pending in the House, to study U.S. intelligence commission, already approved by the Senate and The first step is establishment of a 17-member paring for a long second-look at the intelligence charter it approved in a climate of crisis in 1947. stunned CIA was in mid-sentence, Congress is pre-THE HOUR OF TRUTH has arrived for the Central Intelligence Agency. Three years after the Soviet Union dissolved while the By Thomas Powers Paces an Ax, but How Shar divide the existing agency differently
between a secret collecting and anaous failures in handling the case of Alpugnacious defense of the CIA. A widebut discontent is high with Woolsey's duct covert operations. spread sense that something is badly lyzing arm, and a separate body to condrich H. Ames, who has admitted spy wrong centers on the agency's numer-No consensus for reform yet exists VIEWPOINTS Newsday 一,其是并是有其有其正的時間,因此有有有有有有有有有有有 10/17/94 A25 **VIEWPOINTS**

commission's reassessment, the size of its budget, means: The agency in its current form is no longer sacred. What it will look like at the end of the needs and how they ought to be met. No one at the CIA has any doubt about what this even the name over the door — all are in question.

die-hard resistance to cutting its \$3-billion budget; plain dislike of the director, R. James Woolsey, by legislators, and a growing belief that without the Soviet Union to worry about, the CIA has nothing is an appetite for blood-letting in Washington, fueled by the embarrassment of the Ames Soviet to do. string of had intelligence estimates; the agency's "mole" case; a sex-bias suit by female employees; a Intelligence professionals fear the worst. There

ington for a new and improved intelligence service a second writes up intelligence estimates using inbreaking the CIA in half. Some favor one organizaand perhaps two. Critics for years have proposed formation from all sources. tion to engage in secret intelligence activities while Nor is there any lack of ideas circulating in Wash-Other tinkerers would

peared in the Los Angeles Times. Thomas Powers has written several books, including "The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA." This first ap-


> ing for Moscow between 1986 and his arrest earlier this year. The Soviets side British intelligence. War, but it is doubtful that any other tion of Kim Philby, the Soviet mole inlong a period, with the arguable excep-Soviet spy did as much damage, over so intelligence service during the Cold penetrated every other major Western

case, which criticized sharply a dozen completed a 400-page report on the mance. Last week, he demoted two top reprimands criticizing their perforagency officials, Woolsey issued official After the CIA's inspector general

times. Despite huge growth during the Reagan years, to a peak of more than 20,000 employees, the CIA failed to grasp what was survive unscathed — but even without it the CIA would have been facing hard visible gaffes no official agency could officers. The Ames case is one of those highly

Gorbachev happening to the Soviet Union under Mikhail S.

apparent that the CIA had for years been overestimating the size of its economy and underestimat-By the time the Soviet Union broke up, it was



on Moscow once the Soviet threat had disappeared ing the crushing burden of military spending, and that the agency did not know what to do with the thousands of analysts and covert operators focused When Woolsey took over in 1993, he inherited an **Continued on Next Page**

CIA Faces an Ax, but How Sharp?

Continued from Preceding Page

old agency, huge and set in its ways, with which to monitor a new world. He argued that the United States confronted new dangers — each far less threatening than the old Soviet Union, perhaps, but harder to watch in the aggregate. The implication was that the CIA couldn't function with less money and, in fact, needed more.

The lawmakers were put out. They had been cutting Pentagon dollars — spent in their home districts — and they were impatient with Woolsey's claim that the CIA alone should prosper in the post-Cold War world. It is probably the CIA's resistance to change that is most directly responsible for the plan to rethink U.S. intelligence with the help of a commission armed with a broad congressional mandate to put everything on the table.

The real source of the animosity toward the CIA is not bad public relations, intelligence estimates that miss the point or the failure to catch Ames in a timely manner. It is the Cold War itself — the accumulated resentments of a long, expensive, frightening and sometimes ugly struggle.

Is it really possible that the new commission on U.S. intelligence will dismember or abolish the CIA? This has routinely been the fate of intelligence organizations in the past. The CIA's World War II predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, was shut down and its functions scattered by President Harry Truman only two months after the surrender of Japan. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, its intelligence service was reorganized and renamed nine times before it resurfaced in its current form, as the Russian Intelligence Service. Many Soviet intelligence chiefs were not only removed from office, but shot. Woolsey need not fear a firing souad, but his job is in jeopardy; and it is hard to imagine how Les Aspin, the former secretary of defense who is expected to head the commission, would be content to spend 18 months simply redrawing the arrows on organizational charts. It is probably safe to predict that from Aspin's efforts there will emerge something different, something smaller and something with a new name.

But it remains to be seen whether these changes will be cosmetic or real. U.S. presidents have grown accustomed to instant information, not just satellite photos but the most intimate communications of foreign leaders. In crises, they want someone on the ground, as in Haiti. When a new face emerges in an important foreign government they want some background history, and they want it yesterday. When they want to send a genuinely secret message, they want somebody at hand who knows where the back doors are. Presidents will not want to surrender any of these capabilities, and congressional leaders will not force them to do it. What Congress wants is to pay less for them.

The best way to predict what the intelligence commission is likely to do in the end is to consider who will be the tenant of the CIA's huge headquarters in Langley, Va. The CIA's campus is not going to be returned to woodland, the building is not going to have a second life as a GSA furniture warehouse and the desks are not going to be empty. Sitting at every one of them, in fact, and answering every phone, will be someone in the intelligence business, whatever the name on the door.