

WxPost/CIA/ Domestic Intelligence: Marilyn Berger's 1/1/75 "Angleton Move May Hit Israel"  
jump head (p. 1 subhead "Israel May Feel Impact." HW 1/1/75

While for other purposes whether this story idea originated with Berger or the Post of her/its sources would be material, for the following comment it is not relevant.

Her talk-show appearances after she returned from China identify her as still a cold warrior, probably of social-democratic belief.

The thrust of this story is that the firing of Angleton may be hurtful to Israel because Angleton and Israeli intelligence had worked out a by-pass of "established channels" and because Israeli intelligence is so good.

For this to be true, there would have to be what she does not say, an input to Israel from the CIA and via Angleton alone. If this had been the case, then there would be no point in not saying it because it will be read in by other intelligence services, including Arab. And if it had been the case, there is absolutely no reason why any other professional in Angleton's slot could not perform the same function. Where it could benefit Israel, by giving to Israel, a Mongolian idiot from Mecca would serve as well as Angleton.

A fundamental factual error is relevant, really basic, in consideration of ~~whether~~ whether the converse, that the Angleton firing could hurt the U.S., is or could be true. She concludes what amounts to a defense of both Angleton and the CIA by saying that despite his obvious political bias (far-right) "he dealt only with raw intelligence and did not participate in drawing up the national intelligence estimates on which policy is based." This is entirely false. The only possible correct <sup>rule</sup> formation is that he did not, personally, draw these estimates up. He did "participate" by being first of all a source of intelligence, then an initial filter (after those below him also filtered), then a censor of what is put into channels, and in the analyses he prepared or had prepared and then went over himself. And, of course, there is no possibility of separating belief from intelligence analyses because belief dominates what is seen and perceived and understood and interpreted and then written, even if one does not permit belief to interfere with reporting. The national intelligence estimates used to work upward, not downward, and there is no reason to believe this has changed in any way. Or could.

Berger has to know this. Any Washington political reporter has to know it. So does the national desk have to know it. The question why the gross error that amounts to a defense of the indefensible?

The whole thing is doctrinally wrong, too. The departure of Angleton can have significance only if it signals a change of policy. In this case the reason obviously has nothing to do with policy toward Israel. However, there may be a change imminent if not already started, toward Israel. Then this kind of <sup>story</sup> tends to blame, for those who will not approve a change in policy, those other than the ones who cause changes in policy. Not Ford or Kissinger, for example, but the protest over domestic wrong-doing by the spooks, who were doing wrong to those Berger doesn't like, perhaps? The departure of Angleton can't influence what the Israelis were willing to give CIA either because they know very well that what he got was not for him alone. What he got was for CIA use and the government's. To this his presence or absence is immaterial because if the Israelis did not trust his subordinates or his successor, they would have no trouble working out another "bypass." The same people would then get the same intelligence only by a different channel.

I think she also errs in assuming that what the Israelis would give would be only "raw intelligence" that would then be kept as "raw intelligence" by Angleton. The latter for sure. The Israelis would not be giving copies of their own raw intelligence. They would not disclose agents' identifications or sources, etc. They would give an analysis or a summary or a paraphrase or, more likely, a combination and probably from more than one source.

Taken with the continuing Post downplay of the whole story, which continues, this kind of story and this kind of error raise questions about the Post's policy at the least. It is in the position of defending the CIA when it is under proper criticism, the kind of criticism the Post has made of the FBI, for example, where the FBI could claim jurisdiction.

# Firing of Angleton

## Israel May Feel Impact

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

The forced resignation of James Angleton over allegations of illegal domestic Central Intelligence Agency operations may have an important impact on the agency's counter espionage and foreign intelligence operations, especially as they relate to Israel, informed sources said yesterday.

Angleton, who headed the CIA's counterintelligence division, personally handled exchanges of information with Israel, bypassing the established channels, a former intelligence officer confirmed yesterday.

Normally, counterespionage and intelligence information is sent from a regional desk at CIA to the ambassador and the agency station chief in a

given country. These officials keep local intelligence services informed of intelligence relating to the security of that country. In many cases, the information involves threats of foreign subversion.

For a number of reasons, however, Israel was treated apart from the Middle East regional desk, and Angleton personally served as liaison with Israeli intelligence services.

Informed sources said this was partly due to the fact that Israel has an excellent counterintelligence service and had much information to share. Second, a former intelligence official said, there is a great deal of hostility in the world towards Israel and the agency

See ANGLETON, A3, Col. 1

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ANGLETON, From A1

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It has also been suggested that Angleton had a pro-Israeli bias, partly because he, as a staunch anti-Communist, looked upon Israel as a bastion against Soviet incursions in the Middle East. For this reason, he wanted to keep Israel separated from the CIA Middle East desk, which is largely staffed by Arabists who, by training and inclination, tend to favor the Arab viewpoint.

Although Israel may be expected to feel the first impact of the Angleton departure, intelligence sources said, there is bound to be dislocation in other areas.

In intelligence and counterespionage, these sources said, a great deal depends on the belief in the personal integrity of the officer Angleton, these sources said, was respected as a cautious and careful counterintelligence expert who was sought out by foreign intelligence services. These foreign services were willing to share information, because they could receive excellent intelligence from the United States.

"Because of Angleton," said one informant, "many foreign intelligence services maintained close liaison with the agency."

It was partly on such information that the CIA based its analyses, many of which have stood up well in the past. It is conceded that Angleton may have held anti-Communist biases of the Cold War variety, but it is stressed that he dealt only in raw intelligence and did not participate in drawing up the national intelligence estimates on which policy is based.

# Firing of Angleton Was Urged Early

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Angleton, the fiercely opinionated counterspy who has directed counterintelligence in CIA for a quarter of a century, is the central figure in the controversy over domestic spying activities by the agency, which is, by statute, to confine itself to foreign intelligence-gathering.

One of those who contacted Colby, a former high-level clandestine officer, said in an interview that under the aegis of Angleton there "were certainly reprehensible if not quote illegal unquote things done."

Another long-standing vet-

held one of the most prestigious jobs in the CIA's intelligence directorate, said the leadership of the counterintelligence department reflected a "paranoid mentality on international affairs."

"Anybody who in recent years held the view that conflicts between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as well as the Soviet Union and China are deceptions to dupe Western world leaders are not in touch with reality," the former official said.

He disclosed that several internal studies were conducted within CIA in 1970-1971 to determine whether the anti-movement had any sponsorship from foreign governments. The CIA studies included, he said, that there was no foreign support of the movement.


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Much of the objection to Angleton's continued tenure at CIA centered on this hard line view of international relations and its impact on the conduct of the counterintelligence role. Even some of its detractors, however, paid tribute to Angleton's effectiveness in thwarting espionage penetration of the CIA.

As the counterintelligence chief spent the final work day of his 31-year career in the U.S. intelligence service, there was growing evidence that the agency indulged in highly questionable—if not illegal—surveillance of American citizens.

One former CIA operative, who recently left the intelligence service, corroborated accounts of burglaries directed against foreign embassies. Qualified officials, familiar with Colby's report to President Ford, also acknowledged that some prominent American citizens were also the targets of CIA surveillance in operations which strayed far from the commonly accepted objectives of the 1947 National Security Act under which CIA was created.

So well concealed were the CIA surveillance activities within the United States that one high-ranking former FBI

official... alleged that the... of any such activities within its investigative jurisdiction.

Both CIA and FBI officials reaffirmed yesterday that the operational code under which the two agencies functioned proscribed the CIA from conducting counterintelligence functions within the United States.

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The charter further states that the agency should "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Agency may from time to time direct."

One official who has been kept closely briefed on the progress of the domestic spying investigation said yesterday that "there wasn't much that happened which did not have the prior authorization of the National Security Council."

... CIA was responsible for a number of burglaries within the United States was made by a former intelligence officer in an interview with The Washington Post.

The ex-CIA officer said he had no knowledge of break-ins against domestic political groups, and said he doubted that any have occurred, but he did corroborate the allegation that the CIA engineered a burglary at the Chilean Embassy here in 1972, an earlier break-in at the Israeli Embassy and other foreign installations, particularly in New York where foreign governments have U.N. embassies.

The CIA, he said, was principally interested in photographing codebooks from the foreign embassies which would be useful in reading secret messages, even if the country changed its code after the burglary. The National Security Agency makes tape recordings of coded broadcasts from foreign embassies and keeps them on file so past messages can be read if codes are broken.

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See CIA, A33, Col. 1

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All agency trainees, he and other ex-CIA employees said,

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"I don't want to leave the impression that these were frequent," the agent said. "They were rare." He did not attempt to estimate how many there were over the years.

CIA agents, according to the intelligence officer, also participated in surveillance of foreign nationals within the United States, including in New York City, where the U.S. government has formally assured foreign governments that it does not spy on U.N. diplomats. The FBI expends much more effort on this than the CIA, he added, partly because the FBI has the jurisdiction of protecting against foreign subversion within the United States and partly because the CIA has limited manpower for that task.

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The former agent was not familiar with any spying on American citizens within the United States, though he noted that the CIA has made contact with "tens of thousands" of citizens who travel abroad, businessmen and scholars, among others, in order to gather information about foreign countries. All of these people are recorded in CIA files, the agent said, but that does not mean that any of them were ever under surveillance.

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See CIA, 235, Col. 1

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