



Goldwater with dart gun, former CIA chief Richard Helms on the stand: Did the CIA lie to itself?

may now find that his coattails have shrunk to the point where some Republicans will not want to try to ride them at all next year. For the moment, he showed no lack of zeal for campaigning; at the weekend, he was again exhorting the GOP faithful on a Bicentennial swing in the Western states.

For the Democrats nationally, Durkin's victory was seen as clear vindication of their present strategy of dogged opposition to Ford on almost every issue. It also suggests that while Ford may have won nearly all the Capitol Hill battles on energy and the economy, he just may be losing the war in the process.

Strike: The battles may not be as easily won from now on, either. On the day after the election, the Democrats were already flexing their new muscle. At issue in the House was a major oil bill with a sharp price rollback. Last July, when the Republicans proposed to strike the rollback, the Democrats, fearing defeat, postponed the vote; when they returned from the August recess, they expected to win—narrowly. But in the wake of New Hampshire, they won heavily, 242-151. Durkin's election, gloated House Majority Leader Thomas (Tip) O'Neill, "was worth 30 votes at least." The Administration lost on subsequent votes as well, and veteran political observers suggested that the Democrats were now really ready for battle.

For the moment, the Republicans were in obvious disarray as they surveyed their loss in New Hampshire. "We're all in trouble," said state Republican chairman Gerry Carmen, and it seemed hardly likely that many of his GOP colleagues were about to disagree with him.

—SANDRA SALMANS with TONY FULLER in New Hampshire and HAL BRUNO in Washington

The CIA's Show-and-Tell

As an indignant Sen. Frank Church saw it, the Central Intelligence Agency has been mired for months in a series of charges that made the agency seem at times like "a rogue elephant on a rampage." Last week, the Idaho Democrat set his Senate Select Committee to a full airing of the case, starting with an improbable story of vials of deadly poison squirreled away by a CIA scientist in direct defiance of a Presidential order. In the end, the agency seemed more bumbling than sinister. But in the Church hearings and a matching inquiry by the House, the CIA also emerged as a hive of unaccountable men who were elusive with the White House, with the military they were allegedly serving, with the public and eventually with themselves.

The Church committee hearings began with an elaborate show-and-tell of CIA hard- and software developed over the course of an eighteen-year, \$3 million program code-named "Project Naomi." As CIA director William Colby told it, Naomi was actually a cluster of covert development programs run jointly by the Army and the agency; among other things, the results included a family of poisons capable of inducing everything from diarrhea and memory loss to paralysis and death. Colby brought along evidence of Naomi's technological marvels as well—including a

battery-powered dart gun said to be capable of delivering a poisoned missile at a range of up to 300 feet. There were also pictures of the poison darts, which dissolve on impact, leaving no trace.

Other items of 007 hardware mentioned in testimony during the week included a heat-sensitive engine-bolt for automobiles that releases poisonous vapors into the passenger compartments. There were also such exotic weapons as fountain-pen, umbrella and walking-stick dart guns. One Defense Department scientist described a fluorescent bulb that would emit toxic substances when turned on—and a button made of poison that could simply be sewn on an agent's shirt and worn into another country. Finally, there was the "road depositor." This was an aerosol can filled with

bacteria to be sprayed on highways or railroad tracks. The idea was that the toxic bacteria would be picked up and spread by the wheels of passing vehicles.

As part of Project Naomi, Colby said, the agency had also devised "methods and systems for carrying out covert attacks against crops" and had even simulated a chemical attack on New York City subways, using a harmless gas.

The most intriguing Naomi product was a batch of deadly shellfish poison that turned up only a few months ago in a CIA storeroom—five years after Pre-



The shellfish poison

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Here's the material you requested. I hope you find it useful. Please feel free to get in touch with me again if I can be of service.

Walter F. Mondale

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SENATE RESOLUTION 21

Emory L. Brown, Jr.

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

OF THE

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Senator BAKER: Did you feel hurt?

Mr. SENESSEY: Well, not really.

Senator BAKER: OK, what about a cane, a walking cane?

Mr. SENESSEY: Yes; an M-1 projectile could be fired from a cane, also an umbrella.

Senator BAKER: Also an umbrella. What about a straight pin?

Mr. SENESSEY: Yes, sir.

Senator BAKER: We made a straight pin, out at the Branch. I did not make it, but I know it was made and it was used by one Mr. Powers on his U-2 mission.

Senator BAKER: As a matter of fact, it was not used by Mr. Powers.

Mr. SENESSEY: He did not use it but he had it. Let us put it that way.

Senator BAKER: And buttons. I noticed in the testimony some reference to buttons. What kind of buttons are you speaking of?

Mr. SENESSEY: You can make a button from biological material, compress it in such a way that you could actually put it on your shirt or a coat, button it up and you could walk into another country with a starter for coming up with a biological agent.

Senator BAKER: Did you ever do anything about cigars? Did you ever try to impregnate a cigar with a biological agent?

Mr. SENESSEY: I did not; no.

Senator BAKER: Do you know of any such?

Mr. SENESSEY: Not really.

Senator BAKER: That was not done in your department, then, if it was done at all?

Mr. SENESSEY: No; that would be too easy. I don't think we would have fooled with that one.

Senator BAKER: You don't think that would have been a good technique? Well, I don't mean to press unduly, but of the list that we went into here, did you manufacture or deliver any of these for any of the intelligence agencies of the Government at any time?

Mr. SENESSEY: No; they were only shown and most of the intelligence groups knew of what we could do and it sort of edified them to the point that they could observe and be able to see these things if they were in foreign countries.

Senator BAKER: How did you do that? Did you have a case like a salesman, you opened it up and showed it to them?

Mr. SENESSEY: Just about.

Senator BAKER: Where did you do that?

Mr. SENESSEY: Mainly it was done in our division, of course.

Senator BAKER: Did you send out invitations or what?

Mr. SENESSEY: They usually invited themselves, somehow. I don't know how all this worked, but they showed up.

Senator BAKER: All right.

Mr. SENESSEY: And I might add that many of your own members here, not on this panel, but many of the Members of Congress also observed these.

Senator BAKER: Well, you are very generous. None of us saw them; is that right?

Mr. SENESSEY: I am not sure, I wouldn't know, but I know many did.

Senator BAKER: I don't know either.

Was the toxin program or the chemical-biological agent program necessary in your judgment, for the utilization of the exotic devices that you have described to us? Were these poisons from shellfish, from cobra venom and the like, an adjunct to and a part of these exotic devices? Your straight pen, your fountain pen, the starter and the like, did you use these poisons in those devices?

Mr. SENESSEY: No; not shellfish. I think you have got a misnomer between poison—a biological material itself is not a poison in my estimation. Yes; shellfish poison is a poison, shellfish. The others are biological agents, such as erythrin, tularemia and that type of thing. The only thing that you mentioned there that could be used with shellfish poison are the dart-type things. The rest used biological poisons.

Senator BAKER: The last question, and my time has expired, Mr. Senessey, do you know of any records of this program that have been destroyed?

Mr. SENESSEY: I could not tell you whether they have been destroyed or kept intact. I know when the division closed, a lot of stuff was sent, they told us, to Kansas City.

Senator BAKER: If I wanted to find out more about the conversation with the CIA and the destruction of records, would Dr. Cowan be the one to talk to?

Mr. SENESSEY: Possibly.

Senator BAKER: Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Senator Baker.

Senator Hummelston is next.

Senator Hummelston: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Carrying on the line of questioning by Senator Baker as to the kind of items you experimented with and developed, would it be accurate to say that you worked on and experimented with gadgets for which nobody ever yet has found a use?

Mr. SENESSEY: I think there were some intended uses. For instance, the Special Forces gave us SDR, Small Development Requirements, indicating that they had a military requirement to meet a certain situation.

Senator Hummelston: Was mostly all of your work then done on the basis of these special requirement requests that came either from the Special Forces or some other source?

Mr. SENESSEY: That is true.

Senator Hummelston: Did these requests come from the CIA directly to your knowledge?

Mr. SENESSEY: No; they sort of rode piggyback on most of these. They sort of rode piggyback on the Army's development and picked off what they thought was good for them, I guess.

Senator Hummelston: But you did not undertake a development or an experimental program of a particular weapon until you had some request from the Special Forces to develop a delivery system?

Mr. SENESSEY: There was one item. It was a hand-held item that could fire a dart projectile. It was done only for them; no one else.

Senator Hummelston: You developed that yourself?

Mr. SENESSEY: I had a hand in it. I did not do all of the development.

Senator Hummelston: All right, during the course of your work there, did you have frequent contact with Dr. Gordon?

not there because we were not first enough getting it into the logistics system.

Senator SCHWEIKER. What about the device that you made, or whose development you supervised? What was the most utilized device of the ones with which you worked and supervised?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. By whom?

Senator SCHWEIKER. The only thing that I know that was really used was the dog projectile. The other things were in the stockpiles. I don't think anyone ever requested them.

Senator SCHWEIKER. How do you know for certain it was for dogs? Mr. SENSENBERRY. Well, that is what they asked us to test them against. They wanted to see whether they could put a dog to sleep, and whether sometime later the dog would come back and be on its own and look normal.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Of course, as I recall, that is what they did with Gary Powers' drill with shellfish toxin. They tested it on a dog to see if it would work. So I do not know that that at all would conclude that it was only provided for dogs.

Of the devices that came through you, which of these were utilized in any capacity other than for testing?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. That was the only one that I know of—the dog projectile. I call it a dog projectile. We were developing it because the scenario read that they wanted to be able to make entrance into an area which was patrolled by dogs, leave, the dog come back, and then no one would ever know they were in the area. So that was the reason for the dog projectile.

Senator SCHWEIKER. And how many of these were made?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. Well I would say there were probably as many as 50 at least. They look—

Senator SCHWEIKER. About 50?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. Yes.

Senator SCHWEIKER. And didn't you get any reports back from the field on their effectiveness?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. No. That is one thing you never get; you never get the feedback. You did not know what happened.

Senator SCHWEIKER. I'm puzzled by that. You are the research and development person; you design the weapon—and I haven't seen a part of the military yet that did not have some feedback on whether it was effective in hitting the target or missing it. How do you know if you are doing things right or wrong?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. We must have been doing right. They kept asking for it.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Then somebody was using them. I gather. Is that correct?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. I would assume so. The missile was gone when they returned the hardware.

Senator SCHWEIKER. But you cannot give us any specific evidence or proof that they were used solely for dogs, from your knowledge, or from your feedback?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. No. Not at all.

Senator SCHWEIKER. You said a moment ago that you also distributed the cans to Mr. Boston at the end of this shellfish project. Mr. SENSENBERRY. No cans did I distribute to him. I only gave him the display models of the prototype items.

Senator SCHWEIKER. No; I'm referring to the shellfish toxins.

Mr. SENSENBERRY. I did not give him any shellfish toxins.

Senator SCHWEIKER. What did you give Mr. Boston?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. All I gave him were display models.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Of what?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. Of hardware.

Senator SCHWEIKER. No shellfish toxins? Are you aware that along with that went the shellfish toxins?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. Well, I thought it should be. They had to pick it up sometime.

Senator SCHWEIKER. In addition to giving it to them, did you give it to any other sources, any other branches of Government or the service, or any other parts of the Army?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. I did not give it to anybody, so I really do not know what the disposition of the material was. I was not in the agent area; I was only in hardware development.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Did you have a responsibility for cleaning out the inventory?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. Only on the hardware side, not on the agent side. Senator SCHWEIKER. And where did all of the inventory go?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. I don't know. Senator SCHWEIKER. Where did the inventory of hardware go?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. All hardware was destroyed, period.

The only thing that was distributed to the CIA were prototypes—and I would not even call them prototypes, they were display models, outway models. They were mounted on boards, on plaques, that type of thing.

Senator SCHWEIKER. That's all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Schweiker. I think it ought to be emphasized that the document from which you read was a document in which the CIA laid out its specifications for the research work for which the Agency was trying.

Senator SCHWEIKER. And for which purpose, too, Mr. Chairman, that they met quarterly to see if their funds were being well spent?

The CHAIRMAN. Right. And their specifications with respect to the particular delivery systems we have been discussing were as follows: When funds permit, adaptation and testing will be conducted of a new biologically effective, disseminating system, which has been specifically designed to be capable of introducing materials through light, sound, and olfactory and silently, without pain.

So I think it is clear that the CIA was interested in the development of a delivery system that could reach human beings, since not many dogs wear clothing. And you would agree with that, wouldn't you?

Mr. SENSENBERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Mr. Schwarz here has one final question and then we will move to the final witness this morning.

Mr. SCHWARZ. Along the same line of the chairman's and Senator Schweiker's questions, I assume you agree that pending money in order to make dates of such a character that they cannot be detected in an autopsy does not have much to do with dogs.

Mr. SENSENBERRY. No; that would not have anything to do with dogs. Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.