Old intelligence hands Rockefeller, Kissinger: Inquest or whitewash?

A True-Blue-Ribbon Panel

President Ford's blue-ribbon commission of inquiry into the CIA revved up for action last week—and ran into heavy flak before it ever really got off the ground. Critics complained that the panel—headed by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and heavily packed with former high-ranking government officials—was bound to be sympathetic to the top-secret intelligence agency, or at least would seem so to many Americans. The Veep, as is his custom, ignored the complaints and went about his appointed business. But the make-up of his panel alone guaranteed that it would not have the field to itself: Congress, quite to the contrary, was more determined than ever to press its own investigation into the multiplying charges that the agency had carried on illegal domestic operations.

The CIA itself approached the coming inquiries with mixed emotions. Its director, William Colby, in his first full-dress interview since the scandal broke, told NEWSWEEK that he would be "delighted" if the various investigations "can clarify some of the gross misunderstandings of intelligence" (opposite). But he complained that the flap had already taken up inordinate amounts of his own time and energy, and had damaged agency operations and morale as well. Newsweek learned that Colby's still secret report to Ford confirms that the agency had kept records on 9,000 U.S. citizens—quite apart from a similar-size list it got from the Justice Department—and that its agents had occasionally strayed into illegal domestic operations.

Colby refused to discuss these findings; he insisted only that the controversy was overblown and would die down "after we explain what the truth behind these allegations is."

The flare-up over the panel officially charged with getting the truth was probably inevitable given the President's conflicting impulses. Finding members who had no ostensible links with the CIA, it developed, was easier said than done. Practically everybody old enough and prominent enough to serve on the commission has had at least some contact with the intelligence community in the past," said one Administration official. Ford was also clearly eager to avoid the danger of a runaway investigation whose final recommendations he might find unacceptable. As a result, he ignored past precedent and named a commission that did not include a wide variety of viewpoints—no noted critic of the CIA was selected—nor even any women or minority members.

"We can expect nothing here but a whitewash," fumed Democratic Rep. Robert L. Leggett of the House Armed Services Committee, which plans to hold hearings.

Most of the criticism focused on Rockefeller himself, reportedly a last-minute choice to head the panel. Rockey's "deep and extensive involvement in national-security and defense affairs traces back to 1940," according to a recent Library of Congress analysis of his record—which includes service as President Eisenhower's special assistant for foreign affairs and as a member of President Nixon's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The Vice President also has close ties with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, head of the supersecret Forty Committee that oversees all U.S. intelligence operations.

Infiltrate: Other panel members raised eyebrows as well. Ronald Reagan is a man of the partisan Republican right. Lyman Lemnitzer, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962, had personally approved the CIA's Bay of Pigs operation. Lane Kirkland is secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO, some of whose member unions have helped the CIA infiltrate foreign labor movements. Last week, in fact, a former CIA official revealed that he had read the mail of AFL-CIO boss George Meany to determine if CIA money was being properly channeled to anti-Communist unions. (Meany denied his federation had handled CIA funds.)

Rockefeller scarcely acknowledged the controversy, moving instead to round up a fifteen-member staff under a White House-designated executive director, David Belin, 46—a Republican, longtime Ford friend and onetime counsel to the Warren commission whose selection also seemed likely to draw fire. The panel was to meet this week and, after laying the necessary groundwork, have preliminary meetings with Colby, Kissinger, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger (Colby's predecessor at CIA) and perhaps U.S. Ambassador to Iran Richard Helm, who was CIA director when the alleged improprieties reached their peak.

*The other commission members: former Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, former Commerce Secretary John T. Connally, former Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold and Edgar F. Shannon, former president of the University of Virginia.*
height. Still, Rockefeller’s people were reportedly wary of the job, and some one: “There are certainly no points to be made running this operation.”

That was hardly the attitude on Capitol Hill, where party caucuses in each house this week were expected to endorse one or more of the half-dozen separate inquiries proposed since the CIA furor first erupted. Among those most eager to start digging were three subcommittee chairmen whose panels had run investigations of their own in 1973–and somehow missed any trace of the alleged CIA excesses. “Some of the sleeping giants are awakened,” one Senate staffer remarked drily. But Massachusetts Rep. Michael J. Harrington, dismissed the existing committees as “will ing patsies” for the CIA, and some fellow liberals urged the creation of a special joint committee or select committees in both the House and Senate to do the job.

Whoever ends up running the Congressional investigations may well get a helping hand from Tennessee Republican Howard Baker, who collected a trove of leaks and CIA domestic activities in connection with his service on the Senate Watergate Committee. Although the agency spurned many of Baker’s requests for information, Newsweek learned, he did amass a knee-high pile of CIA documents, a waist-high stack of still-classified testimony—and a spy-high mass of unanswered questions about the CIA’s White House connections.

How thoroughly these and other questions are pursued remains to be seen. But it will clearly depend on the enterprise of the investigators—both Ford’s commission and the Congressional panels—and the CIA’s willingness to breach its own privacy to win back public confidence.

AN LBJ PORTRAIT,
WARTS AND ALL

Even before Lyndon Johnson left office, his library at the University of Texas began building a living monument to him—a tape-recorded “oral history” of his Presidency as told by hundreds of his aides and associates. But if the object was to honor Johnson’s memory, the result has sometimes been chatty—and catty—backstairs taletelling of quite another sort. Last week, the recollections of Johnson’s one-time press secretary George Reedy came to light after five years in the vaults, and they were unfailing indignant; an acid group portrait of a President in isolation, a staff in disarray and Reedy himself in despair at his client as a PR problem. “I’ve come to the conclusion,” he told the tape recorder bleakly, “that the White House is no place for a man of any real sensitivity whatsoever.”

Reedy, now dean of journalism at Marquette University, pictured himself as a victim of “court politics” in the Johnson Administration—and of Johnson’s own “extraordinary” views about the role and uses of the press. The President, he said, “had somewhere along the line picked up the concept of a public-relations man as a kind of high priest . . . For a while he labored under the belief that Pierre Salinger had actually elected John Kennedy to the Presidency.” Johnson was never disabused of his great expectations, and in 1965 Reedy was out of the White House altogether. He picked up the concept of a public-relations man as a kind of high priest . . . For a while he labored under the belief that Pierre Salinger had actually elected John Kennedy to the Presidency.” Johnson was never disabused of his great expectations, and in 1965 Reedy was out of the White House altogether. He

Reedy: Backstairs taletelling

flattery . . . He usually trusted the wrong people). Undoubtedly his own fall from power shaded his assessment, but he was just as candid about other sore spots of the Johnson years. Excerpts:

On LBJ’s withdrawal in 1968: “I think that he really decided that the game wasn’t worth the candle. He thought that the only way he could get any meaningful negotiations in Vietnam was if he took himself out of the political arena . . . In fact, the night before the 1964 convention he walked around with me on the White House grounds . . . saying he was going to announce his withdrawal the next day, which of course was absolutely incredible at that point. Naturally I was there to talk him out of it.”

On LBJ’s erratic protégé Bobby Baker: “Strangely enough, there are some people who like to look crooked when they aren’t. And Bobby was one . . . and I don’t to this day know the extent to which Bobby was guilty . . . and the extent to which it was a merely Bobby by talking big . . . But Johnson really panicked . . . He adopted this line that he hardly knew Bobby Baker, and I think he tried to convince himself the line was true . . . Whatever Johnson tells you at any given moment he thinks is the truth. The first victim of the Johnson whopper is always Lyndon Baines Johnson.”

On Moyer: “He was out to be No. 1 man and succeeded. I had pretty well followed the policy of not letting the press get past me, or giving them any hooks that would enable them to criticize the President. But Bill took quite a different tack. What Bill did was to win the responsibility upon the President in private conversations with the press. Of course, he disliked the President intensely—he had for many years—and made no secret about it to anybody but the President . . . [Once] they had some trooper of a singer back from Vietnam . . . The President didn’t particularly understand modern music. I’ll never forget Bill running around tugging reporters at the arm and laughing, saying, ‘Ha, ha, ha! It doesn’t mean anything to the stupid son-of-a-bitch, does it?’ somebody one day took . . . the polls and showed [Johnson] how his own popularity had been damaged rapidly during the same period that Bill’s popularity was building up . . . I think the President is quite bitter about it now.”

Johnson never forgave Moyer, who clearly regretted the split. “Our own relationship was strained toward the close,” he wrote last week that he was “astounded” by the accusations and attributed them to the “scurrilous” Reedy “who has been a patient of mine for years. ‘I made mistakes at the White House,’ said Moyer, ‘But I never said bad things about a man I loved even when we disagreed.’”

Newsweek, January 20, 1975
'GOOD' AND 'BAD' SECRETS

CIA director William Colby sat down with Newsweek's Evert Clark and Bruce van Voorst last week for his first interview since the domestic-spying scandal—and, true to his calling, he sometimes dodged and betrayed no trade secrets. Excerpts:

Q. Looking back at the recent troubles, do they suggest you have reached the point where there should be a full-faced review of the agency's functions?
A. Various reviews of the agency's activities are of course already taking place. People do you have to be delighted if they can clarify some of the gross misunderstandings of intelligence. I think that the image of intelligence in the normal observer's mind is very heavily that of the traditional intelligence spy, whereas intelligence today is far beyond that in terms of what it really is and what it does.

Any kind of review that increases public understanding of the real nature of intelligence today I think is very welcome, because then things fall into proportion.

Q. Is it possible, given your clandestine operations, to let Congress in on everything?
A. We've done it for years.

Q. Do they really know everything?
A. Well, we've done it in varying detail for varying things, let me put it that way. In other words, when we go up for appropriations presentations every year, we obviously summarize ... But you'll get the question how many people do you have in country X, and we'll answer it. Or, what kind of activities are you doing in country Y, and we'll answer it ... Now we haven't gone into every detail, no.

Q. Does the fact that today's spy is no James Bond mean that there's less need for secrecy in some areas?
A. Oh, we need secrecy. There are some "traditional" secrets that don't need to be secret anymore ... There are some "bad" secrets—mistakes we've made, things that have gone wrong, sure. But there are some "good" secrets, necessary secrets ... We have people whose lives and reputations depend on your secrecy. We have technical systems whose effectiveness can be annulled if they come out we are doing a particular thing.

Q. Does détente, the changing diplomatic atmosphere, make your job any easier?
A. The openness of relations with countries obviously helps the modern intelligence business because this business is based upon the flow of information. The more information that can flow normally, the less you have to go after in the hard way ... At the same time, of course, there's a certain lessening of the intensity of feeling that I think led to a much tighter discipline about our own secrets at the time when we were under major threat. And I think that people who twenty years ago would not have talked to a newpaper, today will ... Actually, quite frankly, I think that's one of the crying needs we have for legislation right now—some better protection of our secrets, I mean, because the present legislation is just hopeless ... We're talking about the question of how, and consequently whether, you can run an intelligence service in our free society.

Q. Is that question becoming even more serious to you?
A. It does become serious when the stuff leaks out and when ex-employees are free to tell what they knew ... I think it's terrible, frankly, because this puts people's reputations in bad shape, it puts people in physical danger.

Q. Would you go further and suggest that we have a British-like system restricting what is printed?
A. No ... It could only apply to people who consciously join the intelligence business ... It would not apply to the journalist or any publisher.

Q. Speaking of being hurt abroad, are there measurable ways of defining whether what's happened already has influenced the agency's operations in liaison or recruiting?
A. We have some pretty clear indications. I can't give you any numbers but we have had individual agents who have said, "Thanks, but no thanks. I really have to quit." And we've had various foreigners who have spoken to me about their concern about whether we can keep their secrets. The next step on that is they start to hold up on the productivity of what they give you ... It's a very difficult time for the people in the agency. Most of the accusations are greatly overblown and exaggerated, and the problem is how can we keep our secrets ... in this state of constant hullabaloo ...

I mean ... take my time—what is my real purpose? It's supposed to be spent on what's going on in the Soviet Union and China and all those places around the world, and making this information is funneled and accurate and considered and gets to the right places. And you know [instead] I spend a substantial part of my time bouncing around with problems like Watergate, the Chile expose, the Marchetti thing [ex-agent Victor Marchetti's book, which the CIA tried to censor]—and now this.

Q. I'm still very much concerned with this whole question of gray areas because it's my impression, even from what little we've picked up from the Colby report, that the agency has done some questionable things.

A. I think you have a spectrum from something which is, you know, absolutely clear—there's no question about your ability to do it—to something over here which is absolutely wrong, no question about it, it's criminal. Now, some of the things that are alleged may have been in between—you begin to get a little policy judgment. Well, it's a bit wrong, but is it really? You need a criminal intent to actually be at fault, and if you did it under certain circumstances, you know, nobody in his right mind would prosecute or do anything.

Q. But I've been told that your report concdecd the possibility that those things were done, and I read possibility to mean again a question of interpretation.
A. Well, not to talk about the report, because I really can't talk about that, but what I could say is that in the 25 years' history of this agency, just like the 25 years' history of almost any other agency or corporation, even perhaps publishing house, various things happened that maybe shouldn't have happened, you know, but they're exceptional, few and far between, that kind of thing.

Q. But you think that the agency has recovered from whatever might have gone on and that you're quite able now to face up to Congress and investigation.
A. Yes.