

346. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation  
Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, June 14, 1962.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Edwin Martin, State  
General Craig, Defense  
William Harvey, CIA  
Donald Wilson, USIA

SUBJECT

Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning

This confirms the oral assignment of tasks for further contingency planning.

The Defense operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open, widespread revolt in Cuba. This contingency is seen as a non-U.S.-initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. U.S. actions are seen as including the use of U.S. military force.

The State operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open revolt in one or a few localities in Cuba. This contingency is seen as a non-U.S.-initiated situation where the people in one Cuban locality (or several neighboring localities) openly defy the Communist regime, are being suppressed with force, and U.S. help is requested (by the Cuban revolt-ers or Latin American opinion).

All U.S. Departments and Agencies participating in Operation Mongoose will assist in the preparation of these plans, as required. Plans should include a description of the assumed contingency situation, specific actions to be taken and by whom, timing required, and an indication of post-action requirements.

Although current operations take priority, it is expected that working drafts of these contingency plans will be ready by 16 July. A working meeting of operational representatives will then ready these plans for submission to the Special Group (Augmented).

EG Lansdale  
Brigadier General, USAF

Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files, Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study, Top Secret; Notorn; Special Handling. A copy was sent to General Taylor.

347. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation  
Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, June 14, 1962.

SUBJECT

Progress, Operation Mongoose

*Political Actions.* At its 7 June meeting,<sup>1</sup> the Group desired that my 17 May list of suggested priority actions<sup>2</sup> be re-issued, to include agreed-upon tasks for State. Completion of this is awaiting the appointment of a representative for the Department of State who can devote full time to Operation Mongoose, as agreed upon. When the appointment is announced to the Special Group, it is my plan to hold a meeting promptly with him and other representatives to work on the schedule of special-ef-fort activities. Meanwhile, we are working on the accepted tasks. State reports that briefing papers have been given to Secretary Rusk on Cuba-European trade, for his forthcoming trip to West Europe and that the Directing Council of the Pan-American Institute of History and Geogra-phy has voted to exclude Cuban delegates from meetings.

*Cuban Recruits in U.S. Armed Forces.* Concept approved and directive issued by the Secretary of Defense.<sup>3</sup>

*Outstanding Studies (including Blockade).* My 8 June memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented)<sup>4</sup> reported on the current status of all outstanding studies. The desired Defense and CIA papers on the means required for and possible effects of a blockade of Cuba were transmitted with this memorandum.

Also transmitted by my 8 June memorandum was a Defense reminder of the Attorney General's question about U.S. actions in case the Soviets established bases in Cuba. Mongoose representatives were alerted to the last paragraph of the Defense paper, which asked for comments by the 14 June Group meeting.

*Possible Contingency.* The rumored uprising of the Cuban people in mid-June continues to be watched closely. The CIA coverage inside Cuba has not confirmed this uprising from resistance organizations there, and

Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files, Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations, Top Secret; Sensitive; Notorn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatrick, Lennitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale. See Document 343.

<sup>1</sup> Document 338.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Document 345.

<sup>4</sup> Document 345.

*Bureau of the Budget*

Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist, expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies:

- a. As requested by Task Agencies, prior to plan implementation, and
  - b. As requested by Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.
4. *Coordinating Instructions.*
- a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by the President.
  - b. Military operations, including clandestine and paramilitary activities, will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration of military government activities in Cuba will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.
  - c. Political, psychological and economic operations will be accomplished in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.
  - d. Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and maintained in current status.
  - e. During implementation of the plan the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency activities. The coordinating office will be established in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.

363. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 85-2-62

Washington, August 1, 1962.

THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA<sup>1</sup>

The Problem

To analyze the situation in Cuba and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so, with particular reference to Castro's relations with the Communists and to the potential for resistance to his regime.

Conclusions

A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban communism; the "old" Communists have had to accommodate themselves to this fact, as has the USSR. Further strains may develop in these relationships, but they are unlikely to break the ties of mutual interest between Castro and the "old" Communists and between Cuba and the USSR. (Paras. 1-10)

B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies. (Para. 11)

C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal leadership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 12-19)

D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in present circumstances. They are probably capable of containing and con-

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan. 63, Secret. A covering note indicates that this estimate, submitted by McConne, was prepared by CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction.

<sup>1</sup> This estimate is designed to bring up-to-date NIE 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 21 March 1962. The background information contained in that document remains generally valid. [Footnote in the source text. For NIE 85-62, see Document 315.]

## (2) Phase II—(Post Invasion)

Cuba, 1961-1962 891

- (a) Provide immediate emergency economic and other assistance to the civil populace.
- (b) Turn over as rapidly as possible to the Cuban Government for administration the territory taken by United States troops and assist that government to the extent feasible as it requests.
- (c) Make preparations to provide the Cuban Government with long range economic assistance.
- (d) Take measures to assist the Cuban Government to control entry into and exit from Cuba.
- (e) Re-establish the United States country team in Havana.
- d. *Central Intelligence Agency Operations.*
- (1) CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by a component of CIA Headquarters, Washington. Operational elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida, with sub elements at other Florida locations.
- (2) In the event of localized revolt, CIA will give covert support to the revolt through introduction of communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as appropriate and feasible.
- (3) When US Military intervention is directed and contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fully support the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA Command Relationship Agreement,<sup>2</sup> whether it is implemented or not.
- (4) Liaison and communications will be established prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate plans.
- (5) CIA will support military operations by clandestine intelligence, counter intelligence, propaganda, political and paramilitary operations.
- (6) After the initial assault and during the subsequent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will designate selected personnel from CIA Headquarters and/or CIA operations base, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and conduct clandestine operations in support of US forces and objectives. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
- e. *United States Information Agency Operations.*
- (1) The Agency will provide complete, but strictly factual and impartial informational coverage to a spontaneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of action. *Extreme caution* will be taken to avoid the appearance of US involvement during this phase so as to nullify possible later charges of US intervention (by Cuba or other Latin American governments) should the revolt fail. In this context, the Agency during this phase must carefully refrain from a type or tone of coverage that might be construed as incitement to riot.

- (2) In the event of direct US involvement, the Agency will:
- (a) Assign informational specialists to work with Defense Psywar units during combat operations.
- (b) Staff up a regular USIS unit to move into Havana with the Department of State contingent at the time and place to be decided on by the Department.
- (c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical equipment and resources necessary to support a USIS operation in Cuba.

(3) Basic considerations in Agency informational support of direct US military action:

- (a) Medium wave radio should receive priority attention for any overt combat operation in Cuba. Immediately upon securing any beach-head or other enclave on the island, and perhaps immediately prior to or concurrent with such action, massive medium wave broadcasting facilities, floating transmitters and, as soon as possible, captured Cuban station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short wave facilities will also be increased to provide necessary backup.
- (b) The messages of this initial phase should be simple and direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and the protection of their individual rights, instructions on the maintenance of public order, the distribution of food and medical attention, all done hopefully in a Cuban context and with only the minimum of reference to US military forces and power necessary to maintain order and to assure credibility of the inevitability of Castro's rapid and complete defeat.
- (c) Care must be exercised, particularly with the anti-Castro Cubans, to avoid alienating possible support by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications of possible loss of any gains (housing, land, social benefits) which might have accrued to the peasant and worker groups during the Castro regime.
- (d) Given the relatively high rate of literacy in Cuba, wall posters and leaflets reiterating the themes of the broadcasts should also be available and utilized as soon as practical; the leaflets by air drop ahead of military action where deemed advisable.
- (e) Any provisional military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the civilian population.
- (f) In all psychological planning, special attention should be given to avoiding in so far as possible any indications of plans to return to the status quo ante, all information output should be designed to reassure the populace that the US supported movement is designed to carry forward the realization of the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.

f. *Department of the Treasury*  
*Department of Justice*  
*Department of Health, Education and Welfare*  
*Department of Agriculture*  
*Federal Aviation Agency*

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

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<sup>1</sup> This estimate is designed to bring up-to-date NIE 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 21 March 1962. The background information contained in that document remains generally valid. [Footnote in the source text. For NIE 85-62, see Document 315.]