not think in terms of new large schools; in any case it is going to cost some $4 million simply to put the existing buildings in order. There is also a shortage of teachers. By 1970 some 170,000 will have to be trained, either to add to or to replace the present force of 300,000, but present facilities are not up to it, and at the moment there's a freeze on developing new ones.

Brian Wenham

Containing Central Intelligence

by Harry Howe Ransom

On January 22, 1946, President Truman by Executive Order created the Central Intelligence Group, which in the following year became the CIA by act of Congress. American taxpayers spend at least $500 million a year on the Agency, knowing very little about what their money buys or how far the CIA has strayed from the original intent of Congress. At the start, neither Congress nor the President intended the Agency to become a major symbol of the US abroad or a rival of the State Department. As Mr. Truman recalled in December, 1963: "I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peace-time cloak-and-dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role that it is being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue and a subject for Cold War enemy propaganda."

Mr. Truman did not mention that it was during his Administration that the CIA was transformed from a "quiet intelligence arm" into one capable of secret operations overseas. That the CIA has gone far beyond its originators' intent and has earned America a growing reputation as a blundering, crass, reactionary world power is not simply the consequence of bureaucratic empire-building. It stems from the extremely ambitious and radically new national objectives expressed in the Truman Doctrine, as well as lack of precision about the Agency's purpose and organization. From 1947 on, the United States undertook, in Truman's words, "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." To combat outside pressures, the US tried to develop overnight a secret arm. No problem has plagued us more than how to organize the foreign policy instruments to implement the Truman Doctrine and subsequent commitments abroad. And no agency among the many created has caused more trouble than the CIA.

There is no need to recite the familiar list of failures and "successes" in political warfare. When the CIA has "won," it has often been no more than a victory for the status quo, often the propping up of an inadequate foreign government. The CIA may have been "successful" in its interventions in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and the Dominican Republic in 1965, but these have been negative "victories." The crisis of the CIA clearly came to a head with the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion plan in 1961. The "lessons" of this tragic episode have been frequently noted; yet grave doubts persist as to whether they have been properly applied.

That the CIA feels beleaguered is indicated by its apparent attempt to silence its critics, to quietly suggest that to criticize the Agency is to parrot the Communist line. Four years ago, Allen Dulles publicly attacked Andrew Tully's book, CIA: The Inside Story, as containing "a good deal of material pulled from far leftist sources." Dulles implied that critics of the CIA end up "quoting Communist propaganda, sometimes maybe [sic] without knowing what they were doing." It is one thing to cite errors of fact or judgment in a book; it is quite another for the head of the CIA to attack in this manner a respected journalist without telling us where his facts were wrong. In recent months CIA officials have circulated among a select and powerful few on Capitol Hill, documentary evidence of how Soviet Russia maintains a special "Department of Disinformation" whose function is to discredit the CIA and other American agencies, including the US Information Agency and the FBI. The Soviets, says the CIA, do this in part by circulating or planting outright forgeries or by reprinting from respectable American sources material reflecting unfavorably on the Agency.

The Soviet Union may wish to discredit it, but the CIA has succeeded in gaining a bad name on its own. Foreign service officers overseas refer to some CIA personnel as "spooks," tend to be annoyed by their presence, doubtful about their competence and envious of their apparent affluence. The Pentagon doesn't completely trust it and has gone a long distance in setting up its own partly competitive intelligence arm in the
Defense Intelligence Agency. On Capitol Hill, except among a tiny group (mainly Southern Democrats and Republicans) privy to some of the CIA's secrets, references to the CIA are frequently accompanied by laughter. In academic circles, professors advise their best students to avoid employment with the Agency, advice which is sometimes ignored. The CIA has long been a target of disrespect of both liberals and conservatives, of "McCarthyites" and members of the ADA. At least, the Agency has a public-relations problem.

As originally set up, the CIA was patterned along the lines of the wartime Office of Strategic Services. It was to be the central coordinator of all foreign information for the President and the National Security Council. It did not replace the Armed Services, the State Department and other intelligence units, but was to perform those functions best performed centrally.

Eventually four major tasks came to be gathered under the CIA roof: (1) research and analysis and the production of the "national intelligence estimate," (2) foreign espionage, (3) counterespionage overseas, and (4) a variety of foreign secret functions best termed political warfare. Merger of these disparate services, not all of them primarily "intelligence" functions evolved gradually in pursuit of the ambitious objectives of the Truman Doctrine and from Communist surprises, such as the Czechoslovakian coup in 1948 and the start of the Korean War in 1950. Allen Dulles came to Washington in 1951 to oversee, as Deputy Director, the formation of the "Plans Division" of the CIA, which became responsible for overseas espionage, counterespionage and secret political action. Here was where the Bay of Pigs plan originated.

Strictly construing the CIA's legislative charter, one might argue that it is violating its statutory mandate assigning to it only functions related to "intelligence" matters. For it takes a very loose definition of intelligence to accommodate many of the activities the CIA has engaged in during the past 15 years. There is at least a firm ground here for Congress to reopen the question of the CIA's proper functions. Was it not, for example, a basic mistake from the start to combine such disparate duties as research and analysis, overseas espionage, counterespionage, clandestine political action as well as paramilitary, counterrevolutionary missions?

The organization and management of the CIA have been the subject of six major governmental studies. One of the most thorough was that of a Hoover Commission task force in 1955, headed by General Mark Clark. Its public report noted the CIA's freedom from outside surveillance of operations and fiscal accounts.

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"There is always the danger," said the report, "that such freedom from restraints could inspire laxity and abuses which might prove costly to the American people." The Clark task force recommended both congressional and Presidential watchdogs. Congress failed to follow this advice. A Presidential board of outside consultants was created, but over the years it has appeared to function more as a polite alumni visiting committee than as a vigorous watchdog.

Shake-up at the CIA

After the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy ordered a special investigation of the invasion's failure. The investigators included Robert F. Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor, but in a strange ceremony of self-investigation it also included Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleigh Burke. The aftermath was a thorough, if delayed, shake-up of the CIA leadership. President Kennedy tightened up review procedures over the CIA, instructing his aides, particularly McGeorge Bundy, to review more closely proposed CIA operations. Kennedy also transferred primary responsibility for any future paramilitary operations from the CIA to the Pentagon. But the Agency retained and still retains, to the disappointment of many observers, operating responsibility for espionage, counterespionage overseas and covert political action.

Shortly before his death, President Kennedy had denied that the CIA was operating independently overseas. Referring to Vietnam, he stated bluntly that the CIA was operating "under my instructions." At about the same time a squabble developed among the military, the State Department and the Agency, and Ambassador Lodge ordered home the pro-Diem CIA "station chief," John Richardson. Although Kennedy had voted for a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence in an unsuccessful Senate move in 1956, he no longer favored such a proposal. He was, he said, "well satisfied" with existing controls. His true concern is revealed by the fact that a few days before his death he was in the process of creating a task force to survey the global intelligence and other secret operational activities of the United States, to improve coordination and efficiency. Like most previous studies, however, the intelligence community was again to investigate itself. The three-man task force represented only the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA. It remained for President Johnson to receive the report and no publicity was given it.

It is time for a full-scale public inquiry, covering all categories of government support, direct and indirect, for foreign intelligence and research. Focus should be upon the major intelligence agencies—CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and Department of State. But a hard look needs to be taken
the sponsor of research by such organizations as the Agency for International Development, the Armed Services, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and others.

The following items might be placed on the agenda of such an inquiry:

1. Organization — There is strength in the argument that espionage, counterespionage and clandestine political action overseas need to be under unified direction and control. But of questionable validity is the combining of all this with the massive research and analysis performed by an agency that can be called properly an intelligence agency. The present arrangement has made it impossible to maintain secrecy for that which ought to be secret; has made it difficult to recruit high-quality personnel for research and analysis; and has prompted serious duplication and conflict as one agent trips on another's cloak and dagger. Not only has a large and possibly duplicating Defense Intelligence Agency grown up in the Pentagon, but the FBI appears to be reasserting its claim for an overseas intelligence role, at least in Latin America, where it engaged in extensive operations in World War II.

2. Control — There are difficult problems about where best to place the intelligence function within the policy-making structure. But the most difficult problem involves the control by responsible political authority of espionage, counterespionage and political warfare overseas. Normally the State Department should have a veto in this regard.

Beyond a certain point the secret agent, whether spy, secret propagandist or guerrilla, cannot be controlled. Failure to understand this may in part explain the lack of effective coordination and control under the Eisenhower Administration. Under Kennedy, there was promise of stronger Presidential coordination and leadership. Yet the Bay of Pigs, the greatest public disaster to befall the CIA, revealed continuing weaknesses in concept, command and control. The State Department remained in the shadows, not exercising proper authority, while the Pentagon and the CIA were in the forefront, playing an ill-defined role. As Theodore Sorensen recalls, Kennedy felt that State had a "built-in inertia which deadened initiative and that its tendency toward excessive delay obscured determination." A question to probe is to what extent the "CIA problem" may be a State Department problem.

3. Cover — Secret warriors and intelligence agents must often shield their true identity, purpose and operations. What is the proper use of cover in a democratic society? One shocking example of how far the CIA has got into the habit of infiltrating other American overseas agencies for the purpose of "cover" is the Peace Corps. In the Corps' formative days, a deliberate and stout effort was required to forestall CIA attempts to infiltrate it. This threat was successfully resisted. But it is astounding that the CIA threat existed, in the face of Communist claims that the Peace Corps was no more than an espionage front.

How far should the CIA be allowed to go in using for cover the diplomatic service, foreign economic aid missions including university-operated technical assistance missions in foreign countries and other agencies? Equally serious questions are raised by the CIA's invasion of the domestic private sector, its secret use of foundations, universities, publishers and others for the Agency's purposes. Most universities undertaking government-financed defense research have done so openly.

Poisoning the Academic Wells

But that which only pretends to be open, or in which the true support is falsified, raises serious questions. Such camouflage can poison the academic wells, just as it can spoil the way for the American professor innocently seeking to gather data in scholarly research overseas. The Center for International Studies at MIT was at its founding financed in part by the Central Intelligence Agency. But its links to the CIA were not publicly revealed in 1951-52. It could be said that MIT was providing "cover" for the CIA. This kind of arrangement was abandoned by MIT after a few years. Yet one is forced to wonder what other academic research institutes, then or now, have provided "cover."

One of the greatest dangers of a Cold War mentality is that it tends to ape the adversary. Certainly our scholars, books, foundations, universities and others in the private sector must remain free of suspicion that they are available for use as "cover" by secret agencies. Hopefully we have not reached a point of no return.

4. Secrecy — The CIA Director is responsible "for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Even with secrecy oaths, binding after employment with the CIA, lie-detector tests as commonplace personnel routine and "top secret" labels profusely applied, the CIA has been patently unsuccessful in keeping its proper secrets. Combining under one roof, research and analysis and covert strategic services requires a blanket of secrecy over the entire Agency. The blanket has proved to be full of holes. One important reason for this has been a lack of respect for the Agency's efficiency among journalists, on Capitol Hill and in the State Department. Another reason may be found in Allen Dulles' lack of a passion for anonymity while CIA chief, particularly during Eisenhower's reign. More recent directors, John McCone and now Admiral William F. Raborn, have, commendably, gone about their job more quietly. Nevertheless, at a press conference in January, 1964, CIA spokesmen gave their estimates of Soviet economic growth rates to demonstrate that Russia was falling behind expectations. Why the CIA as the source? The Agency was,
at best, doing the job of (a) the White House, (b) the State Department or (c) the nation's propaganda agency.

America has worked out reasonably well the ground rules for civil-military relations. Popular novels and movies to the contrary, the military "man on horseback" (or piloting a B-52) poses no great contemporary threat to civilian higher authority. But the proper place and control of so-called intelligence agents and activities are problems not yet solved. Complacency or the unchecked rule of Parkinson's Law in this field can ruin us.

Radicals on the March

But Where to, and by What Route?

by Andrew Kopkind

Thirty thousand people marched in Washington to seek peace in Vietnam. They blazoned "peace" on banners, proclaimed it from platforms and demanded it in pamphlets. Whereupon, the Administration began to lay plans for the next escalation of the Vietnam conflict into a major war in Asia. No logical connection need be drawn between the two events; it remains that the protests of the last seven months - bearded or beardless - have been largely irrelevant to what official decisions are made.

There may have been some who came to Washington during the Thanksgiving weekend with hopes of influencing Vietnam policy. Few had them when they left. The older, respectable protesters who came out to demonstrate in the SANE march saw plainly enough that 30,000 voices, or votes, is not much of a bite out of President Johnson's consensus on the war. The students, who have been at the anti-war game since last spring, were reacting for the most part out of chronic anger. They had lost most illusions of their power a long time ago.

But there was more to the weekend than the Saturday march, and there were other consequences than despair. In the development of the radical politics of the last few years - the movement of civil rights workers, war protesters, students and organizers of the poor - the weekend was an informal first Party Congress of the "New Left." When it was clear that all the elements of the political left, both old and new, would be in town, events began to proliferate. There was a convention of more than a hundred national and local end-the-war organizations grouped under the loose National Coordinating Committee. So many members of the larger student groups were in town that they were able to hold their own caucuses and conferences. One day was spent discussing the possibilities of bringing the radical students and the older liberal reformers together for joint political action.

This broad encampment of the left was diffused in Negro churches, expensive hotels, under trees on the Mall and in scattered apartments all over Washington. And over all there was a mood of uncommon pessimism. The activities of the radicals have not been able to keep up with the evolution of their rhetoric. The civil rights effort, both South and North, has been stymied for months; there is no obvious strategy for integration of the Negro and white communities after the legal barriers are removed. The students find they have no workable program for effecting the changes, on campus or off, that their analysis tells them are necessary to broaden democratic participation; authority seems everywhere to be consolidating itself. The organizers in the ghettoes cannot move from the small victories to major alterations in political power; how can the leap be made from street and block organizations and the incorporation of a few poor people on anti-poverty boards to changing the political life of a city? Above all, the war protesters can do nothing to end the war.

It is almost impossible to exaggerate their concern with that war. The young people of "the movement" make no polite protest; they rage against the war because they see it as the embodiment of all they are fighting in American society. It is a product of "the system" from which they are alienated. It is a system which will not hear the voice of the poor in a world