

Post 1/3/76 **Looking at the Future of the CIA**

It was with sadness and regret that I read the article of my fellow CIA retiree, Harry Rositzke, in *The Post* of January 18. The sadness because he concludes the article suggesting that the CIA be reduced to just the Operations Directorate as a true secret service. Somehow the implication is given, to me at least, that the disclosures of agency operations have come from those of us who did not serve in operations. It is his suggestion that intelligence reporting of the Intelligence and Scientific-Technical Directorates be separated from operations and made a part of the White House staff that I regret.

When I left the agency in 1972, active encouragement of contacts between those who did the intelligence writing and evaluation and those who planned and conducted operations to be more open with each other had begun. This was different from the time when I first joined the agency in 1955 when it seemed that the operations people considered their job was operations for operations' sake, and for practical purposes contacts were non-existent, the apparent result of having many former OSSers who began their intelligence careers during World War II when this was true. The collection of information was secondary to the operation. They hadn't realized that times had changed, and that operations and intelligence were intertwined as never before, and the collection of information being the primary purpose of most operations. It was further made obvious that the intelligence analyst was an inferior being not having the OSS experience.

It was not really until the Bay of Pigs, a para-military type operation which both Rositzke and I feel should be somebody else's responsibility, that the link between operations and intelligence was brought home. As the public post mortem of this operation indicated, those on the intelligence side had made an assessment that the people of Cuba were not ready to revolt. If the operations people had been

sharing with the intelligence people at that time, perhaps the final recommendation to President Kennedy would have been to abort the operation.

It was only after that that Helms, Karamessines, Colby, Fitzgerald and others, aware that the analytical people had much to offer, began to encourage direct contact between the operational officer and the intelligence analyst so that their knowledge and expertise could benefit each other. My hope is that this cross-fertilization is not endangered by following the Rositzke suggestion of again making intelligence analysis and operations separate as they both have much to contribute to the success of each other's work.

J.E. (NED) DOLAN
Garrett Park, Md.

My old friend and colleague, Harry Rositzke, had an admirable article on revamping the CIA in your January 18 issue. Permit me, however, to add three points which I wish he had included.

First, the underlying fallacy in most discussions of this subject is a characteristically American one: the assumption that an ideal solution exists. It does not. Only in a world totally devoid of evil would there be perfect ways of achieving all our ideals and aspirations.

Secondly, some compromises with principles are going to have to be made if (and the "if" is a big one at this time) we are to have a fully effective intelligence service. Without secrecy there can in the long run be no viable system of collecting intelligence from human sources. The only good human sources are non-Americans who have a stake in surviving in their own societies. If this stake is jeopardized by lack of secrecy on our part, they will not cooperate with U.S. intelligence. If they do not, we shall then be left with the irresponsible, the uninformed, and the insane. Strange as it may seem, there are a great many people around the world to

whom one or all of those adjectives apply who are willing, even eager, to provide us with "intelligence"; but we are better off without what they have to offer.

Thirdly, however our intelligence is reorganized it must be done in such a manner that American intelligence representatives overseas continue to have a clear channel to the top policy makers in Washington. When a foreigner provides the U.S. with valuable intelligence, he is performing a political act; if he is performing it responsibly, he wants to be sure that the recipients on our side can be counted on to use it in the responsible formation of U.S. policy. If he believes, on the contrary, that U.S. intelligence representatives are held in widespread disdain within their own government, he will have no interest in dealing with them.

I have not seen these points publicly made, yet they are premises from which any enlightened discussion of the future of CIA, or an alternative agency, must start.

JOHN LIMOND HART
Potomac

The writer is a former CIA chief of station in Vietnam, Thailand and Korea. He retired two years ago.

The Washington Post

EUGENE MEYER, 1875-1959
PHILIP L. GRAHAM, 1915-1963

KATHARINE GRAHAM
Publisher

BENJAMIN C. BRADLEE
Executive Editor

HOWARD SIMONS
Managing Editor

PHILIP L. GEYELIN
Editorial Page Editor

MEG GREENFIELD
Deputy Editorial
Page Editor

MARK MEAGHER
General Manager

Vice Presidents: JOHN M. DOWER, Communications; THOMAS R. MCCARTIN, Sales; JACK F. PATTERSON, Circulation; VIRGIL P. SCHROEDER, Operations; WILLIAM A. SPARTIN, Administration; LAWRENCE A. WALLACE, Labor Relations

Published by The Washington Post Company
KATHARINE GRAHAM
Chairman of the Board

LARRY H. ISRAEL
President