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Post script
EPILOGUE

Investigating the investigation of the murder of President Kennedy, published with an estimated 10,000,000 words of what, for lack of an accurate designation, has come to be known by the official designation of "evidence" and an estimated 300 cubic feet of files of incalculable wordage and all that is available that the government ^{works} ~~is~~ ^{shunned, ~~is~~ an endless job that could not possibly be completed in an adult lifetime devoted to nothing else.}

In my own "Report On The Warren Report" I have sought to analyze each of the more important aspects, as I could, from the documentation I could find. What I could and did find depended upon the time I had available, for I was simultaneously an author, one full-time function, a publisher, which entails more numerous specialities, and the researcher. To a large degree what my research into the files yielded was controlled by instinct and luck, for they are arranged in a manner designed to frustrate logic and waste enormous amounts of time. It was also controlled by what was available.

Initially, 100% of the staff papers were denied. It is no distortion or exaggeration to say they were suppressed. Beginning about the first of 1967, a few ^{behind} were allowed to peek from oblivion. I know of no one else who has, if he found any, made any use of them. Meager as is the medical-autopsy data the Commission permitted itself to possess and dubious, evasive and woefully incomplete as that tiny percentage of these 300 cubic feet is, I postponed that part of my inquiry and writing in the hope that I would be able to drawn upon these still-secret working papers.

When this could no longer be delayed, still seeking what had been suppressed, I had to begin writing this book.

~~Finally~~ I requested and paid for the Xeroxing of every paper in the essential files. Here I ran into the obstacle set forth in the correspondence. ^{appending} Finally, I did get all but what I was told had been withheld, two unidentified

memos, four short pages. They and a then-undisclosed number of additional documents would be available simultaneously. The promised date of by September five days. 15 was delayed only ~~xxxxxx~~ The ~~xxxx~~ official reasons for this delay are set forth in the correspondence. They do not make sense to me.

In any event, on September 20, 1967, ~~research~~ researchers, of whom I seem to have been the only one with manifested interest, ^{we} permitted to examine these two documents that until then were withheld from the J.F.K. 4-1 or "autopsy" file, ^{plus} and twelve additional boxes, each holding about four inches of documents. It should be apparent that ~~about a~~ ^{two (1/2)} stack of documents ~~two feet high~~ requires a considerable amount of time for the briefest scanning. An inquiry of this sort should, properly, proceed more slowly. Were I to do that, however, I would never complete this task. This is a subject that goes to the heart of the democratic society, one from which every national act and policy ~~stem~~ subsequent to November 22, 1967, stems. There was a change in administration and there were changes in policies brought about by this murder and by it alone. The murder and the analysis of its official investigation, already established as at best entirely inadequate and dishonest and at worst a deliberate fraud, possibly conspiratorial, therefore cannot wait the slow workings of history and the as yet unmanifested interested of professional historians, the official "scholars". Nor can it await the belated assumption of their responsibilities by the ^w layers who were the first to abdicate their responsibilities; that of the press, which has concerned itself only with sycophancy and slander; or an official investigation, of which there is no sign.

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So, I have to make spot decisions ^{on} of what I will read and how carefully I will examine or not examine each ~~fix~~ paper within a folder, each folder within a file, each file in each box. This I had to do without benefit of any really ^{em}an- ingful guide to the contents of the considerable stack of materials. Our government can burn millions in Vietnam every day of the year, but it cannot afford to spend more than the part-time work of two men in going over ~~the monumental chaos~~ ^{the monumental chaos} dumped on the National Archives by the Commission ~~when it folded~~. No matter how competently or with

GENERAL

Alphabetical Files of Outgoing Letters and Internal Memoranda

Box 1 A-R [Letters to witnesses and the general public]

" 2 S-Z; General Circulars

RANKIN
(IN GENERAL)

Box 3 ^{GREEN} ^{MEMO}
Rankin, Commission (by word) Staff (by word)

Box 4 Commission; Staff; Memoranda for the Rankin; Internal Circulars

(3) Document

Box 5 Agriculture - White House

Government Agencies Involved

have been of correspondence, memoranda, and parts
of various documents relating to Federal and
other governmental bodies also

what dedication these two men perform their functions, they ^{immersed in} confront a vast verbal accumulatuon and can do only so much each day, especially because they are also the ones who make what has been released available to those who seek it and because of the necessary additional time consumed in working with materials that are, properly, kept under lock and key and may be examined only under guard.

They cannot make an index to the clutter, nor can them make a meaningful table of ^{its} contents. They can compose only the most rudimentary guides. For these ~~ixxxxxxxkxxxxkxxxx~~ two feet of documents, here that is:

Nil-attached.

This addition to the ^{already-} written book cannot exhaust-cannot, really, begin to reflect what may be stashed away in these ~~two~~ essentially-undescribed ^{two} feet of large illegible carbon copies made less legible by repeated Xeroxing. When any single sheet of paper may have the most vital significance, this is a considerable defect and a liability. ^{17/} That is unavoidable, but the reader should be aware of it.

By the time a single man could study two feet of documents with the requisite care, there would be another two feet demanding the same or more attention, and there would be no writing, no book, nothing publicly available. I see no alternative but ^{wonder} silence to this undesirable and unfortunately incomplete approach. However, ^{because I} in printing the entire document wherever possible, the reader can see for himself that I have taken nothing out of context and have restricted myself to data ~~ixxxxxxxkxxxxkxxxx~~ ^{essential} whose meaning cannot be altered by the availability of documents still suppressed. Further information might strengthen the case against the Commission and its staff, but they cannot change what these documents say and mean.

From the brief description above, it is apparent these 12 boxes of Commission papers do not focus on the medical and autopsy ~~evidence~~ ^{facts} of the case. Here I ~~also~~ include only what is relevant in this book of what I have discovered buried in these until-now secret files. The medical-autopsy content of these files is but a tiny fraction.

In what I have gone over, there is not a single page that in any way disputes this book, not one that even indicates I have made any unfair or unwarranted representation in this book or the earlier-completed four. Everything I have seen substantiates my analysis and conclusions.

129 While it would have been better, from a literary perspective, in any event, had this material been worked into the appropriate chapters, it may, perhaps, be not without value that the reader ~~can~~ see what was in the files that ^{were suppressed} was denied researchers for so long a period, just how contrary it is to the official story so lustily propegandized throughout the world. It may give him ^(additional) an insight into how the Commission worked and thought and into the minds, ~~if~~ ^{if} got the hearts, of several of the more prominent ⁿ staff members.

Nora Spore

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Howard Willens, staff director, Department of Justice employee, favorite and trusted of the Washington Post, was an important Commission official. He also wrote many memos, most of which, without doubt, I haven't seen. ~~One released for study and until then,~~ whatever gentler word the Commission's apologists would prefer, *me* in reality suppressed until September 20, 1967, when most of the interest in the report had slaked in response to the tremendous propaganda campaign in support of the Report and attacking ~~the~~ its critics, is ~~in my possession~~ *just made available.* among those in my possession. Under date of August 8, 1964, Willens sent General Counsel Rankin a critique of "Chapter IV - Draft dated 7/21/64."

Without exception, every copy made for me of those reports suppressed until that day is exceedingly pale, more so than necessary, even if all come from indistinct carbon copies. This one is no exception. The date seems to be "7/21." It may, ~~be~~ if one every saw an original, be a day or so later. My copy came from the internal staff memoranda file. There is another in File ~~XXXX~~ "Rep 2" and, presumably, other copies are in other files. Many copies were made before the one Xeroxed for me.

In the Report as issued Chapter IV is "The Assassin". From internal evidence, ~~in my possession~~ Willens' memo discusses what, in essence, was in this chapter. Comparison of this illegible critique and the final, printed Report indicates much of what Willens demanded he got.

On the second page he has this entrancing paragraph: Lil- numbered 3, all.

Here he says "why weaken our case by considering whether Oswald was mechanically capable of the crime? What difference does it make if it was impossible for him to have done that shooting?" The really truthful statement was not intended to be interpreted as I do:

"I think our case remains the same even if Oswald had limited or negligible capacity with a rifle". This is exactly true. The case remained the same. *7/20/64* it was a frameup. The best shots the Commission could get, under improved conditions, could not duplicate the shooting attributed to Oswald (WHITEWASH X 26), and Oswald was

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a truly lousy shot who, when last tested, on an easy course, scored but a single point more than the absolute minimum demanded of every serviceman (WHITEWASH, "The Marksman"). In the appraisal of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, he was "a rather poor 'shot'." (WHITEWASH 30).

~~Excerpt~~ ~~graph~~ ~~letter~~: Lil- numbered 5-all

That this seems to say is that he didn't get the rifle at his Dallas post-office box, although the Commission says he did, in Dallas.

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That Willens is a lawyer trained in the adversary system, in which he has an opponent to present the other side, is here clear. This nine-page critique has 41 numbered items. They seek to ^{now} enforce in the report not that meager bit of the other side of the evidence that, unwanted, crept in, but a partisan presentation of what the Commission wanted believed. This is what permeates his demands and suggestions. Not ^{is} that he was unaware of it. In the seventh item he argues the presence of an old, hidden palmprint on the rifle that could not have been made during the assassination is sufficient (there being no other prints on the rifle allegedly used and hidden in great haste). By ^{now} 14, when he recognizes the weakness of attempting to use the discovery of Oswald's fingerprints on curtains he ^{is} was paid to handle, that being his job, as a mean of placing him at the sixth-floor window at the time of the assassination, ^{is} he forthrightly states: In an effort to strengthen the prosecution case, not get the truth out, ^{Willens}

"The basic question is when ^(emphasis in original) he was at the window and when we come near to that question we back away from it. Furthermore, we never do make an effort to refute the many other possibilities for these fingerprints which are consistent with Oswald's innocence".

What Willens might have added is that the report never states these "possibilities" that are "consistent with Oswald's innocence".

Recognizing the great weakness of using ^{The witness} Howard Leslie Brennan as an "eyewitness" to identify Oswald at that window ^{with} (Whitewash 39-42) ^{with} and another "similar" ^{with} (really meaning no identification that had meaning), ^{with} he argues in his

18th item, "I would eliminate eliminate this comparison here and perhaps make a reference to it later on when the Tippit shooting is discussed." This confirms exactly what I said in WHITEWASH ("The Tippit Murder"), that if the Tippit murder hadn't happened, it would have had to have been invented, to pin the rep of cop-killer on Oswald, ^{offic / stigma} to make the ~~obscure~~ ^{more making the very weak} evidence of him as the assassin seem credible. The incredible Brennan is, to Willens (item 19) "a good witness" and the Commission "should reaffirm" his testimony "as the source of the shots".

The reader will recall that the Report argued that Oswald took the alleged assassination rifle to work the morning of the assassination ^{only} because he was seen to carry a bag. The testimony was given by Wesley Buel Frazier and his sister, Linnie May Randle (WHITEWASH 12-23). Oswald is said to have claimed he had curtain rods in this bag. All the testimony about the bag and its contents are 100% against the Commission's conclusions. The Commission got around this by simply ^{saying that} saying what it wanted is right and ~~incorrect~~ all of its testimony was wrong. The evidence was ^{that} that bag could not have contained ^{that} the rifle, ~~as~~ the

Commission, in the absence of any testimony whatsoever, simply said the rifle was disassembled, ^{Had this been only the bag of this, by inferring that it would have held it.} which left the situation still one of total impossibility, but a few inches closer to possible. ^{like} The Commission conducted no investigation to see whether Oswald had carried curtain-rods with him, ~~as~~ the FBI before it had failed to do. So, Willens wants the Commission to conclude (as it did) that "He lied about the curtain-rod story and the paper bag" (Item 23). ~~It~~ It is not inconsistent for him then (Item 24) to argue that "The discussion...regarding disassembling seems to have limited relevance". His concept of the use of the "Frazier-Randle testimony", under a reorganization he proposed, ^(Item 22) is "so ~~to~~ ^{as} to prove that Oswald carried the ~~bag~~ paper bag to work, and then turn to the question whether the bag contained the assassination weapon." What this means, simply, in the absence of proof that the bag held the rifle, is that the Report would be reorganized to poison the case against Oswald. Prove that he carried a bag and then pretend that the bag held the rifle, therefore, he took the rifle to work. This is what

the Commission and the Report did. It is contrary to the evidence. It would not
open
have been dared in court. nature.

The entire memo if of this ~~character~~

There again, ample reason for keeping these files away from those
researching the assassination and its investigation. For whatever reason, this is
exactly what happened. For whatever reason, when the question of the integrity of
the work and ~~the~~ conclusions was a hot issue toward the end of 1966 and early in
1967, this and the ample similar evidence was suppressed. They are pertinent to
the character of the Commission and that of its work.

Justice Spence