

Quotes From U.S. Intelligence Studies

Here is the text of mistaken U.S. assessments about the 1973 Arab-Israeli war that the House Intelligence Committee voted to make public Thursday, including a four-word phrase about "communication security" that CIA director William E. Colby wanted kept secret.

Syria-Egypt—The movement of Syrian troops and Egyptian military readiness are considered to be coincidental and not designed to lead to major hostilities.

DIA Intelligence Summary, 3 October 1973

Egypt—The exercise and alert activities [one or two words deleted] in Egypt may be on a somewhat larger scale and more realistic than previous exercises, but they do not appear to be

preparing for a military offensive against Israel.

—**Central Intelligence Bulletin, 5 October 1973.**

Egypt—The [one or two words deleted] large-scale mobilization exercise may be an effort to soothe mobilization exercise may be an effort to soothe internal problems as much as to improve military capabilities. Mobilization of some personnel, increased readiness of isolated units, and greater communication security are all assessed as parts of the exercise routine . . . there are still no military or political indicators of Egyptian intentions or preparations to resume hostilities with Israel.

Central Intelligence Bulletin, 6 October 1973.

Israel-Egypt-Syria—Both the Israelis and the Arabs

are becoming increasingly concerned about the military activities of the other, although neither side appears to be bent on initiating hostilities . . . For Egypt, a military initiative makes little sense at this critical juncture . . . Another round of hostilities would almost certainly destroy Sadat's painstaking efforts to invigorate the economy and would run counter to his current efforts to build a united Arab political front, particularly among the less militant, oil-rich states. For the [two or three word deleted] Syrian president, a military adventure now would be suicidal [lengthy deletion].

—**DIA Intelligence Summary, 6 October 1973.**

The Watch Committee met in special session at

0900 on 6 October 1973 to consider the outbreak of Israeli-Arab hostilities . . . We can find no hard evidence of a major, coordinated Egyptian/Syrian offensive across the Canal and in the Golan Heights areas. Rather, the weight of evidence indicates an action-reaction situation where a series of responses by each side to perceived threats created an increasingly dangerous potential for confrontation. The current hostilities are apparently a result of that situation . . . It is possible that the Egyptians or Syrians, particularly the latter, may have been preparing a raid or other small-scale action.

—**Special Report of the Watch Committee, 6 October 1973.**

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