

# CIA Didn't Predict Portugal Coup

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The Central Intelligence Agency was working with apparent leisure on a report about Portugal entitled "Cracks in the Facade" when the Lisbon government was toppled in a left-wing military coup last year, it was disclosed yesterday.

Testifying before the House Intelligence Committee, officials of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research conceded that United States intelligence experts not only failed to predict the coup, but thought that trouble in Portugal was brewing on the right rather than the left.

In fact, just four days before the April 25, 1974, military takeover of Premier Marcello

Caetano's right-wing dictatorship, CIA official Keith Clark said he had been reviewing a draft of "Cracks in the Facade" and ordered some revisions in it by the CIA analyst who was preparing the study.

A national intelligence officer for Western Europe with government-wide responsibilities for following developments in some 25 countries, Clark did not spell out the "improvements I thought ought to be made" in the study, but he told the committee that the analyst "went back to work" on them when Caetano was overthrown.

"As soon as the coup took place, I took a look at it and saw a great deal of relevant background information," Clark testified. He said it

eventually became the subject of an interagency memorandum that was distributed in United States intelligence circles the month after the coup.

Speaking for the DIA, Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson (U.S. Army), who was deputy director for military attaches at the time of the Portuguese coup, disclosed that he had sent two letters to the DIA's men in Portugal in the preceding months telling them to talk to more people.

Gen. Wilson said he "suggested rather strongly that they get out in the hinterlands a little," but indicated that of the six U.S. military attaches in Portugal at the time, only the most junior among them, a Navy lieutenant, made much of an effort.

Insisting that Defense attaché reports to the Pentagon were "satisfactory" before the coup, Wilson emphasized at the same time that they didn't deserve any medals either. The reports, he said, were "suggestive of a coup" but "they were not predictive of a coup."

The State Department's director of intelligence and research, William G. Hyland, put it more bluntly, telling the committee that "even a cursory review of the intelligence record indicates there was no specific warning of the coup of April 25, 1974, in Portugal."

Summing up the United States intelligence reports available at the time, the

See INTELLIGENCE, A6, Col. 2

## INTELLIGENCE, From A1

CIA's Clark said that "field reporting, and the finished intelligence which derived from it, paid close attention to the frustrations among conservatives over the Caetano regime's softness and its occasional flirtation with concessions in Africa or at home." He said they failed to forecast the left-wing nature of the armed forces movement, which staged the coup, "except by occasional suggestion."

At the close of yesterday's hearing, Chairman Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.) said he was gratified by news reports indicating that President Ford is also alarmed over the failures of the United States intelligence community in light of its costs.

Pike said the committee's public inquiry into the quality of American spywork was nearing an end, although he held open the possibility of hearings on intelligence forecasts at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.