C.I.A apart from those dealing with tech-nological espionage—satellites and the like—had their budgets arbitrarily reduced by half. A number of others suggested that it was possible for a great

that it was possible for a great many of the C.I.A.'s informa-tion-gathering functions and study projects to be handled openly' by the State Depart-ment, if only Congress would appropriate the money for it. But the State Department is traditionally startwed for funds by members of Congress who scoff at the "cookie-pushers" and the "striped-pants boys." The same members are often The same members are often quite willing to appropriate big sums, almost blindly, for the secret, "tough" and occasionally glamorous activities of the spies, saboteurs and mysterious experts of the C.I.A. As another example of what

a specially organized, responsible Congressional investigation might discover, some officials expressed their doubts about the National Security Agency. This Defense Department arm specializes in making and breaking codes, spends about \$1-billion a year-twice as much as the C.I.A .- and, in the opinion of many who know its work, hardly earns its keep. But to most of those interviewed, the question of control ultimately came down to the caliber and attitude of the men who run the C.I.A., and par-ticularly its director. The present director, Admiral

Raborn, is a man who earned a high reputation as the de-veloper of the Navy's Polaris missile but who had no previous experience in intelligence work. Nor is he particularly close to President Johnson or to other high Administration officials.

Inauspicious Start

The admiral took office on a bad day-the one on which Mr. Johnson dispatched the Marines to Santo Domingo last April.

Admiral Raborn and his pred-ecessor, Mr. McCone, lunched together in downtown Washington that afternoon, unaware of the imminent intervention. As they parted, Admiral Raborn offered Mr. McCone a ride to the Langley, Va., headquarters of the C.I.A But Mr. McCone said he was going home to pack his clothes.

Those who know of this ex-change have a hunch that if Mi McCone had accepted the invitation and returned to the turnoil that quickly developed in his old office, the history of the intervention might have been different. Many are in-clined to blame Admiral Ra-boun, in any event, for the minimash of hasty evidence the C.I.A. contrived to justify the State Department's claim that there was a threat of a Communist uprising. One reason the admiral was


One reason the admiral was chisen, after President Johnson hal searched for six months for a successor to Mr. McCone, wis that as head of the Polaris project he had shown great ability to work with and mol-lif inquisitive Congressmen. Inother was that his mill-tay background made him an unlikely target for charges of being too "soft" or too liberal for his post. The same con-sieration influenced President Kennedy in choosing the con-

Kennedy in choosing the con-servative Republican John Mc-Servative Republican John Mc-Cone, and it is notable that no leading figure of the Demo-cratic party, much less one of its liberals, has ever been the agency's director. Because of his lack of ex-perience in intelligence and in-constituent efficiency it is widely

ternational affairs, it is widely believed among present and believed among present and former officials that Admiral former officials that Admiral Raborn was chosen primarily as a "front man." Ironically, the Congress that he was sup-posed to impress is actually concerned—interviews disclosed —because he has not seemed to have the sure grasp of the excess?" packs and sofuties agency's needs and activities that would most inspire confidence in it.

Raborn Defended

Knowledgeable sources say the C.I.A. itself, in its day-to-day business, is a bureaucracy like any other, functioning rou-tinely whatever the quality of its leadership. These sources argue that the experience and



CHIEFS OF THE C.I.A.: Allen W. Dulles, left, was replaced by John A. McCone, center, in 1961. Present director, Adm. William F. Raborn, right, has held the post for a year.

professionalism of its staff are so great that any lack of these qualities in Admiral Raborn is scarcely felt.

But they do not agree that "Red" Raborn is just a front man. He is different—as would be expected—from any director who preceded him, but there is evidence available to suggest that he may not be such an unfortunate choice as has been suggested in a number of critical articles in the press.

The admiral is said to have President Johnson's confidence, although in a different way from the confidence President Kennedy placed in Mr. McCone. The latter was a valued member of the group that argued out high policy and influenced the President's decisions, not with facts but also with opinions and recommendations.

Admiral Raborn is said to to make little effort to exert such an influence on policy. Partly, this is because Mr. Johnson apparently does not want the C.I.A. director in such a role —and among those interviewed by The New York Times there was a belief that one reason John McCone left the post was that he could not play as influential a role as he had in the Kennedy Administration.

The main reason for the admiral's approach, however, is his Navy background. He regards himself as having more of a service and staff mission than a policy-making job. ' He believes it is his duty to lay the best available facts before the President and those or influence policy, so that their judgments may be as informed as possible. To enter into policy discussions as an advocate, in his view, would inevitably compromise his role as an impartial and objective source of information.

Among knowledgeable officials, moreover, Admiral Raborn is credited with at least two administrative developments within the agency—both stemming, again, from his Navy background.

Long-Range Planning

He has installed an operations center, not unlike a military command post or a Navy ship's "combat information center." In it, round-the-clock duty officers constantly monitor communications of every sort. They can instantly communicate with the White House, State Department, Pentagon and agents in the field, by means of the agency's wizardry with machines and electronics.

This represents primarily a drawing together and streamlining of capabilities the agency already had, but it is rated as a positive advance in C.I.A. efficiency.

The other Raborn innovation is a Navy-like system of longrange management planning. He has assigned a group of officials to "look ahead" for decades at the shape of the world to come.

to come. Out of this continuing study, the admiral hopes to be able to make more precise plans for the agency's needs in manpower, money, equipment and organization in, say, 1975, so that it can be planned for right now. There persists among many interested in the C.I.A., however, a reluctance to accept the idea that the agency should be headed by anyone other than an experienced, strong executive with a wide grasp of international affairs and intelligence work, strong ties to the Administration and the knowledge and determination to keep the agency's work within the limits of policy and propriety. This concern has been height-

This concern has been heightened by the departure from the White House of McGeorge Bundy, now president of the Ford Foundation. As Mr. Johnson's representative on the 54-12 group, he was probably second only to the director of the C.I.A. in maintaining "control" and took an intense interest in this duty.

Thus, if the White House replacements, Bill D. Moyers and Walt W. Rostow, prove either less interested or less forceful in representing the White House interest in C.I.A. operations, and it Admiral Raborn's alleged leck of experience in intelligence and foreign affairs handicaps him, effective control of the agency could be weakened without any change at all in the official processes of control.

Promotion Debate

Some people concluded even before the end of the admiral's first year that the difficulties of finding a succession of suitable C.I.A. directors made it advisable to promote impressive professionals from within the agency.

The most widely respected of these is the deputy director, Richard Helms, who was said to have been Mr. McCone's choice to succeed him.

Others argue, however, that intelligence is too dangerous a thing to be left to professional spies and that a loyal associate of the President's with the political qualifications for a senlor Cabinet position should hold the post.

Whatever his identity, however, the prime conclusion of

The New York Times survey of the Central Intelligence Agency is that its director is or should be the central figure in estab-lishing and maintaining the actual substance of control, whatif the director insists, and bends all his efforts to make sure, that the agency serve the political administration of the Government, only blind chance or in-eptitude in the field is likely to take the C.I.A. out of political control.

Conclusions of Study

A number of other conclualso emerge from the sions study:

Whatever may have been the situation in the past, and whatever misgivings are felt about Admiral Raborn, there is now little concern in the John-son Administration or among

son Administration or among former high officials, and there is even less evidence, that the G.I.A. is making or sabotaging foreign policy or otherwise act-ing on its own. When C.I.A. operations ac-quire a life of their own and outrun approved policy, they often follow a pattern well known also in less secret arms of government. Diplomats fre-quently say more than they are quently say more than they are told to say to other govern-ments or otherwise exceed their instructions. Foreign aid and propaganda operations, though "public," can commit the United States to practices and men in ways not envisioned by Washington. Military operations can escalate by their own logic, and

ington. Military operations can escalate by their own logic, and when things go wrong the Pen-tagon has at times been more reluctant than the C.I.A. in producing the facts. ¶Nonetheless, while the C.I.A. acts as the Government's fountain of information as well as its "black" operating arm, while it is the C.I.A. that both proposes operations and sup-plies the facts to justify them, the danger of its getting out of control of the Administration exists and ought to be taken seriously within and without the Government. The Bay of Pigs stands as enduring testi-mony to that 'fact, ¶The task of coping with this danger is essentially that of the President, his highest officials

President, his highest officials and the director of the C.I.A. It can only be met peripherally by Congressional oversight, and then with increased danger of security leaks and domestic po-litical pressures on the agency.

The charges against the C.I.A. at home and abroad are so widespread and in many ways so exaggerated that the effectiveness and morale of the agency may be seriously im-paired. In particular, there agency may be seriously im-paired. In particular, there could ultimately be a problem in recruiting and keeping the high caliber of personnel upon whom the agency must rely both for doing useful work and for keeping that work within proper bounds.

Crucial Questions

Thus, there must be in this and in any Administration a tight, relentless, searching re-view and analysis of the C.I.A. its activities, and meeting squarely and answering honest-ly at least these questions: Is any proposed operation or activity likely, on balance, to make a genuine and necessary

contribution, in the long view. as well as the short, to legitimate American interests and aspirations in the world, or is it merely convenient, expedient and possible without regard to its wider implications or to the

real necessity for it? In sum, is the government of proud and honorable people relying too much on "black" operations, "dirty tricks," harsh and illicit acts in the "back al-lays" of the world? Is there some point at which meeting fire with fire, force with force, subversion with subversion, crime with crime, becomes so prevalent and accepted that there no longer remains any distinction of honor and pride distinction of honor and pride between grim and implacable adversaries?

These questions are a proper it and necessary concern for the it people of the United States. They are a proper and necessary it concern for Congress, But in the it nature of the case, neither the people nor Congress can easily learn the answers, much less insure that the answers are al-ways the right ones.

The President's Task

That can only be done within in the executive branch, by the u-highest authorities of the Gov-ernment. Controlling the C.I.A. is a job that rests squarely upon the President of the United States, the director of the agency and the officials appointed by the President to check its work. And if these men are to 3 art insist that they do control the agency, then they are the ones who must be blamed if control an 0.01 fails.

"Those who believe that the svis United States Government on onceasion resorts to force when it shouldn't," Richard Bissell, the C.I.A.'s former deputy di-petor, once said, "should in all dirness and justice direct their yiews to the question of national 32 100 7019 olicy and not hide behind the riticism that whereas the Prestent and Cabinet generally are plightened people, there is an avail and ill-controlled agency T.8*** which imports this sinister ele-1.60

The New York Times study of the C.I.A. suggests that it is not an invisible government but the real government of the United States upon which the responsibility must lie whenever the agency may be found "out of control." For if that responsibility is accepted, there be no invisible government. can