esterminding the Washington? lef of counterintelshugin was Angleton's about 1968, and such end of his tour of duty at general in the history and then the chief of igence service, the First in his mid-thirties, these rsonal ability, his loyalty gton. Nothing less than notions, and one would nterintelligence service, tions against the Soviet ited and controlled the ch for sixteen years the Red Navy; and he also the U.S. manufacturers

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1960s and was trained as ne United States. Presumconditions, for Kalugin as a spy while working as s, I believe, I successfully

er to develop a new cover, adio reporter. In 1965 he ort and became, he claimed, JSA and, when the resident g time."⁵

The term "monster plot" was CIA in origin and scornful in meaning, and at the center of it was Angleton, who had acquired a large reputation and even larger power. No overseas appointment could be made without his approval; no operations could be undertaken without his assent, and he alone, except for the CIA's signal master, saw all the agency's messages. One reason was that only Angleton had the means and the knowledge to verify the character of the appointee, to assess the security situation surrounding the operations, and to gauge the worth of the intelligence being received. Moreover, it was necessary for him in the daily exercise of his work to know what all the other chiefs of the agency were doing. The Counterintelligence Division became subject to his direction alone, and few if any directors of Central Intelligence interfered with it, largely because few understood his craft or had the time to study the endlessly complex games in which he was involved. He was completely trusted by his chiefs; few if any of his colleagues or subordinates dared question his work. Angleton became a law unto himself between 1963 and 1971, the main years of the monster plot.

But if he was a brilliant man, he possessed serious intellectual weaknesses. Cleveland Cram, a Harvard Ph.D. and a senior CIA officer for thirty years, was called back to the CIA from retirement in 1977 and spent four years researching and writing the official but internal history of Angleton's career on the basis of unrestricted access to the CIA's files. When done, the history consisted of eleven volumes on legal-size paper. Cram had dealt with British affairs for much of his CIA career and served as deputy chief of mission in London during the main period of the monster plot. A man of calm, measured judgment, and much respected in his trade, during his investigation of Angleton and his conduct of office Cram formed the view that Angleton was "obsessively theoretical, obsessively ambitious, and obsessed about Philby." When Philby defected, Angleton suffered "severe psychic damage." And as Cram also remarked, "If Philby had achieved nothing else in the Soviet service he would have earned his keep by the peculiar thralldom he obtained over Angleton's thinking."6 Cram's judgment is shared by Angleton's wife. Cicely Angleton told how Philby's disappearance affected her husband "terribly, deeply - it was a bitter blow he never forgot."7

It will be recalled that when Philby was recruited into the Soviet service in 1934, he was required by his case officer, Arnold Deutsch, a psychologist, to write appreciations of all significant persons he met. "You will produce a lot of rubbish," Deutsch told him, "but one useful page will be worth lots of waste paper." By now, the early 1960s, these

Anthony Cave Brown

TREASON IN THE BLOOD

H. St. John Philby, Kim Philby, and the Spy Case of the Century



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