# Taking The Cover Off

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The shadowy business of the Central Intelligence Agency, by its nature, demands secrecy. But in a finger-pointing, probe-conscious democracy there is constant pressure to lift the lid and have a look.

Scarcely a day — or a coup — goes by that someone, somewhere does not accuse the CIA of murder or kidnaping, or bombing or blackmail or bribery or masterminding this in Tanzania or bungling that in Singapore—all the while strewing American dollars hither and yon.

Since it is inherent in an intelligence apparatus not to confirm or deny anything, the claims, rumors and charges leave the public confused as to whether the agency is exceedingly good — or bad.

The fact that it cannot answer for itself makes the CIA fair game for the wildest of charges and only occasionally does this iceberg of espionage surface: such as the U2 flights over the Soviet Union and the Bay of Pigs invasion.

What the CIA does concerns not only the Kremlin. It also concerns a number of critics in the United States. To them the CIA has gone too far into areas of foreign policy, has gone too far into the woodwork to be properly monitored by the government it serves, has dealt low blows to our we-fight-fair-why-don't-the-others image.

Has it?

The CIA has many spies, few spokesmen. It doesn't talk. But a typical sampling of allegations which have been published in books and newspapers and which are part of the accepted picture of the CIA in many parts of the world provides such as the following:

Allegation 1:

—Two Syrians testified an American Embassy official offered them $2 million if they could deliver a Soviet naval patrol boat and its rockets to Cyprus. He was asked to leave the country. They were hanged.

Allegation 2:

—The CIA has rigged elections in Laos. And an American newsman said he saw Communist and CIA agents literally bumping into each other while visiting Congolese parliamentarians to buy votes during a crucial vote of confidence.

CIA agents adulterated a shipment of sugar aboard a Soviet freighter docked in Puerto Rico. The aim was to sour the Soviet sweet tooth on Cuban sugar. President John F. Kennedy became angered when he learned of it and the sugar thereupon was destroyed by a mysterious fire.

The activities of the CIA, in fact or myth, mark the great distance U.S. intelligence has come from simpler pre-cold war days.

As recently as 1929 then Secretary of State Henry Stimson disbanded the department's "Black Chamber" code-breaking operation saying, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Less than two decades before the U2 and the Samos spy satellites, the government was asking its citizenry to send in any postcards it might have of Pacific scenes to aid the war against Japan.

Just how much the United States may be spending on intelligence a year is anybody's guess. There are few estimates that go below $2 billion.

Who needs it?

The United States, says Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who adds that a "back alley war" is going on all over the world. To spurn its sordid, ruthless stealth runs the risk of falling victim to it.

"We cannot safely limit our response to the Communist strategy of take-over solely to those cases where we are invited in by a government," wrote former CIA chief Allen Dulles. "We ourselves must determine where and how to act."

The command of this line of defense hides behind unmarked, pastel-hued doors in a woods-encircled, king-size new building in Langley, Va., outside Washington. It is anonymous save for the carved inscription "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make ye free." No signs lead to CIA headquarters although its emblem, an eagle surrounded with the words "Central Intelligence Agency," is massively inlaid on the terrazo floor inside the front entrance.

Basically work at the CIA is divided in two. There is "plans" which handles the agents who do the cloak and the dagger work. Espionage provides less than 20 per cent of the CIA's intelligence.

The "intelligence" end concerns itself with everything from technical journals, field reports and foreign publications to monitoring radio broadcasts in more than 60 languages to the tune of 6 million words a day.

From all this the agency prepares periodic "national estimates," predicting future events around the world, and daily digests of intelligence reports which are seen by the President and the secretaries of state and defense — and the workaday printers who set them in type.

The CIA's concern is catholic: How did Mao look at the last peasant's parade, what is the latest in Soviet biological research, how many trains run through Minsk each day. "It's fine to know about trains," said an ex-agent. "It's better to have a plant in the Politburo."

The CIA man in the field may be rather openly attached to an embassy where he usually is the object of gossip, informed or otherwise. He may be underground or he may be a paid informer in the nation involved.

Such "plants" start at about $100 a month, in part it keeps them from acquiring more yachts, mistresses and gambling debts than their normal salary would allow.

The CIA recruits its agents from college campuses, tries to make career men and women of them and has had a high proportion of Ivy Leaguers. It wants the most normal, strongly motivated people available. Only one applicant in 10 is hired.

Once in the field, the agent may observe, spy or decide to act. If things in a given country look bad, he might say, "Let's support Gustavus Adolphus, hes a middle-of-the road guy." The agency then begins to plant propaganda, spend money, recruit support. But, the CIA reportedly points out, none of this can occur without approval of a policy agency in Washington outside the CIA.

This could be the U.S. Intelli-

# The Undercover Business

gence Board — USIB — composed of representatives of the various U.S. intelligence arms — CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, made up of the separate armed services intelligence branches; the FBI the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Security Council. Or it could come from the "Special Group", an ever-so-secret committee of the CIA director, the secretaries of defense and state and their deputies and a high presidential adviser, lately McGeorge Bundy.

The USIB oversees operations and coordinates the various reports for the President. Dissents by minority view holders are permitted. Very hush-hush decisions are made by the Special Group. It reportedly knew but the USIB did not, for instance, about the Bay of Pigs.

The CIA was formed in 1947 to bring the intelligence arms under one control. Has this been done and is there, indeed, control?

Some critics claim the CIA has been given authority over men and money far beyond any other U.S. agency. It has all but a blank check from the U.S. Congress. Its funds are hidden throughout the federal budget, presumably in the huge defense appropriations.

About 20 well established congressmen of the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services committees are privy to CIA acts and spending. These subcommittees meet periodically in secret, hopefully at least once a month, actually much less.

While these congressmen — and one woman, Sen. Margaret Chase Smith, R-Maine — decline to discuss the CIA, they echo Rep. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., of the House Armed Services Committee in saying: "I can tell you we get everything we ask for and more."

But, and it is not a small but, if the CIA provides all the answers, does it point out as well the proper questions?

"We try to inform the committees of anything with widespread repercussions" said a CIA officer. "I wouldn't be categorical and say they are told everything, but they are given as much as we can."

Few if any congressmen dispute the CIA's need for secrecy. Some feel — and strongly — that the agency should, however, be subject to more frequent and stringent congressional scrutiny, preferably a joint watchdog committee which would include representation from the committees on Foreign Affairs, which are not now included.

Ultimately, the problem of supervision of the CIA comes to the desk of the President because it is to him the agency ultimately reports. So there is yet another board — the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, created in 1956 at the prompting of the Hoover Commission.

"They (the FIAB) sit back and act as a hair shirt rather than try and run the agency," said one of its alumni. The FIAB tries to meet once a month for a day or so examining what the CIA did or did not do. Once a year it receives a comprehensive written report.

This watchdog's watchdog is composed of prominent men outside government such as Clark Clifford, former adviser to President Harry S. Truman; Gen. James Doolittle; Frank Pace, former secretary of the Army; Dr. Edwin Land, president of the Polaroid Co.; Robert Murphy, former undersecretary of state and Dr. William Langer, Harvard history professor.

The CIA boasts, off the record, of being as tight-fisted as it is tight-lipped. While the CIA director and field agents can distribute funds solely on their signatures, these vouchered moneys are checked to the last penny by the CIA's own auditors. Each station is on a budget. If it is not producing, the budget is gone over. The Special Group audits larger budgetary items. The Bureau of the Budget also has six men who know the CIA's finances intimately and has an examiner at Langley almost daily.

But there are critics who fear not that the CIA has overdrawn the Treasury but that it has overgrown its original territory which was to collect and interpret information. They claim the expanded scope of its works and the legacy of having had the two Dulles brothers operating so closely as heads of CIA and the State Department have left the agency too involved with actual policy making.