

An open letter to the CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency was created twenty-seven years ago for the purpose of keeping the American government informed about other countries—especially those behind the Iron Curtain. Currently, the CIA spends some \$500 million and employs about 3500 people not to gather intelligence, but to engage in clandestine operations for and against other nations. We believe that this constitutes a distortion of the original intention behind the CIA and that this distortion may be diplomatically, politically, and socially immoral. Operations such as the "destabilization" of Chile were supervised by a handful of men and kept secret from the American people. We believe that the people, through their duly appointed representatives in Washington, should be kept informed about the

CIA, its methods of operation, and the individuals who control and supervise its activities. For this reason, we have decided to publish the following controversial interview with Victor Marchetti, a former high-ranking CIA official who feels that Americans have the right to know how their tax dollars are being spent by the CIA. We believe that Mr. Marchetti raises serious questions about the agency and that it is in the best interests of our nation to establish a dialogue about the role of the CIA.

For this reason, we will be happy to provide equal space, in the first available issue of *Penthouse*, to a reply by the CIA—or any competent authority nominated by the CIA—to Mr. Marchetti's charges. We hope the CIA will respond to this invitation.

Your morning headline reads, "CIA Spent \$11 Million to 'Destabilize' Chile" or "U.S. Paid Greek Junta" or "Ford Defends CIA in Chile." If you are shocked or disturbed, well you might be. For nearly thirty years, the Central Intelligence Agency has been able to bribe the leaders of foreign governments, subvert their authority, undermine and overthrow them, and in some cases even have them assassinated. It has waged secret wars, trained and financed torturers, fixed "free" elections—and the American people have been kept in the dark about what it has been doing in their name. Now, Victor Marchetti, a former high-ranking official of the CIA, is attempting to alert Americans to the truth about the CIA.

As it appears today in your local bookstore, Marchetti's book, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (Alfred A. Knopf), is a sad comment on the contemporary status of American democracy. This is not because of what Marchetti and his co-author John D. Marks have written, but because of what the CIA has forced them to delete. As we near the 200th anniversary of the American Republic and its traditional and much-vaunted dedication to free speech, Marchetti's book is the first work ever to be censored before publication by our apparently suspicious government and its courts. The CIA sued without Marchetti's knowledge; and, on the basis of a secret affidavit submitted only to the judge, won a restraining order against him and his attempts to speak out. Later, in a trial that was closed to the press most of the time at the agency's insistence, Marchetti lost his First Amendment rights. From then on—for the rest of his working life—he would have to allow the CIA to censor his writings, both factual and fiction, and he could speak to audiences only at his own peril, always fearing contempt-of-court charges. Then, before his book was published, the CIA cut out what it didn't like—339 passages, roughly 10 percent.

Marchetti and Marks—a former State Department intelligence specialist who came to Marchetti's aid in his struggle with the CIA—filed a countersuit with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union and won an acknowledgement that most of the CIA's cuts contained nothing classified or detrimental to our national security. But the CIA appealed this ruling. The whole matter is still before the courts, and the published version of Marchetti's book contains 168 censored passages—some of them running on for several pages, with the blank areas marked "DELETED." One censored passage that has since come to light is a quote by Henry Kissinger attempting to justify CIA efforts to destroy the elected Allende government in Chile: "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." (See page 91 of this issue for a reproduction of the page from which this quote was cut.) The fact that the government employed difficult and unpopular laws to censor something embarrassing rather than classified is a disgrace to America.

When you visit Marchetti in his ordinary suburban Washington home, neither he nor his surroundings give the impression of spies, state secrets, or one man's heroic efforts to preserve the First Amendment. At forty-four, Marchetti is mild-mannered and a bit paunchy. He speaks quietly, in a voice that recalls, of all people, Red Skelton. He pads around in an old T-shirt, shorts, and sandals, and sips warm iced tea as he talks. His three boys, aged twenty, fifteen, and eleven, kiss him before they go out for the evening or off to bed. While the clandestine life of CIA employees often destroys

their marriages—so often that the agency maintains a list of approved lawyers to keep unsavory details out of court—Marchetti and his wife, Bernice, have been in love since they were schoolchildren in Hazleton, a coal town in northeast Pennsylvania. They have been married for twenty-one years.

Son of a plumber, Marchetti was a high school football star and actor—and "quite the Romeo with the girls," according to his wife. He had a sense of adventure and a somewhat romantic notion that the strip mines and slag heaps of Hazleton were not really what life was about. He left for Greenwich Village, studied at NYU, and maintained a bohemian existence by working as a cook. Later he took off for Paris, lived on the Left Bank, and attended the Sorbonne. When his draft board caught up with him, he joined the army in Germany and spent two years in Intelligence, questioning East German border crossers to discover Communist agents and criminals. He returned to Pennsylvania and got a degree at Penn State in 1955, when he was recruited by the CIA.

He remained for fourteen years, gradually rising through the "analytical side" of the agency—as opposed to Clandestine Services, home of the dirty-tricksters and spies. Eventually he made it to the CIA's "executive suite," becoming assistant to the former deputy director of operations, Vice-Admiral Rufus L. Taylor. He regularly sat in on the CIA's most-secret and highest-level staff meetings. But the more he learned, the more unhappy Marchetti became, especially with the Vietnam War. He quit in 1969, receiving an autographed picture from then-director Richard Helms that said, "To Vic—with appreciation for his support."

For three years, while Marchetti and his family lived off their savings and a job that his wife got to make ends meet, Marchetti plugged away quietly on a spy novel, *The Rope Dancer*, published in 1971. Writing the novel crystalized his ideas about what was really wrong with the CIA and American foreign policy, and he began to speak out. The CIA became less friendly. Admiral Taylor, whom Marchetti still respects, sent a letter warning him not "to give help to our enemies within and without."

That was only the beginning. According to Marchetti, the government not only urged him not to write, it tapped his phone, had him followed, tried to entrap him into illegal conduct, and censored his work. Marchetti received treatment similar to others who have blown the whistle on the evil doings of some of the mighty agencies and enterprises in America. Other notable victims included Daniel Ellsberg, who was spied upon and prosecuted for disclosing the Pentagon Papers, and Philip Agee, a former CIA agent whose forthcoming book has been the target of extensive CIA espionage and entrapment efforts. The CIA actually tried to enlist Marchetti to help get a copy of Agee's manuscript. Marchetti refused.

As of the moment—under President Ford as well as under former presidents Nixon and Johnson—the nation needs more Victor Marchetti to tell us what is really going on. Although he is still operating under a court order that prevents him from telling everything he knows, Marchetti did reveal, in an exclusive interview with Morton Kondracke, the extent to which less-than-honorable tricksters, spies, and secret-keepers have come to dominate an agency whose biblical motto—inscribed in marble at the CIA's Washington headquarters—is "And Ye Shall Know the Truth, and the Truth Shall Make You Free."

Penthouse: In your book, you say that in 1955 you were recruited "in a clandestine manner" by the Central Intelligence Agency. How did it happen?

Marchetti: I was studying Soviet culture and history at Penn State, and I now know that one of my professors was an agency contact. He kept trying to talk me out of graduate school and into government work. Toward the end of my senior year, I got a phone call one night from a fellow who said he was a friend of my brother's, that he just happened to be talking to this professor about me and, gee, he'd like to see me. Great. He said, "At this hotel. Don't ask for me at the desk. Come to this room." Hmm. . . . All right. It sounded a little bit odd. So I went over to the Nittany Lion Inn and knocked at this door and another guy answered. The fellow who called was sitting in the room. It was quite obvious that I was about to be given a recruitment pitch. I didn't know it was the CIA, but I figured it was obviously high-level government intelligence.

Penthouse: Why?

Marchetti: Well, it's hard to describe. It just looked and smelled that way. You know, intelligence is not a science; it's an art. Sometimes you just feel things. Desmond FitzGerald, who is now dead, was the chief of Clandestine Services and ran afoul of Robert McNamara early in the Vietnamese War when he gave him one of these instinctive briefings which ran counter to McNamara's computerlike mind. FitzGerald said, "Vietnam just doesn't *smell* right. I don't *feel* right about it. It's not going to work, you know. We're heading for trouble." McNamara demanded facts, but FitzGerald couldn't provide them. McNamara was barely able to contain himself to keep from throwing the guy out of the office. FitzGerald never briefed McNamara again. The irony of it all, of course, is that FitzGerald was right. And McNamara was wrong.

Penthouse: These two characters who met you—did they have cover names?

Marchetti: No. I know the fellow who introduced himself as a friend of my brother's used his real name. The other fellow was much more mysterious. He had part of his right trigger finger missing, and I kept wondering how he lost it. I was quite impressed. After a long conversation, they said that they were going to recommend me to the agency. I went down to Washington a few weeks later and spent three or four days talking to people, taking tests. Everybody seemed very professional. They were nothing more than government bureaucrats, personnel officers, of course, but to me they were like all the wonderful, mysterious, miraculous—and fake—people that inhabit James Bond stories.

The long and short of it was that I got hired. Well, the last thing I did as I left was to turn in a chit for expenses. They said, "You'll be hearing from us." I kept expecting to receive a brown envelope with "United States Government" on it and a blue check inside. Instead one day I got a letter from a furniture company in Washington, D.C. I couldn't imagine what it was. I opened it up

and inside was a letter saying, "This is to reimburse you for the equipment that you returned"—something like that. It was a check in the exact amount of expenses I had submitted to the CIA.

Penthouse: Who was the professor who was the CIA contact? What was his name?

Marchetti: I'm not going to tell you. It doesn't make any difference what his name was. He was a very nice guy. A very sincere guy. And he was doing what he thought was his duty at that time. In 1955 there was a Cold War and he probably felt, as I did, that the United States had a responsibility to contain communism, keep the world free for democracy, and all that sort of stuff. He did other work for the CIA. He was quite deeply involved. There are many such professors, I know now.

Penthouse: Still?

Marchetti: Yeah. They recruit potential officers, spot foreign students who might be useful as secret agents in their own countries someday, or do research—either social science or scientific.

Penthouse: Did you become a spy after your recruitment by the agency?

Marchetti: No, I was never a spy. I was recruited into the Clandestine Services, which is that part of the agency that engages in espionage and dirty tricks known as covert action—everything from paramilitary activity to penetration and manipulation of governments, student groups, political-action operations. I spent about a year in training, which included how to recruit an agent, how to handle him, how to surveil people, how to avoid surveillance, how to infiltrate and exfiltrate enemy territory, how to conduct certain paramilitary operations, and so on. But this part of the agency didn't appeal all that much to me.

Penthouse: Why not?

Marchetti: I don't know. There was a certain phoniness to it. But it was exciting, romantic, and it was fun to run these problems, to work with a team to try to penetrate a border. A lot of the training was given at Camp Peary in southern Virginia, called "the farm," which is a secret CIA installation that poses as a military research facility. They had built a phony border area with barbed wire, and had observation towers and mines, searchlights, guards with dogs, the whole bit. We'd be delivered to the border at a certain time and we had so many hours to infiltrate. You couldn't cut the barbed wire because pressure would cause a fake grenade to go off. If they saw you, they'd start firing blanks from machine guns. And there were umpires down there to score, "you're dead," "You're caught." So, it was fun.

Penthouse: Sort of like boys playing war?

Marchetti: That's right. And a lot of jumping out of airplanes, parachute training, amphibious training, night operations, learning how to work with demolitions. I could never get with it, though.

Penthouse: What kind of person could get with it?

Marchetti: I've never been able to generalize about it. There were gung-ho military types who got swept up with it all, but also

guys who were rather mousey-looking and not terribly impressive in a macho sense. There were guys with Ph.D.'s who could be carried away by it.

Penthouse: Would you say that most military activity—not just spying—is boys-in-the-schoolyard stuff?

Marchetti: Not really. I firmly believe in the need for a military, a strong retaliatory force to discourage people from going after your territory. As long as governments behave like children, the military is a legitimate profession.

Penthouse: Do CIA agents tend to be Ivy League types—well-born, upper-class?

Marchetti: At the time I was there, yes. Most of them were Ivy Leaguers. It was a carry-over from the wartime OSS and the agency was heavily seeded with Harvard, Yale, Princeton kind of guys, especially at the top. Although, as you got more into paramilitary aspects, you began to run into West Pointers, Annapolis men, ex-Marines, Notre Dame men.

Penthouse: Isn't William Colby, who runs the agency now, an Ivy type?

Marchetti: Well, Colby is not quite Ivy. He went to Princeton, but he's more a middle-class boy. He's not the same as a Richard Helms, the director when I was there. Colby's family does not have money and high social position like Helms's family, which is connected with James Pierpont Morgan. There's a difference. Colby is a reflection of what's beginning to happen at the agency. Where it once was a kind of aristocratic club of smoothies who were doing this because it was part of their patriotic duty—and fun—it has now become one cut below that. It's now becoming something more like the military. Colby's a good example. He lives in the suburbs of Virginia, not in Georgetown. He's not on the cocktail circuit. He's active in the Boy Scouts. He's an Irish Catholic, a bit fanatical.

Penthouse: Is Howard Hunt, the Watergate conspirator, a Brahmin like Helms?

Marchetti: No, he's more like Colby. He went to Brown. Hunt never really understood the upper-class view of intelligence. For the upper class a lot of this was just a game that they didn't take all that seriously. But a guy like Hunt accepted the war with communism at face value. I think he's very pathetic. He ended up being about as simpleminded as his friend William Buckley. Hunt is basically dumb, he's just not very smart. These guys who are so vehemently anticommunist have a religious need to *hate* something, not to *believe* in something. A Hunt, a Buckley—they don't believe in America. They have a negative belief that there's something evil out there, something attacking us. These are the kind of guys who were really great in Spain during the Inquisition, who roasted people at the stake. I think they're mostly fighting something evil inside themselves. Communism, for them, represents evil. Stalin, Castro, all these guys are now the devil, replacing Satan. This is one type of person in the CIA. Then you have other guys who are also anticommunist, but they're really more interested in operations for operations'

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sake. They're caught up in the life, in the activity. You know, it's exciting, playing games with government money. They feel important—they have the power to overthrow governments. These guys can come from any background.

Penthouse: What kind of person is Colby?
Marchetti: Colby is a very dangerous man. I think he's got the mentality of a Heinrich Himmler. He would have made

—and might still from the way he's going—a very good Communist. Of course, he's *not* a Communist. I mean that he's the kind of guy who is best qualified to run a concentration camp, not an agency like the CIA. He could run Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago. He's a mousey kind of guy who wouldn't harm a fly, but could sit down and plan counterterror programs, secret wars in Laos and Cambodia, and then have the goddamn nerve to write a law that is worse than the British Official Secrets Act. The new Colby recommendations for enforcing secrecy in government are worthy of the best Communist commissar in the Soviet Union.

Penthouse: What would this law provide?

Marchetti: That any employee of the United States government or any worker for a government contractor can be indicted for releasing classified information and be tried *in camera*—the evidence can be presented in secret to the judge. Colby will decide what's classified or not classified. He'll decide what should be shown to the judge and not shown to the judge. If everything goes his way, the guy ends up in the pen with a ten-year jail sentence, all in secret.

Penthouse: What's Colby's background?

Marchetti: It's all clandestine. He's a spook. In World War II,

he jumped into Norway and France as an OSS man. He got out for a while and went to law school, then he came back into the agency around '47 or '48 and spent his whole career in clandestine work, mostly on Far East problems. He was very covert-action oriented. That's not just prying for information, spying and playing counterespionage games with other governments. It's getting into their pants and manipulating them. Among other things, Colby was Chief of Station in Vietnam when Diem was the dictator.

Penthouse: Didn't he invent the "counterterror" program in Vietnam?

Marchetti: Yeah, the counterterror program was an attempt to cope with terror fomented by the Vietcong, who would come into villages, identify the villagers who supported the Saigon government, and assassinate them. The counterterror program was simply the reverse. They'd go into another village and identify the Vietcong—or suspected Vietcong—and assassinate them, kidnap them, torture them, interrogate them, and put fear into the hearts of their sympathizers. Many of the victims were innocent. This

Colby gets off by saying that "There were excesses," and that "in a program this big, you can't help but have those things and certainly we don't condone them." This is part of the deception and the hypocrisy that you get into with the agency, particularly in Clandestine Services.

Penthouse: Did Colby have to know that his people were committing murder?

Marchetti: Sure, he had to know. There's no way he could possibly not have known. He was head of the division. He was responsible for the whole program: Vietnam station chiefs had to report to him, had to tell him what was going on.

Penthouse: Does that make the present head of the CIA a murderer?

Marchetti: No, not in the legal sense. Of course not. I mean, this is what the agency is so very good at. You can never really prove that it as an institution, or the president as an individual, actively committed a crime. They're smart enough always to work through other parties. Generally, the dirtier the work is, the more likely it is to be farmed out. In paramilitary operations, you don't usually find agency guys jumping out of the airplanes, submachineguns in hand. Usually, it's some ex-Marine, or some soldier of fortune, some mercenary that's left over from another operation like the Bay of Pigs. So, with things like murder—these very dirty things—it's almost impossible to prove that the agency did it.

Penthouse: William Colby would not feel morally responsible for the Phoenix murders, would he?

Marchetti: No, of course not. His attitude toward the Phoenix program would be essentially the same as, say, the general who sends out the B-52s every day, wiping out village after village and killing hundreds of people. That man would go to church and all that. He'd teach little boys not to lie and cheat. If you ask, "How can you do that?" he'd say, "I'm not a murderer. I'm

not murdering anybody. It's war. I'm just carrying out orders." People with a clandestine mentality are able to play these games with themselves.

Penthouse: Why was Richard Helms relieved as head of the CIA? Did it have something to do with the Watergate scandal?

Marchetti: The White House clearly wanted to use Helms and the CIA to cover up, but Helms proved usable only to a certain degree. The Nixon gang didn't really trust Helms, so they turned to his deputy, General Vernon Walters, who they thought they had a stronger tie to on the basis of his friendship

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) Henry Kissinger made that statement not in public, but at a secret White House meeting on June 27, 1970. The country he was referring to was Chile.

In his capacity as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Kissinger was chairman of a meeting of the so-called 40 Committee, an interdepartmental panel responsible for overseeing the CIA's high-risk covert-action operations. The 40 Committee's members are the Director of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (At the time of the Chilean meeting, Attorney General John Mitchell was also a member.) It is this small group of bureaucrats and politicians—in close consultation with the President and the governmental departments the men represent—that directs America's secret foreign policy.

On that Saturday in June 1970, the main topic before the 40 Committee was: (

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) The Chilean election was scheduled for the following September, and Allende, a declared Marxist, was one of the principal candidates. Although Allende had pledged to maintain the democratic system if he was elected, the U.S. ambassador to Chile (

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) Most of the American companies with large investments in Chile were also fearful of a possible Allende triumph, and at least two of those companies, the International Telephone and Telegraph

A typical page from Mr. Marchetti's book, with censored sections. The CIA originally deleted the words in bold, but yielded them up in response to legal demands.

with Nixon. Helms, the old-school guy, seems to have got wind of this and stopped it, and he probably got canned over it. But before Watergate, Helms was very cooperative with the White House Plumbers, with the Houston domestic-espionage plan, and with breaking into embassies and other things that he thought were legitimate functions of the CIA and that he thought J. Edgar Hoover was going too slow on.

Penthouse: What do you make of Charles Colson's allegations that President Nixon was a prisoner in the White House, a prisoner of the CIA?

Marchetti: My gut feeling is that this is just a manifestation of the White House paranoia, Nixon paranoia—a reflection of Colson's own dismal ignorance of how things really work. Anything's possible, but from what I saw in the agency, it is a loyal and responsive component of the government, particularly loyal to the White House, to the presidency. Most of the CIA's major activities, its most important activities, its riskiest activities, are carried out either at the direction of or with the approval of the White House.

Penthouse: Colson and Senator Howard Baker believe that Howard Hunt was a CIA spy in the White House, an active agent, and that James McCord purposely flubbed the Watergate job to get Nixon into trouble.

Marchetti: Hunt is not clever enough to be that kind of an agent. He is a reactionary, a guy who couldn't get his wig on right, a burned-out old stumblebum case officer. McCord was a security officer, a support officer. They're the kind of people that the Nixon administration would hire. I mean, they're the kind of incompetents that a nitwit like Haldeman or a bullethead like Ehrlichman would hire. These guys aren't clever enough to fool anybody.

Penthouse: Was Hunt a fairly trusted agent of the CIA? It makes you wonder about the competence of the agency.

Marchetti: Yep, and I think you should wonder about the competence of the agency as a whole, and particularly in clandestine operations. In countries like Uruguay, or wherever the hell it was that Hunt operated, the host government was basically friendly. Even if the government wasn't friendly, in these Third World areas, the spooks were operating against relatively primitive and inefficient security services. They developed a lot of sloppy techniques and methods. If these guys had been operating in hostile territory, in Europe or behind the Iron Curtain, they'd have been out of business long ago. It would be good advice to any future Nixon-like administration, if they want to hire somebody to do dirty tricks, to hire professionally competent people rather than these kind of guys.

Penthouse: Is the CIA a threat to the Constitution, to domestic liberty?

Marchetti: No, but I think it's possible it might be someday. As I said before, things are changing at the agency. The agency is becoming a lot more like the military. It's getting a different class of people, more conservative politically. The basic problem is that the agency has clandestine talent

and secret assets. Now, if you get the wrong kind of people running the agency, and then you get the wrong kind of people in the White House—people who would throw the Constitution out the window—you have all the ingredients of a secret police.

The CIA does have a domestic-operations division and it seemed to take on more responsibility during the racial and antiwar riots of the Sixties, mainly to see if these activities were manipulated by foreign powers. My concern about the CIA's domestic activities centers on what largely could happen if the CIA isn't better controlled by

"William Colby, the CIA's director, is a very dangerous man. . . . He's the kind of guy who's best qualified to run a concentration camp."

Congress, the news media, and the public.

Penthouse: Is Gerald Ford exercising better control of the CIA than did Nixon or other presidents?

Marchetti: I don't think that anything has changed with the coming of Ford. All trends that were in motion are continuing while he's in power. He's caught up in the old Cold War thing the way most conservatives are. He's all for national security and national defense. It's an unthinking reaction. I do not expect anything good to come out of the Ford presidency. The hope for change is with public opinion, and with senators like Proxmire, Cranston, Percy, Church, and congressmen like Michael Harrington.

Penthouse: In your book, you indicate that there is some reason to hope that Congress is prepared to exercise more control.

Marchetti: I think we'll be a lot better off in 1975 than we were in 1972 and before. I think Watergate scared the hell out of a lot of people and has encouraged some of the younger, more liberal, activist senators to push a little harder. But we're far from getting there. This past April there was a debate over the CIA in the Senate and you had Hubert Humphrey and others saying the same old things, and nothing came out of it.

Penthouse: Doesn't the flap over Chile—over the CIA's role in destroying the elected Allende government—offer the chance to finally bring the CIA under control?

Marchetti: It won't do it. It will increase the pressure, but it's quite obvious that the CIA and the other parts of the intelligence cult are digging in. They'll fight like hell. Ford will protect them, as he's already done, and fight off any real attempt to reform the system. The agency will say, "It just goes to show you, you can't tell Congress everything that's going on." They'll just fog it up and muddy the water, delay, and deceive,

and lie outright, if necessary.

But I do think that the pressure is increasing. Many senators and congressmen who respect the Constitution are getting to be more demanding, but Chile is not the final flap. It's not big enough. There has to be a really dramatic flap. Even the disclosure that the CIA messed around with domestic institutions like the National Student Association and labor unions did not result in a big investigation.

Penthouse: Well, how do you think the CIA will finally be brought under control?

Marchetti: The ideal would be for a president to come to power who believed that CIA activities ought to be subject to review, and he would have to bring public opinion, the press, and Congress with him.

Congress can increase the pressure, but if Congress couldn't stop the Vietnam War, it is not going to be able to bring the intelligence cult under control. It's too entrenched. To increase the pressure, more and more information has to come out—from former intelligence officials speaking out, and there has to be more flaps and investigations by Congress. The best hope is with the younger generation and with younger members of Congress. It will be, let me tell you, a very gradual process.

Penthouse: You've said in your book that the CIA may have the biggest air force in the world. Do you mean bigger than any national air force?

Marchetti: Oh, no. It couldn't compete with our own air force or the Soviet air force. I'm talking in terms of private companies. The CIA owns a whole series of ostensibly private airlines, like Air America, Civil Air Transport, Air Asia, Southern Air Transport, Inter-Mountain Aviation, and they have owned other ones. The total is in the hundreds of aircraft, pretty damned huge. Not even the CIA knows how many. Secrecy can screw up anything.

Penthouse: Why do they need all those airplanes?

Marchetti: Basically to support paramilitary activities in Southeast Asia, in the Congo, in Latin America. You have to have your assets in place in case you need them.

Penthouse: Is it true that heroin has been smuggled aboard Air America planes?

Marchetti: I think it was, but I don't think it was done with the approval of the CIA. The CIA was paying the Meo tribesmen in Laos to fight Communists, and the Meos' primary source of income came from the opium poppy. We would be fools not to think that some soldiers of fortune who fly for Air America wouldn't be willing, against company rules, to fly out opium from time to time. The CIA used to support the Kuomintang gang down in Burma, and they were a bunch of dope runners, too. In fighting communism, the spooks make some very strange bedfellows. They don't care what a guy does on his own, as long as he cooperates. Who in the hell are you going to get to teach you breaking and entering, for example? You get an expert, right? Down at the agency's farm, the head instructor was supposedly an ex-convict who had been given a pardon in order to

teach the course. By the very nature of its business, the agency has got to come in contact with crooked people. I'm sure they have had a lot of connections with the Mafia down in Cuba because their goals were the same—to overthrow Castro.

The agency also has to use a lot of untraceable money. All over the world, the CIA deals on the black market and gets laundered funds in all kinds of currencies. For a long time, much of the CIA's operation in Vietnam was run with black-market money. We were actually undercutting the damned economic system that we were trying to preserve! It was much cheaper for the agency to operate because the American dollar was worth more on the black market. Finally the Bureau of the Budget caught on. At one time the Bureau of the Budget entertained the thought of the CIA running a massive black market to support all government operations in Vietnam. But that would have been such a huge operation, it was just ridiculous. The idea was thrown out.

Penthouse: But it has been charged that the CIA knowingly, intentionally, and as a matter of policy promoted heroin dealing. These charges have been made by some very responsible people. Don't you think they could be true?

Marchetti: No senior official in his right mind would permit it. I still firmly believe that this was done by the Air America crowd on its own. The more-senior officers perhaps suspected it or knew about it, and looked the other way because the political issues were

overriding, but I still don't believe the top guys would do it intentionally—certainly not for profit. They knew the Meos were growing poppies, that the warlords and top Laotian officials were trading in heroin, and maybe that some Air America pilots might be transporting it. So they ignored it, but they didn't sponsor it.

Penthouse: Let's talk about some specific CIA activities. You come very close to saying in your book that Willy Brandt was a CIA agent or operative. Can you talk about that?

"Henry Kissinger is power-mad, a manipulator of world events. I don't think he understands what this country is all about."

Marchetti: I would never have called him a CIA agent or operative. If I had described Willy Brandt in the book I would have referred to him as an "ally of the CIA."

Penthouse: Was he paid off by the CIA? Was he on the CIA payroll?

Marchetti: No, not in that sense. If he received money, it would have been to support his political party. It was mainly a device to keep Berlin free, because he was its mayor. I can't go beyond this . . . with him or

other foreign government leaders who had close and secret ties with the CIA.

Penthouse: Why not? Why don't you reveal these connections, right now?

Marchetti: I can't. I'm under a court order which says that this information should be put back in my book, but there's a stay on it while the CIA's appeal is being heard. I am absolutely abiding by the law. I don't want to go to jail. I like it at home. Also, I made up my mind that I was going to fight the CIA openly and legally. I was going to do it within the system.

Penthouse: In another area, then: how many assassinations a year does the CIA order?


Marchetti: I have no idea. Excluding what went on in Southeast Asia, it always was my belief that assassinations were very rare things. Now, it just goes without saying in this kind of a business there must be times when somebody has to be rubbed out, I would assume. But I have no firsthand knowledge. There are two kinds of assassinations: first, there is the political assassination, like Trujillo and Diem. The CIA isn't going to go in there and shoot him. They might hire the guys who do it. They might foster a situation in which he is going to be overthrown, and in the course of being overthrown he may have to be eliminated. If you read the Pentagon Papers, this is essentially what happened to Diem in Vietnam. CIA was in very, very close contact with the coup. If they didn't know that these generals and colonels, who were very tough cookies, were going to kill Diem, they were pretty bad case officers. I think this was kind of the thing that also happened with Trujillo. Also, there may have been times—and this is the second kind of assassination—when it was necessary to terminate an agent by killing him. In training, we were told that this would require the approval of the highest authority in the agency and that it would be very difficult to get, but I just assume there have been cases where some agent was about to blow sky high and defect to the other side and that there was no other way out but to assassinate him. Now, how it would be done, I wouldn't know—I know of no specific case.

Penthouse: You refer in the book to the Special Operations Division, which sounds like a James Bond operation, a U.S. assassination squad. What is it?

Marchetti: These guys are the CIA's own gorillas. G-O-R-I-L-L-A-S. They're sometimes referred to as "the animals." They provide the know-how for running paramilitary operations, infiltrating behind enemy lines, sabotage, and blowing up a bridge or something. They're specialists. The area division would actually have control of the operation, but these guys would be the ones to do it. Now, over the years, this group has become largely just a body of experts—they themselves don't do very much anymore. They hire people.

Penthouse: It's been reported that members of the old Greek military junta were receiving personal payoffs from the CIA. Is this true?

Marchetti: I don't know directly. This wasn't



discussed openly even in the highest-level meetings of the agency. One had the feeling that we were well in with the junta, but it came only from half-completed sentences and knowing glances. Helms would always say, "We'll discuss this later in my office." I'm convinced there were subsidies for the generals and colonels, but I don't have any hard information. It's interesting that when the CIA withdrew its support for the junta, though, it just collapsed, without a single shot being fired. I think the junta became a liability in the Cyprus mess. The agency probably knew it was going to collapse eventually, anyway, and it had been moving out important functions to Teheran, Iran, where Helms, of course, is ambassador.

Penthouse: The world now knows that the CIA spent millions to "destabilize" the Allende government in Chile, but it's constantly denied that the United States was directly involved in the coup that killed him. Do you believe that?

Marchetti: No, not at all. Our goal was to prepare the ground for the collapse of the government, to weaken Allende so much that he'd be voted out of power in 1976—or, if everything went well, to have him collapse before that. We spent our money with an eye toward building up opposition groups. We built up the military that finally did him in. Before we became involved, the Chilean military had the reputation of not getting involved in politics. We got in there to move these guys far enough right to get them to violate their own constitution. I don't know that we tapped some general on the shoulder and said, "It's time to move," but I wouldn't be surprised to learn, when things we'd set in motion began to snowball, that we did.

Penthouse: Is it true that the CIA originally did not want to get involved in Chile, but that Kissinger ordered the policy?

Marchetti: It's true, absolutely; it was Kissinger. Remember, six years earlier when Allende almost won the presidency, the CIA poured \$20,000,000 into Chile to prevent him from winning. In 1970, apparently, the CIA just didn't have the muscle to pull it off. At the time, the analytical side of the CIA was saying, "Don't get involved in these kinds of things anymore in Latin America. It won't work. Just let nature take its course." The objections weren't moral or legal, but practical. I think that the State Department felt the same way. Kissinger felt the other way. The CIA did not dump Allende alone, remember. There was a very large, complex, and well-coordinated program that included other elements of the government and the business world. For example, the World Bank, the great helper of poor nations, wouldn't give Allende any money, but the Pentagon kept supplying military hardware to the generals.

Penthouse: In the end, do you think that the United States government and Kissinger are morally responsible for the death of President Allende?

Marchetti: Yes, for that and for a lot of other crimes committed in the name of the people

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You have to remember that Kissinger is brilliant, but devious; charming, but ruthless—and I'd put the emphasis on the latter words. He's power-mad, a manipulator of world events. I don't think he does it for any solid ideological reason, just out of instinct. I don't think he understands what this country is all about. To him, everything is a deal. Détente with the Russians and the Chinese—it's a good thing, mind you—is not for the purpose of peace and prosperity in the world, as far as Kissinger is concerned. It's a trade: "You take this part of the world, and we'll take that."

Penthouse: Does the CIA engage in industrial espionage—directed against corporations as opposed to governments? For example, would the CIA move against the oil companies, ITT, or other multinational companies that don't recognize the sovereignty of any particular country?

Marchetti: I don't know about actual espionage operations against them, but I think that CIA would be derelict if it wasn't keeping tabs on multinational corporations and their involvements throughout the world—their assets, their interests, and the like. I would think it would be largely an information-gathering and analytical effort at this point. This is an interesting area. You say to yourself, it's what a good intelligence organization should be doing, but I keep thinking back about all the blunders they've made and all the dumb things that they've done over the years, and I sometimes wonder if they're smart enough to do this.

Penthouse: Apparently Israeli intelligence

was caught off-guard before the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Did we have any advance information about it?

Marchetti: I was told by a senior CIA officer the other day that we knew about it. But I would be willing to bet that out of twenty thousand reports on the Mideast, probably two predicted the war. They find these reports in the after-crisis postmortem. But what were they worth beforehand? See, you can't just take a report from Clandestine Services that says Abdul Somebody-or-Other said that they are planning to attack Israel, and take it seriously. Abdul's been saying it for the past ten years. Somebody is always going to attack Israel.

For instance, I worked on the Cuban missile problem and I saw the crap that came in from Cuba. I read it all and every day burned a bagful of garbage that the Clandestine Services was putting out. I remember two reports that said there were big missiles coming into Cuba. But even the spooks didn't put any extra emphasis on those reports, and we had been constantly getting such reports, which were wrong. The analysts proved them wrong over and over again—about bombers being there, and offensive missiles being there, submarines and other things. Now, with 20-20 hindsight, we should have discovered the missiles a couple of days earlier than we did. I mean we might have gotten solid photography a few days earlier than we did. But if you think that's an error, at least we knew there was a military buildup.

Penthouse: Has the CIA tried to assassinate Castro?

Marchetti: I think there was no doubt the CIA was supporting rebel groups that were out to assassinate Castro. You find reference to this in interviews with the Water-

gate burglars who were working for the CIA. **Penthouse:** Can you cite some triumphs of analysis, as opposed to espionage and operations? You're obviously biased toward the analysis side.

Marchetti: Well, we know all about the Soviet military and Chinese strategic forces and their capabilities—this all comes from analysis based on materials that are collected either through technical sources, communications intelligence, or satellite photography. There is no clandestine espionage involved. CIA can't spy against them. Other good examples of information based on analytical work rather than clandestine espionage are the Sino-Soviet split and the collapse of the Communist Chinese Great Leap Forward.

Penthouse: Would things be better if an analyst ran the CIA?

Marchetti: Well, if the CIA continues to exist as it is now—if it still has Clandestine Services—I would like to see an analyst run the CIA, because analysis is the real name of the game. I would rather see the agency's clandestine activities abolished completely, though.

Penthouse: No spies?

Marchetti: No spies.

Penthouse: Not a single spy?

Marchetti: Not a single spy. I would be willing to give up whatever little good can be acquired through classical espionage in order to be assured that we are getting rid of all the dirty tricks. And I would like to see the agency concentrate on collection of information through technical and other clean, nonprovocative means, and on the processing and distribution of that information, not just to the White House but to the entire government, even to the general public.

Penthouse: Don't you think there is something inherent in international relations that demands espionage?

Marchetti: No I don't, I don't think so at all. I think that's a myth.

Penthouse: But doesn't espionage have a very long history?

Marchetti: That's right. But I don't think we need to do it in this world. We don't have to plot against the Bolivians or against the Moroccans. If they are plotting against us, let them plot. What are they going to do? Who cares? We should be sitting over here and watching our primary rivals as carefully as possible. If we can't trust them to keep an agreement on arms limitation, we've got the kill-power anyhow. If the Soviets attacked tomorrow, they would be blown off the face of the earth.

Penthouse: But if somebody is going to stage a coup that might affect our commercial interests, don't we have to know it?

Marchetti: Ah-h-h-h, bullshit! We don't have to know that, and to hell with the commercial interest. Just let nature take its course. You can't prevent every little coup. Anyway, we have diplomats in all these countries. They acquire a great deal of information. So do military attachés and the news media. We get enough information from them about what's going on in the world for our own protection.



Penthouse: Suppose there was a good democratic regime that was about to be overthrown?

Marchetti: Well, okay so there goes a good democratic regime. . . . Tough titty. We sympathize with them, sure. We think it's a bad thing and we lament it. We work through the United Nations. We cut off aid. But we do it all openly and aboveboard.

Penthouse: You wouldn't intervene to help?

Marchetti: No, I would not. One of the reasons I'm so anti-intervention is that I think it's about time we get off of this international kick that we have been on since 1939 and clear up our own problems here. I feel like we are living in a house that's coming apart at the seams. You know, we've got drug problems, law problems, ghetto problems, pollution, graft, and here we are running off to save some rinky-dink dictatorship.

Penthouse: According to your book, we spend more than \$6 billion a year on intelligence. . . .

Marchetti: And that's just for intelligence. We spend \$80 billion for defense. When you add it all up, some 60 percent of our budget goes into these kinds of things. And when you think of it, \$6 billion is more than we spend on most of our domestic problems.

Penthouse: What happened to you? In 1955, you were a firm believer. What changed you?

Marchetti: Well, the world changed and I changed with it, I like to think. Around 1964 or '65, I began getting turned off on the Vietnamese War, for one thing. I began to get fed up with what I thought was overemphasis on the military in this country, and when I moved into staff work, I saw that the agency was overemphasizing clandestine activities, particularly covert action. I decided to quit about six months before I did.

Penthouse: You had no thought then of exposing the agency?

Marchetti: Not at that point, no. I told the director why I was leaving, of course. I didn't make any bones about what I thought was wrong. But he had heard me talk that way before. So I left. In the course of doing a spy novel, I began to really get worked up and I wanted to start writing some articles.

Penthouse: But you had signed a document saying that you wouldn't reveal what you had learned.

Marchetti: Yes, when I first went into the agency; and when I left, I signed it again. But the last one was thrown out of court. It's not considered valid. Nor do I feel morally obligated by the first document. My first loyalty is to the USA, not the CIA.

Penthouse: Besides legal action, what did the CIA do to prevent you from writing your book?

Marchetti: They did all kinds of things to discredit me and entrap me. They sent letters that ostensibly came from an East Berlin publisher saying, "We understand you're having difficulty in publishing what you want to write. Why don't you come to Berlin and visit with us?" Then, also, I would get phone calls from people offering assistance, wanting to make contact, asking me

to put an ad in the newspaper with code numbers they'd spot and then contact me. This was during 1971 and into '72, when I first began to speak out, and evidently there was White House interest in my case. It's quite possible that I may even have been a target of the Plumbers. Maybe it wasn't CIA. Maybe it was the Plumbers mucking about, trying to see if I was leaking information.

Penthouse: Was there any other harassment? Was your income tax audited?

Marchetti: No, my income tax was never audited, thank God! But I had such a low income. What was there to audit? I know my

"Hunt and McCord were just the type of incompetents that a nitwit like Haldeman or a bullethead like Ehrlichman would hire."

phone was tapped, though, and I know I was surveilled, but not for the reasons most people think they're being watched—because they hear strange clicks on the phone, or they see strange people sitting behind them on buses. All this is classified, now, so I have to phrase this very carefully and I can't get into any specifics. During pretrial negotiations with the CIA and the Justice Department [in 1974] the reactions of the CIA and the Justice Department left no doubt in my mind, in my co-author's mind, and my lawyer's mind that we were probably being tapped and followed. We began to get these shitty answers that bureaucrats give when they're covering their own asses—"To the best of my knowledge" kind of answers. You would have had to have seen their demeanor, the time it took them to answer, the huddling, the stumbling around, the whole bit. That's the first time I became absolutely convinced that I was being bugged or followed. Before, I kept saying to myself, "No, no. Don't get paranoid. Forget it. . . . But just in case you are, play it straight. Don't try to be cute."

That's a piece of advice I'll throw out to anyone: if you ever get involved in a situation like this, play it as straight as you possibly can. Don't say anything on the telephone you wouldn't say to the director of the FBI or the CIA. Same with your letters. Don't go anywhere you wouldn't want the press to know about. And don't pal around with anyone you wouldn't want to have your picture taken with. Be as pure as the driven snow. If you go away to visit the relatives, you have to go on the assumption that a break-and-entry team can come in. You had better not have anything that you don't want anyone to find. I wouldn't even get a passport. I certainly

wouldn't go out of the country because one of their favorite tricks. You go out country, somebody slips something of your drinks, you get a snootful; and you know it, there're pictures taken secretly, with your arm around some the bar who happens to be a KGB agent something.

Penthouse: Have you had any other contacts with the CIA lately?

Marchetti: They asked me, as a matter of fact, to see if I could get them a manuscript of Philip Agee's book on the CIA's activities in Latin America. [Agee was an undercover CIA agent for twelve years.]

Penthouse: After all you've been through with them, they asked your help?

Marchetti: Yep. A friend from the agency paid me a visit and asked me to get a copy of Agee's manuscript. I couldn't believe I didn't have a copy. I knew there were copies circulating in New York and Washington, said, "Why should I do this for you people view of the bullshit I've been getting the last couple of years?" He gave me this news about how I was basically a pe American who had stayed within the system, but that Agee was different—ruthless, without principle, probably a KGB agent.

I challenged that on the basis of the correspondence I'd had with Agee. But he said, regardless of whether Agee was an agent or not, he was going to blow a lot of our agents in the field—foreigners and our own people under deep cover.

I said, "This is the risk you take when you become an undercover agent." He said, "You don't want innocents to be hurt, do you?" I said to him, "These guys are exactly innocent. I don't think it's necessary for Agee to name them, but if that's what he wants to do it, these agents went into business with their eyes open."

I made no commitments to this friend, a week later I told him I wasn't going to do what he wanted because Agee is my mate—I don't think he's a foreign agent and I just don't trust the bastards at the CIA. For all I could figure, they were trying to appeal to my patriotism and my reluctance to see people hurt, and hook me into being an undercover man for them—possibly discredit me. The whole thing was damned scary. Incredible, in fact.

Penthouse: Who was your CIA friend who made the pitch?

Marchetti: I'm not going to tell you his name. I was pissed off at him, and I still am, but no names. I told him I'd continue to be his social friend, but that I resented his doing that.

Penthouse: Why does the CIA do all this? Are they afraid they'll lose respect from the intelligence services of the world—Soviet KGB and the others—if they keep their people quiet?

Marchetti: Oh, yeah. There's a certain amount of that. But there's one thing I can tell you: if I had worked for any other espionage agency in the world, I would probably be dead by now. ☐