CIA

The eerie history of the Central Intelligence Agency, which is affecting the lives of 190,000,000 Americans and influencing . . . in secret . . . major decisions involving peace or war

The invisible government

BY DAVID WISE AND THOMAS B. ROSS

THERE are two governments in the United States today—one visible, the other invisible. The first is the government that citizens read about in their newspapers and children study in their civics books. The second, an invisible government, gathers intelligence, conducts espionage and plans and executes secret operations all over the globe.

The Central Intelligence Agency is at the heart of the Invisible Government. But that government also includes nine other agencies (the National Security Council, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation) and many individuals, units and agencies that outwardly appear to be a normal part of the conventional government. It even encompasses business firms and institutions that are seemingly private. To an extent that is only beginning to be perceived, this shadow government is shaping the lives of 190,000,000 Americans. Major decisions involving peace or war are taking place out of public view. An informed citizen might come to suspect that the foreign policy of the United States often works publicly in one direction, and covertly, through the Invisible Government, in just the opposite direction.

The intelligence network has grown into a massive, hidden apparatus that secretly employs about 200,000 people and spends several billion dollars a year. Because of its enormous size and pervasive secrecy, the Invisible Government has become the inevitable target of suspicion and criticism. It has been accused by some knowledgeable congressmen and other influential citizens, including former President Harry S. Truman, of conducting a foreign policy of its own and of meddling deeply in the affairs of other countries without Presidential authority.

The American people have not been in a position to assess these charges. They know virtually nothing about the Invisible Government. Its employment rolls are classified. Its activities are top-secret. Its budget is concealed in other appropriations. A handful of congressmen are supposed to be kept informed by the Invisible Government, but they know relatively little about how it works. Overseas, American ambassadors are supposed to have control over the Invisible Government's agents. But the agents maintain lines of communications and codes of their own, and the ambassadors' authority has been judged by a committee of the United States Senate to be a "polite fiction." At home, the intelligence men are directed by law to leave matters to the FBI. But the CIA has more than a score of offices in major cities throughout the United States, and it is deeply involved in domestic institutions—from broadcasting stations and a steamship company to universities.

The Invisible Government is also generally thought to be under the direct control of the National Security Council. But, in fact, many of the major decisions of the Invisible Government are never discussed in the National Security Council. They are handled by a small directorate of men known as "the Special Group," whose existence is unknown outside the innermost circle

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The CIA sent out engraved invitations when it laid the cornerstone of its "secret" headquarters

of the Invisible Government.

The Vice-President is by law a member of the National Security Council, but he does not participate in the decisions of the Special Group. Lyndon B. Johnson was not truly involved with the Invisible Government until he was sworn in as the 36th President of the United States. On November 23, 1963, during the first hour of his first full day in office, Johnson was taken by White House National Security Assistant McGeorge Bundy—who had been President John F. Kennedy's personal link with the Special Group—to the Situation Room, a restricted command post deep in the White House basement. There, surrounded by top-secret maps, electronic equipment and communications outlets, the new President was briefed by the head of the Invisible Government, John Alex McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and a member of the Special Group.

McCone took over as CIA Director from Allen Dulles in November, 1961. Through the large picture window of his immaculate private dining room atop the CIA's $46,000,000 hideaway in Langley, Va., he can watch deer and other wildlife gambol in the woodland below.

Appropriately, the CIA's concrete headquarters is invisible, an architectural diadem set in bucolic splendor in the middle of nowhere and modestly veiled by a thick screen of trees. In the State Department, which does not always love its brothers in the intelligence world, the CIA is often referred to as "those people out in the woods." The advantages of a rustic retreat were extolled by Allen Dulles, when he went before a House Appropriations Subcommittee in June, 1956, to seek funds for the CIA headquarters. His report said: "Located on a 125-acre tract forming an inconspicuous part of a larger 750-acre Government reservation, the Langley site was chosen as the one location, among many sites inspected in detail, most adequate for safeguarding the security of CIA's operations. . . . This site, with its isolation, topography and heavy forestation, permits both economical construction and an added measure of security safeguards. . . ."

Three years later, guests, in response to engraved invitations from Dulles, attended the cornerstone-laying ceremony. Col. Stanley Grogan, the CIA's public-information man at that time, handed out a press release. "The entire perimeter of the main part of the site is bounded by trees," it noted, "and very little of the building will be visible from the public highways." That the CIA could send out public invitations to a ceremonial at its hidden headquarters reflects a split personality that plagues the agency and occasionally makes it the butt of unkind jokes. Dichotomy pervades much of what the CIA does. It is simultaneously supersecret and not.

When Allen Dulles became Director in February, 1953, the CIA was housed in a ragged complex of buildings at 2430 E Street in the Foggy Bottom section of the capital. A sign out front proclaimed: "U.S. Government Printing Office." Once, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his brother Milton set out to visit Dulles. They were unable to find the place. Dulles thereupon investigated the secrecy policy. When he discovered that even guides on sightseeing buses were pointing out the buildings as "the CIA," he had the printing-office sign taken down and one that said "Central Intelligence Agency" put up.

After the CIA moved across the Potomac to its Langley home in 1961, the matter of secrecy still proved bothersome. Large green-and-white signs pointed the way to the CIA from the George Washington Memorial Parkway. Originally, they were erected to guide workmen to the site during construction. As he drove to and from work each day, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who lived in nearby McLean, Va., would pass the signs that trumpeted the way to the CIA. One day, they abruptly disappeared. In their place was only a small green-and-white marker reading "Parkway," with an arrow pointing

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along the highway, and "B.P.R.," with an arrow pointing to the CIA turnoff. "B.P.R." stands for Bureau of Public Roads, which really does have two buildings at Langley.

Despite the atmosphere of secrecy that surrounds the CIA headquarters, a Soviet KGB agent trying to find it would have no difficulty. He could drive to the nearest service station and ask for a map of Washington, which (like most road maps) clearly identifies the CIA site at Langley. The Russian spy could also make the trip for 44 cents on a public-transit bus, as do hundreds of the CIA's regular employees. A caller who asked the transit company for the schedule to Langley received this reply: "Going to CIA? Buses leave at 7:12 a.m., 7:46 a.m. and 8:16 a.m., and arrive at CIA 34 minutes later. Returning in the evening at 4:38 p.m., 5:08 p.m. and 5:40 p.m. Have a nice trip."

If the Soviet spy were a top "illegal," as the Russians call agents who have no embassy cover, he could check the Washington *Post* for a suitable base of operations. In March, 1963, for instance, the paper carried a large advertisement for the Broadfalls

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

Apartments in Falls Church, Va, headlined: "Convenient to CIA-Dulles Airport-Pentagon." Below the inviting headline, leaving nothing to chance, a map showed exactly how to get from the apartment house to the CIA. There is such a thing as an apartment house becoming *too* convenient to the CIA. Early in 1963, an enterprising realtor who owned 13 acres adjacent to CIA headquarters applied to the local zoning board for permission to build apartment houses on his land. With horror, the CIA learned that from the fourth or fifth floor, residents would be able, with a spyglass, to look right into McCone's picture window and read his classified documents. The agency then secretly ordered the Government's General Services Administration to buy up the land.

"Going to the CIA? Buses leave at 7:12 a.m., 7:46 a.m. and 8:16 a.m. Have a nice trip."

A visitor to CIA headquarters turns off at the "B.P.R." sign at Langley and soon comes to a ten-foot-high wire-mesh fence that surrounds the entire site. On the fence are various signs—none saying CIA. One reads: "U.S. Government Property for Official Business Only." Another says: "Cameras Prohibited." A third sign says: "No Trespassing." Beyond the gate is a guardhouse, but a visitor who appears to know where he is going is waved through without having to stop and show credentials. A sharp left, and the building, still half-hidden by the trees, comes into view. It is massive, grayish-white concrete, several stories high and cold in appearance. The windows are recessed, and those on the lower floors are barred with a heavy mesh. Off to the right of the main entrance, a separate domed structure housing a 500-seat auditorium gives an almost Martian atmosphere to the grounds. But what strikes the visitor most is the complete silence outside the building. It might be a hospital or a private sanitarium.

On the roof, there are special radio antennas, worth $50,000, a vital part of the CIA's own worldwide communications system. Deep inside the vast headquarters is a central control room, to which alarm systems throughout the building are wired. Three security incinerators, built at a cost of $105,000, gobble up classified wastepaper.

Once past the door, a visitor can get about as far as the inscription in marble on the left wall—"And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free. John VIII-XXXII"—before he is stopped by a guard. He is then directed to a reception room, where he signs in. A security escort takes him where he is going, waits until he is through, and escorts him back to the front door. There, just inside the airy lobby, a mammoth official seal with the words "Central Intelligence Agency" is set in the marble floor, with an eagle's head in the center. As he walks through the corridors, the visitor might notice that most of the doors to offices are closed and unmarked, giving the false impression of a virtually deserted building.

Like a battleship, the CIA's citadel is built in compartments. An employee in one office would not necessarily know what was happening a few feet away on the other side of the wall.

Among the special facilities is a $200,000 scientific laboratory, where the CIA perfects some of its miniaturized weapons, invisible inks, special explosives and other devices. One of the really spooky instruments at Langley is the CIA's electronic brain, which stores and retrieves the mountains of information that flow into headquarters. The CIA's library is split into four parts: a regular library of books and documents, special libraries that store biographic and industrial intelligence, a document center—and the electronic brain. The brain is called "WALNUT" and was developed especially for the CIA by IBM. A needed document is flashed in front of the viewer, by means of a photo-tape robot called "Intellofax." WALNUT and Intellofax, unlike humans, are infallible. Aside from the huge volume of classified data that pours into Langley, the agency collects 200,000 newspapers, books and other "open" material each month. The information is stored on 40,000,000 punch cards. When a CIA man wants a particular item—say a Castro speech or a top-secret report on Khrushchev's health—he feeds into WALNUT a list of key words, perhaps 25, about the subject. The brain finds the right microfilmed document and photographs it with ultraviolet light. The tiny photo is then projected on the viewing screens. This takes five seconds.

The CIA also has a special spy-fiction library, which it does not advertise. This collection contains thousands of past and current mystery and espionage stories. It should please the fans of such writers as Ian Fleming, Helen MacInnes and Eric Ambler to know that the CIA makes a point of keeping up with the latest tricks of their heroes.

CIA men and women lead a cloistered life. Intra-agency marriage is not unusual, the most notable recent groom being U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers. After his release by the Russians, Powers continued to work for the CIA at Langley. He was divorced from his wife Barbara, and on October 25, 1963, married Claudia Edwards Downey, 28, a divorcée and CIA psychologist. Mrs. Downey, mother of a seven-year-old girl, is said to have resigned to become Mrs. Powers.

In bygone years, CIA employees were barred from admitting where they worked. They usually managed to hint at it anyhow. Nowadays, overt employees are permitted to give the information—although not to a foreign national. Intelligence officers in the Clandestine Services, however, are not normally allowed to say they have a job with the CIA. Cover names are used even inside the CIA. "I don't know the names of everyone I deal with at the agency," one high official confided, "We often use pseudonyms in-house, in case a wire is tapped or a piece of paper gets into the wrong hands. And we never use real names in communications."

Many of the CIA's younger people are recruited off college campuses. At every large university, there is usually someone who serves

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secretly as the CIA's talent scout. At Yale, for example, during the late 1940's, it was "Skip" Walz, the crew coach. The college recruits are enrolled as CIA JOT's—Junior Officer Trainees.

When Sargent Shriver was organizing the Peace Corps, he realized that the new agency, with its thousands of young volunteers dispersed over the globe, could well look like an all-but-irresistible "cover" to the CIA. He was also aware that even one "spy" incident involving a volunteer might destroy the Corps, and privately proclaimed his determination to do everything he could to divorce it from even the faintest smell of intelligence work. One story circulating around the executive suite of the Peace Corps had the then Vice-President, Lyndon Johnson, advising Shriver, "Beware the three C's—communism, cuties and the CIA." Shriver went directly to President Kennedy to discuss the problem. "Jack Kennedy gave me his promise," Shriver later told a friend, "that there would be no CIA agents in the Peace Corps." Kennedy followed up this verbal assurance by issuing specific orders to the Director of the CIA to stay away from the Corps.

Of every 1,000 persons considered for CIA employment, 200 are selected to undergo security investigations. About 22 of the 200 are screened out because "they drink too much, talk too much, have relatives behind the Iron Curtain, which may make the applicants subject to foreign pressures...." What this boils down to is that 178 of every 1,000 applicants are accepted for CIA jobs.

Not all those who pass over these hurdles spend their time at CIA headquarters or on secret missions overseas. Although few Americans are aware of it, the CIA has offices in 20 cities throughout the country. The National Security Act of 1947 establishing the CIA stated that "the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement or internal-security functions." Since it was created to deal exclusively with foreign intelligence, the question might be raised why it has field offices across the nation. The answer CIA officials give is that the offices are needed to collect foreign intelligence domestically, principally from travelers returning from abroad.

The CIA's use of tourists and travelers to gather intelligence was clearly forecast in a memorandum that Allen Dulles submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1947, when it was considering the act establishing the agency. The memorandum is a public document. It concludes: "Because of its glamour and mystery, overemphasis is generally placed on what is called secret intelligence, namely, the intelligence that is obtained by secret means and by secret agents. During war, this form of intelligence takes on added importance, but in time of peace, the bulk of intelligence can be obtained through overt channels, through our diplomatic and consular missions and our military, naval and air attachés in the normal and proper course of their work. It can also be obtained through the world press, the radio and through the many thousands of Americans, business and professional men and American residents of foreign countries, who are naturally and normally brought in touch with what is going on in those countries. A proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by these overt, normal and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy. . . ."

Though it is not unusual for the CIA to contact Americans about to go behind the Iron Curtain as tourists, not all are approached, and many decline to get involved in high-risk amateur spying. Recently, a New York publishing executive and his wife were about to leave for a tour of Russia when a telephone call came from the CIA. Would the editor be willing to report any interesting conversations he had during his visit there? Would he turn over any interesting pictures he might take? The couple politely refused.

In addition to approaching legitimate tourists, the agency also plants its own sightseers behind the Iron Curtain, occasionally with disastrous results. On August 25, 1960, two Air Force veterans, Mark I. Kaminsky and Harvey C. Bennett, were arrested while touring the Soviet Union. Both men were proficient in Russian. Kaminsky, 28, taught Russian at Ann Arbor (Mich.) High School, and Bennett, 26, of Bath, Maine, had just graduated in Slavic studies from the University of California at Berkeley. Kaminsky was sentenced to seven years in prison by a court in Kiev. Then the Russians changed their minds and expelled the pair. They returned to the United States on October 20. At a press conference at Idlewild International Airport, Kaminsky denied any spying and said he had planned to write a book called *The Soviet Union Talks Peace While Preparing for War*. The two said they had traveled to Russia on grants of $2,000 each from the "Northcraft Educational Fund of Philadelphia." However, they were not able to describe the operations of the fund, which was not listed then or later in the Philadelphia telephone book, the National Education Association's file of foundations, *The Foundation Directory*, or any other standard reference list.

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Johnson reportedly told Shriver, "Beware the three C's—communism, cuties and the CIA."

In a similar case, in 1961, another American, Marvin William Makinen of Ashburnham, Mass., was arrested while touring Russia. Makinen, only 22, had studied chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania and had just completed a year as an exchange student at the Free University of West Berlin. He spoke fluent German and Finnish. He was arrested and sentenced to eight years after the Russians charged he took pictures of military installations in Kiev. They claimed he had confessed to spying. Makinen remained in Vladimir prison until October 12, 1963, when he was shipped back to the United States in a four-way trade. Makinen had little to say to reporters as he stepped off a BOAC airliner at Idlewild International Airport just after dawn. When he was asked about his imprisonment by the newspapermen, he replied in a low voice, "I guess it was mainly because of my confession."

Aside from tourist contact work, there have been many other types of activities centered at the CIA's 20 regional offices within the

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"What's so new about a war on poverty? I've been fighting one for years."

United States. In Miami and New York, the agency financed and directed Cuban refugee activities. In New York and Chicago, it probably conducts similar activities with Eastern European anti-Communist émigré groups. The CIA's domestic field offices are also useful in obtaining intelligence from business firms that have extensive foreign operations, and serve as a contact point with universities.

The relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and the universities is two-way—the agency secretly finances research programs at some universities; in turn, the universities help to recruit CIA personnel. There is evidence as well that the CIA subsidizes some foundations, a number of cultural groups and an important publishing house.

In most cases, in a particular city, the telephone directory lists a number for the Central Intelligence Agency under the "United States Government." But there is no address given for the CIA office. As at Langley, the switchboard girl doesn't answer "CIA." She simply repeats the number.

But the listed offices are only the beginning of the story. The CIA has other offices in some United States cities. In Miami, for example, in 1963, the agency not only had a Coral Gables number (HI 5-3658), but also operated as Zenith Technical Enterprises, Inc. This CIA cover firm was listed as follows in the 1963-64 telephone directory:

Zenith Technical Enterprises, Inc.
Univ of Miami South Campus Perrine
238-3311.

In true Ian Fleming fashion, the cover office had no precise address—the university South Campus is a big place. It can be revealed, however, without imperiling national security, that the cloak-and-dagger people have worked from Building 25. The CIA has also operated under at least three other commercial cover names in Miami—the Double-Chek Corporation, the Gibraltar Steamship Corporation and the Vanguard Service Corporation.

The point of all this is that the CIA is not simply an agency that gathers foreign intelligence for the United States in far-off corners of the globe. It is deeply involved in many diverse, clandestine activities right here in the United States, in at least 20 metropolitan areas. It can and does pop up in many guises and under many names. On university campuses and in the great urban centers of the United States, the foundation, the cultural committee, the émigré group, the Cuban exile organization, the foreign-affairs research center, the publishing house specializing in books on the Soviet Union, the freedom radio soliciting public contributions, the innocent-looking consulting firm—all may in reality be arms of the Invisible Government. And these examples are not idly chosen.

Whether this state of affairs was intended by Congress when it passed the National Security Act of 1947, or, indeed, whether Congress is even aware of these facts is another matter. Certainly, the vast majority of the American taxpayers are unaware of them.

Overseas, the CIA works principally under embassy cover and commercial cover. In several corners of the world, the agency operates what appear to be small business concerns that really are CIA covers. No subject is touchier to the CIA than the question of cover, for cover is the "cloak" in cloak and dagger, the professional intelligence man's *sine qua non*. In United States embassies around the globe, there is a restricted floor, or section, that houses the CIA mission. Each mission is headed by a station chief, with several intelligence officers reporting to him. These officers in turn recruit their own local "agents" to collect intelligence information.

The CIA personnel are listed as State Department or Foreign Service officers. This is their "cover." In many cases, the identity of the CIA station chief is quickly known to diplomats, newspapermen—and, of course, to his Soviet opposite numbers in the KGB and the GRU. In sharp contrast, British and Soviet secret-service mission chiefs are very seldom known. CIA agents below the level of station chief are generally less well known outside of the embassy. CIA operation under embassy cover is not something that the Government discusses or would be expected to confirm. Still, on occasion, references to it pop up in unexpected places.

On April 12, 1962, Navy Capt. Charles R. Clark, Jr., naval attaché in the American Embassy in Havana from 1957 to 1960, was being questioned at a hearing of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee by J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel.

MR. SOURWINE: Were there CIA people in the embassy?

CAPTAIN CLARK: Yes, sir. A considerable number.

MR. SOURWINE: Was their cover good?

CAPTAIN CLARK: I thought it was terrible. Everybody in town who had any interest in it knew who they were . . . their cover was so shallow that it was very easily seen through.

In 1963, the Russians ousted five Americans from the United States Embassy in Moscow in a sensational spy case. Oleg V. Penkovsky, deputy chief of the Soviet State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research, and very likely also a colonel in Soviet military intelligence, confessed passing 5,000 frames of miniature-camera film, containing classified information about Soviet rockets and other secrets, to American and British agents. The Russian version of the spy case, as it unfolded in *Pravda* and at the trial, was as follows:

Penkovsky would hide his information in a matchbox behind the radiator in the hallway of a Moscow apartment house at No. 5-6 Pushkin Street. He would mark a circle with charcoal on lamppost No. 35 near a bus stop on Kutusovsky Prospekt. The Russians said he would then telephone either Capt. Alexis H. Davison, assistant air attaché of the American Embassy, or Hugh Montgomery, the internal-security officer. He would put down the receiver without speaking. Davison would go to the lamppost. If he found the charcoal circle, it meant there was something ready to be picked up at the Pushkin Street drop. Richard C. Jacob, the embassy "archivist," would go to the radiator and retrieve the little package. When the information was picked up, the Americans would make a black smudge on the door of the fish department of a Moscow food store. Then Penkovsky would know the transfer had been accomplished. Although no less than 12

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A publishing house, a radio station, and some foundations may be arms of the Invisible Government

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"I just wonder if it has brought them happiness."

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Nixon wanted the Cuban invasion to take place before election day in November, 1960

American and British diplomats were linked, in one way or another, to this serious charge of espionage, London and Washington stayed exceedingly quiet about it.

On July 18, 1960, one of the most fascinating and controversial episodes in CIA history began when President Eisenhower sent similar telegrams to candidates Kennedy and Johnson, offering them "periodic briefings on the international scene from a responsible official in the Central Intelligence Agency . . . exclusively for your personal knowledge. . . ." They accepted the offer. On July 23, Allen Dulles, then Director of Central Intelligence, flew to Hyannis Port with two aides. In a two-and-a-half-hour conversation at the Kennedy summer home, Dulles briefed him on what the candidate described afterwards to reporters as "a good many serious problems around the world." Kennedy indicated that particular emphasis had been placed on Cuba and Africa.

On July 27, Dulles flew to the LBJ Ranch in Texas and remained overnight to brief Johnson. Dulles briefed Kennedy once more during the campaign, on September 19. A few days after this briefing, in a reply published on September 23 to a series of questions from the Scripps-Howard newspapers, Kennedy said: "The forces fighting for freedom in exile and in the mountains of Cuba should be sustained and assisted. . . ." Then, on October 6, in Cincinnati, Kennedy delivered his major speech on Cuba. "Hopefully," he said, "events may once again bring us an opportunity to bring our influence strongly to bear on behalf of the cause of freedom in Cuba."

These sentiments were making the Nixon forces increasingly edgy. Neither Richard M. Nixon nor his aides knew exactly how much, if anything, Kennedy knew about the secret invasion plan. They did not know if Dulles had told him about it. But they certainly did not want the Democratic candidate to benefit from an invasion that might be launched by a Republican President. The Republican candidate and his advisers wanted the CIA invasion to take place before the voters went to the polls on November 8. One of Nixon's top campaign

"I knew she'd be a good sport about it."

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Nixon misrepresented his own views about Cuba in 1960 to "protect" a covert CIA operation

aides later privately confirmed this. He explained that Nixon was hoping for the invasion before November 8, because "it would have been a cinch to win" the election if the Eisenhower Administration destroyed Fidel Castro in the closing days of the Presidential campaign. That was exactly what the Kennedy strategists hoped would *not* happen. They were receiving persistent, and disturbing, reports that some kind of Cuban exile operation was in the works. The reports of invasion training were picked up from a number of sources, including alert members of the press.

At one point, there had been discussion among Kennedy strategists of a speech by the candidate to anticipate the brewing invasion, and thereby neutralize its political effect. The idea of a formal speech was dropped, however, when investigation showed there was little possibility of launching an invasion before election day.

The Cuban issue was not, however, dropped completely. On October 20, the Kennedy and Nixon campaign trails crossed in New York City, where both candidates were preparing for their fourth and final televised debate the following night. That afternoon, newspapermen accompanying Kennedy were alerted for an important statement to be issued shortly. When it came, on the very last page appeared these key words: "We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista, democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus far, these fighters for freedom have had virtually no support from our Government."

At the Waldorf-Astoria, eight blocks away, the effect on Nixon was immediate and explosive. A year and a half later, in his book *Six Crises*, Nixon wrote that when he read Kennedy's Biltmore statement, "I got mad. . . ." Nixon said in his book that the "covert training of Cuban exiles . . ." by the CIA was due, "in substantial part at least, to my efforts," and that this ". . . had been adopted as a policy as a result of my direct support." Now, Nixon felt, Kennedy was trying to preempt a policy that the Vice-President claimed as his own.

Nixon wrote that he ordered Fred Seaton, Interior Secretary and a key campaign adviser, "to call the White House at once on the security line and find out whether or not Dulles had briefed Kennedy on the fact that for months the CIA had not only been supporting and assisting but actually training Cuban exiles for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself. Seaton reported back to me in half an hour. His answer: Kennedy had been briefed on this operation. . . ." Kennedy, Nixon wrote, was advocating "what was already the policy of the American Government—covertly—and Kennedy had been so informed. . . . Kennedy was endangering the security of the whole operation. . . . There was only one thing I could do. The covert operation had to be protected at all costs. I must not even suggest by implication that the United States was rendering aid to rebel forces in and out of Cuba. In fact, I must go to the other extreme: I must attack the Kennedy proposal to provide such aid as wrong and irresponsible because it would violate our treaty commitments."

The next night, during their fourth debate, Nixon hopped on the Kennedy proposal as "dangerously irresponsible."

On the night of October 22, in the crowded gymnasium at Muhlenberg College in Allentown, Pa., Nixon cut loose: "He [Kennedy] called for—and get this—the U.S. Government to support a revolution in Cuba, and I say that this is the most shockingly reckless proposal ever made in our history by a Presidential candidate during a campaign—and I'll tell you why . . . he comes up, as I pointed up, with the fantastic recommendation that the U.S. Government shall directly aid the anti-Castro forces both in and out of Cuba. . . . You know what this would mean? We would violate right off the bat five treaties with the American States, including the Treaty of Bogota of 1948. We would

also violate our solemn commitments to the United Nations. . . ."

By the time Kennedy reached Wisconsin the next day, he was feeling the heat of the Nixon attack. In North Carolina, Adlai E. Stevenson, campaigning for Kennedy, was alarmed at Kennedy's Cuba stand. Stevenson placed a long-distance call to Kennedy and warned him that the statement urging aid to the exiles could develop into a political trap for Kennedy if he were elected. Kennedy seemed embarrassed about the statement and told Stevenson he would pull back from it to a safer position.

Accordingly, Kennedy dispatched a telegram to Nixon that day in which he said he had "never advocated and I do not now advocate intervention in Cuba in violation of our treaty obligations. . . ." And he said no more about aiding Cuban exiles.

In March, 1962, when Nixon charged in his book that Kennedy had been briefed about the Cuban invasion and had deliberately endangered its security, the White House issued an immediate denial, which was backed up by Allen Dulles. The then Presidential press secretary, Pierre Salinger, said Kennedy "was not told before the election of 1960 of the training of troops outside of Cuba or of any plans for 'supporting an invasion of Cuba.' " Nixon's account was based on a "misunderstanding," Salinger stated. Dulles's campaign briefings, he added, had been general in nature. He said Kennedy was first informed of the Cuban operation on November 18, 1960, ten days after the election. Dulles, too, attributed Nixon's version to "an honest misunderstanding." "My briefings were intelligence briefings on the world situation," Dulles said. "They did not cover our own Government's plans or programs for action, overt or covert."

Exactly what was said during Dulles's briefings of Kennedy, Dulles's precise words when the question of Cuba arose—his nuances, his inflections—will never be known for certain, since the meeting was top-secret and unrecorded. But there is some evidence that Kennedy did not want to be briefed on operational matters—such as the Cuban invasion—because this might have limited his freedom of action.

In any event, Nixon's dispute with Kennedy and Dulles over who told what to whom missed the point. Regardless of the content of the CIA briefings, the Kennedy camp had learned informally from other sources that an exile invasion was hatching. Both candidates for the Presidency were allowing their campaign strategy and public positions to be influenced by a secret operation of the Invisible Government. The Invisible Government participated in the 1960 Presidential campaign. It was unseen, but it was there. END

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"Hereafter, let's each plan our own getaway, Butch."