

3/13/72

Dear Js,

I am once awed and a bit distressed at the welcome volume I know I'll enjoy dated 3/8. My concern is that you do not have the time for it. I've gone over three of the enclosures and address them briefly not to forget.

I am glad to get what Je picked up from Pacifica on the professional healers helping heal the problems of the FBI. I was entirely unaware of it. 10 yrs ago I'd have been shocked. Tpday it is but the living Orwell, or one of the new and increasing manifestations of the Ameriform totalitarianism. In connection with Oswald's, some years ago I started a "Legal Rights" file. For a long time I picked up nothing not directly related with that. Recently I have started expanding it, looking forward to the time in the future I might want to write on the gradual whittling away. As part of it I have started a rudimentary file on repressions. My filing is like Topsy, and much of it is soon lost in the mass. However, I'm making a desperate effort in the morning to make an improvement in the mechanics. The local Woolco store has a \$1/44 sale. It includes a 4-drawer, 15" file cabinet. I have one of theirs and while it is pretty punk, I need dead-storage space, have a large but piled-up basement, and if I can get it, that will relieve the space problems in my office for a while and I can make further subdivisions. The one gesture toward order is also an inhibition. I now make a card on each file folder. And I'm carding all WC materials, which means I have something like 2,000 pages plus of unread FBI reports! But, this is the kind of tidbit I do welcome for the future, and there is no way of knowing when such a brief aside in closer writing might be quite illuminating.

The extra copy of the Esquire article was for you to keep if you wanted to. I had hoped you'd have time to evaluate and your estimate coincides with mine. I am disturbed that you can see the identical future usefulness, for there is no literary purpose in publishing such trashy writing. The one thing I have learned since sending it that might be relevant is that Shaw is a friend of Hayes, the Esq. editor. My letter is unanswered. I couched it the way I did hoping Hayes would be outraged that I suggested plagiarism of my work. That was a fair inference but not what I had in mind. It was Blair's. I think it impossible that O&D did not submit F-U to Esquire, as we agree it is impossible for neither the author nor any editor to be unaware of the obvious errors....I have a letter from Ray today that I've not yet read.

The letter ~~for~~ Hal and Gary: Hal sugarcoated for you a bit. He was fired in some haste. I do hope his present job is better, and I did know of his San Jose business. That seems to be a growing one. I hear he has a show on his collection coming up-but not from him. He is silent. Charlie Brown phoned me Sat. in her concern over the appearance of one Dusty Rhodes at Skyline College, at or near Brisbane, with some pretty wild stuff. She had phoned Hal first. He, like I, recall the name but no more. I have no separate file on Rhodes. I do not think Hal has been as busy as his lack of communication indicates, and on one point in particular I find it entirely unlike him. There is a slow but steady demand for O in N.O. the last remaining copies of which John Christian abandoned in his Pacific Ave former residence. It is two years since I arranged for the payment of the shipping costs by Canyon, and the job of arranging that can't be great, at most the writing of my address on the cartons already made at the printer's. Hal just hasn't responded. Meanwhile, I write letters fairly regularly regretting that I can't supply copies because the book is out of print. S, because all of this is so unlike Hal, I assume that he is a bit turned off on me for some reason, real and misunderstood or fancied. Gary is beginning to get the way you detected on acupuncture, and it is inconsistent with the younger man, when he went for a fair share of the farout assassination possibilities. He is, however, a very fine and deeply concerned young man. I have not heard from him since he was there, but I hope to soon, as recent enclosures to you indicate.

Lil will be tickled with the pictures. The are great of the kids and the color is good on the blanket.

Larry Shears-NYTimes clip. Woodcock asking investigation: there are may strange aspects to this entire affair, not the least of which is the radicalization of the fink. I had a number of earlier cases in the full COUP and have started a file for a future book, I,SPY. Some pretty farout things! Your tapes were welcome for this....Glad to get the Service pieces. I'll lay them aside for more careful reading soon. Thanks....Doubt we'll ever know

the cost to the country of such things as befell him and his colleagues. That was merely the best-advertised. There were many earlier ones of one of which I have first-hand knowledge.

Glad to get the simple explanation of the Chou distance keeping. Makes perfect sense.

We diverge on your worry about the turning of history that can follow this. I agree completely on the racist interpretation of the dropping of the atom bombs and am certain every land of pigmented people feels this way. I've heard blacks say it often. But I do not share your worry that our military will get to or need to use tactical nukes in SVN, for domestic reasons. At least not unless things awful thing lingers long, for I don't think the Dirty Trickies will dare try that on the electorate while they expect to return to the electorate. My greater concern for the immediate future is with internal repression. It is the ultimate non-answer of the man who has no answers.

I think you undertate in pointing out that the Chinese have said they would not be the first to use nukes, although you are correct. Did not the USSR also either say that or ask a joint declaration on it?...And I'm inclined to think that even the bombast and recriminations will now recede. There is and will always be the strong disagreement between the systems and their representatives. But I think we have moved farther forward than perhaps any but the direct participants might. The one danger is the horrible mistake to which you refer, and I wonder if that might not involve us and the Chinese as much as them and the getting-more-paranoid USSR. What remains, of course, is the danger from the lone nut, the Khrushchev figure of speech. I suppose that can always happen, a la Strangelove.

You are right on your comment on the Cold War, but here I am more optimistic than you. I think we have now advanced to the point where everyone realizes that the kind of opposition we have mounted to liberation struggles can't succeed, that there really is no answer to guerrilla warfare when it is waged by a majority of the local people, and that there will have to be a gradual end to this kind of foolishness. What the left seems not to have apprehended is the end of the usefulness of the traditional imperialism and now the end of the first form of its military variant. The race has gone faster than even the runners have realized. Examining, for example, some of the lingering Chinese slogans and ask yourself if they are not really a bit outdated. This does not mean they are outdated in terms of internal usefulness or as a means of making what it is desired be understood comprehensible. But strictly speaking, I think they have not kept pace and I predict, with the always-present danger of predictions, that in time their formulations will change. Not the basic thing they say, but how they say it.

One of the deterrents, in my opinion, is the validity in your mixed metaphor of the throwing of fat back from the wild blue yonder. The most populous nation is the one best able to survive such a tragedy, and the one least able to is the one most "advanced", that is, requiring all sorts of modern devices and machines. We are the fat that would be thrown back into the fire with such wild-blue-yondering, and I think the realization has reached all but the insane.

My knowledge of the competitive histories of the peoples of the USSR and China is inadequate, although it does include that to which you refer and some of the more recent. However, what you say can be said almost without exception about all peoples who have been neighbors and doesn't explain the present situation. I can't really believe the Chinese look longingly at Siberia because it given them room. I can believe they hold parts are their land taken by force. However, I also seem to remember that in every other case where there was a border dispute except with India the Chinese settled each case on generous terms more than satisfactory to that neighbor. Of course, it can be argued that in that stage of their development the minor territorial concessions represented no real cost and hardly anything like their enormous return in immediate political and public relations, satibity, ending disputes, etc. My feeling is that their offer to India was more than fair. So, this leaves the major problem and the only recent clash that with the USSR, and I can't think of any reason to exist aside from political. Assuming it is not a fake, those parts of Khrushchev Remembers that relate to this might interest you. I think perhaps the initial trouble comes from excessive holiness by the Only True Believers. The USSR had made a literal interpretation of Marx that it had found valid from its experience, in a land that could be considered the kind of which Marx theorized. China is no such land. Mao's interpretation of Marx was the equivalent of Lenin's for Russia, for there was no European-like proletariat in China. This part of society there was the peasant. I think it began here and got worse when events proved Mao right. Were I Mao I'd also feel the way you say he does about the USSR's continued recognition of Chiang for so long, especially during the

beginning of the Cold War. But taking all the legitimate and existing tensions you point out, the relations between these two giants can't be explained to my satisfaction in reasonable terms consistent with their doctrines and theories. I think they find a kind of inappropriate parallel in history, in the religious wars of the past. If I think you are absolute correct in describing "Sino-Soviet friendship" as "a difficult, fragile thing", I also believe it need not be and it is very much against the genuine and the selfish interests of both parties for it to be. It is irrational, especially in the world of today. My own feeling, and it is only a feeling, for my knowledge is deficient, is that if both are in part to blame, most of it is that of the USSR and the strangest part of all, given Chinese current approval of Stalin, is that it is largely his heritage. Not the right way to put it. Part of his legacy, he laid the foundation for it, made it first possible, then inevitable.... I'd like to think it possible that Mao could not recall the inevitability of all the many flowers blooming and attempt to germinate a few of those so long dormant in the colder climes. I think he should NOW take the initiative, and I think ~~it would~~ it would increase his enormously greater stature were he to try. At the same time, I think the most obvious grim interpretation of Nixon's move would impel the USSR along the same line. I think they should be looking forward to increased domestic dissatisfaction and stronger internal demands. Discontent, really.

I think Mao was wrong on Tito, that Tito was correct for Tito, for his country, and for international communism. Stalin's or the USSR's dictating of internal policies and approaches within each land and for each people was wrong. Moreover, he visualized a new imperialism, not a confraternity of the friendly, of political brothers. He visualized all the contiguous lands as suppliers of the USSR of what the USSR said it wanted from each. The inevitable consequence was a lower standard of living and life for those people. Tito was only the first. It has become the reality. Why should the Romanians, for example, accept the role of food supplier for the Moscow table, and live the life of international peasant? I think we have not yet realized the probable extent of Stalin's mental illness.

Whether or not Kh. Remembers is authentic, one of the things that makes it seem to be is the enormous support for what it says in Stalin's known record. I have noted a few of the indications that it is not authentic, and largely they do relate to the East. If it is an oversimplification, there are things the Russians are going to have to learn of politics that they have learned in other areas. Examples are their developing of seeds best suited for special areas, like what that does well in the bitter cold. It is like me trying to plant an orange tree and expect it to survive our local winters. It is irrational. But we can grow apples and all sorts of other things. I'd have loved to have brought a Bird of Paradise plant back from California to see if Lil, with her green hands (not just a thumb) could find a way of keeping it alive inside. But I know damned well that it can't make it outside here. There are such simple realities that major powers of more advanced political understanding and thinking can't excuse avoiding, and the disputes

between these two can't be justified or explained by history. They have both emerged from their histories, are both different lands, with people even different, if basically true to their pasts. But no point in carrying this further. To me, at least, it is as minimal as it is obvious. I can't find explanation that satisfied.

Is not the Mao "lean to one side" speech to which you refer a kind of Titoism? And is there not explanation of the lower Chinese opposition to us than to the Russians really because there had been fewer frictions, less exploitation from us than from all the other ~~Oppressed~~ Oppressed White Barbarians? Did not more Chinese learn English because there was more immediate use for it, before the Russian revolution? You develop a reasonable thesis, but I think it begins to break down at the point where we were succoring Chiang as he collapsed. I have a fairly good recall of that period. We were training his men and equipping them on Taiwan, and as soon as they hit the front, the desertions were total and complete, entire divisions, from generals down, and with full equipment. So, we then used our navy, initially to move troops on the mainland, then to Taiwan, and then to enforce protection of Taiwan. These things of the closer present, ordinarily, should have been heavier in the Chinese scales. If I were to guess at a reason it hasn't been that way it is because of what is probably not paranoid, the Chinese view of the recent past that they are between several more powerful enemies, and here your references to history can be an important factor, because despite the past, the USSR did then begin to help China, in meaningful ways. The

contrast was so great it should have had a greater impact. Except for the religious-like dis-groements, I think it would have been. (Aside, in the atime when such things should be diminishing, they are increasing, I think much of this has been inflamed and inflated in the near east to make that an immediately⁹⁹ncoluble issue, but I think it would not have been a legitimate issue and was made into one for other reasons having, really, nothing to do with Jews ligin on what Arabs regarded as Arab lands. I think I have addressed this before, but if I havon t, and it interests, I will. I think the basic issue there is the lack of vaibility of the government of any of the neighboring states without this issue.)

Cannot the traditional suspicion of the Russian, greater than that of Americans, be attributed to closer proximity and longer-existing exploitation and the liking for Americans, at least comparatively, be attributed to some factors you do not mention, for example, the comparative success of Sino-Americans, who write home and after the initial coolie days had it comparatively well, to the hope of having a hance of getting benefit from us when history indicated that not likely from the Russians, and from the goodness of a number of you, reporters and some of the military, ranging from Carlson to Stilwell?

O suggest you underestimate the impact of the Korean adventure on Mao and the Chinese. All you say is true, but they got an added and important lesson, that American political control does not include the military. Tjis had to worry them. More recent history has to have made this belief an article of faith in Chinese ruling circulse.

Agreed on your guilt-complex opinion of the Russians. I can't understand howm except in terms of Stalin's illness, this could have come to pass. He should have had no problem gith Mao's extension of Marxist thinking to include th peasantry as the agricultural proletariat or some such formulation and evolution. I know they took forst Chiank and then his son under their wing. But after Shanghai, how could they continue. Too many locomotives were fueled with Marxist brothers.

Thereia a kind of contradiction in successive paragrpahs, each accurate, that I can't reconcile. Tme, Kh. withdrew in 1960, but is it really because he had been outwitted and out-manuevered? What about? I know little about that affair, but I'd lean more to the belief that the basic conflict was doctrinal. and how explain the bitterness and totality of the Russian withdrawal from the land of bothers, taking even their plans with them? I think, ultimately, it made China, but I just can't see the USSR conduct here, especially not when they should have understood so clearly how adversity was their best ally. I watched the Khrushchev visit here with fascination and agree completely with your local reporter's evaluation. It was everywhere that way. It was also an eyeopener for many Americans. Whoda think of a bloody, dictatorial tyrant walking waround on enemy turf without battalions of of guards and wearing \$10 watches? That, too, was a watershed, and it had to have been followed by the U-2 affair to slow down what has ensured.

The works you cite are unknown to me, but the indictemtns of the 50s I do, if dimly, recall. But I think that ear is aneding, and there will be a "rehabilitation" of the vistins, could be of their work of the past, and think there will be of their work of the future, of which I hope on retirement you become part. It it inevitable that there will come a melding of honest writing and national need, even in Nixonian terms, on this subject. It will not be as is my specialty, that of pariahs.

Thanks much for taking the time. Thinking of these things is good for me as is your knowledge, which covers what mine does not. By the way, after the notes I made on Lamia In continued in it and I think the Asian parts will, in the end, interest you. They begin about page 85-88, somewhere in there, perhaps a bit earlier. I am finding it fascinating confirmation of my spot analysis based on inadequate raw material.

Best,

carbon more legible.

8 March 1972

Dear Harold:

Many thanks again for the magnificent flow of ~~xi~~ clips from the Washington Post. We're particularly glad to see those by Karnow and Marder. Don't always agree, but then who does ?

This will be a general reply to your mails of Feb 25, 28 and two on March 2, all stuffed with goodies which we've looked through and sampled but which remain to be read in detail.

In general I certainly agree with you that Nixon's main compulsion originating in his domestic situation, far worse than even hinted at, which accounts for the TV spectacular and the vast amount of time, manpower and money spent on it. I'm also inclined to agree that straightening out some of the imbalance in the international situation simply by recognizing a few realities also will give him more room to crack down domestically, after the election, of course. His whole character will lead him inevitably toward state socialism, merely the logical extension of what we already have, but the speed with which he goes after it may be determined in part by domestic disturbances or the lack thereof.

Your perception that Chou was keeping his distance during appearances on camera is excellent. It means that while Nixon was playing to his electorate, Chou was playing to his -- primarily the Chinese people, including the hard-line militarists, but also the proletariat of the entire world. You are quite right that the Chinese understood what was available to them and used it to perfection. The Chinese image of a statesman is that of a patient, sometimes indulgent scholar who knows exactly what he is doing when dealing with barbarians.

I had forgotten about Chou's arm. Was reminded by Bernard Kalb or someone from Peking who explained that it was broken and badly set during the Long March. This sounds right, but I have not had time to look it up and verify it in earlier works done at the time or soon afterward.

As to whether the Peking visit can develop into a major development that genuinely turns history along a more sensible ~~ix~~ path, I have only one very serious worry -- the possibility that our military will resort to tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam. This the Chinese will not stand for. Our military -- and Nixon did too at one time -- make a distinction between strategic and tactical weapons, claiming that tactical nukes are now conventional weapons. The Chinese will never agree to this. To them, the dropping of the atomic bomb on the Japanese was just as meaningful as to the Japanese -- we had not used it on the Germans. It doesn't matter that the Germans surrendered before we had such bombs. No one is ever going to convince any non-white person that we would have used it against the white Germans. Our entire record is too racist for that to be believed. So is Europe's, for that matter.

At every opportunity the Chinese say they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons in any situation. The implication is that if someone else uses them, watch out. They mean this. They will not stand for tactical nukes[^] anywhere in their part of the world. This can be depended upon.

Otherwise, as you yourself say, it is going to take many years to work out problems like Taiwan unless some new and now-undreamed-of formula can be found, simply because there are too many abysses to be bridged. There will be much jawing back and forth and mutual recrimination and bombast, but it's much to be doubted if the situation can ever again be quite as explosive as it has been at times in the past. Unless someone makes a horrible mistake, of course.

The Chinese have used Nixon's election campaign machinery to project world-wide an image of themselves which threatens no one, holds out the prospect of reasonable peace for everyone, and which is as promising as the Cold War (which it bids fair to defang) was threatening to every man alive on the planet. As I say, the only real threat to all this that I can see is the always present possibility that some hawk will take off into the world blue yonder and throw the fat back into the fire. How's that for an unproductive mixture of metaphors ?

You raise the question of whether it is fair to say that we drove the Chinese into the arms of the Russians, making the excellent point that there would have been, in any case, a great deal of fraternizing and solidarity in ideology. ~~to some~~. Quite true, but it would still have had to overcome the history of the two countries. While it is true that they never have fought a major war along their long border, it is also true that some of the reasons they were able to avoid such a war no longer hold true and that both ~~people~~ peoples are inclined to be paranoid about each other. For equally good historical reasons. Russia was overrun by the Mongols (who probably had a good many Chinese pressed into service at all levels), having conquered China and India) and Chinese history records many invasions from the direction of Russia -- China, Tartars, Hung, Mongols, and Manchus.

If anything, the Russians are more paranoid than the Chinese, and don't ever imagine that Mao & Co. are forgetting the way Stalin preferred to prop up Chiang Kai-shek and even kept his embassy going in Canton until after the Chinese Communists were established in Peking. Nor that the Russians wrung from Chiang and T.V. Soong after World War II a restoration of Czarist special privilege in Manchuria, and even in the mutual aid treaty with Mao of 1950 managed to spin out relinquishing those rights for another 10 years. There are all sorts of chronic Sino-Russian problems such as Mongolia and Sinkiang, not to mention Tibet, which make genuine Sino-Soviet friendship a difficult, ~~is~~ fragile thing.

It began breaking down, perceptibly, in 1948 when Mao, who was a Tito long before Tito ever was heard of, denounced Tito before Stalin dared to and thus forced Titoism into the open and also forced Stalin to accept Mao's support because he was boxed in and could do nothing else.

Almost immediately Mao made his famous "lean to one side" speech in which he said China should in general lean to the side of the socialist and developing nations while relying on herself to solve her own problems. This was the watershed in Chinese communist policy, and would have been ~~possible~~ impossible under the circumstances had not Pat Hurley squelched Mao's offer of friendship to the US and the Cold Warriors suppressed the fact that it had been made.

The circumstances were that America's reservoir of goodwill among the Chinese people, whether logically so or not, never had been higher, because of the defeat of Japan. Few Chinese spoke or read Russian, even few Chinese Communists. A thousand times as many spoke and read English.

Furthermore, for some reason I never have been able to understand fully, they just liked Americans as people and had little but suspicion for Russians of any political stripe. If I described the apparent rapport with Americans as somewhat astounding, I was referring to the phenomenon of two dramatically different peoples speaking and thinking in radically different languages, coming from radically different cultures, finding anything in common. But they did. In some cases individuals didn't hit it off, but in most cases they did. Laughter often was the common denominator. I don't think I've ever seen a Russian and a Chinese laughing together. Both are too busy being Russian or Chinese. The Chinese disliked our military during the treaty port days and thoroughly despised our missionaries, yet tolerated both with much less heartburn than they did those of other countries. I can only suggest that they found us less repugnant as foreigners than other foreigners, for reasons which are not at all clear except that as a class we had more money to spend.

The point of all this is that Mao took over a China which was prostrate from many years of civil war and almost as many years of foreign invasion. She had to have help of some kind. When Hurley and his backers saw to it that we weren't to provide it, Mao had to take second best. He took Russia. If he wasn't pushed into this decision, which was anything but popular with the great mass of the people, he was left no other choice.

When MacArthur went on his little rampage in Korea, in spite of Chou's warning not to come too close, that did it. Anti-Americanism became a politically viable thing in China and was exploited to the fullest to help consolidate the revolution through rallying to combat an external threat. Mao also used the occasion to get Russia to help build China's fighting force into the strongest in Chinese history.

Naturally, the Russians did not appreciate this, and it all added to their own distrust and suspicions about the Chinese. Ever since I caught on, sometime during World War II, that Stalin was supporting Chiang instead of his Communist buddy Mao, I have been conscious that the Russians suffer from a suppressed guilt complex about China. This may help explain some of Khrushchev's silence and glossing over of questions relating to China. They just don't like to think about it, neither as Russians nor as Communists.

This of course grossly oversimplifies Khrushchev's role in Sino-Russian relations. At times he tried very hard -- harder even than Nixon because as a Russian he knew there was a significance to going to Peking which Nixon may not yet fully realize -- but the fact that in the end he gave it up as a bad job and withdrew all Russian technicians from China in 1960 meant only that he felt hopelessly outwitted and outmaneuvered. Which, no doubt, he was. Rome simply didn't know what to do with Byzantium.

I haven't read his book, but saw it in paperback the other day and shall pick it up, hoping some time to find time to read it. When K. was here that time several years ago and explored the mysteries of a supermarket and other local attractions, the AP ~~age~~ assigned a veteran police reporter type to go along. He came back marveling at K's common touch -- said he could just as easily be a ward ~~Kramer~~ ^{Heeler} from Fresno if he weren't limited to speaking Russian. I believed it. K always seemed to me to personify that admirable thing about the Russians -- their willingness to be completely honest and candid once they felt sure you wouldn't stab them in the back. And they have a pride and open generosity under the same circumstances which has to be experienced to be believed.

Several people have told me about the program you mentioned, Misunderstanding China. Apparently an excellent job, closely paralleling if not duplicating a book written in 1964 called "A Curtain of Ignorance," written by Felix Greene. Felix is a cousin of Graham Greene, ^{and} an old World War II BBC sidekick of Elsa Thompson, who went to China first in 1957 and wrote a book thereafter called China, the Country Americans Are Not Allowed to Know. A Curtain of Ignorance was partly researched by Julian Schuman, a post-World War II ABC correspondent in China who stayed on after the revolution to work with Bill Powell on the China Weekly Review after the reds took over. Bill, his wife and Julian were indicted for treason here in the early 1950s but after several years the indictment was dismissed for lack of evidence. Julian went back to China with Felix in the early 1960s and has been there ever since. His name has appeared recently on a few UPI stories out of Peking, but I gather he's working mostly for the Peking government. However that may be, A Curtain of Ignorance is a magnificent compilation of the lies and halftruths that have been spread about China from the beginning. Felix published a new book about a year ago called The Enemy, meaning imperialism. The job done on it by the publishing industry closely parallels the one done on F-U. We had a postcard from him today from Peking. He's been there since November. Says the Nixon invasion has come and gone, and everyone is calm and totally unimpressed.

Enclosed, among other things, are four articles by Service on his recent trip to China (before Nixon) which we thought you might enjoy.

Thanks again for everything you've been sending, and best from us both.


jdw