

FIRED AFTER CRITICIZING AGENCY *Times* Dec. 27, 1977 *Reporter's*

Ex-CIA Man: A Spy Out in the Cold

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SAN DIEGO—In 26 years of domestic service as a public representative of the Central Intelligence Agency, Donald S. Jordan never came in from the cold of covert operations because he was never in it.

But, the gray-haired, 57-year-old intelligence officer suddenly found himself in the chilling climate of the unemployed when he publicly criticized the agency and CIA Director Stansfield Turner.

Jordan was summarily dismissed as chief of the CIA office here Dec. 5 on Adm. Turner's orders. He was forced into retirement without a hearing or, he says, an explanation. Three agency officials showed up that day.

"I was told, 'Look! The admiral's decided you're terminated,'" Turner recalls. "Now, we have your retire-

ment application here. If you want your retirement, you'll have to fill in these papers. Sign them."

They demanded his office key and ordered a change in the combination of the office safe. Jordan was through as a CIA man but not as a CIA critic. He told *The Times* in an interview that:

—Despite Watergate, despite Congress' investigation of the agency two years ago and despite media exposure of the CIA's drug experiments on unsuspecting persons and other violations of its charter, the organization remains essentially unchanged.

—No matter who is CIA director, the agency is run like the military by "elitists" of Civil Service "super-grades" 16, 17 and 18 and politically appointed professionals, most of whom are contemptuous of "idiots" in the unwashed general public and who

are willing to lie to Congress, if necessary.

—The CIA's domestic collection division is inefficient in gathering intelligence, overstaffed by half and wasteful of taxpayers' money. It is a "paper mill" often gathering information which is not only inaccurate, misleading and useless, but also—in some instances—fabricated.

—Despite its vaunted national defense mission, the CIA is as much afflicted with empire builders as the most mundane federal agency. Ranking bureaucrats, playing a "numbers game" in collecting domestic intelligence, are more interested in quantity than quality of reports in order to justify hiring more employees to produce more reports, to expand their areas of responsibility.

—CIA "super grades" and high-level appointees maintain two sets of personnel files on employees who are thought to be "whistle blowers." One file is official, containing periodic fitness reports, and the other is secret, sometimes containing fabricated information. The clandestine "funny files" are used to control, harass and get rid of CIA employees who disagree or criticize their bosses.

Jordan's knowledge of the CIA's domestic operation comes from more than a quarter century of agency service in five Western cities.

Jordan, a Princeton University graduate, spent his CIA career publicly representing the agency in Los Angeles, Denver, Seattle, San Francisco and San Diego. He was deputy office chief in Denver, Seattle and San Francisco, and he had headed the San Diego office for more than three years and held a Civil Service rank of 14 when he was fired.

According to Jordan, the CIA's overt division for which he worked and the agency's covert group are "almost like two different organizations."

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CIA CALLED WASTEFUL, ELITIST

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For half of his career, he says he considered himself a "whistle blower," who tried to correct perceived faults in the CIA's domestic operations. The effort, he feels, cost him advancement and finally got him fired.

After Jordan's ouster became public, an aide to Adm. Turner said Jordan had been fired because of insubordination and because he would not believe old files on employees had been destroyed and no new ones were being kept.

Furthermore, the aide maintained, Jordan had become obsessed with demands that the heads of two operating CIA divisions be fired and that Jordan's work had suffered because he was "too busy campaigning."

Jordan describes the CIA's contentions as "totally false." He characterizes the agency's position as a "continuation of the coverup of wrongdoing and further damage to me for my opposition to wrongdoing."

His difficulties started, Jordan says, after he became appalled at what he considered abuses in the CIA's domestic operations and became a "whistle blower" to correct them with full realization that he was harming his career.

Under Executive Order 11905, signed by President Gerald R. Ford in 1976, the CIA has authority to collect foreign intelligence from cooperating domestic sources.

Jordan thinks the mission of gathering information from U.S. citizens who travel abroad or have foreign connections is valid, but he adds there are "very few Americans who can make a real contribution."

Nevertheless, Jordan says, CIA bureaucrats in the domestic collection division waste citizens' time needlessly in a "numbers game" and keep score with a computer.

"The problem with the system basically is that we have a quantitative approach to collection. Rather than rating people upon the value of the product they provide or the information they collect, it's run basically on how many intelligence reports a guy can write. It's almost a quota system," he said.

"So, what happens when your quota is a little low . . . The CIA guy will call up someone and say:

"Now, I understand you went to Cuba. Gee! we think you could provide some real valuable information on Cuba. Can I come out and see you?"

"And, actually the CIA man could know in advance that the chances of his learning anything of value is almost nil. That makes no difference. He'll go out and run through a lot of questions and write down the information regardless of whether it has any value or not because he has to have a report.

"It's a paper mill. The bad aspects of that are, one, you get a lot of useless information. You get some that is totally inaccurate, which misleads the analyst who is supposed to come up with an estimate on whatever it is they are working on.

"It results in pressure on U.S. citizens to take the time to sit down and talk to these people who are wandering around the countryside collecting information."

Sometimes, according to Jordan, an agent intent on meeting a quota may embellish an unproductive interview so much that it is really a fabrication.

"I've been just appalled at how indifferent some high-level officers are to this fabrication: 'OK, so some of it is made up, so what? There are lots of other reports that will correct it, maybe. So it really doesn't hurt. It is making us more reports. It will increase our budget. We'll get a few more people.'"

Jordan says he got in trouble with his bosses for refusing to play the "numbers game."

"This is where pressure was brought to bear on me to embellish because I wasn't meeting my quota, and I told them to go to hell."

Jordan thinks his refusal to meet a quota, along with his criticism of "flaws in the domestic operation," made him a victim of a secret file system.

"Now what this amounts to is that—on some employees anyway—they keep two sets of books," he says. "One is the official record of your performance, and that's supposed to decide promotions and so on."

But, Jordan said, a CIA employe with a good official record and a clandestine file marking him a "troublemaker" will not get promoted and never know why.

The "funny files" are kept at the top levels among the super civil service grades 16, 17 and 18 and appointed professionals above those levels, Jordan says. He charges that one of his superiors actively used the system against him.

"I denounced him for it," he says. "The inspector general extracted a promise from my boss he wouldn't do it anymore, but he kept right on."

Jordan says he obtained part of the information in his secret file through the Freedom of Information Act and found part of the material had been fabricated.

One of the things I was accused of was what, in effect, amounted to insubordination and to sending classified information to a person outside the agency. The incident was totally fabricated," he said.

He said the men who run the agency have an elitist mentality. Many of them view the agency as sort of a

group apart: "We are just a little better than anybody else in government."

"The top level guys, I think, feel it's their prerogative to say any damn thing they want to: 'The regulations don't mean anything to me. I don't have to follow regulations.'"

Jordan believes there is "no difference" between the pre-1975 and post-1975 CIA despite Congress' investigation because the thinking "hasn't changed a bit."

"Now, they give lip service: 'Oh, yes, we're going to abide by the law, and we won't do this and we won't do that.' And probably for awhile the effects of the investigation will have a salutary effect. But, they haven't changed their thinking a bit. They're just furious because they got caught."

"Again, this elitist attitude holds. 'Okay, we know what's best in national security and all those idiots in the general public, the unwashed masses, we know better. If we think something's good for national security, we will do it. And if we have to get up and lie like hell to Congress, that's fine.'"

Jordan recalls that when Richard Helms was CIA director in 1971 he ordered preparation of a fact book for use by the agency's public representatives and classified it confidential.

One of the points stressed in the book was the question of assassinations.

"It said, 'This is one canard that we must lay to rest: the idea that the agency would ever contemplate assassination. There have been rumors about this, and they are totally unfounded, and if anybody brings up the subject, just emphasize that this is a terrible false accusation.'"

Adds Jordan, "We know what utter . . . that is now. It's come to light, you know."

Jordan went public with his criticism of the agency with release to the media of a Nov. 15 telegram sent to CIA Director Turner. In it, he noted that in compliance with CIA regulation HR 7-1 (6) requiring employes to report possible wrongdoing he had—earlier this year—notification of the agency's inspector general of "possible illegalities and other senior malfeasance."

"As has happened before," Jordan said, "the inspector general covered up the problems I reported and penalized me for raising the issue. I then attempted to bring to your (Turner's) attention the wrongdoing, including the in-

spector general coverup. You assigned the case to one of your special assistants.

"I submitted to him in August, 1977, a memorandum including some of my charges, supporting evidence and offered to supply additional information."

"Three months have elapsed and my memorandum has not even been acknowledged."

As a result of his experience, Jordan said he could only conclude that HR 7-1 (6), product of the 1975 investigation of the CIA, is "rank hypocrisy, since any employe who complies with the regulation faces severe reprisals including possible dismissal."