

C.I.A. OPERATIONS: A PLOT SCUTTLED

Plan to Doctor Cuban Sugar
Depicts Control Problem

Following is the fourth of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other Times staff members.

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WASHINGTON, April 27—On Aug. 22, 1962, the S.S. Streatham Hill, a British freighter under Soviet lease, crept into the harbor of San Juan, Puerto Rico, for repairs. Bound for a Soviet port with 80,000 bags of Cuban sugar, she had damaged her propeller on a reef.

The ship was put in drydock, and 14,135 sacks were off-loaded to facilitate repairs. Because of the United States embargo on Cuban imports, the sugar was put under bond in a customs warehouse.

Sometime during the lay-up, agents of the Central Intelligence Agency entered the customs shed and contaminated the off-loaded sugar with a harmless but unpalatable substance.

Later, a White House official, running through some intelligence reports, came upon a paper indicating the sabotage. He investigated, had his suspicions confirmed and informed President Kennedy, much to the annoyance of the C.I.A. command.

The President was not merely annoyed; he was furious, because the operation had taken place on American territory, because it would, if discovered, provide the Soviet Union with a propaganda field day, and because it could set a terrible precedent for chemical sabotage in the undeclared "back-alley" struggle that rages constantly between the West and the Communist countries.

Mr. Kennedy directed that the doctored sugar not leave Puerto Rico. This was more easily ordered than done, and it finally required the combined efforts of the C.I.A., the Justice

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Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department, customs agents and harbor authorities to dis-intrigue the intrigue.

The Soviet Union never got its 14,135 sacks of sugar; whether it was compensated for them has not been disclosed.

It would be unfair to conclude that this was a typical C.I.A. operation. On the other hand, it cannot be dismissed as merely the unwise invention of some agent who let his anti-Communist fervor get out of control.

There is good reason to believe that a high-level political decision had been taken to sabotage, where feasible, the Cuban economy. The sugar project, harum-scarum as it was, developed from a general policy determination in the Plans Division of the C.I.A., and the general policy, if not the specific plot, presumably had the approval of the interagency, sub-Cabinet group responsible for reviewing all operations that could have political consequences.

This was not, then, a well-laid plan that went sour in the operation; it was a badly laid plan that was bound to cause trouble.

It is instructive because it illustrates many of the control problems in C.I.A. operations and makes plain why, from the outset, so many questions have been so persistently raised by so many critics about the adequacy of these controls.

A Major Concern

First, there is the pre-eminent concern whether the C.I.A., despite its disclaimers to the contrary, does on occasion make policy—not willfully, perhaps, but simply because of its capacity to mount an operation and pursue it wherever it may lead without day-by-day guidance or restriction from the political departments of the Government.

Operations like that of sabotaging the Cuban economy can lead to such dangerous episodes as the sugar doctoring; they can acquire a momentum and life of their own, the consequences of which cannot be anticipated by political officers who may have given them original approval.

Thus, it should be noted that in the sugar tampering, the C.I.A. and its agents unquestionably believed they were operating within approved instructions, and consequently resented what they regarded as "interference" by the White House officer who reported it to the President.

Another example of opera-

tions assuming a life of their own occurred in 1954 during the C.I.A.-engineered revolution against the Communist-oriented President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman.

A P-38 fighter, piloted by an American, bombed a British ship, the Spring-Fjord, which was lying off-shore and was believed to be carrying aircraft to the Arbenz Government. Only one of the three bombs exploded, and no crew members were injured. The ship, which was actually carrying coffee and cotton, was beached.

Richard M. Bissell, a former C.I.A. deputy director for plans, has admitted that the bombing was a "sub-incident" that "went beyond the established limits of policy."

An outstanding example of an operation with political consequences was the dispatch of Francis Gary Powers on the U-2 flight from Pakistan to Norway across the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960, just before the Paris summit meeting and the scheduled visit of President Eisenhower to Moscow.

Unresolved Question

The U-2 photoreconnaissance flights had been going on for nearly five years, with fabulously profitable results. It was established practice for the President to approve in advance a set of flights within a given time span, and there was also established machinery for the approval of each flight by the Secretary of Defense. Yet, to this day, no one then in the top councils of the Government is able to say with certainty whether the Powers flight, the last in a series of six, was specifically approved by Thomas S. Gates Jr., then the Secretary of Defense.

One Senator has said that the U-2 flight was a perfectly legitimate operation of great value, and that the embarrassment to the President was not inherent in the project but was the result of a lack of coordination and controls.

"The operation," he said, "just went along regardless of the political circumstances."

A second serious control question derives from the special position of the C.I.A. as the Government's fountain of necessary information. This appears to be at once the major advantage and a principal hazard of the C.I.A. operation today.

"Policy," Allen W. Dulles, the former C.I.A. chief, once said, "must be based on the best estimates of the facts which can be put together. That estimate in turn should be given by some agency which has no axes to grind and which itself is not wedded to any particular policy."

This point is often made by

the C.I.A. and its defenders. They cite, for instance, the agency's accurate estimate on Soviet missile strength, as a contrast to the inflated estimates that came from the Pentagon in the late Fifties. The latter, they say, were surely influenced by service rivalries and budgetary battles—such as the Air Force's desire for more missiles of its own. The C.I.A. has no such vested interest and little to gain by distorting or coloring its reports and estimates.

Mr. Dulles—like Secretary of State Dean Rusk—insists that no C.I.A. operation "of a political nature" has ever been undertaken "without appropriate approval at a high political level in our Government" outside the C.I.A.

The problem is that the facts presented to the Government by the C.I.A. are sometimes dramatic and inevitably tend to inspire dramatic proposals for clandestine operations that the agency's men are eager to carry out, and that they believe can—or might—succeed.

Long Odds Can Help

Even long odds sometimes work to the agency's advantage. President Eisenhower, for instance, has written that he undertook to aid pro-Western rebels in Guatemala in 1954 because Mr. Dulles told him the operation had only a 20 per cent chance to succeed. If the C.I.A. director had estimated a better chance than that, General Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs, he would have been unrealistic, unconvincing and overruled.

Command of the facts—at least the best facts available—plus zeal to do something about them: many critics fear, can make the C.I.A. an unanswerable advocate, not for a vested budgetary or policy interest, but for its own sincere notions of how to proceed. And its advantage of providing the facts on which decision must be made, which critics feel, can enable it to prevail over the advice or fears of political officers.

Thus, in 1958, Ambassador John Allison strongly opposed the plan of Allen Dulles to aid the rebel movement in Sumatra against President Sukarno of Indonesia. But Mr. Dulles had won the powerful support of his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

Ultimately, the plan went forward—with the result that an American pilot was shot down and captured by the Sukarno forces, causing a conspicuous deterioration of relations between Indonesia and the United States. The plan was not unapproved; it was just unwise.

A third problem of control arises from the necessary secrecy that surrounds the agency. To protect its sources of infor-

mation, to permit it to proceed with any form of clandestine operations, to guard the nation's political relations with most other countries, it is necessary for the C.I.A. to be shielded—and Congress has so shielded it, by law—from the ordinary scrutiny, investigation and public disclosure of activities that other Government agencies must undergo.

Within the agency, until the Bay of Pigs disaster of 1961, even the Intelligence Division was not allowed to know about the "dirty tricks" being planned and carried out by the Plans Division.

Stevenson in the Dark

Many of the highest Government officials are told nothing of some of the agency's activities because, in the course of their own duties, they do not "need to know."

It is now well established, for instance, that until the disaster unfolded, Adlai E. Stevenson, the United States representative to the United Nations, knew nothing of the Bay of Pigs plan. As a result, he and his Government suffered grievous humiliation after he publicly misstated the facts.

In years past, C.I.A. secrecy reached some absurd proportions—with high-level employees identifying themselves solemnly at cocktail parties as "librarians" and "clerks." In its early days, for instance, C.I.A. employees who in their private lives needed to apply for credit were instructed by the agency to say, when asked for an employer's reference: "Call Miss Bertha Potts" at a certain number.

It was not long, of course, before the lenders who were told to call Miss Potts would say gleefully: "Oh, you work for the C.I.A."

For many years prior to 1961,

a good many critics had been aware of the control dangers inherent in the C.I.A.'s peculiar position. In 1954, Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, obtained 34 cosponsors for a bill to create a 12-member joint committee on intelligence to keep watch over the C.I.A., much as the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy does over the Atomic Energy Commission.

Allen Dulles, who was completely satisfied with the scrutiny provided by four carefully selected subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, went to work. He succeeded in cutting away 14 of Mr. Mansfield's cosponsors, and the bill was defeated, 59 to 27.

Board Headed by Killian

A year later the second

Hoover Commission also recommended a Congressional joint committee, as well as a Presidential appointed board of consultants on intelligence activities.

To forestall the first, Mr. Dulles acquiesced in the second, and in January, 1956, President Eisenhower named a board of consultants on foreign intelligence activities, with James R. Killian Jr., president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as chairman.

Those familiar with the board's work in the Eisenhower years say it performed a useful function on the technical side, where Dr. Killian, for instance, was a powerful advocate in the development of the U-2. However, it is generally agreed that the board did not give very critical attention to "black" operations, and then only after the fact.

In 1954 there was also established by the National Security Council—which advises the President on defense and foreign policy matters—what came to be known as "the special group," or the "54-12 group," after the date (December, 1954) of the secret directive ordering its formation.

This directive also provided the basic charter for the agency's countersubversive and counter-Communist activity. Until that time, these activities had been undertaken under authority of a secret memorandum from President Truman issued in 1947 and inspired principally by the Italian, Czechoslovak and Berlin situations, then acute cold-war issues.

The 54-12 group was—and still is—composed of the President's special assistants for national security affairs, the director of the C.I.A., the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary (or Deputy Under Secretary) of State for Political Affairs, plus other officers consulted occasionally on particular proposals.

The group seems to have been created, partly at least, in response to public concern over the problem of control, and it was given responsibility for passing on intelligence operations beforehand. However, because of the fraternal relationship of Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles, because of their close relations with President Eisenhower and because Allen Dulles had the power to give it the facts on which it had to base its decisions, the 54-12 group during the Eisenhower Administration is believed by knowledgeable sources to have exercised little real control.

The Classic Disaster

At the Bay of Pigs, just after President Kennedy took office in 1961, the worst finally happened; all the fears expressed through the years came true.

The Bay of Pigs must take its

place in history as a classic example of the disaster that can occur when a major international operation is undertaken in deepest secrecy, is politically approved on the basis of "facts" provided by those who most fervently advocated it, is carried out by the same advocates, and ultimately acquires a momentum of its own beyond anything contemplated either by the advocates or those who supposedly "controlled" them.

Responsible officials of the Eisenhower Administration report, for instance, that the invasion plan was not even in existence, as such, when they went out of office on Jan. 19, 1961; there was nothing but a Cuban refugee force, available for whatever the incoming Administration might ultimately decide to do with it.

Yet the testimony of Kennedy Administration officials—Theo-

dore C. Sorensen and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., for instance—is that the matter was presented to Mr. Kennedy by the C.I.A. advocates as if he were already committed to it and would have to cancel it rather than approve it. Mr. Sorensen even wrote in his book, "Kennedy," that Mr. Kennedy had been subtly pushed to be no less "hard" in his anti-Castroism than President Eisenhower supposedly had been.

The ultimate disaster and its various causes need no retelling. Their effect was graphically described by an official who saw the shaker Mr. Kennedy immediately afterward. The President, he said, "wanted to splinter the C.I.A. in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds."

At the same time, to Clark M. Clifford, a Washington lawyer and close friend, who had written the legislation setting up the C.I.A. during the Truman Administration, Mr. Kennedy said flatly and poignantly: "I could not survive another one of these."

An Inquiry Ordered

But because he could not simply abolish the agency, much less its function, the President decided he would "get it under control."

First, he ordered a thorough investigation by a group headed by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and composed also of Allen Dulles, Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

Second, on Mr. Clifford's advice, the President recreated the old board of consultants under the title of the Foreign Intelligence Committee and asked Dr. Killian to resume the chairmanship. (Mr. Clifford became a member and later succeeded Dr. Killian as chairman.) The Pres-

ident directed the committee to investigate the whole intelligence community from "stem to stern," recommend changes and see that they were carried out.

Third, after a decent interval, the President replaced Allen Dulles with John A. McCone, a former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. He told the new director that he was not to be simply the director of the C.I.A. but should regard his primary task as "the coordination and effective guidance of the total United States intelligence effort." Mr. Dulles's key assistants were also removed.

Fourth, the President sent a letter to every Ambassador telling him he was "in charge of the entire diplomatic mission" at his post, including not only foreign service personnel but "also the representatives of all other United States agencies." These representatives of other agencies were to keep the Ambassador "fully informed of their views and activities" and would abide by the Ambassador's decisions "unless in some particular instance you and they are notified to the contrary."

The President followed this letter, which was made public, with a secret communication, saying he meant it and specifically including C.I.A. men among those responsible to the Ambassador.

A Blow to Bundy

Perhaps the most important change in control procedures, however, involved the 54-12 group within the political ranks of the Administration, and it came without any Presidential initiative.

The Bay of Pigs had dealt a severe psychological blow to McGeorge Bundy, who as the President's assistant for national security affairs was a member of the group, and perhaps also to his self-esteem. Thereafter he set about tightening up the surveillance of C.I.A. operations, subjecting them to searching analysis before and not after the event. The hard-eyed Mr. Bundy was notably relentless at that kind of administration.

The President accepted the advice of the Taylor and Killian investigations on two important questions.

First, he decided not to limit the C.I.A. to intelligence gathering and not to shift clandestine operations to the Pentagon, or to a special agency created for the purpose.

These ideas had found favor among some sections of the State Department, among many public critics and even among some members and the staff of the advisory committee. But it was stoutly opposed by Allen Dulles, who argued that this would result in duplication and rivalry, and that the two functions were interdependent, though he ad-

mitted that they had not been working in harness on the Bay of Pigs operation.

The two committees of inquiry agreed with Mr. Dulles, and so, finally, did the President.

Second, the committees recommended, and the President enthusiastically agreed, that the C.I.A. should leave sizable military operations to the Pentagon and henceforth limit itself to operations of a kind in which United States involvement would be "plausibly deniable." This, however, has proved to be a rule of thumb in which it is often difficult to hide the thumb.

Something Like Secrecy

For instance, the later creation of an air force of anti-Castro Cubans to fly for the Congolese Government was carried out and managed by the C.I.A., not by the Pentagon, despite the recommendation.

The obvious reason was that the agency could do the job in something like secrecy, while Defense Department involvement would have been necessarily more open, advertising the backing of the United States for the "instant air force."

It is beyond dispute, however, that the Bay of Pigs was a watershed in the life of the C.I.A. and its influence on policy-making. Before that, no matter how much administrative control and political approval there may have been, Mr. Dulles ran the agency largely as he saw fit.

He was able to do so because he could almost always get "approval"—and thus adhere to the forms of control—from his brother in the State Department or from President Eisenhower, with both of whom he had the closest relations of trust and liking.

The effect of the Kennedy shake-up was immediately apparent—on policy in Laos, for instance. W. Averell Harriman, then the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, was given a free hand in getting rid of the American puppet, Premier Phoumi Nosavan—whose backing by the C.I.A. President Eisenhower had specifically approved—and reinstating Souvanna Phouma at the head of a neutralist government.

By general agreement of virtually every official interviewed, the C.I.A. does not now directly make policy, and its operations are under much more rigorous surveillance and control than before. Nevertheless, there continue to be—and probably always will be—instances where the controls simply do not work.

Uncertain Boundaries

Richard Bissell, who as deputy director for plans was largely responsible for the U-2 reconnaissance triumph and for the Bay of Pigs disaster, has ex-

plained why this must be.

"You can't take on operations of this scope," he has said, "draw narrow boundaries of policy around them and be absolutely sure that those boundaries will never be overstepped."

Recently, for instance, the C.I.A. was accused of supporting Cambodian rebels who oppose Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the head of state. Even some senior United States Foreign Service officers said they were not sure that the agency's firm denials meant no agent in the field, no obscure planner in the huge C.I.A. building in Virginia, had strayed from the strict boundaries of policy.

A high degree of control of C.I.A. activities exists, however, and inquiry produced this picture of the controlling agencies and how well the control works:

The 54-12 Group

The 54-12 group is the heart of the control system. Its members now are Admiral William F. Raborn, the C.I.A. director; U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and two Presidential assistants, Bill D. Moyers and Walt W. Rostow, who have replaced McGeorge Bundy in representing the White House.

This group meets once a week with a detailed agenda. It concentrates almost exclusively on operations. It approves all proposed operations and it passes in great detail on expenditures as small as \$10,000 that have political implications or could prove embarrassing if discovered. Any differences are referred first to the Cabinet level and then, if necessary, to the President.

While the group approves

every "black" operation, it does not necessarily clear all the routine intelligence-gathering activities of the agency. Nor, once approval has been given for a "black" operation, does it maintain a running supervision over every detail of its execution.

Under a given policy decision approving a guerrilla operation in a certain country, for instance, the 54-12 group might also have to approve something as specific and important as a bridge-blowing. But the over-all program would go on by itself under the direction of agents in the field.

Bureau of the Budget

Another form of control is that of the pursestring.

The C.I.A.'s annual request for funds, which is hidden largely in the Defense Department budget, is the responsibility of the head of the Budget Bureau's

International Division. The request has usually fared well, but in the fiscal year 1965, for the first time in several years, it was cut back sharply by the bureau.

Another form of budgetary control centers on the agency's "slush fund," which used to be about \$100-million a year and is now in "the tens of millions." One official has said that "the C.I.A. can't spend a dollar without Bureau of Budget approval." But another official put a somewhat different light on how the "slush fund" is handled.

Suppose, he said, that Country X is having an election and the candidates backed by the United States Government seem headed for defeat. The Ambassador and the C.I.A. station chief—the agency's chief in that country—may forward a request for some fast money to spread around.

The request, when reviewed and cleared by the middle levels of the State Department and the C.I.A., goes to the 54-12 group for review.

This group will first decide whether the money should be spent, how the C.I.A. should spend it and how much should be made available. Then the request goes to the Budget Bureau to be justified in budget terms against other needs.

A Call Brings the Money

For example, this official said, one such project was recently trimmed by the Budget Bureau from \$3-million to \$1.7-million. But in the last week of the election, the C.I.A. ran out of funds just as it needed some more billboards plastered, and it was able to get the money simply by a phone call to the Budget Bureau. This official explained that there had to be some way of providing "quick-turn money" under tight controls and audit.

It should also be noted that this form of control is purely budgetary and not substantive. The Bureau of the Budget does not interpose any policy judgment but simply weighs a proposed operation against total money available and the outlays for other projects.

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Another control agency is the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This group has nine members. Four have had extensive government experience.

The chairman, Clark Clifford, was special counsel to President Truman from 1946 to 1950. Among the other members, Robert D. Murphy, former career Ambassador and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, has had personal experience in clandestine operations, for he prepared the way for the American landing in North Africa in 1942. He is now a director of Corning Glass.

Gordon Gray, a director of

the R. J. Reynolds Company and a newspaper owner, was Secretary of the Army under President Truman and later was President Eisenhower's special assistant for national security affairs. Frank Pace Jr., chairman of the Special Advisory Board, Air Force Systems Command, was director of the Bureau of the Budget in 1949-50 and Secretary of the Army from 1950 to 1953.

Two members are scientists connected with industry—William O. Baker, vice president in charge of research for the Bell Telephone Laboratories, a member for many years of the Science Advisory Board of the Air Force, and Edwin H. Land, chairman and president of the Polaroid Corporation, a former adviser to the Navy on guided missiles and an expert on photography.

There are two military representatives—General Taylor, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Ambassador to South Vietnam, and Admiral John H. Sides, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet from 1960 to 1963. Dr. William D. Langer, the ninth member, is Professor of History at Harvard and a frequent government consultant.

The board meets an average of one or one and one-half days a month. It is subdivided into two-man panels specializing in various fields, which meet more frequently. Individual members also take field inspection trips. Mr. Clifford went recently to South Vietnam; Mr. Gray has been on extensive trips to the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

There is divergent opinion on the control value of this board. Some of its members are highly pleased with their own work. They point out that over the last four and one-half years they have made some 200 recommendations, of which the President accepted 95 per cent.

They take credit for persuading President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to create the Defense Intelligence Agency, combining the separate service intelligence divisions. This had been recommended by Secretary of Defense Gates and by Lyman Kirkpatrick, inspector general of the C.I.A., as a result of the widely differing estimates of the so-called "missile gap" in the late

nineteen-fifties made by the intelligence arms of the services.

Another official in a position of authority, however, believes that the board does little more than provide a "nice audit" of C.I.A. operations and that any "control" it exercises is largely ex post facto. He asked what could be expected from a board that met only a few days a month.

"By 5 in the afternoon," he

said, "the guys can't remember what they were told in the morning."

Even the members concede that their work has been aimed primarily at improving the efficiency and methods of the C.I.A., rather than at control of individual operations. Thus, if the board does investigate some "black" operations, its emphasis is placed on whether it was done well or could have been more successful, rather than on the political question of whether it should have been done at all.

One member reported, however, that the C.I.A. now brought some of its proposals to the committee for prior discussion, if not specific approval. This is not an unmixed blessing.

While the board might advise against some risky scheme, it also might not; in the latter case its weight added to that of the C.I.A., would present the responsible political officials in the 54-12 group with an even more powerful advocacy than usual.

An advantage of the board is its direct link to the President. Since this is augmented, at present, by Mr. Clifford's close personal and political ties to President Johnson, any recommendations the committee makes carry great weight with the bureaucrats of the C.I.A., even before they appear in a Presidential order.

State Department and Ambassadors

Also exercising some control over the C.I.A. are the State Department and Ambassadors. Secretary of State Rusk has confided to his associates that he is now quite certain the C.I.A. is doing nothing affecting official policy he does not know about. But he added that he was also sure he was the only one in the State Department informed about some of the things being done.

Despite this information gap as high as the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary levels, State Department officers with a need to know are far better informed about operations than before the Bay of Pigs.

Moreover, in the 54-12 group and in interagency intelligence meetings, State Department officers are now more ready to speak out and more likely to be heeded on proposed intelligence operations that they believe would compromise larger policy interests.

President Kennedy's secret letter to the Ambassadors also had some effect in changing a dangerous situation.

In 1954, William J. Sebald resigned as Ambassador to Burma because of continued C.I.A. support to Chinese Nationalists in northern Burma despite all his protests. In 1956, James B. Conant, Ambassador to West

Germany, was not told about the tunnel under East Berlin. In 1960, in Laos, Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown was often bypassed as the C.I.A. helped prop up the American-backed Premier Phoumi Nosavan, against his advice. The same year, the Ambassador in Malaysia knew nothing of the Singapore operation that ultimately was to embarrass the State Department in 1965.

It is doubtful whether such things could happen today if an Ambassador is forceful enough in establishing his authority.

In the last four years the Ambassadors have been kept much better informed, and their relations with C.I.A. chiefs of station have been consequently more cordial. Ambassadors Clare Timberlake and Edward Gullion were completely posted on C.I.A. operations during the Congo crisis and worked closely with the agency. So, apparently, was Henry Cabot Lodge after he took over the embassy in Saigon in 1963.

While the Ambassador may not always be completely master in his own house, neither does it seem to be true—as a staff report of Senator Henry M. Jackson's subcommittee on national security, staffing and operations said in 1962—that the primacy of the Ambassador, supposedly established by the Kennedy letter, was largely "a polite fiction."

For example, Robert F. Woodward, Ambassador to Spain,

vetoed a man chosen by the C.I.A.'s Spanish station chief. And the State Department, while still complaining about the size of some C.I.A. stations, is now supposed to approve the number of agents in each diplomatic mission.

In secret testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the summer of 1965, Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann made plain that the creation of the Imbert military junta in the Dominican Republic in May was a State Department, and not a C.I.A., idea.

Asked whether the C.I.A. would have set up the junta without orders from State, Mr. Mann replied:

"I will say that in the past this may have been; I do not know. But since I arrived in January, 1964, I have had an understanding first with Mr. McCone and now with Admiral Baborn, and I am sure the department has, even more importantly, that the policy is made here [at State] and that nothing is done without our consent."

This "nothing" probably goes too far, since there remain areas of ambassadorial ignorance. An Ambassador is not always informed of "third-party" spying in his country—for example,

spying in France on the Chinese Communists there. Nor is he given specific details on counterespionage and information gathering about which he may be generally informed.

If the C.I.A. has "bought the madam," as one official put it, of a house of ill fame patronized by influential citizens or officials of a host country, the Ambassador does not know it and probably doesn't want to. He would, however, have the dubious benefit of any information the madam might disclose.

These are the four institutional forms of "control" of the C.I.A. that now exist—save for Congressional oversight and the all-important role of the agency's director. And The New York Times's survey for these articles left little doubt that the newly vigorous functioning of these four groups has greatly improved coordination, more nearly assured political approval and substantially reduced the hazards implicit in C.I.A. operations.

Nevertheless, the agency still remains the fount of information on which many policy decisions rest, and the source of facts, selected or otherwise, on which to justify its own projects.

Nevertheless, the C.I.A. enjoys an inherent advantage in any conflict with the State or Defense Departments because of its undeniable expertise—especially in economics and science—and because it is free from such political entanglements as trying to build up a missile budget (as in the case of the Air Force) or of having to justify the recognition of a foreign leader (as in the case of State).

And nevertheless, in its legitimate need for secrecy, the C.I.A. simply cannot be subjected to as much public or even official scrutiny as all other agencies undergo.


A Call for More Control

For all these reasons, and because of occasional blunders, there has been no abatement in the demand of critics for more and stronger control. Inevitably, their call is for some form of increased supervision by the people's representatives in Congress, usually by a joint committee of the two houses.

The Times survey indicated a widespread feeling that such a committee would do the agency's vital functions more harm than good, and that it would provide little if any solution to the central problem of control.

The history of the Central Intelligence Agency since 1947 makes one thing painfully clear—that the control question, while real and of the utmost importance, is one of "not measures but men." The forms of control mean nothing if there is no will to control, and if there is a will to control, then the form of it is more or less irrelevant.

Such a will can only come



INVOLVED IN 1962 C.I.A. OPERATION: The S.S. Streatham Hill, a British freighter under Soviet lease, lying at anchor alongside two U.S. destroyers in San Juan, Puerto Rico, late in 1962. Her cargo of sugar was con-

United Press International
taminated by C.I.A. agents when the ship put up for repairs en route from Cuba to the Soviet Union. The incident, designed by the intelligence agency to injure Cuban trade, instead incurred President Kennedy's wrath.

from the high political officials of the Administration, and it can best be inspired in them by the direct example of the President.

But even the President probably could not impose his will on the agency in every case without the understanding, the concurrence and the vigorous and efficient cooperation of the second most important man in the matter of control—the director of the C.I.A.