

add on withheld docs.

~~on 214~~

*use in appendix?
Ara Speer*

In the correspondence appendix the reader will find the exchanges of letters reflecting that I was denied access to four pages-two memos-in the JFK 4-1 file, that on the autopsy. I could not then and I do not now understand the reason for it. The Archivist wrote that it was to release the documents in an orderly, chronological manner. The later one of these two is dated ¹⁹⁶⁴ May 12. Before this question arose I ^{at} had not only obtained from the files, but + had by then printed published staff memoranda of later date, for example that of Editor Goldberg dated May 25 (PHOTOGRAPHIC WHITEWASH 265).

The promised availability date I went to the Archives for them but they were delayed another week. Thus I did not obtain copies until September 21, 1967. By then this book had been written and I cannot weave their contents and significance in the appropriate places. On that day also ten additional boxes of until-then suppressed staff memos, ~~xxxxxxx~~ letters and similar data were made available, all at the same moment. It took me about a working day to read, in too great haste and in many cases just skimming, about a third of a single box. Releasing such large amounts of data at a single time means that much of the content will be effectively denied researchers by the volume alone, for without subsidy the amount of time required to just scan this volume precludes it. The net effect is a kind of suppression, ^{by} ~~for~~ the withholding of these documents, ^{in whose name} until interest in investigating the investigation and the assassination had ~~by then~~ slacked off. No one else wanted to see these documents. Not a single additional person was working in this ~~to~~ archive that day.

At my invitation, Congressman Theodore Kupferman and a member of his staff spent a few moments examining the ~~Nix and Muchmore~~ Orville Nix (WHITEWASH II, 2,132, 174,180,211,214; PHOTOGRAPHIC WHITEWASH, 16, 123-4,277,280) and Mary Muchmore (WHITEWASH II, 2,132,180-1,211,214; PHOTOGRAPHIC WHITEWASH, 16,42,45-6,123,176,281) movies and a few of the Zapruder slides. They, however, did not have time to examine any documents. So, there was no great demand when the documents were made available, which is not inconsistent with the ardent federal desire.

These two brief documents, these four pages the Xeroxing of which requires less than a minute, disclose Arlen Specter's uneasiness over the testimony he had elicited, over the record he had made for the Commission. They can be interpreted to mean he suspected or believed the record was a false one. There is no doubt that he considered it an undependable one. That was his way -and the Commission's-of investigating the murder of the President.

Specter did what he knew was wrong and inadequate and thereafter wrote self-justifying memoranda.

Having been content to avoid what he, as a lawyer, knows was the required "best evidence", the pictures and X-rays of the autopsy, at the one time they were essential, in taking the autopsy testimony, he later addressed appeals to Boss Rankin ^{asking} that these film be shown Dr. ^{that} Humes and the doctor be examined thereafter in the presence of an official stenographer. These film were such an obvious minimum requirement of competent testimony on the autopsy, so clearly the "best evidence", the legal necessity, that beginning with my first book I so called it, with a ^{out} single protest from the odd bag of semi-official, unofficial and official apologists. Showing them to the doctors as the basis for their testimony involved no question of good taste, for these are the doctors who, as I then wrote, took the President's body apart as their unhappy task required. For this President, this Commission -this lawyer-the minimum of the law was too much.

Specter got his lollypop May 25, 1964, when he staged his "reconstruction" of the crime in Dallas. He acknowledged to U.S. News and World Report that he had seen an unauthenticated picture that was said to be of the non-fatal injury. It is my private information that this was shown him by Secret Service Inspector Tom Kelley, who seems to have had these film either in his custody or available to him. (Federal standards and concepts of good ~~xxx~~ taste are odd: it is not good taste for the medical experts whose testimony absolutely required them to see these film to do so as the basis of their testimony, but it was perfectly alright for the Secret Service to have and display them.)

None of this is in the record. ~~PRESENTLY (THESE) (XXXX)~~ In the massive Report and the 10,000,000 words in those 26 volumes, there is no indication anyone ever saw those pictures and X-rays. In fact, every word about them is suppressed.

And, unhappily, there were more than two memoranda withheld, more than four pages. I had been given no inkling of an additional, very important one that is entirely inconsistent with the official propoganda.

Not a single page of these documents or several accidentally withheld when I got copies of the Connally files is ^{clear} legible. Not a single one is suitable for photographic reproduction. I have been able to darked them and make it possible to read most of the words and guess most of those not clear enough to read. Here again we see the character of the most essential evidence on the murder of the President: with clear, original copies and countless clear carbon copies in the government's files, there are, in the archive to the murder and its official investigation, only pale eye-breakers, remote-generation Xeroxed copies that defy and weary those who seek the truth of this foul crime and the additional, unnecessary tragedy that is the "investigation".

On April ³⁰ ~~12~~, ^{and a half} a month after he took the testimony of Fumes and the other autopsy doctors, Specter addressed this memo to Rankin:

extra space