

There is one additional anguish Harper and Row spared us, and for this we may be grateful. The customary blurbing on the dust jacket is pitched in subdued Manchester modesty. The last words on the back flap credit "Jacket designed by J. Caroff Associates, from an idea by William Manchester". This "idea" reserves the entire back panel for Manchester's picture, appropriately posed with pen poised over a blank piece of scratch paper. Thus, there is less space for words. The inside flap pretends a bond between the author and the President because both were in service in the Pacific in World War II, a bond that equally ties hundreds of thousands of Americans of that generation to the martyred President.

The settlement of the Kennedy suit against the author and the publisher lacked the fine print that was also missing from the original agreement. It did specify that the book would carry a disclaimer of Kennedy approval or endorsement. That appears in small type on the copyright page, which no one reads. It says, "Harper & Row wishes to make it clear that neither Mrs. John F. Kennedy nor Senator Robert F. Kennedy has in any way approved or endorsed the material appearing in this book." But as in his original dealings, Manchester and his agent made no reference to their plans for the serialization of the book and the profitable collateral rights which derive from its auspices, not

its authorship, so in the settlement of the suit and in agreeing to this disclaimer did the author and the publisher have their fingers crossed behind their backs as they spat thrice over their left shoulders.

The dust jacket advertises, "...Mrs. Kennedy realized that she and others would be obliged to share their recollections of the national tragedy with a responsible writer - and so she and Senator Kennedy asked Mr. Manchester to set down a history of the assassination ... At the invitation of the Chief Justice, Mr. Manchester was a privileged observer at the Warren Commission inquiry. Meanwhile, however, he had developed his own sources of information. Operating out of headquarters in the National Archives, for two years he worked twelve to fifteen hours a day, conducting a major historical investigation ... accumulating forty-five volumes and portfolios of transcribed tapes, shorthand, documents and exhibits, all of which will be deposited in the Kennedy library ... The result is a powerful narrative which, in the opinion of the publisher, is both a significant contribution to history and an eminent literary achievement."

Does one get the idea that Mrs. Kennedy vouches for Manchester's "responsibility", despite her suit? It is not accidental.

The description of Manchester's special "privileged" position is accurate. He enjoyed what was denied every other writer, a gift of tremendous cash and literary value. The description of his research is a largely meaningless repetition of the successful Look commercialization. What is a "volume" or a "portfolio"?

Has it a hundred pages or five hundred per volume or portfolio? Is it single- or triple-spaced - or handwritten? Of course, the real measure is not of bulk but of content. This tasteless advertising of Manchester's great and anguished labor, less than that of others working in the field, makes of it a commodity, not the obligation of a serious writer on a serious subject.

To what extent and how will the national heritage be enriched by his deposit in the Kennedy Library, which he and Harper's also treat as an advertising gimmick? Of what will it consist?

The lack of a single footnote of reference throughout his text, a surprising omission in a work of self- and publisher-proclaimed scholarship, denies us any evaluation of this treasure. We have no way of knowing which of his 350,000 words comes from what interview, what tape, what volume or portfolio, what strike of intellectual lightning illuminated which of the minds of those 300 "witnesses" he interviewed and thus released for our history and ennoblement what was previously locked in which of the 300 minds and memories.

From this "powerful" narrative we must guess for ourselves who is the source of what and what its credibility and accuracy. By comparison with the official inquiry, we see that this "significant contribution" is in ~~exquisite~~ ^{exquisitely} fine detail a denial of that official account of what transpired when the President was murdered. One of the two is wrong, if not both. Manchester can not be right in saying one thing and the Commission right in saying another about the same thing, coming from the same witness, about the same time, event, observation or recollection.

So, without the minimum we expect of other "scholars", especially "historians", which is what Manchester calls himself, without the obligatory footnoting of sources, we are left to imagine the authority for what he in each instance says and quotes. Thus, he and the Commission are at opposite poles. When its Report, adorned with thousands of footnotes, appeared with as much and as unseemly fanfare as Manchester's "achievement", its footnotes had no meaning for the source material was "top secret". Its subsequent release in 26 massive tomes was designed to restrict it to the smallest possible distribution. The design was successful. Very few people felt like spending \$76.00 to check a single footnote. Just as few could take the time for the combing of so many thousands of references. Those few of us who did found the labor less than rewarding and not corroborative of the Commission's conclusions.

Manchester's publisher makes unstinted reference to his vast accumulation of "documents and exhibits", yet with blank pages remaining at the end of the book and with others available and economically more than feasible at its \$10.00 price, there is not a single document printed with it, in type or facsimile, a not reassuring omission. There are six charts and maps which might be considered "exhibits". They add nothing to the Commission's work and have little meaning, unless one considers a sketch of its accommodations captioned "Plan of Air Force One" and aid to understanding of the crime of the century, or a map of the southeastern quadrant of the United States, complete with all the capital cities, captioned with an eye for impressive detail,

"Flight Path of Air Force One 2:47 P.M. CST to 6:05 P.M. EST, November 22, 1963", a "significant contribution to history". There is a two-page map ~~the~~ of part of Washington that, if desired by the publisher or author, could conveniently have fitted on less than a single page without sacrifice of detail or legibility. Were these pages numbered, a convenience if not an essential in a work of reference, they would be 684 and 685. Apparently, someone in publishing authority deemed this map important, if not for citation then for other purposes, for in addition to these two pages, with nothing but the skimpy proper name index and seven following blank pages intervening, it is repeated on the inside back cover of the book and the page preceding it, the only difference being the use of two tones of blue rather than of gray for the background.

This is not to say there is no appendix. There are four, beginning on page 651 with "Words of President Kennedy which were to have been read at his graveside by Senator Edward M. Kennedy". The second appendix is headed identically save for the substitution of the name of the then Attorney General. The third is modestly entitled, "Jacqueline Kennedy to Nikita Khrushchev, December 1, 1963". Each of these would take up a single page or less were it not for the large display type at the top and the generous but attractive blank space which together consume about half of each page. Appendix IV is simply entitled, "Chronology (Eastern Standard Time)". Here it requires four pages. Where identically reproduced on the inside front cover and the following page, it needs but half this space.

So there is, too, an appendix, if mostly repetition and if exclusively not of original material relating to the murder.

It is followed by something briefly entitled "Sources" that, according to the table of contents, is not part of the appendix. According to the table of contents, the next thing is the index, but as a sort of afterthought, centered at the bottom of this listing, is the notation, "A section of charts and diagrams begins on page 678".

There is no page bearing the number "678". This lack of numbering on pages that should be numbered, the seeming improvisation in the table of contents and the seven blank pages at the end of the book, which are expensive, suggest emergency, last-minute alterations in it. This would not be surprising with the problems it and its author and publisher faced once it was subject to litigation and republished in Look and some of its contents became known for the first time. With this, other litigation was more than possible and changes were made.

Manchester breaks his sources into three groups: "Author's Interviews" (660-9), "Unpublished Documents" (669-75), and "Published Material" (675-7), which is subdivided into "A. Books" and "B. Articles".

In the second category, on pages 672-3, he credits himself with these hitherto "unpublished" charts he considers appropriate to the story of the assassination. Look enjoyed the same high opinion of his pretendedly original contribution to the available knowledge and published one of "his" charts. It also appears in the book, on an unnumbered page following the appendix. Were these

pages numbered, this supposedly "unpublished" chart of the "Parkland Hospital Emergency Area" would bear the number 680.

This "unpublished" diagram, with which the ever humble, thoughtful and gracious Manchester, considerably credits others with helping - his exact words (672) are, "Prepared with the cooperation of Sgt. R. E. Dugger and the Hospital staff" - was first "unpublished" as "Price Exhibit No. 6" (21H157), where it is more complete in the original form. It shows the existence of doors Manchester does not, the directions in which they open, of rooms and divisions of rooms the existence of which he does not acknowledge, and has explanatory text he does not. This is the sort of triviality of detail in which, in his text, he dwells on at point-less length. The inaccuracy and incompleteness of his diagram is its only claim to originality.

However, there is something in Manchester's version not in the "unpublished" official one. In his list he describes it as "showing where principal figures stood" (672). On his chart these entries are printed in invisible ink. Not a single name is added. The initials "LBJ" affixed at two different points is the total reference that can be interpreted to mean "principal figures". His first-named widow is not a "principal figure", surprisingly enough, nor is any one of the many others about whom he goes into great and useless detail in the text.

But perhaps Manchester explains this elsewhere in his exposition of his "Sources" (659-60):

Behind this book are two chief sources of fact: the notes of participants, written or taped at the time of these events or soon thereafter, and the author's own interviews. A third

vein, which I explored carefully but seldom mined, was the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy's twenty-six-volume conglomeration of testimony, depositions, and exhibits.

Thus we can explain this discrepancy, this departure from truth and fact, in Manchester's own words, "I explored carefully but seldom mined." We have a fine example of his care and the proof of his not mining - not the only one, either. He is consistent in both his "care" and his steadfast refusal to "mine".

On page 673 he lists as another "unpublished" source, "Parkland Hospital Registration Sheet, 12:31-3:42 P.M. CST, November 22, 1963". By the time he noted five more "unpublished" sources and turned the page, he had "Registration of Patients, Parkland Memorial Hospital, Dallas County Hospital District Emergency Room, 12:31 P.M.-3:42 P.M., November 22, 1963". This is careless of him for these are, of course, the same thing. This is padding, as are other items and, in fact, as is much of the text of the book and its entire style. This information was first "unpublished" in facsimile as "Price Exhibit No. 5" (21H156). With this "unpublished" data Manchester was too "careful". It has a proper, printed title, "REGISTRATION OF PATIENTS", under which is printed "Dallas County Hospital District - Emergency Room". It is not identified as "12:31-3:42" but has an individual number printed in the upper left-hand corner, "01811". The first listed patient was entered at 12:31 and the last, on the very last line of the sheet, at 3:42. It is the second and fifth patients in whom he and we are interested, and we discuss this elsewhere. At this point our attention is on his "care" and his

~~used~~^{refused} to "mine" the official evidence, preferring his own more careful and more meticulous investigation. But it is too bad that, because this "Registration of Patients" is in error (6H150), Manchester did ~~not~~ "mine" just a little. The President is recorded "E.R." (presumably representing "Emergency Room") 24740 - and he was not. He was 24743. Alas, Look, with or without Manchester's encouragement, liked this wrong number so much that it used it as the title of the second instalment. Look devoted an entire very expensive black-printed page to it. The page really is solid black except for a dozen words in white and the title in blood red. The title is "CASE No. 24740".

He does not, however, exaggerate in describing the 26 volumes as a "conglomeration". This is really an understatement. It is an organized chaos. But Manchester was a "privileged observer" at the Commission's hearings. He had daily knowledge of and access to its exhibits during its life and, in a private office, no less, in the Archives when no one else could see them. He should not have been confused. He should be able to presume he understood what was happening. Unless he moved the cot he had in his Archives office to the hearing rooms, he should have known of his other "unpublished" medical evidence. All but two of those statements he listed as "unpublished" are published by the Commission. These are the statements of:

Peter N. Geilich, hospital administrative assistant (Price Exhibit No. 8, 21H176-89);

Nurse Margaret Hinchcliffe (Price Exhibit No. 30, 21H239-40);

R. G. Holcomb (his name is Robert and he signs "Bob"), another administrative assistant (Price Exhibit No. 32, 21H245-50);

Steve Landregan, still and her administrative assistant (Price Exhibit No. 7, 21H158-75. This could have given Manchester trouble because it is unsigned, but not if he listened to the testimony of Charles Jack Price or read it, 6H150, for Price identified the statement as Landregan's);

Nurse Bertha L. Lozano (Price Exhibit No. 20, 21H213);

Nurse's Aide Era Lumpkin (Price Exhibit No. 16, 16H208-9);

Nurse's Aide Rosa M. Majors, (Price Exhibit No. 23, 16H-220-1);

Nurse Doris M. Nelson (Price Exhibits Nos. 4, 21H155, and 31, 21H241-4, and testimony, 6H143-7. The "m" is for Mae);

Price, C. J. (his name is Charles Jack and Manchester calls him "Jack", Price Exhibits Nos. 33 and 34, 16H255-67, and testimony, 6H148-52);

Nurse's Aide Shirley Randall (Price Exhibit No. 22, 21H-217-9);

Dr. Tom Shires (his name is George T., Exhibit 392, part of which is also printed in the appendix to the Report, and testimony, 6H104-13); and

Director of Nursing Services Elizabeth L. Wright (Price Exhibit No. 11, 16H193-202).

At first I wondered if it were possible that Manchester interviewed all of these people privately because he did not trust the Commission. He lists his private interviews in the appendix (660-9). Some of them are a little confusing, for "Deputy Chief Charles Batchelor" has his "Position at 12 Noon, Nov. 22, 1963" given as "Dallas police officer (Assistant Chief)", and "Carmine Bellino", immediately after whose name "CPA" appears, is described not as a certified public accountant but as "Washington attorney to the Kennedy family". Passing over this list of those Manchester felt it important to interview personally and their positions will not increase the confusion and just may tend to diminish it. This, of course, is important, for the major contribution of this eminent self-described historian to the source material of those historians of the future perhaps not yet born, this most basic

of all sources of all of the important information on the assassination, this definitive work on the crime of the century, should be as unconfused as humanly possible. Manchester himself has burdened it more than most books would survive. His plea when there was superficial criticism of his work as it appeared in Look was that it be judged in its entirety, not in its twice-book-length excerpting. His loud response when the Kennedys raised questions about its content was that he would not stain the "integrity" of his work by altering it. So I will accommodate him and not analyze this list per se.

But because of his own tabulation of "unpublished" sources upon which he drew, to be certain that I did him no injustice, because I knew these statements had, in fact, been published, having myself finished a book drawing upon them more than two years before his "book of the century" was published, I did compare those "unpublished" statements published by the Commission and also listed as his "unpublished" sources by Manchester with his list of those he interviewed.

To his everlasting credit I acknowledge that of those twelve tabulated above, he did, in fact, interview two: Landregan and Price.

In deference to his unending invocation of the "integrity" of his work and his plea that it be judged on its "entirety", we can be generous and concede that, in converting these statistics into percentages and then assuming that he used not the Commission's published statements but his own interviews in these two instances; and then assume further that there was no duplication,

or that some useful purpose was served by not using the Commission's published data from these two sources, we can concede him a maximum ~~percentage~~ of 16-2/3 percent "integrity", judged on the "entirety". This is not at all bad if compared with the rest of his assassination data.

I would encourage those less generous to withhold ~~his~~ judgment, not to evaluate this as a minimum of 83-1/3 percent inaccuracy until they have evaluated the entire "entirety", and I shall not do it with the appendix. I address only these few narrow aspects which bear some relationship to the assassination, no matter how distant and if less intimate than I would prefer. Certainly, what the medical personnel had to say is pertinent, if properly used.

Manchester is critical of the superfluity of doctors in the emergency room. His scientific opinion (for he is a scientist as well as a historian, an expert on ballistics and marksmanship and many other sciences, as we see elsewhere) is that three would have sufficed and done better than his count of seventeen. Properly, perhaps, he does not make the mistake for which he criticizes others. He did not, from his own tabulation, interview a single one of them, despite the listing of Dr. "Tom" Shires, who attended Governor Connally.

The soul~~of~~ consistency, Manchester refers to only four doctors in his "entire" book: Dr. Charles J. Carrico (183,222); Dr. Marion T. Jenkins (183,187,188,213,409,524); "Dr. McClelland" (524); and "Dr. Malcolm ('Mac') Perry" (184,185,186,187,188 - the indexer padded a bit, too - 215-6,218,221-2,432-3,524).

He did not interview Dr. Perry. This is unfortunate, for among other things Dr. Perry is quoted in the oldest existing handwritten copy of the autopsy, drafted two days after the assassination, as having told the autopsy surgeons that the President had been shot from the front, leaving an inference of both perjury and subornation of perjury. This also does not make easier an understanding of Manchester's "explanation" of his consistent use of the first names and nicknames of prominent people. It is not, he insists, name-dropping, not a literary device. It is just that once he met people they preferred this informality. But he never interviewed "Mac" Perry.

Had he "mined" the Commission's work just a trifle, he could have recorded for those breath-holding historians of ~~ax~~ the future that "Dr. McClelland" is Dr. Robert N. McClelland and that he did make statements and give testimony about the assassination, although Manchester's reference is to his presence when Oswald was on the operating table. Then this basic work could also have recorded that Dr. McClelland was not in accord with the official attribution of the cause of the President's death (Exhibit 392, R526-7) and that he persisted in this disagreement in his testimony (6H30-9). This obdurate "superfluous" doctor said "the cause of death was due to the massive head and brain injury from a gunshot wound of the left temple", not the back of the head, indicative of a shot from the front.

If not his readership of the future, perhaps his audience of today, undoubtedly the largest any book ever had, might also have been interested in noting what Manchester did not, that Dr.

McClelland was not called to Washington to impart his knowledge and beliefs to the members of the Commission, who might then have examined him, but instead was questioned in Dallas by Assistant Counsel Arlen Specter at 3:25 p.m. on March 25, 1964.

But here again it is necessary to concede consistency to Manchester, for he does not in any of the third of a million words in his book refer to the information in the "unpublished" published statement and testimony of Dr. "Tom" Shires. This is not at all surprising when it is understood that Dr. Shires was in charge only of Governor Connally's case. It is even less surprising when it is further understood that he alone of the doctors interrogated in Dallas swore to the presence of a fragment of bullet in the Governor's chest and, likewise, was not presented to the members of the Commission. Nor does Manchester refer to Dr. Robert Roeder Shaw, who swore that there were more than three grains of metal missing from that magical bullet with the built-in intelligence and a control finer than anything launched from Cape Kennedy, that marvelous Exhibit 399 whose capacity to inflict seven non-fatal injuries upon both the President and the Governor, smashing bones in three parts of the governor's body and through all of this spectacular career preserving itself in almost perfect, pristine condition upon which his and the Commission's entire case hangs. By stretching it a bit, the Commission and Manchester base their case upon this bullet having lost no more than 2.6 grains. So, if it lost, in addition to the already disqualifying more-than-three grains that Dr. Shaw observed in Connally's wrist, and in addition to the fragment imbedded in the Governor's left thigh,

any additional metal in his chest, Manchester can as readily be excused for making no reference to it as the Report in also not mentioning it and the staff in not examining Dr. Shires before the members of the Commission. And it is just as proper for Manchester to ignore Dr. Shaw, from whom he does not claim to have any statement, published or unpublished, as it is to ignore Dr. Shires, from whom, he tells us, he has one that he did not deem worthy of use.

The historian is consistent as his integrity is resplendent. Of the others in his "statements" he does refer to six, two of the administrative assistants and four of the nurses.

He does not confuse history with what would undoubtedly befuddle his "entire" accounting of it, with the invocation of the doctors most occupied in the futile effort to save the President's life. Those willing to risk a non-Manchesterian representation of what those doctors really swore to will find it in the last two chapters of WHITEWASH, in some detail. Those discomfited by Manchester's omission of what petty men with less of his special brand of "integrity" might consider essential evidence in the "entire" story of the assassination may perhaps take comfort from his inclusion in it of President William Howard Taft (twice), Thucydides (on two consecutive pages), and Walt Whitman.

For those of different taste, although it is not in the index, there is always "Camelot", Alan J. Lerner and Frederick Loewe (29); "The Hollow Men" and T. S. Eliot (40-1); "To An Athlete Dying Young" and A. E. Housman (400-1); and most of five lines "from a poem composed by the Irish poet D. L. Kelleher for

the christening of Dr. Thomas Kierans' son" (374).

Yet Manchester's rendering of this small part of the assassination story does not leave without questions those less than addicted to Housman, Kelleher and Camelot. Had he mined the medical aspect just a bit, he would have noted the absence among the "Price" exhibits of any statement by Darrell C. Tomlinson, senior hospital engineer. But the "Price" exhibits, supposedly, include statements by all who had anything to do with caring for the President and Governor or in any other way with the assassination. It is Tomlinson who "found" that bullet, 399, so essential to the Commission and to Manchester. Tomlinson turned it over to O. P. Wright, hospital security man, who was not a witness before the Commission in any of the exotic forms it considered that of "witness". It is Tomlinson who said he could not sleep if he testified that the bullet came from Governor Connally's stretcher. In translation, this was presented to the Commission members as proof that the staff had established the Governor's stretcher as the source of the bullet. Especially because he lists no "unpublished" statement from Tomlinson could it have been worthwhile if Manchester had interviewed him. Instead, he has no mention of either Tomlinson or Wright.

Had he dug here just a little, he would have found that the "Price" exhibits do include statements from three of the orderlies (Nos. 25-7) but not R. J. Jimison who helped undress the Governor and removed the stretcher from the operating room and probably placed it on the elevator over which Tomlinson later took control.

On the other hand, Manchester does itemize "unpublished" statements from Phyllis Bartlett and Anne Ferguson, switchboard operators, and from these essential contributions to the "entire" history he succinctly records that each did, in fact, answer the telephone (162,178). That these are not among the personnel from whom Price obtained statements and that Manchester considered it vital to interview personally to learn that they did answer the phone, as they were paid to do, while not deeming the words of the physicians or those who "found" and forwarded the bullet worthy of his time, can without doubt be explained by special concepts of history and evidence that I am not intellectually able to comprehend.

There are other "unpublished" sources. "The remarks" of "the Most Rev. Philip N. Hannan" when "delivered from lectern during Mass in St. Matthew's, November 25, 1963" were broadcast to the world's largest television audience, but they are "unpublished" (671).

The floor plan of the Paine residence (672) is an "unpublished" document Manchester attributes to himself. It appears, however, as Exhibit 430 (17H158), surrounded by an ample selection of other charts and photographs of its exterior and interior and that of the nearby Randle home (Exhibits 429-50,17H157-69). A genuine hunger for detail can be sated with the visible clutter in the Paine garage, including spare tires, furniture not in use, power tools that are inaccessible, a freezer, and a miscellany of boxes and barrels in which God alone knows what was stored. The shrubbery, fencing, driveway and concrete structures, secretary

desk, kitchen (with even the baby's high-chair, stove and cabinets), and, for completeness, the trashcan along the street can readily be seen. There are similar photographs of the Randle residence, including a view of the rear of Mrs. Randle as she reenacts the difficult role of looking through her kitchen window.

Likewise does Manchester credit himself (672) with "unpublished" floor plans of the Texas School Book Depository Building. These and repetitious photographs appear throughout the hearings and the Report, which also includes a photograph of one of the very precise scale models made by the FBI (R142). Many others, too numerous to mention, are available to all qualified researchers and the press in the Commission's files.

Had Manchester applied some of that passion for completeness and that vaunted integrity to tracing a few of the mysteries of the medical evidence instead of collecting and itemizing published "unpublished" documents, what might we ~~not~~ not know? For example, Dr. Kemp Clark, Director of Service of Neurological Surgery, sent Presidential Physician George G. Burkley (another unpublished source) a single letter on November 23. It appears in two different places, as Price Exhibit No. 2 (there is no Price Exhibit No. 1), which Manchester, with his special connections and powers, might well have inquired into) and as part of Exhibit 392. In the latter form it is also printed in the Report (R516-8). These are, presumably, photographic copies of the same letter. However, as Price Exhibit No. 2 (21H150-3), it takes up four pages, the first of which is not in Exhibit 392. As Exhibit 392, it has a first sheet the top and bottom of which have been cut off and

bears neither salutation nor signature, contains language on this page not there included in the Price exhibit, and was seemingly typed on a different typewriter. The Report version does not list the data from which the information was collected or the other places where permanent copies were filed. The retyped last page appears in the Report version as the first, without acknowledgment that the time of the President's arrival at the hospital was altered on the original from 12:43 p.m. to 12:38 p.m.

Manchester also credits himself with the chart, "PRESIDENTIAL MOTORCADE ROUTE IN DALLAS, November 22, 1963", acknowledging the assistance in its preparation of Secret Service Agent Forrest Sorrels (672). It is on unnumbered page 678. Here, for completeness, he also has an enlarged inset that complicates his accounting. He gives the names and draws in perhaps a dozen streets having nothing, really, to do with the assassination, but in representing the Texas School Book Depository Building he shows only part of it. In this he is consistent with the Commission, the FBI and the Secret Service, all of whom felt compelled to eliminate the large shed-like structure attached on its western side, a rather large part of it, or to represent but its south and east sides incompletely and with lines that go nowhere and connect with nothing.

He could have overcome a deficiency in the Report, which in 900 pages gives no chart of the route. However, had the Report done so, it perhaps might have had to acknowledge that the morning paper also printed the motorcade route the day of the assassination and showed that it was not planned to go under that sixth-floor

window, an essential part of the Manchester-Commission reconstruction of the crime, and that it was planned to make an entirely possible but illegal right turn into the Stemmons Freeway. This map appears in WHITEWASH: THE REPORT ON THE WARREN REPORT on page 23. In his page 678 version, the reality is apparent, that this turn was perfectly feasible. Dallas cabdrivers do make it. The Commission said it was not considered because it was illegal, an entirely new conception of Presidential motorcades.

Manchester's passion for thoroughness is reflected in a detail chart of the assassination area on what is page 679 but also bears no number. Here the divider in the roadway is extended considerably westward to make the turn seem impossible. Here also the perhaps third of the missing area of the Texas School Book Depository Building is resty^oed to it. But with all the available space, there is no representation of the location of the Presidential car at the various crucial times, readily available in the version to which he subscribes in the Commission's printed materials or in numerous file pictures. The locations of such things as the "grassy knoll" and the parking lot, important to other accountings of the assassination and the pretended refutations, likewise are missing. The outline of the grassy knoll, which is delineated by a prominent stockade-type fence, is missing. The positions from which various witnesses observed the events are not marked. The emplacement of the photographers and their cameras is not indicated. It is unders~~a~~standable that Manchester would pay no heed to Phillip Willis, whose existence and whose pictures he ignores in his book, even though Willis's pictures are in evidence

and are part of the most vital evidence prepared by the FBI, such as Shaneyfelt Exhibit 25 (my own partiality to which is shown by its inclusion in both WHITEWASH and WHITEWASH II). It is not incomprehensible that he would ignore the picture and position of Associated Press Photographer James W. Altgens (whom he could have called "Ike" because others do), but he makes no reference to this most important of the individual pictures and the one most used by the press and abused by the Commission, as its treatment in both my books shows. Not that Manchester entirely ignores Altgens. On page 197 he employs the accepted technique of the novelist to flash away from the scene of the crime into the lobby of the United States Senate:

At the Republican end of the Senate lobby the UPI ticker, ignored, had clattered out its lengthening page of historic bulletins. The AP machine stirred and clanged. In the torpor induced by the federal library debate it, too, would have been overlooked had not Senator Wayne Morse's hunger for news been insatiable. Phillis Rock of his office was maintaining a vigil near the AP teletype. At 1:41 she checked it and cried out. Richard Riedel tossed down his newspaper, came over, and read:

....AP Photographer James W. Altgens said he saw blood on ~~the~~ the President's head.
Altgens said he heard two shots but thought someone was shooting fireworks...

Had Manchester been at all interested in Altgens, who was very much on the President's left, he might have been led to wonder how Altgens could have seen the blood on the right side of the President's head, where alone his head was exploded in the version that is both Manchester's and the Commission's. But we can concede his downgrading the positioning of Altgens with that of everyone else on his special chart of the area because he ignores them all. He does not even illustrate where he and the Commission allege

Oswald was. So, none of the Commission's or other aerial photographs or charts would do. Not for the totality or integrity of Manchester's work.

But how could he ignore his pal Abraham Zapruder, "Abe" to him alone, whom he interviewed September 21, 1964 (~~199~~), alphabetically the last of his "unpublished" sources, of whom he says (675):

Zapruder, Abraham. 18.24-second color motion picture sequence (334 frames) taken in Dealey Plaza, 12:30 CST November 22, 1963, showing the Presidential car at the moment of the assassination. Observed by the author June 29, June 30, August 5, and October 9, 1964.

Positioning Zapruder would not have revealed his gross error in describing the film, especially in saying it had 334 frames. It had many more. The Commission published (despite his "unpublished" listing) all but four of the frames beginning with 171 and ending with 334 without going to the end of the film. Perhaps, having decided against mining, Manchester opted four counting. Had he multiplied the time he says the film runs by the speed at which the FBI said Zapruder exposed the film, 18.3 frames per second, he got 333.802 frames. No one can fault him for converting this into the whole number, 334. The problem is his old one and our continuing one, the substitution of Manchester for reality. His arithmetic is flawless; his fact wrong.

Elsewhere Manchester makes much of the number of times he viewed and studied ~~the~~ this film (learning remarkably little in his study), as though he alone had studied it and suffered ~~with~~ with the viewing, an unforgettable experience. It is important to history to record that the anguished Manchester suffered to study the

film on four different occasions (fewer than I have). But his rendering of history, with a full-page chart to mark as he would, does not require the recording of where Zapruder stood when he took the most important evidence of the entire assassination, or the location of the sign over which he took his picture, inaccurately represented by Manchester as for a time hiding the entire Presidential car from the lens (157), or the fact that this sign had been replaced by another planted in a different position and at a different angle and elevation before the Commission had an extensive reconstruction made for it by the FBI. How could Manchester not ^{mark} ~~mark~~ for posterity the exact point from which those pictures over which he wept for so many well-advertised, painful showings were taken? He alone knows, for he did not. So it is less than earth-shaking that he also fails to record that once this sign was moved and replaced by another, set in a different place, at a different angle and a different height, no faithful reenactment of the crime was possible. If he is aware of it, that is, for he did not soil his mind with mining the Commission's evidence. Is it not enough that he wept? Let us not demand too much of his thoroughness and his integrity. Let us accept his tears as a substitute for, in sooth, it is more than the Commission offers us.

Before passing to Manchester's acknowledgment of published sources in his bibliography, let us record briefly that he refers to two works by Roberta S. Sigel, of Wayne State University, Detroit, as unpublished, and to writings by Thomas J. Banta, Bradley J. Greenberg, Fred I. Greenstein, Paul B. Sheatsley, and Jacob J.

Feldman, as published in article form only. These experts are published in a book he almost but not quite credits in citing as the source of the Greenstein work "The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public School: Social Communication in Crisis", edited by Benjamin S. Greenburg and Edwin B. Parker, Stanford University Press: 1965". With the removal of the word "school" this is not an article but a book, edited by those men and published by that University in that year. It is not listed in Manchester's book bibliography.

President Kennedy's death certificate, executed by Justice of the Peace Theron Ward, is correctly listed as unpublished. It is in the Commissioner's files (number 81.1), from which I readily obtained a copy. Had Manchester sought to explain this death certificate - if he could - he might have eliminated the confusion that may confront those future historians who depend upon his definitive work. According to this official document, the inquest was held twelve days before the assassination. It says, "Witness my hand officially, this the 10th day of November 1963" over Ward's signature as "Justice of the Peace, Precinct No. 2". Here death is attributed to "multiple gunshot wounds of the head and neck", not quite the same as the language of the official autopsy in Bethesda, which attributed death to a single shot to the back of the head. The second page bears Ward's equally official certification that his "findings" were arrived at one December 6. ~~Here~~ he identifies himself as "Justice of the Peace, Precinct No. 3". On December 6 he certified that the President was "shot by unknown assassin" - not by Oswald - and locates two wounds: "(1)

Near the center of the body and just above the right shoulder. (2) One inch to the right center of the back of the head." And on the last page, under "By Whom Information Was Given", Ward says, "Dr. Malcolm Perry, M.D., Parkland Memorial Hospital", the same Dr. Perry who swore to the Warren Commission that he had not examined the back of the President's body at all, hence had no knowledge of the wounds there, another vital part of the Commission's pretense that the doctors in Dallas, the only ones ever to see the wound in the front of the President's neck, did not declare it a wound of entrance.

Not diminishing the probable confounding of those future historians depending upon Manchester for their real dope is the covering letter with which Inspector Thomas J. Kelley (interviewed by Manchester October 9, 1964) on December 11, apparently without haste, transmitted the certificate of death to Washington. Kelley identifies Ward as "Justice of the Peace, 305 N. 5th Street, Garland, Texas". Manchester gives December 11 as the date on which the death certificate was "received by local registrar", presumably in Dallas, not Garland, seeming to require five days in delivery. Might one from this ~~ponder~~ponder what happens to the certificates of death of those of lesser station than the President of the United States?

All of this may be normal in Texas, if it seems confusing, But Manchester will confute historians even more. It is not that he ignores Judge Ward; he belabors him lustily, as befits his impartial role as neutral recorder of fact and history. The indexer plunged into the spirit of the affair and used the judge to

swell the statistics. After his name (709) appears, "300, 301-2, 303, 304, 305". This is really a single entry, for Ward is center on Manchester's stage from page 300 through page 305. On all but the last page he is assaulted and insulted for daring to uphold the requirement of the law he was sworn to uphold. (On the last page he is assailed because he is there.) This is the fiasco of the forced removal of the President's body from the only legal jurisdiction, for there was then no federal law against murdering presidents. Only mailmen.

Once the President's body had been bullied out of the hospital, the judge, says Manchester, "departed to complete a batch of official forms ... docketed the inquest he had never held as No. 210 ... Kemp Clark's death certificate turned out to be inadequate under state statutes, so Ward signed another. Accuracy was not a forte of official Dallas that afternoon."

Blissfully unaware that the house of his writing is glass, Manchester continues to cite errors, such as in the President's age and his address, given as "600" rather than "1600 Pennsylvania Avenue" (Manchester should hold out his own wrist, for there are, in effect, two Pennsylvania Avenues in Washington, one in the Southeast section and the other in the Northwest, where the White House is); "The Dallas Police Department completed a homicide report later in the day and it, too, was imprecise (Manchester, as we have by now seen, is a master of imprecision and readily detects it - in others - sometimes), stating that headquarters had received word of the shooting at 5:10 p.m. With that the local rites were over. Ceremonial homage had been paid to the letter

of the law" (305).

Good, decent, generous Manchester. He was kind to the Dallas police. They made a number of other errors. This homicide report is part of the same file and, although the Commission, like Manchester, deemed it unworthy of publication, I do intend to print it. Unlike Manchester, I think it is not less important in the recording of the events in the President's murder than the preserving for posterity of the opinion of his sister, Eunice Shriver, that black dresses tended to make her look slimmer during pregnancy. Had Manchester read this report more and women's styles less, he would have noted that it also specifies the time of death at 1 p.m., before the 5:10 p.m. typing. Where the police really goofed is in the box right next to the one Manchester quoted. Under "Date Reported" the typist inserted "11/23/63", the coming day!

There is in this same file the "General Offense Report" on the Connally shooting, also said to have been executed the following day, not at 5:10 but at 7:30 p.m. Of more interest to me, if not to Manchester, who declined this additional crack at the police - if he knew about it - is the statement that the Governor's thigh wound was caused by a fragment of the bullet that caused his other injuries. If correct, and it is in accord with the ignored scientific opinion of the doctors who treated the Governor, it is the end of the "single-bullet theory" and Manchester's and the Commission's single-assassin-no-conspiracy theory. This report, after stating that the bullet wounded the Governor in the chest and wrist, says that "a fragment continued, entering the interior

portion of the left thigh, causing a flesh wound."

Of course, with all that integrity just bubbling out of him and into the headlines every time he beats his breast, Manchester would not consciously suppress this evidence simply because it disagrees with him. It is probable that he was entirely unaware of it, as he was of most, so we can return to the President's death certificate and Manchester's unpublished source, Judge Ward. We know it is the same Judge Ward and the same death of the same President, but it is still a different certificate, not the first and not the second one prepared the day of the assassination, before the police homicide report, but a third one, not mentioned by Manchester. But it is "unpublished" and it is the file copy.

Is it any wonder he prefers Eunice Shriver's taste in colors and the rose garden and kitchen details in fashioning his report on the real inside of the assassination, the entire story?

Yet in fairness, we cannot leave Judge Ward without proper acknowledgment of the debt we and those who follow will forever owe Manchester for his perspicacity in detecting and his diligence and incorruptible integrity in reporting that the judge sped from Garland the "fourteen miles" to Dallas "in twenty minutes", whereupon he "added his tan Buick coupe" to what Manchester, with commendable reserve and understatement, describes as "the tangled junkyard" at Parkland Hospital (300).

How essential to our complete understanding of the assassination is the uncontested certainty that the judge drove a Buick and that it was a coupe - and tan!

Need anything else concern us?

Another of the "articles" upon which Manchester drew is additional endorsement of his pledged word that he did not "mine" the Commission's Report and hearings. It is the "'Wanted For Treason' unsigned dodger attacking President Kennedy, distributed in Dallas November 21, 1963" (677). This was published by the Commission which also, in its euphemism, conducted an "investigation" of it.

Three articles by Ronnie Dugger, editor of The Texas Observer, are among Manchester's sources (676). Like the Commission, he does not include Dugger's charge that he had been "officially" informed that Oswald was "an FBI employee". Possibly this is retaliation against Dugger's reference to him as "Harland" Manchester. Dugger was not a Commission witness (R487). He was not a Manchester interviewee (662).

As the telling of just how great Manchester's "integrity" is becomes repetitious and less of an exultation, I end my comment on his sources and his selective use of them by alluding to his acknowledged indebtedness (677) to an article in the December 1963 Times Talk by Tom Wicker, NEW York Times Washington Bureau Chief, whose assassination-day reporting from Dallas was brilliant.

In one of his very few footnotes, most of which ~~xxx~~ are super-erudition, afterthoughts, insults, trivialities or arguments, and not a single one of which is a citation of his famous materials, what "historians" want, Manchester says (180), "An inaccurate story reported that they washed out the back seat

with a bucket of water. Actually, this was contemplated. Nurse's aide Shirley Randall was asked whether she would 'come and wash the blood out of the car.' Miss Randall agreed but in the excitement she forgot." Shirley Randall was not the only one asked to wash the car or bring water, but discovery of the others required "mining" the Commission's evidence, which is against Manchester's stalwart principles. However, he did use Wicker. It is therefore unusual, if that is the right word, that he did not quote Wicker's report that on entering the hospital through the ambulance bay he saw a bucket of bloody water near the Presidential car. Wicker's article was printed in the New York Times book, The Working Press. His exact words, from the bottom of page 26 and the top of 27, are, "There at its emergency entrance, stood the President's car, the top up, a bucket of bloody water beside it." Manchester did read Wicker's article. It is one of his "sources". These words are in it.

Here we have Manchester's "integrity" in its most perfect resplendence, his unquenchable quest for the total truth. Only old-fashioned nit-pickers who do not really understand integrity and totality of truth, Manchester-style, will niggle about the kind of evidence that a half-day later could be searched from that car.

So the paucity of footnotes is understandable. The absence of sources on what Manchester quotes or alludes to is also comprehensible. Footnotes have a way of being checked, especially by contemporaneous doubters, and much of this dedication to totality and utmost accuracy of information in the definitive, basic source

work on the assassination, now and in history, is Manchester-made. The "facts" do not exist, the words were not uttered, and in at least one ^{of} case the person referred to four times (150-154, 155,159) never lived.

Manchester can take little comfort from his appendix. It is too much like the rest of the book that is designed for sales, yokel appeal and sensation, for which it is but additional padding and ostentation. It is consistently and repetitively inaccurate. It is literary flatulence. For example, Appendix IV (655-3) was already printed on the inside covers and the chart, "ROUTE OF THE STATE FUNERAL" (unnumbered 684-5), on the back. It is a fitting monument to the author's contempt for reality if reality competes with his fancy or his certain, superior knowledge of how it could have been better or more aromatic; to his disinterest in truth if it is less to his taste than what his uninhibited imagination could and did fashion; to his incredible ego and immodesty and utterly insane insistence that what he wants to have been the case was the case; to his fairy-tale concept of the assassination and what was important in it - meaning everything else in preference to the details of the murder - meaning social trivialities and the sludge and slush of jet-set thinking - meaning what he prefers to fact in the usual event fact does not fit the scheme of his romance called history - meaning, really, a well-hippodromed rewriting of that history.

In all of these seamy things and more, his appendix is his own egocentrist's mad epitaph to his insane self-casting, his consummate greed and demand for attention and accreditation, which no rational man knowing the truth can grant. It is his king-

complexed assault on everything and everyone else and insistence that what did happen did not because he did not script it that way and he knows best what it should have been.

In seeming rationality, he irrationally concludes his preface to his "sources" - what a defamation of the word! - that began with his boast that he "explored carefully but seldom mined" the Commission's evidence of which he is so contemptuous (659), with these words (660):

Of course, no one can ever root out the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. That is a game lawyers play. There is something touching about their naive assumption that one gets the full story by putting a man under oath. In practice you get very little of it. Anxious not to perjure himself, the witness volunteers as little as possible. The President's Commission on the Assassination was dominated by attorneys. The record shows it. Their depositions of minor witnesses were remarkably brief. The author, with his tape recorder or shorthand notebook, gets a great deal more chaff; but in the long run he harvests more wheat, too.

Witnesses "anxious not to perjure" when the record is perjurious, with witnesses even called perjurers by the lawyers? "The witness volunteers as little as possible"? Did he read the testimony of Zapruder, Orest Pena and many others who tried to volunteer what they thought important and were cut off by the lawyers, or the New Orleans grand jury testimony of Lawyer-Witness Dean Adams Andrews, Jr., who swore, as an experienced lawyer and a public prosecutor, that the right questions had never been asked of him? "Depositions of minor witnesses were remarkably brief" when aging and ill Mary Bledsoe (6H400-28), recovering from a stroke, beginning at 9:30 a.m. April 2, 1964, was kept in marathon testimony ~~over~~ ^{many} over her objections for 28 long printed pages, for a total

of 1,700 lines, wearing out two Commission lawyers, Joseph Ball and Albert Jenner, who worked in shuttle with her own, Miss Melody June Douthitt, in a futility of impatient persuasion because the old lady could not honestly swear to the triviality they tried to hornswoggle out of her? The "depositions of the minor witnesses were remarkably brief" when poor Mrs. Bledsoe was questioned four times as long as Zapruder, who had the most essential evidence to offer and who was not called until July 22, three and a half months after she was, a month after the Commission had planned to finish its work? When Mrs. Bledsoe was examined at greater length than were, collectively, all the few of the photographic witnesses who were called? When Marina Oswald, who was a witness to nothing, an incompetent witness who would have been barred by any court in Texas, took up about ten percent of all the time of all the testimony before members of the Commission, and when others, like those who had pictures unseen by the Commission or who had information that Oswald had government connections, were not called at all?

We ~~xx~~ see Manchester's understanding of major and minor in witnesses. Those he conceives as important are not the doctors whom he did not interview and did not quote; not the uncalled photographers whom he also did not interview; not those with the essential pictures unseen, which he also did not see; nor those with the essential pictures that are in evidence and who were belatedly called for brief and inadequate appearances that served only to avoid the charge that they had not been called (whom he neither interviewed nor quoted, like Willis); not Mary Moorman,

whose picture of the exploding Presidential head is one of the more widely printed ones and who was not called - by the Commission or by Manchester - and one of her pictures was returned unused and unkept for the record; not those who, like Mrs. Carolyn Walthers, saw someone other than Oswald in the window (whom Manchester, also, neither interviewed nor ~~mentioned~~^{quoted}; Not those who would have said Oswald had government connections. These are not the "major" witnesses. Those he regards as "witnesses" to the assassination, those with the word he needs for the "full truth" to tell us and to record for posterity the real story of the assassination, are the nurse of the ill Joseph Kennedy and his attendant niece, the chief chef at the Hotel Texas, a Houston caterer, the friend with the eye on the President's rose gardens and an absolutely incredible mishmash of secretaries and society-page figures, the frill and froth of the unreality in which ~~he~~ lives and the pitch of the planned appeal of his book.

We can, perhaps, be grateful that, among his 300 personal interviews, there are so very few with even the slightest relationship to the actual events of the assassination, for that many more have escaped his brain-washing. What good did it do for him to interview Billy Nolan Lovelady (665) when he does not mention him in the book? Why should he have dared interview him and make of him a pornographic statistic in ~~his~~ literary *Beggars' Gotterdammerung* when he knew so little of what he was working with? Yet the Lovelady interview could have been of incalculable importance had Manchester made but a single demand: "Show me the shirt you wore November 22, 1963."

Lovelady told the government he, not Oswald, is the man in the Texas School Book Depository doorway, preserved in Altgens's always corrupted picture, all of which is at no point in the evidence. The FBI told the Commission it had asked this question of Lovelady and he showed them a "red and white striped shirt". In WHITEWASH II I print this report and the FBI picture of Lovelady in that shirt which proves beyond question that he could not have been the man in the doorway had he been wearing the red and white stripes that are so prominent for that man is wearing a darkish, unstriped shirt with a fleck through it, an exact description of the shirt in which Oswald was arrested. In itself, this picture comes close to proving that Oswald was, in fact, standing in the doorway halfway through the assassination observing it while officially and by Manchester said to have been simultaneously committing it from six floors above.

Manchester had access to this and other related FBI reports immediately, more than two years before I could begin to search for them. He did not have to ransack 300 cubic feet of disorganized files to find and stitch together these separated pieces, for he was there when the "evidence" was adduced. He was present, day by day, the self-advertised "privileged observer". His own words in Look of April 4, 1967, are, "I had immediate access to all testimony, documents, exhibits and depositions." His performance is as gratifying as the suit of an impotent lover.

"The whole truth" is "a game that lawyers play", not the dedication and challenge of American law and justice, the quest of the responsible author in pursuit of his personal integrity

and that of his craft. That it escaped Manchester is not surprising, for he did not seek it. His quest was for the salable chaff he could advertise and sell as wheat. That he found; this he did. Those sheaves are not even the threshed, dried straws of no nourishment from which the grain has been separated. They are the bound false oats called cheat.

It is as though he dedicated himself to proving that "no one can ever root out the truth".

His appendix proves he did not try and cannot recognize it.