

KINJU MORIKAWA: ... Concerning assassination teams, do you have any cases in which the assassination teams assassinated Saigon regime officers or other people under the cloak of the N.L.F. to arouse sentiment against the N.L.F.?

Yes, I do have knowledge of such type operations. It wasn't a widely known thing, but it was known; it was part of the C.I.A. program — I might add that it was at that time, now the assassination teams that are around today are not necessarily working on that basis, . . . but back in '63-'64, such was the case: assassinate an individual, and blame it on the N.L.F. I believe it was Senator Young of the United States government who also gave testimony to this, which he claimed he got directly from a C.I.A. officer in Vietnam.

HALIMI: *The cannister you are not familiar with?*

No, except by definition. It's not classified material, as far as I know. If I could add something about the M-16, concerning my testimony at the Levy trial. Specifically, what they were asking was the effect of a bullet from an M-16 on the human body.

Whether by design or not I have no way of knowing — as I was not one of the designers — the hitting effect of the M-16 rifle is essentially a circumvention of the law prohibiting the use of dum-dum bullets. The bullet is very small in diameter — .22 caliber — but very long proportionately to its diameter, and it has a shell casing on it which would look more at home on a 7.62 cartridge than it does on this little .22. Because of its length and because of its shape and because of the high velocity with which it travels through the air, when it strikes the body — whereas a 7.62 round, which is the standard NATO round, would continue through, essentially in a slanted direction — with the M-16 bullet, the bullet hits but does not have the tendency to penetrate, rather as it hits it tumbles. So in effect what we have now is a very big object trying to go through sideways. The effect of this, of course, is quite devastating. It's possible for a single bullet, if it hits a bone, to shatter that bone completely — one bullet now. If it hits a bone, let's say in your leg, the shock itself could kill you. It would not be necessary to kill a person in a vital area such as the heart. To give you an idea of its hitting effect, on one combat operation at a relatively close range, I hit a man in the chest with one of these. It literally picked him up and jured him back till he was stopped by a tree. He must have traveled about three or four feet off the ground and, of course, there was no chest left on the man. It was completely demolished. With a dum-dum bullet, which is an expanding bul

HALIMI: While working for our Tribunal, I heard strange revelations, and most of these deal with the penetration of the CIA into the Special Forces. I must say that the principal source of information is Captain Peter Bourne, who, as far as I know, is an apolitical doctor. He has explained objectively the role the CIA plays in the Special Forces in Vietnam, and it was especially the CIA who decided the location of the refugee camps, not according to military or to strategic criteria, but solely according to political criteria. On the other hand, Mr. Robin Moore, who defended this viewpoint, answered very peremptorily that the CIA was in the Special Forces. That throughout the world where Special Forces are found, it [CIA] takes men from the Special Forces, uses them, and puts them back into uniform. Questioned on the extent of this penetration, Robin Moore said, (I think this is his exact phrase) "They are all over the world." He even gave details of the penetration of the Army of Peru, of the Tenth Group of Special Forces at Battols in Germany, and I believe that the only exception he agreed to make was Mexico. He said, "I am not sure whether we have this form of organization in Mexico." So the question I would like to ask you, and this is my last question, could you explain to the Tribunal what are the official ties between the CIA and the Special Forces? Would you first describe the connections between the CIA and the Special Forces in Vietnam?

Yes, I testified, I believe it was this morning, that the whole C.I.D.G. program from the time of conception was a C.I.A. operation, and Special Forces was the operation arm of the C.I.A. in running the C.I.D.G. camps. This is one aspect. This would be an overt operation. Within Vietnam, and this is especially true when Special Forces first went there, many of the Special Forces men traveled in civilian clothes, out of uniform. They entered the country on civilian passports and were working directly with and for the Agency. However, they were still in Special Forces, still being paid by Special Forces. This would be a covert operation within Special Forces itself. This was a means of again circumventing the Geneva Agreements. At that time the number of American soldiers in Vietnam was restricted by the Agreements and this was a way to have them in the country doing the job and being able to say they were not soldiers.

Now in the operation I was on, Project Delta, we worked very closely with the C.I.A. We coordinated operations. We exchanged equipment: communications equipment, radio equipment. Project Delta . . . was initiated for the initial purpose of infiltrating Laos, and of course we would have to cooperate or coordinate with the Central Intelligence Agency, essentially because they already had people in Laos and were we to go in there without coordination we might have compromised

their operation. In other words, we could have jumped people in on top of their people. Their teams were called "Hardnose" teams at that time in Laos. There is another operation called SOG [Special Operations Group]. Its main base is at Bien Hoa, and they have forward operational bases at Kai Sahn [Khe Sanh], Da Nang and a new camp just south of Da Nang. . . . This particular operation, in 1964, was for the purpose of infiltrating teams into North Vietnam, north of the 17th parallel. This was more or less a continuation of a program started quite a while back by Colonel Lansdale, who was the head of the C.I.A. at that time in Vietnam. The training, the direct training of the people on these teams was done by Special Forces personnel, who were put on detached duty to the C.I.A. for that purpose.

The Project Delta itself branched out and had a satellite organization called Project Omega — again both a combined military and C.I.A. operation. Project Omega was formed and its primary duties are to infiltrate teams into Cambodia. Complementary with that they have a similar operation in Thailand for infiltrating Cambodia from that border. They also infiltrate people into Laos from Thailand, again a combined C.I.A. and military operation. Most of the funds for these operations came from C.I.A. . . .

And I have already discussed the strike force operation and the assassination teams. Now this is a little different. The man is taken out of Special Forces, and it would amount essentially to a reassignment within the government. He would no longer be drawing his pay from Special Forces, he would be drawing it directly from the Agency. Special Forces then are both in covert and overt operations with the CIA, but still within Special Forces, and they are detached and reassigned directly to CIA, and then often after that particular mission is completed they will come back to Special Forces. Training for the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba was done this way. The men were taken from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and sent to Latin America for training the Cuban invaders, and when that operation was over these people came back to Special Forces.

remained set up until 1964, a C.I.A. program. The CIA having come up with the idea, of course, did not have the field personnel to conduct the program in the field. Special Forces, then, were made available to the CIA for this purpose, of running it in the field. All the funds, the money for the program, came from CIA sources, directly or indirectly. Another purpose of the CIDG program was to try to set up intelligence nets throughout the countryside emanating from these camps. Again the funds, the money for the agents, came from CIA sources.

HALIMI: Mr. Robin Moore said, in his testimony during the Levy trial, and reconfirmed it when he spoke to me, that there existed "assassination teams." He told me that Americans trained and paid Vietnamese for them. He said, for example, that the assassination teams passed out black cards with white eyes on them, designed to frighten the enemy. Can you tell the Tribunal first, exactly what the assassination teams were; and second, what was their relationship to the American forces and especially the C.I.A., and third, the methods used by these teams?

The assassination teams, as they were called, grew out of Project Delta, which was the program I helped start over there. Men who had worked with Delta were detached, and helped to train these assassination teams under the auspices of the C.I.A. They are organized as part of the overall organization — what they call the Rural Revolutionary Development Team, part of the pacification program in the southern zone. In 1965 it was decided that something had to be done to break up the infrastructure within the villages in the southern zone. In other words, defeating the armed forces of the National Liberation Front on the battlefield, essentially, was not going to accomplish too much if in fact all they did was retreat back in the villages and consolidate its infrastructure. Possibly for the first time there was tacit admission of the success of the National Liberation Front within the villages, because it was declared, at the time, that the way to work in the village was to use the same methods that we claimed the National Liberation Front was using.

In other words, to use the same instruments. It was realized of course, that Americans themselves could not implement this program. It would have to be Vietnamese. So Americans were detached from Special Forces Units to train the Revolutionary Development Cadres. After encircling a village, and making it secure from outside influence, they would go in there, and use psychological methods, and reeducate the people. It was realized, even in the planning stages, that there would be intransigence on the part of the people and there would be those within each village, very determined to see this plan not work. The idea was to find out who these people were and try to remove them from the village and imprison them, or, if that was not possi-

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ble to do without upsetting the village (in other words, they might be respected members of the village and people would rebel if you took them out) there was always the method of removal by assassination. Provisions were made to train assassination teams. The methods they used are unlimited. There are a large number of ways to kill people. The training, the support, the transport and the weaponry of these teams are controlled by Americans. There are Vietnamese counterparts involved. When it was first announced that we were going to use these new methods, we talked about the Revolutionary Village Development Cadre. The American military didn't speak about the assassination teams. It was said at the time it was run by the C.I.A. It was in our own newspapers. The rationale for this — why the C.I.A. and not some branch of the military was in charge — was that the C.I.A. had men in the field, on the place, and that they had the organization ready to go. As a matter of fact, this is much like the C.I.D.G. program when it first started. The fact is that with the C.I.A. there is no accounting for what they do, or the money they spend or where they get their money.

So it can be a rather clandestine operation. Had it been just the Revolutionary Development Cadre going in to reeducate people, there would have been no need for clandestine methods. Since the assassination teams were part of this, the C.I.A. was brought in. The white card that you referred to was a form of psychological warfare. In the initial stages, each time somebody was assassinated, a calling card would be left which varied from area to area. One of these calling cards was a card with a white eye on it. The plan was that in the future you wouldn't have to assassinate the people, leaving a card would be sufficient to stop them from trying to do what they were trying to do. Variations of this are used in other countries where Special Forces operate, in Guatemala specifically. In Guatemala, they use a black hand. You leave it as a little calling card to warn the people not to help the guerrillas.