

# Envoy Recall Angers U.S. Athens Staff

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ATHENS, Sept. 15—The departure of Ambassador Henry Tasca in diplomatic disgrace this week has embittered members of the U.S. embassy and intelligence communities here.

Embassy staff and Central Intelligence Agency members who felt close to the controversial Tasca see his removal by the State Department as part of an effort to shift the blame for the sharp deterioration of Greek-American relations from Washington to the field.

Diplomats who previously seemed to idolize Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger are privately expressing to friends a strong new bitterness toward their chief and his top lieutenants over their handling of the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis.

Tasca's unceremonious recall to Washington and leaks to the Washington press corps detailing the alleged unresponsiveness of Tasca and the CIA here to directives from Washington have given rise to the scapegoat theory.

The behind-the-scenes dispute centers on American actions just prior to and after the Greek-backed coup that deposed Cyprus' president, Archbishop Makarios, on July 15, triggering the Turkish invasion of the island five days later.

Some U.S. officials in Greece are especially incensed by newspaper accounts from Washington that portray Kissinger and his chief deputy, Joseph J. Sisco, in a favorable light, while suggesting that Tasca and the local CIA, which acted as the embassy's liaison with the now-toppled Greek junta, did not act on orders to head off the coup.

The CIA's version of what happened in July is still shrouded by the secrecy that covers the agency's work. But Americans and Greeks int-

imately involved in those crucial days have confided to friends, and it is possible to put together from authoritative sources an intelligence community version of the pre-coup activity.

This version establishes the coup as having been planned and carried out almost entirely by Brig. Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides, the dominant figure of the junta, and Greek army officers on Cyprus. Ioannides' mishandling of the coup and his failure to tell other officers on the junta about it destroyed his authority and led to the junta's collapse after the Turkish invasion, according to this account.

It also maintains that Ioannides artfully deceived the CIA about the coup. The agency is apparently prepared to accept the responsibility for a major intelligence failure, but not for playing any role in the coup or for failing to respond adequately to warnings from Washington.

The agency reportedly was aware that the junta had had a plan for deposing Makarios in readiness since it seized power in 1967.

New warnings were raised in June after Makarios demanded that the junta withdraw 650 Greek army officers stationed on the island, and on June 19, according to this ac-

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count, Ioannides personally informed a CIA liaison officer that he was considering moving against the archbishop.

But he reportedly stressed that he had not come to a decision. Ioannides is said to have discounted the chances of strong Turkish reaction to Makarios' projected downfall, and added that he was sound-out the Turkish military command on this.

On July 4, at Tasca's embassy Independence Day celebration, the agency was reportedly informed by a Greek liaison officer speaking for Ioannides that the general had "almost decided against" any move against Makarios. On July 11, Ioannides is said to have personally informed an agency member that he had decided "to cut the bastard loose," i.e., to withdraw the officers and let Makarios sink or swim on his own.

The agency is said to have accepted these assurances and was reportedly caught by surprise when the coup occurred. Also surprised, according to this account, was the Greek general staff. Other junta members were shocked and dismayed when they learned that the coup was in progress on the morning of July 15.

In the aftermath of the coup and the junta's decision to turn over power to a civilian government, Tasca and the embassy were repeatedly ignored by Washington.

Kissinger secretly issued an invitation to new premier Constantine Karamanlis to visit the United States to discuss the crisis without consulting or informing the embassy, according to American diplomatic sources.

The Greeks disclosed the invitation and their pointed rejection of it at the same time. American diplomats now say this was a predictable response that could and should have been avoided, since relations were already declining rapidly.

"Many of us here can see the reasons behind Kissinger's policy toward Greece during

this period and don't really disagree with it," one intelligence analyst here told a friend. "But there were certainly palliatives that could have been used. Sometimes we seemed to be deliberately antagonizing the Greeks."

"Kissinger seemed much more comfortable with the military government than Tasca ever did," said a member of Tasca's staff, "although the ambassador always took the rap for our closeness to the junta. He does feel that he has been shafted."

The Greeks do not seem to have been pacified by the appointment of Jack Kubisch as Tasca's replacement. The Greek press has said that Kubisch comes "from the same barrel of smelly sardines" as Tasca.